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I 
Abstract 
Islamic finance has gained important momentum in the 1990s, and is now 
r~cognised by financial institutions and regulators all over the world. The development 
of Islamic finance in the Sudan has been through the Islamisation of economic and 
financial sectors along with the political shift towards Islam. It is, therefore, important 
to asses the progress and performance of Islamic financial instruments in a political 
setting such as in the Sudan. 
The study, therefore, covers, explores and evaluates the development of Islamic 
banking in the Sudan for the period 1990-2005 mainly, by focusing on five main areas: 
first, it investigates whether the PLS contracts are dominating the Islamic banking 
system in Sudan. Second, the study evaluates musharakah characteristics and its 
performance perceptions. Also, the study analyses how staff characteristics, bank 
characteristics and overall environment affect the preferences and performance of 
musharakah finance. Third, it investigates the factors influencing decision making in 
Islamic banks as regard to musharakah fmance. Fourth, it investigates the implications 
of using musharakah mode of finance. In this regard, this study examines the perception 
of the implications of using the musharakah mode of finance by the Sudanese Islamic 
banks and provides an empirical assessment of these perceptions about musharakah 
characteristics, performance, preference and obstacles. This study also provides an 
empirical investigation of how central bank policies have affected musharakah finance 
in Sudan. Fifth, it investigates musharakah management to recognise the obstacles and 
factors influencing decision making and aims to suggest possible remedies. In fulfilling 
its aim and objectives, this study utilised both primary and secondary data from Sudan. 
This study finds that banking staff prefer musharakah over other types of 
Islamic modes of finance. However, in reality the Sudanese banks prefer murabahah 
over other types of Islamic modes of finance with a gradual shift towards musharakah. It 
is therefore argued that government pressure has been the major factor behind this shift 
towards more musharakah finance. The study also shows that significantly, the 
dominant type of musharakah is a short term one which lasts for 3 to 6 months. The 
results indicate the correlation between musharakah risk and the average age of 
musharakah. Hence, the major dilemmas facing the present Sudanese Islamic banks 
nowadays are the fact that these banks have to involve in long term finance according to 
its theory. 
The non-parametric test confirms that the perception about the performance for 
musharakah is high in both profitability and risk. However, the comparative financial 
performance of the Islamic financial methods found no difference in both risk and 
profitability. The credit policy and size of banks was found to be the most important 
factor influencing the distribution of bank funds among different types of fmance. Lack 
of proper feasibility studies was found to be the main cause of non-performing 
musharakah finance. The lack of PLS modes of finance performance, because of 
managerial efficiency, can be considerable and may threaten the existence of Islamic 
banking, which is already facing strong competition. Significantly, lack of specialized 
departments were found to be the main cause of the weakness in the following up. The 
study finds that fmancial capability is the most important factor determining the 
capability of the entrepreneurs. Satisfaction with performance measurement systems was 
not high and not acceptable. Training provided to the employees is not enough and needs 
strengthening. 
There is a need for national policies specially designed and oriented towards 
SMEs as well as a policy to ending the current BOS financing policies hindering 
musharakah an(fBOS -oiscriminatory regulations so as to encourage PLS finance. 
Based on the results, this study made a number of recommendations to manage 
and measure musharakah risk. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 An Overview of the Research Background 
1.1.1 Islamic Banking and Finance 
Islamic banking is the fastest growing sector in the banking system; its market 
share of assets has risen from 2% in the late 1970s to 15% up to the mid-1990s. 
Moreover, capital, assets and deposits have grown by a rate between 15-20% 
during the last three decades (Ibrahim, 2006). If this trend continues, it is 
anticipated that Islamic banks would share between 40-50% of the Islamic 
world's savings within the next twenty years. Hence, no doubt, the phenomenon 
of Islamic banking represents a fascinating development in the history of 
international finance, as Islamic banks have not only managed to survive and 
grow under the pressures oftoday's global market, but at the same time, they are 
being governed by religious principles. Nevertheless, the question as to whether 
Islamic banking will make the much expected contribution to investment and 
growth, poses a challenge for bankers, researchers, and policymakers alike. 
Islamic banking, however, still remains mysterious to many people, including 
academics. Therefore, countless articles and books on Islamic banking and 
finance describe the nomenclature and ideologies behind it. Many researchers 
Such as Kahane (1977), Mirakhor (1986) Iqbal et al. (1998), Bashir (1999), 
Samad (1999), Dar and Presley (2000) and Al-Jarhi (2003) described the theory 
and an overall performance and challenge to some experience in some countries 
and cross-country as well. Nevertheless, to date there has been limited empirical 
research analyzing the techniques in detail. A lack of data has been a major 
challenge and reason behind this, especially in Sudan where the experience of 
Islamic banking started in the late seventies of the previous century. 
1 
It is well known from the literature on Islamic economics that the raising and 
mobilising of financial resources in an Islamic economy must be guided by 
interest-free instruments. Accordingly, banks may perform all their functions 
provided that they avoid the payment and receipt of interest. This practice 
already exists and is being constantly refined and modified to meet the rapidly 
changing needs of ever more sophisticated businesses. 
There are seven basic Islamic financing contracts. The underlying concepts for 
each method are simple and can be compared to existing western financial 
instruments. However, actual financing deals can become very complicated, as 
some banks modify the structure to suit the requirements of specific investors. 
These deals may contain elements of more than one of the basic Islamic 
contracts. These methods affect both assets and liabilities on a bank's balance 
sheet and can be divided into two groups: the ones that are based on the PLS 
principal (core modes) and the ones that are not (marginal) 1. 
Almost all theoretical models of Islamic banking are based on Profit and Loss 
Sharing (PLS) contracts, whether mudarabah or musharakah or both2. By such 
financial instruments, both the supplier of the capital and the entrepreneur share 
in the risks. Consequently, both prosper when returns are favourable and suffer 
1 These seven contracts are mudarabah, musharakah as PLS Methods. Murabahah (cost plus 
financing), ijarah (leasing) & Ijarah wa- 'iqtina (fmanciallease), qard-hasan (beneficence loans), 
bai muajjal (deferred payment sale) and sa/am (purchase with deferred delivery) as Non PLS 
Methods. Compared with non PLS mode of fmance, PLS modes are more risky, PLS can not 
systematically be made dependent on collateral or other guarantees, administration ofPLS modes 
is more complex compared with non PLS, these activities include the determination of profit and 
loss sharing ratios on investment projects in various sectors of the economy, and the ongoing 
auditing of financed projects to ensure that Islamic banks' share are fairly calculated. Therefore, 
Islamic banks, in order to safe guard funds and realize profits, would need to rely on a set of 
appropriate policies and adequate infrastructure for portfolio diversification, monitoring and 
control in PLS modes than non-PLS modes. 
2 Mudarabah is a trust based financing agreement whereby an investor (Islamic bank) entrusts 
capital to an agent (mudarib) for a project. Profits are based on a pre-arranged and agreed ratio. A 
mudarabah agreement is a kin to western style limited partnership, with one party contributing 
capital while the other runs the business, and profit is distributed based on negotiated percentage 
of ownership. In case of loss the bank earns no return or negative return on its investment and the 
agent receives no compensation for his/ her effort ZAHER, T. S. & HASSAN, M. K. (2001) A 
comparativ_t< literaturf:_ s_urvey of Islamic fmance and banking. Financial Market, Institution and 
Instruments, Vol. 10,.155 - 199~ Musharakah or shirkah canbe-defmed as ·a form of partnership 
where two or more persons combine either their capital or labour together, to share the profits, 
enjoying similar rights and liabilities SAEED, A. (1999) Islamic Banking and Interest: A study of 
Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary Interpretation, New York, Brill Academic Publishers. 
2 
together when returns are poor (Dar and Presley, 2000). This is the basis for what 
became known as "interest-free Islamic banks". In addition to PLS contracts, 
there are non-PLS contracts such as salam and murabahah3. 
Without a doubt, the aforementioned contracts are generally accepted amongst 
most Islamic scholars as long as both parties in the business adhere to the 
conditions of each contract. 
These methods of finance are considered economic choices; therefore there are a 
number of economic choices for both the Islamic bank and the customer when 
making business contracts between them (Ahmed, 2005). Then, it is possible to 
conclude that the range of contracts available to customers is widened. This is an 
example of the efficiency-enhancing characteristics of spectrum filling (Iqbal, 
2002). The assumption is made that both parties will be rational in order to 
choose a contract that will favour both the bank and the customer. A customer's 
decision to invest according to which method is used, or whether to continue to 
invest with a particular Islamic bank would mainly depend on the risk of the 
method and the projects in which their funds are invested, the returns which they 
expect to receive from those projects using this method, compared with returns 
from other similar risk class projects, and the bank's ability to achieve those 
returns (Pastor, 1999). Other factors include the time in which they can return 
the capital, and whether they have the ability, which the project demands, such as 
the managerial efficiency and so forth (Ahmed, 2005). Generally speaking, the 
profitability and risk factors are the ones that play a dominant role, as both 
parties are fundamentally geared towards maximising their profit and minimising 
their losses (Ahmed, 2006). Just as one cannot deny that the other factors 
3 Murabahah is generally defined as the sale of a commodity for the price at which the vendor 
has purchased it, with the addition of a stated profit known to both the vendor and the purchaser. 
It is a cost-plus-profit contract. Islamic financial institutions aim to make use of murabahah in 
circumstances where they will purchase raw materials, goods or equipment etc. and sell them to a 
client at cost, plus a negotiated profit margin to be paid normally by instalments. With 
murabahah, Islamic financial institutions are no longer to share profits or losses, but instead 
assume the capacity of a classic financial intermediary. Bai Salam (Purchase with Deferred 
Delivery) is a contract in which the buyer pays the seller the full negotiated price of a specific 
product which the seller promises to deliver at a specified future date. Tliis transaction is limited 
to products whose quality and quantity can be fully specified at the time the contract is made 
SALEH, N. A. (1986) Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
3 
sometimes play a greater role, he can also not negate the fact that these other 
factors, directly or indirectly, affect the profitability and risk margins. 
The existing research in Islamic banking and finance has focused primarily on 
the conceptual issues underlying interest free banking including the viability of 
Islamic banks and their ability to mobilise saving, pool risks and facilitate 
transactions (Karsten, 1982). On the other hand, few studies had focussed on the 
policy makers of a financial system without interest payments (Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1987). What is noteworthy is that empirical work on the performance 
evaluation of musharakah financed by Islamic banks is sparse. The lack of 
complete data impeded any comprehensive analysis of the experience of the last 
three decades. Whatever empirical work has been done so far has yielded 
inconclusive results (Bashir, 1999). 
Iqbal et al. (1998) distinguish two models of Islamic banks based on the structure 
of the assets. The first is the two-tier mudarabah model that replaces interest by 
profit-sharing (PS) modes on both liability and asset sides of the bank. In 
particular, in this model all assets are financed by PS modes of financing 
(mudarabah). This model of Islamic banking will also take up the role of an 
investment intermediary, rather than being a commercial bank only (Chapra, 
1985). The second model of Islamic banking is the one-tier mudarabah with 
multiple investment tools. This model evolved because Islamic banks faced 
practical and operational problems in using profit-sharing modes of financing on 
the asset side. As a result, they opted for fixed-income modes of financing. As 
mentioned earlier, fixed-income instruments include murabahah, istisna ', sa/am 
and ijarah. 
If one of the main characteristics of Islamic finance is the PLS nature of its 
financing modes, risk-sharing, as a result, is another important aspect of it. In 
line with this, the model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) shows the superiority of 
risk-sharing provided by the bank. By offering liquid deposits to savers and 
choosing an appropriate mixture of liquid and illiquid investments, banks provide 
complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk, while simultaneously 
facilitating long-run investments in high-return projects. Therefore, savers or 
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shareholders can liquidate their asset while firms' capitals are sustained and not 
jeopardized. Nevertheless, Kahane (1977) believes that capital requirement 
cannot deter the bank risk and may even intensify the problem. 
To mention a few of the differences between Islamic finance principles and 
conventional banking the researcher might say Islamic finance does not deny that 
capital, as a factor of production, deserves to be rewarded. Islamic finance, on 
the contrary, allows the owners of capital a share in a surplus which is uncertain 
(Ariff, 1988). Hence, one of the main selling points oflslamic banking, at least in 
theory, is that, unlike conventional banking, it is concerned about the viability of 
the project and the profitability of the operation but not the size of the collateral. 
Good projects which might be turned down by conventional banks for lack of 
collateral would be financed by Islamic banks on a profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
basis. It is especially in this sense that Islamic banks can play a catalytic role in 
stimulating economic development. In many developing countries, of course, 
development banks are supposed to perform this function. Islamic banks are 
expected to be more enterprising than their conventional counterparts. In 
practice, however, Islamic banks have been concentrating on short-term trade 
finance which is the least risky. 
Early Arabic literature on the Islamic banking has mostly discussed how a 
financial institution could work without interest adopting the contracts mentioned 
in Islamic fiqh like mudarabah, shirkah, etc. It did not address itself to the larger 
question of how the entire financial system of a country could be organized free 
of interest and work according to shari 'ah. It does not mention central banking 
and does not discuss the relationship between the individual Islamic banks and 
the central bank of the country. This is quite understandable in view of the 
political realities and the actual possibilities in the Arab world at that time 
(Siddiqi, 1992). 
1.1.2 Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) 
The three key features of interest-free banking practices are the absence of the 
rate of interest in bank transactions, the presence of risk in bank operations and 
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the strict adherence of bank operations to the tenets of the Shari 'ah. Among 
these, the second issue, namely, the risk-taking feature, has posed the greatest 
challenge to the interest-free banking practitioners. Indeed, using PLS modes in 
Islamic banks changes the nature of risks these institutions face. The returns on 
saving and investment deposit are state contingent. As the depositors are 
rewarded on a profit sharing method, they share the business risks of the banking 
operations of the bank. The profit and loss sharing feature of these depositors 
introduces some other risks. Furthermore, the use of Islamic modes of financing 
on the asset sides changes the nature of traditional risks. 
Hence, profit and loss sharing has recently captured the attention of academician, 
bankers and policy makers, particularly those in the Middle East. These contracts 
are characterized by risk sharing, an element that forces the contracting parties 
especially the financier to fund only sound projects. The theoretical analysis of 
both the profit sharing (mudarabah) and profit and loss sharing (musharakah) 
have received a major boost from a variety of models, including Khan (1986) 
and Haque and Mirakhor (1986) and empirical support among others for 
example, from Bashir and Darrat (1992). The bold claim of these models is that 
if the interest payment on financial capital were to be replaced by the profit 
sharing arrangement, the level of investment would be enhanced instead of 
weakened. 
Since the entrepreneur is interested in convincing the investor to provide the 
required amount of capital to activate the project, he or she has to gain the 
investor's financial support through information transfer. One way to do this is 
for the entrepreneur to show his or her own willingness to invest in the project. 
Such willingness may serve as a signal to the financial market about the project's 
quality. However, the contract should be structured in such a way that the 
entrepreneur has no incentive to cheat. 
Bashir and Darrat (1992) have proved that the possible effects of internal equity 
and profit and loss sharing ratio in the equity participation contract on the level 
of investment are negative. While the underlying theory expects the effects of 
internal equity to be positive, Haque and Mirakhor (1986) assert that an equity 
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contract is superior to debt contract because the enterprise can improve profit due 
to the absence of some limitations normally imposed by debt. They also point out 
that the level of investment will increase in an economy as a result of banking 
with equity participation. 
Weitzman (1985) has shown that equity participation can in effect increase the 
potential for profits along with the benefits of decentralized decision making. 
Their arguments, however, are predicated on the premise of absence of moral 
hazard as suggested by Khan (1986) and risk overestimation by the bank. 
Banks, however, resolve the asset substitution moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem through monitoring and feasibility studies4. Banking theory 
would indicate that banks would be relatively more exposed to adverse selection 
during economic upturns and to moral hazard during downturns (Dewenter et al., 
1998). 
Obviously, adverse selection can be avoided by careful screerung of finance 
applicants. When a bank provides equity and debt finance simultaneously, it will 
have more access to information than when only debt finance is provided. The 
researcher can, therefore, conclude that screening would be more effective and 
adverse selection less probable with universal banking. Reducing possibilities of 
moral hazard requires monitoring the firm that obtains finance. All three kinds of 
ex ante, interim and ex post monitoring must be exercised to be effective (Aoki, 
4 Adverse selection is the problem created by asymmetric information before the transaction 
occurs, For an Islamic banker it occurs when the potential applicants for financial assistance who 
are the most likely to produce an undesirable outcome are the ones who most actively seek out a 
contract, and are thus most likely to be selected. Since adverse selection makes it more likely that 
banks' offers might be made to bad credit risks, suppliers may decide not to make any or few 
offers even though there are good credit risks in the market. Moral hazard is the problem created 
by asymmetric information after the transaction occurs. Moral hazard, on the other hand, occurs 
when the bank is subject to the hazard that its partner has the incentive to engage in activities that 
are undesirable i.e., against the contract. Since moral hazard lowers the probability that the offer 
will be repaid, the banks may decide that they would rather make limited deals or no deal at all 
SADR, K. (1999) The role of musharakah financing in the agricultural bank oflran. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 14, 245 - 256. Hence, a bank can be exposed to moral hazard when the firm obtaining 
finance uses the funds for purposes other than those for which finance was advanced. This could 
lead to business failure and inability to repay on part of the debtor firm. The bank would be 
exposed to adverse selection when it fails to choose the finance applicants who are most likely to 
perform AL-JARHI, M. A. (2003) Islamic finance: an efficient & equitable option, Jeddah, The 
Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
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1994). Theoretically, equity finance provides the bank with access to information 
necessary to practice monitoring at all intervals. It also reduces the firm's 
incentives to substitute riskier for safer assets. Furthermore, when the firm faces 
problems, the bank, as an equity holder, will assist in order to protect its 
investment (Al-Jarhi, 2003). Meanwhile, debt finance would reduce the firm's 
incentives to hide its profits. 
Islamic banks would presumably be willing to bear greater risks only if they 
were compensated by high enough returns. Nevertheless, Islamic banks might 
accept investments with greater variability in the expected rate of return because 
part of the increased risk would be borne by the depositors (Karsten, 1982). 
It is easy to say that the moral hazard problem relates mainly to situations which 
are dominated by non-incorporated small scale firms. The theory has little 
relevance to the modem large-scale corporate sector which accounts for the bulk 
of investment activity. The owner of a small one man firm is able to capitalize on 
relative informational advantage by under reporting the true return of investment 
to his financier. But this can not be contemplated when the firm is a legal person, 
as it will simply mean that the company's board of directors may under report the 
true returns to the shareholders (Tag el-Din, 1991). 
Indeed opponents of the Islamic financial system argue that the introduction of a 
financial system based entirely on Islamic profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
arrangements would reduce savings and retard development due to increased 
uncertainty of the rate of return and consequently high risk surrounding 
consumption and savings decisions. This is thought to adversely influence the 
willingness to save under an Islamic financial framework (Karsten, 1982). 
Al-Swailim (2000) argues that the Islamic banks, so as to have optimal 
intermediation, have to base their finance on a bank's agency relationship (e.g. 
wakalah, mudarabah, musharakah) with both sides: savers and businessmen. In 
theory, such a model of banking achieves an optimal level of efficiency and 
profitability. The common model of existing Islamic banks (based on murabahah 
on the asset side) on the other hand, is less efficient than the proposed model. 
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Providing finance on a PLS basis requires constant vigilance by the banks over 
the utilization of funds. This can provide benefits in the form of improved 
financial control. Banks are still likely to have to increase their staffs by 
employing engineering and management experts to evaluate projects more 
thoroughly. This results in increased costs that bankers will have to balance 
against prospective increases in rates of return that could be earned by making 
more efficient use of funds (Karsten, 1982). 
Critics of Islamic banking argue that moral hazard incidences arise more often in 
equity contracts than in debt contracts. If a contract could be structured so that 
moral hazard would only occur in certain situations, then there would be a 
reduced need to monitor partner firms, and the contract would be more attractive 
than the equity contract. The debt contract has exactly these attributes, because it 
is a contractual agreement by the borrower to pay the lender fixed amounts 
periodically (Sadr, 1999). Furthermore, the critics admit that by better 
monitoring and closer supervision, they can make up for the shortage of 
information to overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Sadr, 
1999). 
The elimination of interest and its replacement by profit-loss-sharing would not 
only change the level of uncertainty but also redistribute the consequences of 
uncertainty over all parties to a business (Al-Harran, 1993). It would moreover, 
by removing the daily destabilising influence of fluctuating interest rates, bring 
about a commitment of funds for a longer period and also introduce a discipline 
in investment decisions. 
Islamic banks, thus, have a lower degree of control over the management of the 
enterprise they finance through the PLS contract. By contrast, credit risks related 
to financing through non-PLS modes are lessened by the possibility of 
collateralization, including mortgaging. The assessment of an appropriate level 
of the capital adequacy ratio for Islamic banks should be primarily based on 
systematic analysis of the underlining asset portfolio between PLS and non-PLS 
transactions (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). Although the PLS contracts perhaps 
present significant risks to Islamic banks, it also presents profitable opportunity. 
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Accordingly, the assessment and management of investment risk becomes more 
difficult in an Islamic environment than in conventional banking because of the 
following factors (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
On the other hand, the depositor's preferences for using an Islamic bank may be 
due to religious or ethical reasons, while the investors of these banks do not 
necessarily have this motive (Ismail, 2006). Nevertheless, financing under 
musharakah, the capital owner has a right to enter into the management and 
hence, have some control over the problems created by the informational 
asymmetry and moral hazards. 
Dar and Presley (2000) argued that under PLS, Islamic banks do not have any 
controlling rights, but they share financial risks with the borrowers. They called 
for reforms in banking regulations to balance the management and control rights 
between Islamic banks and managers of the companies they invest in. In this way 
shareholders are not just passive capitalists but share decision making in the 
running of the organization. Choudhury (200 1) also argued for the use of 
musharakah to realize the extensively relational perspectives of Islamic socio-
economic co-operation with extensive participation across agents, firms and 
sectors, and to transform venture capital into a more integrated financial 
instrument. He pointed out that resource mobilization in the economy-wide case 
through the extension of musharakah from limited liability and partnership to 
extended form of economy-wide and inter-sectoral participation causes linkages 
between real and financial resources. 
Some arguments, state that in the absence of Islamic ethical values functioning in 
the business community, engaging in risk return activities such as musharakah 
by the bank without adequate safeguards may lead to the bankruptcy of the banks 
(Mirakhor, 1987). This legitimate concern of the authorities translates into 
policies which approach the idea of risk return sharing, so essential to the 
adoption of Islamic banking, with highest caution, thus resulting in heavy 
reliance on weekly Islamic modes of finance, such as mark-up, which have 
minimum probability of risk. And this way leads to policy tools such as limits on 
the bank's rate of return, moral suasion, and credit rationing being used to steer 
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the banks away from risk return sharing projects through musharakah (Mirakhor, 
1987). 
In practice, two approaches have been adopted by Muslim countries for 
eliminating interest from their financial systems. Three countries, Pakistan, Iran 
and Sudan, have opted for the removal of interest from the operations of all their 
financial institutions simultaneously. In contrast with this, a number of countries, 
including some non-Muslim ones, have allowed the establishment of Islamic 
banks alongside conventional interest-based banks (Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
Sudanese Islamic banks' experience represents one of the rare occasions in the 
world in which this system has worked in practice and has been heavily 
supported by specific banking legislation. The experience is associated with 
central bank financing policies geared towards Islamisation of the entire banking 
system. Currently an effective banking system only operates in the north, where 
the financial institutions are all Shari 'ah compliant. 
Elhiraika (1998) argued that the activities of Islamic banks in Sudan are 
constrained by the macroeconomic environment in general and repressive 
monetary and credit policy in particular. He concludes that when such constraints 
are removed only then may the Islamic banking system make a meaningful 
contribution to financial and economic growth in Sudan. 
Ahmed (1998) studied the effects of religion on the design of management 
control systems of banks by comparing Islamic banks with Islamised banks 
in the era before Islamisation in Sudan to see the effects religion has on 
management control systems. It was found that religion affected organisational 
objectives, strategies, banks' structure, and investment mechanisms. According 
to Ahmed (1998), the effects of religion on management control systems are 
clearly seen in the following aspects: the establishment of Shari 'ah supervisory 
boards to audit the banking practice from a religious point of view, the 
recruitment, training and evaluation of staff according to the requirements of 
religion, and the great influence of religion on the rules and procedures 
governing investment operations. This is in addition to various control problems 
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that Islamic banks have to solve such as, finding a practical definition of "profit-
optimization", the "timely liquidation of ventures" and dealing with interest-
based banks in the correspondent banking business. 
Elhiraika (2003) studied Islamic banking instruments for financing agriculture in 
Sudan, and his empirical research indicates that Islamic financial instruments 
might offer efficient alternatives in rural and microfinance on a profit and loss 
sharing basis. In addition, Hussein (2003) estimates the operational efficiency in 
17 Sudanese banks between 1990 and 2000. His findings show that the average 
efficiency is almost stable between 1990 and 2000. However, there are wide 
efficiency differences across Sudanese banks. Despite the small size of the 
foreign banks, they are more efficient than state-owned and joint-ownership 
banks. He also examines the sources of inefficiency by estimating a second stage 
inefficiency regression. 
Hussein (2003) concluded that in order to improve efficiency, Sudanese banks 
should first increase their (low) paid-up capital ratio, but not through merger and 
acquisition activities and second should implement serious programmes for 
human capital development in order to reduce the current level of cost 
inefficiency. For him Sudanese banks have an advantage in musharakah modes 
of finance, which are not fully utilised yet. The results support the moral hazard 
hypothesis. His findings suggest a positive relationship between risk and 
inefficiency. These results suggest that Sudanese banks have an advantage in 
managing musharakah and murabahah contracts. 
In addition, Hassan (2003) believes that the amounts of musharakah in the 
Sudanese banks balance sheet reduce cost efficiency, but they do not raise profit 
efficiency, which confirms the hypothesis that these instruments are inherently 
more risky. His results show that the amount of musharakah over off-balance 
sheet items, however, impacts both cost and profit efficiency positively but the 
amount of murabahah deposits over off-balance sheet items influence only profit 
efficiency positively. Fee-based activities are the most important source of 
income for many Sudanese banks and a trade-off between musharakah and 
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murabahah finance and fee-based financial services may have an off-setting 
impact on cost efficiency (Hassan, 2003). 
Empirical evidence from 17 Islamic banks from 10 countries, including the 
Sudan, indicates that credit risk perception is highest in PLS modes in general 
and lowest in murabahah followed by ijarah and istisna ', respectively. Salam 
ranks average in terms of credit risks. In terms of operational risk (legal risk, 
understanding of contracts, management of contracts etc), murabahah and ijarah 
have the lowest risk whereas salam and istisna ' have the highest risk (Khan and 
Ahmed, 2001). 
Al-Harran (1993) identified that risk, the difficult nature of investment and long-
gestation period in receiving returns and problems of management are the major 
reasons why Sudanese Islamic banks do not undertake equity financing modes. 
Indeed, PLS modes require adequate experience in management, additional 
supervisory and monitoring roles compared with sales-based modes which are 
relatively less risky and easy to manage. Moreover, PLS modes are subject to 
erosion of investment in the case of a loss that is why ISBs are hesitant to 
undertake them at the initial phases of their operations. Instead they use mostly 
debt-based sa lam and murabahah instruments which shift most of the risk to the 
client. By contrast, Ahmed (2005) has reported that musharakah in Sudan had 
less risk compared with other modes of finance in two Sudanese banks for the 
period 1993-1999 while most of the remaining sampled banks were reported to 
have no difference between their modes performance. 
While research on musharakah mode of finance in Sudanese Islamic banks 
remained limited, this applies to other countries as well. The literature indicates 
that only a few studies available on the performance of musharakah in other 
countries. For example, 
Dooren (1990) studied the partnership finance for the rural credit in Sudan before 
the Islamisation period, and he believes that the experience is still-limited but 
worth the monitoring and can be developed to be applied elsewhere. In 
supporting this, Abdalla (1997) reported that the experience ofthe SIB still needs 
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fine tuning with a respect to the minimizing of transactions, recruiting special 
personnel, and applying innovative collaterals. Ahmed (2003) has studied the 
financial performance of the Islamic finance methods in nine Sudanese banks 
between 1993 and 1999. His findings support the theory of high risk of the PLS 
in two banks only. 
El-Bhasri and Adam (1997) examined the experience of the Sudanese Islamic 
Bank, with a view to assessing the impact of its partnership financing on 
enterprise development. Their findings show that the bank was able to reach new 
entrepreneurs who have not gained access to this unconventional finance scheme. 
Abdalla (1997), on the other hand, developed an institutional understanding and 
noted that the potential of SIB experience in musharakah financing of SMEs can 
be expanded to other banks. In the same direction Ibrahim (1999) reported that 
the potentiality of PLS musharakah finance to work in conventional western 
banks. 
Osman (1997) found musharakah finance experience in Sudan is more flexible in 
financing working capital compared with murabahah and mudarabah. However, 
he suggested a mixed contract of musharakah and ijarah as a way of overcoming 
the asset evaluation constraint. Ahmed (2005), on the other hand, investigated the 
risk and profitability for the Islamic finance modes with connections to the 
human resources side of the development in Islamic banking and therefore 
reached a conclusion that the lack of knowledgeable bankers capable of 
selecting, evaluating and managing profitable projects is a significant cause for 
the paucity of PLS projects. The paper exposes the key issues involved in bad 
debt and general risk for the Islamic finance methods, and demonstrates the need 
for bankers trained in feasibility studies skills to make up for the lack of 
efficiency in managing, controlling and following up musharakah projects. 
Nasr (2005) studied the pecking order of Islamic finance methods in Egypt with 
special reference of musharakah. Nasr (2005) argues that if the pecking order 
hypothesis holds, then, owners should be reluctant to use the musharakah mode 
of finance mainly due to the absence of a control factor from the demand side 
and high risk embedded in the instrument from the supply side. According to 
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Nasr (2005) small business owners prefer to be financed using murabahah then 
ijarah wa iqtinaa, followed by mudarabah and lastly musharakah. 
Ahmed (2007) evaluated the performance of Islamic entrepreneurship projects 
financed through the banking system in Sudan. His initial results indicate that the 
need of long term SMEs finance which is the major dilemmas facing the present 
Sudanese Islamic banks nowadays. His recommendations show the need of a fair 
and proper measurement should be taken to estimate the management role on the 
profit and this should be reflected on the management share of profit denoted to 
the entrepreneur. 
Hamdan (1997) studied musharakah financing for small enterprise under the 
Jordan Islamic Bank's lending programme. He concluded that it is premature to 
judge the financial and managerial results for the SMEs finance using 
musharakah. In a similar study for Pakistan, Akhtar (1997) stated that there is a 
need for proper environment to introduce musharakah finance in Pakistan. In this 
context, he recommended the enactment of musharakah law and other 
regulations to close possible loopholes of cheating, fraud and concealment. 
Management input in the agricultural bank of Iran plays an important role in the 
shift to musharakah financing from the alternative low risk tools. Having both, a 
banking background and agricultural expertise, in addition to field experience, 
helped the board of directors to understand the need for timely and effective 
solutions (Sadr 1999). Yesseri (1999) studied the Iranian expenence of 
musharakah, and with lack of data, he concluded that the large scale of 
musharakah finance is only focuses on housing finance. He further added that 
the inflation rate remarked as a serious threat to this practice. Najmabadi (1997), 
on the other hand, proposed a model from the Iranian experience of musharakah. 
His model tried to avoid, or at least attenuate, many existing complications and 
procedural inconsistencies and ambiguities in Iran, as well as the system and 
operational problems. It does not, however, propose any change in the existing 
methods of mobilizing and attracting bank deposits, as the methods are on the 
whole satisfactory. 
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Laffont and Mattoussi (1995) developed a theory of sharecropping, from the 
Tunisian experience, which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the 
provision of effort and financial constraints. Their model is compatible with a 
large variety of contracts as observed in Tunisia, and their findings support the 
lower efficiency when the tenant's share of output is lower. The roles of financial 
constraints in explaining which type of contracts is selected are supported by his 
findings. 
Borhan's study (1997) focused on the doctrine and application of partnership in 
Islamic commercial sharia' law in Malaysia. He presented the opinions of 
different sunni schools about musharakah rules with especial reference to 
shaft 'ate school followed by any discrepancies between sharia' and the 
Malaysian commercial law. Al-Harran (1997) has suggested musharakah 
financing for marketing as an integrated approach to grassroots development in 
the Malaysian fishing industry. 
It is true that these studies have contributed to the development of the field; their 
research framework refrained from delving into complicated musharakah issues 
beyond surface. This current study, therefore, take the research in the field a step 
further by directly engaging with the many unresolved and micro-country based 
specific issues related to the practice of musharakah financing. 
1.2 Motives, Contribution and Significance of the Study 
In view of the nature of Islamic banking and finance and the lack of research on 
its impact and implications on banking operations and customers in Sudan, this 
study aims to provide an empirical investigation of how musharakah finance 
works in Sudan. 
Despite the increased number of the Islamic banks and the increased studies, 
articles, and researches on the theory and ideology of Islamic banking, few 
researches deal with the actual practical exp~rimentation of interest-free financial 
and banking system. Because the subject of the Islamic banking is relatively new, 
several puzzles and misunderstandings still exist for academics and policy 
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makers alike. Whether a system that forbids the interest charges or payments can 
be viable in a modem economy is a question often raised by economists, western 
economists and even by some Muslim economists. However, what is missing is a 
comprehensive empirical investigation that analyses the Islamic banks' 
instruments and evaluates their successes and failure in the light of their 
conformity to Islamic principles. 
The significance of this study stems from the fact that despite the apparent 
success of Islamic financial institutions in many comers of the world, many 
governments are reluctant to endorse a full scale shift towards Islamic finance. 
Limited knowledge about the economic effects of the profit and loss sharing 
methods of the Islamic finance is one of the reasons behind such reluctance. The 
study hopes to contribute to a better understanding among researchers and 
policy-makers as to the likely implications of using musharakah mode of Islamic 
finance. Further, this study aims to provide an empirical investigation of how 
central bank policies have affected musharakah finance over the period 1990-
2005 in Sudan. 
This study extends the existing literature on Islamic banking and finance in two 
directions. First, it applies methods that are scantly used to analyse implications 
of using PLS methods. Second, it provides empirical evidence for a country for 
which no research (or little research) has been conducted to understand the nature 
and dynamics of musharakah mode of finance. In the case of the Sudan there has 
been a dearth of studies on the impact of Islamic banking practice. However, 
relatively little in the way of concrete economic analysis has been undertaken. 
Consequently, there is a need for in-depth analysis of the effects of this practice. 
The study addresses this issue ofthe Islamic banking practice in Sudan to fill this 
gap in the literature. In this context, the study departs from previous studies by 
using different techniques of analysis, a longer period (most of the previous 
studies use a short period for evaluation), fresher data and quantitative 
assessment ofthe effects of policy and non-policy factors. 
This study can, therefore, be considered as pioneering research in the field of 
Islamic finance, both in Sudan and in the context of developing countries. The 
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principal aim of this study is to evaluate the effects of using the profit and loss 
sharing scheme to establish its role in improving the supply of funds for 
entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, an empirical study based on the experience of the Islamic banking in 
Sudan is presented in this research. The experience of the Sudanese banks is 
chosen for the following reasons: 
(i) Sudan is chosen as the subject for this study, because the country is 
viewed as becoming one of the major players in the economic and 
political stability of the Middle East region. Sudan is now adopting a 
liberal economic policy attracting Arab investors from different 
countries in the region. In addition, among all Arab and Muslim 
countries, the Sudan has greater potential for growth in productive 
sectors, especially the agriculture and oil industry. This potential has 
not been utilised, partly because of lack of capital; 
(ii) The first generation of Islamic banks in Sudan was established in the 
1970s. Also Sudan has more Islamic banks than other Islamic or 
Arabic countries, as there are more than 26 banks operating in Sudan; 
and 
(iii) The performance of the Sudanese banks is of special concern to the 
researcher, who as a lecturer worked at Sudan University's banking 
and finance department of the College of Business Studies. 
1.3 Statement of the Problem, Objectives, and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Statement of the Problem 
The bulk of the assets of banks operating according to a paradigm of Islamic 
banking is represented by PLS transactions, i.e. mostly uncollateralized equity 
financing. As mentioned, these assets are far riskier than the ones represented by 
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non-PLS transactions, which are collateralized commercial or retail financing 
operations. 
It is most important to recognize the impact of PLS modes of financing on 
Islamic banks, especially the fact that when Islamic banks provide funds through 
their PLS facilities, there is a recognizable default on the part of the agent-
entrepreneur until PLS contracts expire, barring proved negligence or 
mismanagement on the part of the agent-entrepreneur. In fact, a default of PLS 
contracts means that the investment project has failed to deliver what was 
expected, that is a lower or no profit, or loss. In this case, the lower profit or loss 
is shared between or among parties according to the stipulated PLS ratios (Errico 
and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
The lack of PLS modes of finance performance, because of managerial 
efficiency, can be considerable and may threaten the existence of Islamic 
banking, which is already facing strong competition. To shed light on the Islamic 
finance techniques and practice, this study undertakes an empirical study of the 
implications of using musharakah mode of finance in Sudan, which covers five 
main areas: First, it investigates whether the PLS contracts are dominating the 
Islamic banking system in Sudan in terms of using the largest percentage of the 
funds available. Second, the study evaluates the performance and its perceptions 
of musharakah. Third, it investigates musharakah management to recognise the 
obstacles and constraints. Fourth, it investigates the implications of using 
musharakah mode of finance. Fifth, it investigates the factors influencing 
decision making in Islamic banks in regard to musharakah finance. 
1.3.2 Aims and Objectives 
Hence, the broad aim of this research is to explore and evaluate the PLS mode of 
financing through musharakah in the Islamic financial system of the Sudan. To 
this effect, the study aims to examine the scope, techniques, policy, and 
performance of the mus_harakah method used by the Sudanese Islamic banks. 
This is expected to produce knowledge quantitatively and qualitatively regarding 
the activities of these banks so that a better understanding of the fundamental 
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principles of this system can be reached. Further, the study aims to analyse the 
main obstacles facing Islamic banks in musharakah finance and aims to suggest 
possible remedies. Also, the study intends to analyse how staff characteristics, 
bank characteristics and overall environment affect the preferences and 
performance of musharakah finance through the banking industry. Specifically, 
the aim of the study is to closely examine the relations between performance and 
musharakah characteristics. 
Also the objective is to investigate the perception of the implications of using 
musharakah mode of finance by the Islamic banks in Sudan and to provide an 
empirical assessment of these perceptions about musharakah characteristics, 
performance, preference and obstacles. The intention is to decide which among 
the potential determinants of performance appear to be important (convert for 
ranking). By so doing, the study extends the literature in several ways and fills an 
important gap. 
The focus of the study is on two areas: On the first, the study focuses on an 
explanation of perceptions as it should be, according to conformity to Islamic 
ideology and principles. The second aspect deals with analysis of existing 
practice. This study attempts to analyse in detail some specific perceptions and 
subjects to explain the nature of the musharakah practice by building a 
meaningful and understandable model regarding the activities of the existing 
musharakah finance, which can be compared with the logical or analytical model 
for the purpose of bridging the gap between them. 
Another purpose which is of some importance is to examine whether there is a 
discrepancy between the theory of and expectation from the musharakah and the 
other methods and the actual practice. In this regards, the analysis uses primary 
data gathered through a survey investigation via questionnaires and field studies. 
Moreover, an assessment of the past performance of the Islamic banks will be 
carried out to offer an indication of their potential future. 
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To this effect, the research is expected to examine the wider environment within 
Sudanese banks work; investigate the main features of the credit policy 
controlling Islamic finance methods as well as determine the access to and use of 
credit by small-scale entrepreneurs. 
After providing empirical evidence, that can be useful in provoking an informed 
debate on Islamic finance in Sudan and other countries about the characteristics, 
performances, constraints of musharakah, the research highlights the pros and 
cons of musharakah finance and draws the necessary policy to improve PLS 
finance and concludes by suggesting modifications for further fine-tuning. 
1.3.3 Research Questions 
The following questions are proposed to guide the collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data in line with the research aim and objectives. It is expected 
that the research will, in the end, provide answers to these questions to ensure the 
research is designed accordingly. In particular, the study sought answers to the 
following questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the role of musharakah finance among the total 
Sudanese banking finance? 
Research Question 2: Why ts or IS not musharakah the pnory financial 
instrument in Sudan? 
Research Question 3: What is the average age ofmusharakah projects? 
Research Question 4: Why or why not do Islamic banks prefer short-term 
musharakah finance? 
Research Question 5: What is the preferred economic sector for financing using 
musharakah instrument? 
Research Question 6: Why or why not do Islamic banks prefer musharakah trade 
finance? 
Research Question 7: What is the perceived financial performance of 
musharakah in terms of profitability? 
Research Question 8: What is the perceived financial performance of 
musharakah in terms of risk? 
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Research Question 9: What is the perceived impact of musharakah risk on the 
degree of the interference on management? 
Research Question 10: What is the most preferred instrument among Islamic 
finance methods according to the respondents' perception? 
Research Question 11: What are the possible factors influencing granting credits 
musharakah finance according to the perception of the respondents? 
Research Question 12: What are the perceived possible factors influencing the 
distribution of bank funds among different Islamic finance instruments? 
Research Question 13: What are the perceived factors causing non performing 
musharakah investment? And how can Sudanese banks over come these factors? 
Research Question 14: What are the perceived factor(s) that cause(s) weakness in 
the follow up process of musharakah projects? And how can Sudanese banks 
over come them? 
Research Question 15: What are the perceived factors determining the capability 
of the entrepreneurs to be offered musharakah finance? 
Research Question 16: To what extent are the respondents satisfied with their 
bank's methodology for measuring the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs and 
project related risks? 
1.4 Research Methodology Design 
The principal method used to gather primary data in responding to the research 
questions is a questionnaire survey of staff in the investment department in the 
Islamic banks in Sudan. A period of about six months was spent in Sudan 
carrying out this fieldwork, and the objectives were three-fold: to collect all 
possible and available primary information on the musharakah as financed in the 
sampled banks; to gather all available related secondary information pertaining to 
the research work; and to conduct a survey questionnaire of the participating 
Islamic banks. 
This research is regarded to be an explanatory research and evaluation research 
since it attempts to investigate the trend, development, performance, obstacles 
and prospects of Islamic finance in Sudan for evaluation purposes. This study 
uses sample survey as it was thought to be the most suitable way to achieve the 
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research objective especially based on the nature of the data required and the 
purpose for which it was to be used. The study uses a combination of the 
literature studies and a survey investigation approach, which offers the most 
appropriate and satisfactory methodology in carrying out this study. 
Data from Sudan, which fully adheres to interest-free principles of finance, is 
used to answer the research questions. The researcher used primary data mainly 
to suit the nature and purposes of the research which was to elicit respondents' 
opinions, perceptions and attitudes. The survey approach using questionnaire is 
thought to be the most appropriate technique in collecting the intended primary 
data. A short section evaluating the profitability and risk in the form of 
performance analysis is added in later chapters with the use of secondary data. 
1.5 Limitation of the Study 
It is important to clarify the concept of equity participation finance, for the 
purpose of this study the musharakah equity participation finance is one which 
establishes a partnership relationship between two or more entities (one of them 
is a bank) running a business in common with a view to profit. Therefore, neither 
the equity finance, which consists of a combination of sole proprietorship and 
partnership nor joint stock companies, nor cooperation is part of the scope of this 
study. In fact, this study is interested in musharakah finance through the Islamic 
banking. Thus, a number of issues related to the Islamic economic system are not 
considered in the study, as the study is not an overall evaluation of the Islamic 
financial or economic system. But the researcher finds that it is of some 
importance to the problem area to provide an understanding of some variables to 
analyse bank uses of funds. This study will concentrate on investigating the 
Islamic banking system in terms of its practice of Islamic finance methods. 
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Apart from the limitations, the research cannot investigate Islamic banks across 
all Muslim countries. Therefore, the research will limit itself to the Sudanese 
experience only. The researcher, thus, limits himself to the following: 
(i) This study will be on Islamic finance musharakah instrument m 
Sudan only; 
(ii) The study is intended to cover the period between 1990 and 2005 (for 
the short secondary data analysis, regarding performance, the period 
is further limited to 1993-1999 due to data availability); 
(iii) The setting chosen and the main emphasis of the research is on an 
empirical investigation. A survey investigation via questionnaire will 
be carried out; 
(iv) The data is limited to a sample ofbank:s. 
The results of the survey are generally applicable to the rest of the Sudanese 
district around the country, based on the fact that the Sudanese society is 
homogeneous, and any segment of the population should be a fairly accurate 
representation of the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this study does not 
claim that the sample is a representation of all musharakah projects in other 
countries. 
In addition, the study only focuses on investigating the perceptions of the 
investment department employees of the Sudanese Islamic banks. Therefore it 
does not include the entrepreneurs' perceptions. 
1.6 Organisation of the Study 
This study is composed of eleven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to the 
study and highlights the aims and motivations of the study, the research 
questions, the operational concepts of Islamic banking and finance, the research 
design and methodology in addition to reviewing the types and methods used in 
data collection. 
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Chapter two studies the common rules governing the musharakah partnership in 
Islamic jurisprudence. Discussion in this chapter is limited to the major opinions 
in the main four Sunni schools, Hanafite, Malikite, Shafi 'ite, and Hanbalite. 
Chapter three discusses the main features of musharakah when carried out in 
the banking system to finance potential entrepreneurs. This includes, profit and 
loss distribution, collateral provided, following up procedures, marketing 
musharakah projects, and some other concerns about musharakah. 
Chapter four covers broadly the Sudanese economy and monetary policy. 
Hence, it discusses the performance of the Sudanese economy and demonstrates 
the important characteristics of the credit and monetary policy of the Central 
Bank of Sudan. 
Chapter five focuses on the Sudanese banking industry, which provides an 
overview of the history of the Sudanese banking industry and its performance 
using some selected banking finance indicators. 
Chapter six is the start of the field study and discusses the methodology applied. 
Hence, this chapter describes the research procedures for data collection both 
primary and secondary especially the survey questionnaire, and considers the 
advantages and disadvantages of this approach. It also describes the method of 
data analysis pursued in empirical analysis. Generally, the chapter discusses the 
main issues involved in survey design, data collection and data analysis. 
Furthermore, this chapter provides an outline of the research methods used in the 
fieldwork and presents a description of the study sample and the statistical 
techniques used to analyse the data as well. 
Chapter seven analyses the profile of the Sudanese banks. This chapter 
identifies the structure of the Sudanese banks, the geographical distribution of its 
branches, and the market share of the musharakah fund among other finance 
methods. Also the chapter identifies the sampled banks under study and the 
banks selection criteria. In addition the official guidelines followed by the 
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selected banks in granting musharakah fund are also considered as part of the 
bank's profile. 
Chapter eight examines the sample characteristics and analyses the opinions of 
bank personnel towards banking activities. Hence, this chapter, firstly, presents 
the demographic and work related characteristics of the bank personnel, who 
have responded to the questionnaire conducted by this study including 
demographic and professional experience related information. Secondly, it also 
aims to identify musharakah management characteristics including the awareness 
of the musharakah product cost and pricing decision as well as the responsibility 
and objective characteristics of the banks when carrying out musharakah finance 
projects. Thirdly, it aims to study the longevity of musharakah projects. 
Chapter nine discusses and analyses the preference and performance of 
musharakah finance. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
preference of different modes of finance especially musharakah finance as well 
as the performance of the musharakah. In addition it identifies all factors 
influencing the decision of taking finance through musharakah. The chapter 
determines the preference mode of finance, the preferred sector to finance 
musharakah, factors influencing granting credits and hindering musharakah 
investment and factors affecting the distribution of bank funds according to the 
different methods of finance. The perception of the musharakah performance is 
also discussed. 
Chapter ten identifies the constraints and obstacles facing musharakah finance 
including the causes of non-performing musharakah, the lack of proper 
feasibility studies, factors determining the capability of the entrepreneurs to be 
offered musharakah finance, and measuring entrepreneurs' creditworthiness. 
The final chapter, chapter eleven, is the conclusion, which also provides 
recommendations for the Islamic banking industry in Sudan. The purpose of this 
concluding chapter is to summarise and discuss the findings of this study and 
recommendations derived from these findings on theoretical, institutional, and 
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practical levels. Also, questions arising from this study are used to propose an 
agenda for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Musharakah and Islamic Jurisprudence Fiqh 
2.1 Introduction 
From a very early stage in Islamic history, Muslims were able to establish a 
financial system without interest for mobilising resources to finance productive 
activities and consumer needs. The system to finance business activities was 
based largely on the profit and loss sharing (PLS) modes of mudarabah (passive 
partnership) and musharakah (active partnership). Deferred trading and interest-
free loans were also used to finance consumers as well as business transactions. 
Historically musharakah and mudarabah were used not only by Muslims but 
also by Jews and Christians to the extent that interest bearing loans and other 
overly usurious practices were not in common use (Udovitch, 1970a). 
Arab society during the early rise of Islam had very simple financing methods 
and forms of business peculiar to that society. The coming of the Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him) saw the practice of shirkah already prevailing over the 
commercial activities in Arabia. He not only ratified it, but also did business 
himself on the basis of shirkah. After Hijra, the Muhajireen and the Ansar were 
declared by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be brothers. Subsequently they 
joined as partners, in the form of shirkah, muzara and musaqat, in their trade and 
commerce. The nature of the transactions, in the various forms, is identical. The 
different nomenclature in Arabic refers to diverse activities such as muzara ' in 
agriculture, musaqat in gardening and shirkah in trade. The shirkah of capital 
and labour is called mudarabah. These four forms were so developed that they 
became independent institutions and the jurists formed detailed rules for them. 
Hence, there is a consensus of opinion among Sunni jurists of all schools of 
Islamic thought (Hanafites, Malikites, Shaft 'ite and Hanbalites) that shirkah is a 
valid and legitimate contract in Islam. Jurists, however, differ over its form, 
conditions and other details (Saeed, 1999). 
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Just as it is lawful for a Muslim to use his own wealth for any permissible 
purpose or to give it to a capable, experienced person to invest in a joint venture, 
it is also lawful for him to pool his capital with the capital of others for 
investment, trade, or any lawful business ventures. The Prophet (peace be on 
him) stated in a hadith qudosi that Allah, the Great and Glorious says, "I make a 
third with two partners as long as one of them does not cheat the other, but when 
he cheats him I depart from them". (Reported by Abu Daoud and by al-Hakim, 
who calls it sound in Traditions (sunnan) of Abu Dawood, Book of Sales, No. 
2936). "Third" refers to His help, inspiration, and blessing. 
Classical Islamic law, which will be the main source for this chapter, was created 
during the first two centuries of the Islamic era and continued up to the beginning 
of the fourth century. Thereafter, all the future legal Islamic jurisprudence was 
relegated to commentary, explanation and interpretation of the existing 
jurisprudence. 
Musharakah (partnership) is the first basic profit and loss sharing concept in 
Islamic banking together with mudarabah; the Qunin contains the root of the 
term musharakah, which is shirk, approximately 170 times, though none ofthese 
verses contains the term strictly in the sense of partnership in a business venture. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of several verses of the Qunin, particularly verses 
4:12 and 38:24, as well as some reports attributed to the Prophet (peace be 
upon him) and his Companions, the validity of musharakah in business ventures 
is justified (Saeed, 1999). 
Several sayings of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to his Companions indicate 
that some form of partnership was practised by the earliest Muslim community. 
These sayings merely refer to the existence of a form of partnership, without 
indicating any terms, conditions or concepts which may have been associated 
with this partnership. Given that these reports do not provide any details as to the 
valid terms and conditions of such partnership contracts, as they later came to be 
known in Islamic law, such terms and conditions, as they are defined and 
elaborated injiqh are the product of ijtihad by Muslim jurists (Saeed, 1999). 
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Infiqh, the concept of shirkah is used in a much wider sense than the concept of 
musharakah used in Islamic banking which will be discussed later. 
The objective of this chapter is to study the common rules governing the 
musharakah partnership in Islamic jurisprudence. Discussion in this chapter is 
limited to the major opinions of the main four Sunni schools, Hanafites, 
Malikites, Shaft 'ites, and Hanbalites. So, this chapter covers the definitions and 
different types of shirkah, distinguishing features of mufawadah and i 'nan 
partnerships, the rules governing the distribution of profit; loss and debt 
liabilities, the nature of the partnership capital, purchase; sale and expenses, the 
stipulation of management; securities and work, and lastly, dissolution of 
partnership. 
2.2 Conceptual Definitions 
2.2.1 Association between Musharakah and Shirkah 
The word for partnership in Islamic law is sharikah. Some jurists prefer to use 
the word shirkah which means sharing in the terminology of Islamic 
jurisprudence (jiqh) (Nayzee, 1999). There is, however, no big difference in the 
meaning of the different applications of the word. The association of the word 
musharakah is rather limited, compared to the term shirkah which is more 
commonly used in Islamic jurisprudence (Usmani, 1999). 
Nevertheless, in countries where English common law is applied, a distinction is 
made between partnership and companies or corporations with respect to 
terminology so as to identify the difference in the legal forms. In Sudan, the word 
sharakah is applied to mean partnership while the word sharikah is used for 
companies as well as corporations. To distinguish between legal forms, 
additional terms are used, such as musahamah for corporation and mahdodah for 
limited liabilities. Thus, a corporation is called sharikah musahamah (Oleynick 
and Alexander, 2001). This method of naming different legal forms of the 
business enterprise does not affect terminology alone; it has some conceptual 
implications as well which can occasionally be confusing. 
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In all of Islamic law, the liability in all partnerships is unlimited (in the present 
meaning), which implies that in all Islamic partnership types, the partners are 
liable in proportion to their share of the total investment. If loss occurs, partners, 
according to their shares, have to pay from their own private wealth to cover it. 
There is, therefore, no limit whatsoever to the amount of the partnership's 
liability. Each partner is responsible for his share of the partnership's liabilities 
regardless of what it amounts to, or by how much it exceeds the value of his own 
share ofthe company's assets (Udovitch, 1970b). 
It should, however, be noted that Islamic financial institutions translate 
partnership as 'participatory financing', in order to put more emphasis on one 
particular aspect of musharakah, as the research will discuss later. 
For the purpose of clarity, with regards to the basic concepts of shirkah and 
musharakah, it is essential to explain the meaning of the word sharikah and its 
types and musharakah will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
2.2.2 The Literal Meaning of Shirkah 
The word for partnership in fiqh, as stated earlier, is shirkah or shirkat. In the 
literal sense, the word shirkah has two meanings, which are mixing (ikhtilat) and 
partnership. In the first one (mixing), it refers to the mixing of the shares and 
capital contributed by the partners, by which one of them cannot be distinguished 
from another (Ibn Manzur, 1956). The second meaning describes shirkah as the 
contract of partnership itself, because it is the cause of mixing (Ibn Al-Humam, 
1970). The technical meaning allocated to the word shirkah by the jurists does 
not go beyond these meanings, because partnership arises either through a 
contract or through the mixing of wealth. However, the researcher were not able 
to identify the technical meaning of all types of shirkah as it considerably varies. 
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2.3 Types of Shirkah 
Jurists have divided the types of shirkah partnership into three kinds: sharikat al-
ibahah (common sharing of things); Sharikat al-milk (co-ownership); and 
sharikat al- 'aqd (partnership through contract). 
2.3.1 Common Right to Acquire Ownership (Sharikat Al-ibahah) 
Sharikat al-ibahah is defined as the common right of the people in ownership by 
acquisition, or gathering of things that are permissible (mubah) for such an 
acquisition and are not originally owned by anyone (Majallat, 1923). These 
things can pass into the ownership of individuals in two ways: by actual 
gathering or acquisition, like gathering firewood or the revival of barren lands; 
and by bringing about the cause of acquisition, like placing a pan for gathering 
rain water or throwing a net in the water for fish. It is noticeable that today such a 
partnership would be difficult to form. All things not owned by the citizens are 
owned or regulated by the state, except for things that are free like air or 
rainwater. Today, forests, land, lakes and all other things are owned by the state. 
Thus, an individual may not be permitted to throw his net into water for fish if 
the state has chosen to grant licenses for such an economic activity (Usmani, 
2002). 
2.3.2 Co-ownership or Property Partnership (Sharikat Al-milk) 
Sharikat al-milk is defined as the existence of a thing in the exclusive joint-
ownership of two or more persons due to one of the bases of ownership, or it is 
the joint claim of two or more persons for a debt that is due from another 
individual arising from a single cause (Majallat, 1923). In other words it means 
the joint ownership of a property without its joint exploitation, such as the joint 
ownership of a house transmitted, by devolution, to the heirs of a deceased 
person (Saleh, 1986). Jurists have divided Co-ownership or sharikat al-milk into 
two types: co-ownership in ascertained property and co-ownership in debt not 
ascertained by weight or measure or other means arising through inheritance or 
through exchange or through other means (Ibn Abidin, 1966). The first type is 
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the joint and exclusive ownership of two or more persons resulting from one of 
the causes of ownership, like purchase, gift, acceptance of a bequest, inheritance, 
or by the mixing (ikhtilat) of their property in a manner that does not accept 
distinction or separation (Majallat, 1923). By contrast, the second type occurs 
when two or more persons are owed a debt attached to the liability of another 
person, a debt that has arisen from a single cause. This is a common debt and is 
held in co-ownership between them. If the cause is not common, the debt is not 
in co-ownership (Majallat, 1923). 
2.3.3 Partnership through Contract (Sharikat Al-'aqd) 
Sharikat al- 'aqd or partnership through contract is the same thing as partnership 
in law. It is to be noted, however, that there are different types of partnership in 
Islamic law. Islamic law attempts to assign separate rules for each type. Sharikat 
al- 'aqd can be defined as a contract between two or more people for participation 
in capital and/or labour and its profits, or participation in transactions in someone 
else's capital and its profits, or participation in profit without participation in 
capital or transactions (Nayzee, 1999). Therefore, the emphasis is on the joint 
exploitation of capital and/or labour, the joint participation in profits and losses 
and where joint ownership is a consequence of, and not a prerequisite for, the 
formation of the partnership (Saleh, 1986). This explains that sharikat al- 'aqd 
can be in both capital and labour, capital only, or labour only. 
2.3.4 Distinction between Co-ownership or Property Partnership (Sharikat 
Al-milk) and Partnership through Contract (Sharikat Al-'aqd) 
In law, sharikat al-milk is not referred to as a partnership, but as a co-ownership. 
Nor does co-ownership form the basis of partnership in law. In Islamic law there 
are many differences between them. The main differences appear to be in the 
relation between partners and the purpose of the shirkah (Nayzee, 1999). To sum 
up, while the purpose of sharikat al-milk in ascertained property is not 
necessarily sharing of profits, the purpose of sharikat al-aqd, on the other hand, 
is the seeking and sharing of profits. 
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Secondly, the distribution of the relevant revenues or profits of sharikat al-milk 
always follows the ratio of shares (Al-Kashani, 1968). By contrast, as discussed 
later, in Sharikat al- 'aqd this ratio may be altered. 
Lastly, the partner in a sharikat at-milk is not an agent for other partners while he 
is in a sharikat al- 'aqd. Consequently, in law, a co-owner may sell his interest to 
a third party, but a partner may sell his share in the partnership property of 
sharikat al- 'aqd only with the permission of other partners (Nayzee, 1999). 
2.4 Types of Contractual Partnership (Sharikat Al-'aqd) in Fiqh 
When scholars study this sort of shirkah partnership they repeatedly differentiate 
such partnerships according to the object of the investments with no distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial (Saleh, 1986). Consequently, 
contractual partnerships are normally divided according to its object into three 
categories: 
(i) Sharikat mal (finance partnership), where the money 1s the mam 
investment (Saleh, 1986); 
(ii) Sharikat a 'mal or shirkat al-abdan (labour partnership) where the 
partners contribute their skills and efforts to the management of the 
business without contributing to the capital (Usmani, 2002) ; and 
(iii) Sharikat wujuh (credit partnership) where credit alone is used for 
partnership investment with no initial capital provided by partners. In 
shirkat al-wujuh the partners use their goodwill, their 
creditworthiness and their contacts for promoting their business 
without contributing to the capital (Saeed, 1999). 
Both these forms of partnership, Sharikat wujuh and Shirkat al-abdan, where the 
partners do not contribute any capital, are confined essentially to small-scale 
businesses only. Each of these finance, labour and credit partnerships can take 
the form of an unlimited, unrestricted and equal mufawadah partnership or the 
form of a limited investment (i 'nan) partnership. 
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The musharakah of the Islamic financial institutions is obviously finance 
partnership or, to use the terminology of those institutions, a 'participatory 
finance' where money is the main investment. In accordance with the terms of a 
'participatory finance', the Islamic bank or institution will fund the equity 
capital, or the cash flow requirements, or both, for an agreed enterprise proposed 
by an entrepreneur client to the institution or bank. Profits will be shared between 
the two parties in the agreed ratio, and losses, if any, will be in proportion to the 
partners' shares in the partnership capital (Saleh, 1981). 
Clearly, only the Sharikat mal (finance partnership) of the sharikat 'aqd 
(contractual partnership), only and specifically, is relevant to the present topic of 
the research. Since the subject matter of mufawadah and i 'nan can be wealth, 
labour, or creditworthiness, the researcher will examine the rules that are 
applicable to i 'nan and mufawadah partnerships with regards to wealth as subject 
matter. 
2.5 Sharikat Mal (Finance Partnership) 
All these modes of 'sharing' so far in the Islamic ftqh terminology are termed as 
'shirkah', while the term 'musharakah' is not found in theftqh books. This term 
musharakah has been introduced recently by those who have written on the 
subject of Islamic finance and it is normally restricted to a particular type of 
'Shirkah', that is, shirkah Al-i 'nan of the Shirkat mal for the Hanafttes; 
Shaft 'ites; and Han halites, and mufawadah of the Shirkat mal for the Malikites. 
Sharikat mal can be divided into partnerships with equal shares and partnerships 
with unequal shares. A partnership with equal shares is a partnership which is 
formed when the partners enter into a contract of partnership stipulating 
complete equality between them, and, after they have contributed the property 
which is to form the capital of the partnership, they maintain equality in the 
amount of their capital, and their shares of the profit. A partnership with unequal 
shares is· form·ect~when a contractual-partnership"iscconcluded. withoutc.stipulating_ 
complete equality. For the majority, Hanafttes; Shaft 'ites; and Hanbalites, equal 
shares partnerships are called mufawadah and the unequal shares partnerships 
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called i 'nan. By contrast, the Malikites School call the equal shares partnership 
i 'nan and use mufawadah for the unequal shares partnership. 
Since the topic of this research is to study musharakah mode of finance in which 
the Islamic bank and a customer combine their capital in a musharakah project to 
share the profit (which is almost analogous with shirkat mal), the researcher shall 
now dwell upon it, explaining the traditional concept of this type of Shirkah, 
breaking down the two types of this partnership namely mufawadah and i 'nan. 
2.6 Distinguishing Features of Mufawadah and I'nan Partnerships 
The shirkat mal is a contractual partnership whereby two or more partners 
contribute to a capital fund combined with their labour effort to achieve profits. 
This type of shirkah, depending on its features, can be formed as either an i 'nan 
or a mufawadah partnership. The mufawadah, according to the Hanafites is a 
partnership in which the partners enjoy complete equality in the areas of capital, 
management and right of disposition. Each mufawadah partner is both an agent 
of and a guarantor for his colleague. The Malikites concept of mufawadah is 
nearly the same as the Hanafites concept of i 'nan partnership (Saleh, 1986), as 
will be seen later, as neither demands complete equality in capital, management 
and distribution of profit and loss. Contrary to the Hanafites mufawadah and 
similar to their concept of i 'nan, some lbadi jurists believe that equality of capital 
and equality of shares in the profits is not necessary (Saleh, 1986). To illustrate, 
for the Malikites, mufawadah denotes a general type of commercial partnership 
in which capital and profits are distributed in indefinite shares (Udovitch, 
1970b ). For the Hanafites, complete equality in all financial matters is a must for 
a mufawadah partnership, whether in respect to each partner's contribution to the 
joint capital, or to the share of profits and losses assigned to him. Thus, whether 
the partners invest equal amounts of capital but agree on an unequal distribution 
of the profits, or whether, conversely, they invest unequal amounts while 
contracting to divide the profits equally, the partnership is not, according to 
Hanafites·Taw;- considered' a' mufawadah•{Al-Shaybani, 1884).-~Similarly, for 
i 'nan partnership, equality is necessary for Malikites, but not for Hanafites or the 
other Sunni jurists. 
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For Hanajite jurists, it is not only the structural features which distinguish the 
i 'nan from the mufawadah partnership. Each mufawadah partner is both the 
agent (wakil) of and guarantor (kajil) for his colleague. In the i 'nan partnership, 
the relations of partners to third parties and those between partners are based 
exclusively on the principle of agency. Each partner is only the agent and not the 
guarantor of his colleague and this mutual agency is valid only in the area of 
commerce covered by their partnership or to the extent of their joint capital. To 
conclude, for Hanajites, i 'nan includes a contract of agency only and does not 
include a contract of guarantee. Consequently, if at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract there has been no mention of a guarantee, the partners are not 
guarantors of each other (Majallat, 1923). 
In comparison to the mufawadah, this difference confines the partners' freedom 
of action in the conduct of business and severely curtails the rights and claims of 
third parties toward the partner (Udovitch, 1970b). Consequently, the partners 
must be competent to conclude a contract of guarantee. Similarly, a Malikites 
mufawadah with unequal shares includes a contract of agency only and does not 
include a contract of guarantee. Consequently, if at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract there has been no mention of a guarantee, the partners are not 
guarantors of each other. 
Since the researcher is studying partnership finance between a bank and its 
customer with no equality expected neither in capital (normally) nor in labour 
(definitely), then noticeably it is the i 'nan partnership according to the majority 
of jurists, and mufawadah according to the Malikites, that is of interest to the 
research topic. Therefore, the research will study the common rules between both 
of them and will be referring to the Malikites only when he discusses mufawadah 
and the other three schools and mainly Hanafites when he discusses i 'nan 
partnerships. 
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2.6.1 Derivation of the Mufawadah and /'nan Terms 
2.6.1.1 /'nan 
For the term i 'nan, it is derived from the phrase ('anna li) which means "it 
presented itself to me or it appeared" (Udovitch, 1970b ). It is also said that the 
term is derived from the reins (i 'nan) of a pack animal, in the sense that the rider 
holds the reins with one hand and does something else with the other. Similarly, 
each of the partners transfers to his colleague the reins of disposition for only a 
portion of the joint capital. It could also be derived from the fact that a pack 
animal has two reins, one of them longer and the other one shorter; similarly, this 
partnership is permissible both with equal and unequal shares in the investment 
and profit on the part of the partners, and is therefore designated i 'nan (Al-
Sarkhasi, 1906). 
2.6.1.2 Mufawadah 
There are three meanings from which the term mufawadah could possibly have 
been derived. The first is the term yofawidho, which means "to delegate". Each 
partner makes a complete delegation of all acts to his partner in the entire stock 
of marketable goods (Al-Sarkhasi, 1906). It has also been said that it derives 
from the idea of dispersal, from: yafeedh, which means to "overflow" for 
example, when the water overflows, that it spreads out and disperses; or 
yastafida which means "it is distributed widely" (Udovitch, 1970b). Since this 
contract is based upon the dispersal of authority for all transactions, it was 
designated as mufawadah. The third meaning is that of equality. This contract is 
based upon equality ofwealth and profit according to the majority of jurists (Al-
Sarkhasi, 1906). 
-·-.,~-
.:: .. 
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2.6.2 The Definition of the Terms (Technical Meaning) 
2.6.2.1 /'nan 
According to Hanafttes, Shaft 'ites, and Hanbalites jurists, i 'nan ts the 
participation of two or more persons, with the permissibility of stipulating 
inequality, through their work on their wealth, through their work on the wealth 
of another, or through their creditworthiness without wealth, so that the profit can 
be shared by them as agreed (Al-Kashani, 1968). 
2.6.2.2 Mufawadah 
According to the Malikites it is a partnership in which each partner confers upon 
his colleague full authority to dispose of their joint capital in any acceptable 
manner intended to benefit their association (Udovitch, 1970b ). Indeed, this kind 
of partnership is to some extent identical to the Western joint liability partnership 
companies, in which there are two or more partners who jointly have the invited 
and unrestricted responsibility of debts and in all fields (Zineldin, 1990). 
2.6.3 Equality of Work, Capital and Profit 
Equality is not a condition for either capital or work for a mufawadah partnership 
according to the Malikites (Sahnun, 1905) or for an i 'nan partnership according 
to Hanafttes, Hanbalites, and Shaft 'ites. The opposite is true; the Malikites 
request equalities in i 'nan while the Hanafttes request it for mufawadah as the 
majority of the Shaft 'ites and Hanbalites regard mufawadah as invalid. 
2. 7 Distribution of Profit, Loss and Debts Liabilities 
2.7.1 The Basis for Entitlement to Profit 
Partnerships····and··aR other~forms7of~business,organization~are.set~up primarily-. for 
a single objective: the sharing of profits through joint participation. The jurists 
have different opinions about the basis of profit entitlement; the Hanafttes 
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believe that entitlement to profit is either due to wealth or work or by bearing a 
liability for loss (Nayzee, 1999). The views of the Hanbalites are similar (Ibn 
Qudama, 1962). According to the Malikites, a partner is entitled to profit on the 
basis of wealth contributed to the partnership. In addition, in cases where a 
partner contributes work along with wealth to a partnership, his work is 
considered subservient to wealth. This means, therefore, that work in itself is not 
a valid, or at least independent, basis for entitlement to profit (Nayzee, 1999). 
Therefore, they do not permit the stipulation of a higher ratio of profits for excess 
work; the ratio of profit must always be proportional to the capital contributed. In 
place of excess profits, the working partner is entitled to reasonable wages for his 
additional work. The Shaft 'ites, almost like the Malikites, permit a single basis 
for partnership and this is wealth. They, therefore, do not permit sharikat al-
wujuh, which is based upon surety of liability to bear loss nor do they permit 
sharikat al-abdan, which is based upon labour (Al-Ramli, 1967). 
2.7.2 Distribution of Profits 
According to the basis for entitlement to profit set by jurists, Malikites and 
Shaft 'ites believe that the ratio of the share of a partner in profit must conform to 
the ratio of his investment. The non-working party is not entitled to any share of 
the income, and can claim only the return of his investment and, if it happened to 
be in a form other than cash, some equitable rental fee for its use (Sahnun, 1905). 
But according to Hanafttes and Hanbalites, the ratio of the profit may differ from 
the ratio of investment according to the agreement of the partner (Usmani, 1999). 
Moreover, no premium is placed on the quality of each partner's labour, and it is 
apparently only the quantity of work contributed by each that determines the 
division of profit (Sahnun, 1905). In other words, if they agree, it is permissible 
for the profit to not follow the partners' respective investments share. It is also 
permissible to stipulate for a share in the profit larger than that of his colleague 
(Nayzee, 1999, Udovitch, 1970b). 
In addition, according to the four Sunni schools, there are several conditions 
concerning the profit sharing that must be expressly stated in the contract, 
otherwise it will be invalid. 
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These conditions are given below: 
(i) The ratio of profits must be stated specifically. The reason is that the 
main object of the contract is the sharing of profits, and if this is left 
vague, vitiation of the contract is a natural consequence (Al-Kashani, 
1968). 
(ii) The profit should be a percentage of the whole profit and not a 
specific lump sum like one million pounds. This may also be 
expressed as one half, one third or one quarter. The reason is because 
the partnership might only achieve the amount (or less) set for one 
partner, which will lead to an unfair situation of a profit for one 
partner and nothing for the other (Al-Kashani, 1968). 
(iii) Profits should not be devoted to only one partner regardless of the 
share of capital for the same reasons as above. 
(iv) A larger stipulation should not be set for the partner who has less 
capital share and less labour share, taking into consideration both the 
skills and time for evaluating labour (Majallat, 1923). 
2. 7.3 Distribution of Loss 
Loss refers to that part of the capital which is destroyed (Al-Sarkhasi, 1906) and 
will therefore be distributed in proportion to the capital invested in business and 
borne by the owners of the capital. The principle, agreed by the four Sunni 
schools of jurisprudence, that in case of a loss in joint-stock business, based on a 
shirkah, the loss will have to be shared in proportion to the capital invested 
(Siddiqi, 1985). Therefore, stipulating this in a contract would be not required. If, 
however, one of the partners assumes a share of the loss proportionally larger 
than that of the other, this is not permissible and absolutely invalid (Udovitch, 
1970b). 
Similarly, any damage suffered without any fault or negligence shall in any case 
be oivided -in proportion-to the amountofthecshares ofccapital.-lfany stipulation 
has been made to the contrary, no effect shall be given thereto (Majallat, 1923). 
This point is extremely important for understanding the problem of limited 
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liability of shareholders of a corporation as well as the limited partner in a 
limited liability partnership. Limited liability actually boils down to a violation of 
this condition of losses following capital contributed (Usmani, 1999, Nayzee, 
1999). 
2.7.4 Debts Liabilities 
2.7.4.1 /'nan Partnership 
As for the i 'nan partnership according to Hanafites and some Hanbalites, it 
contains by default, mutual agency, but not mutual surety. By virtue of this, in a 
mutual agency; none of the partners is liable for that which is owed by his 
colleague. In an i 'nan partnership, liability of the partners toward third parties is 
several but not joint; within the partnership, liability for obligations arising from 
partnership affairs is joint. This principle covers all the transactions on behalf of 
the company in which its members are free to engage (Al-Sarkhasi, 1906, 
Udovitch, 1970b). 
The i 'nan partnership is a contractual partnership whereby two or more partners 
contribute to a capital fund, either in money in kind, in labour or by combining 
some or all of these investments. Teachings of the different schools of law vary 
in this respect. For the Hanafites, Malikites and Hanbalites (Saleh, 1986) a 
contribution to the capital of i 'nan partnership can take any of these forms of 
investment; it cannot be credit for the Malikites and Shaft 'ites and it cannot be 
chattels (urud) nor labour for the Shafi'ites (Jaziri, 1963). Partners in an i'nan 
share the profits in the agreed manner and bear losses in proportion to their 
mutual contributions. Each partner is only the agent of and not a guarantor for his 
colleague(s) and this mutual agency is valid only in the area of business covered 
by the partnership or to the extent of their joint capital. The agency principle that 
results from i 'nan is restricted to the partners' relationship, in the sense that only 
the partner who has concluded a transaction can sue the party with whom he has 
corittaCfed, arid'"'tlfe' latter has"no·- action"'except,7 against-the- contracting partner_ 
(Saleh, 1986). 
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For Hanafites and some Hanbalites, the liability of the partners in an i 'nan 
contract is unlimited for the debts of the shirkah when the partners are acting 
according to and within the authority, granted to them. Otherwise, if a partner 
abuses his authority, the liability of the other partner is limited to the extent of 
their shares. This is because i 'nan partnership includes agency contract in itself. 
However if partners agreed on a surety, in which every partner is assuring and 
responsible for his partner's deeds, then a several and joint liability will be 
established (Nayzee, 1998). However, when the shirkah has not been expanded 
on borrowed capital or with goods purchased on credit, the financial liabilities of 
the investors are limited to the extent of their investments in the business. In 
other words, in the event of loss or bankruptcy, the maximum loss falling to a 
party will be equal to the capital invested by him. If, however, the shirkah has 
been expanded on borrowed capital or with goods purchased on credit, the 
financial liabilities of the partners investing capital in the business will exceed 
their capital investments and the limits of this excess will be determined by the 
decisions of the investors who have sought to expand the business by investing 
borrowed funds or by purchasing goods on credit (Siddiqi, 1985). 
2.7.4.2 Mufawadah Partnership 
As mentioned before, by the term mufawadah, Malikites jurists understand a 
partnership in which each partner confers upon his colleague full authority to 
dispose of their joint capital in any acceptable manner intended to benefit their 
association. The emphasis, therefore, is on the delegation of discretionary 
authority to conduct trade with each other's capital. Each partner is his 
colleague's agent and can act in all commercial matters with respect to his own 
and his colleague's property without the latter's prior approval. There is no 
dispute among the Malikites that the contract of partnership incorporates an 
unrestricted agency contract within it. In the absence of any contrary stipulation, 
for Malikites in mufawadah, partners are presumed to have discretionary powers 
in the administration of their joint capital. In all transactions which are 
recognized as a usml.l part of trade; each·partner can act independently in the-
name of the partnership without exposing himself, in the case of loss, to any 
liability greater than that which would normally be his share (Sahnun, 1905). In 
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addition, the Malikites do not make a distinction between principal 
responsibilities and the agent responsibilities in an agency contract. Thus, if an 
agent buys for the partnership, both the agent and the principal can be sued. If, 
however, the agent does not have authority for making credit purchases 
according to his partnership contract, special permission will be required. 
It appears that the Malikites are not satisfied with joint liability even for a normal 
credit purchase as they request that all the partners are present in such 
transactions. The liability, therefore, is not joint alone, it is also several. As each 
partner has acted for himself as well as for the other partners, each one can be 
sued for the entire amount and they can all be sued for it as well; it is up to the 
creditor. It is possible to conclude that the liability of the mufawadah partners is 
both joint and several; any obligation incurred on behalf of the partnership 
toward third parties by one of the associates can be claimed in full from any of 
the other partners since each one of them is liable for any obligation undertaken 
by his colleague in connection with their work (Udovitch, 1970b). 
2. 7.4.3 Limited Liabilities 
The liability of a partner for the debts of a partnership is unlimited, and Islamic 
law does not legitimize the concept of limited liability as it is known in modem 
law for corporations and limited partnerships. Limited liability is the satisfaction 
of the debts of the partnership from the entire assets of the partnership including 
profits or from whatever is left after a loss has been made. This means that the 
creditors do not have access to the personal wealth of the partners, wealth that 
has not been contributed towards the capital of the partnership. This concept was 
allocated as a consequence of considering the partnership as a separate entity to 
their shareholders (Udovitch, 1970b ). By contrast, compared with the corporation 
in modem law, which can be defined as an artificial person created by special 
authority and endowed by that authority with a capacity to acquire rights and 
incur obligations (Schamell, 1962), shareholders do not provide any kind of 
surety foY-the debtsoof the corporation (Nayzee, -1998- ). As -mentioned before 
Hanafite jurists have made it clear that under i 'nan no partner is a guarantor for 
other partners. By guarantor they mean the one who is responsible for the 
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fulfilment of the financial liabilities of another. Under i 'nan no partner is liable 
for the transactions of other partners which fall outside the limits of the joint 
enterprise. The capital shares of the partners cannot be touched in order to meet 
the personal loans of a partner or credit purchases taken on by him in his 
personal capacity. 
2.8 The Nature of Partnership Capital 
The capital for a partnership can take the form of cash, goods, and/or other 
property. It cannot consist of forbidden commodities such as pork or wine, nor 
can the formation of the joint capital involve any kind of riba (translated as usury 
or interest) transaction (Sahnun, 1905). For all jurists in both i 'nan and 
mufawadah the capital must be present. Present capital, in their view, is the 
wealth available for transactions and not necessarily present physically on the 
spot. Absent capital, or capital promised by one of the partners for future 
investment, is not to be considered until it is actually delivered (Udovitch, 
1970b ). This means that the partners can go ahead and conclude the contract 
even if the capital consists of receivables or wealth that is not available 
immediately, but the contract will be effective legally only when the transactions 
in such property are possible (Nayzee, 1999). 
2.8.1 Cash 
For Malikites if at a particular moment the values of dinars or dirhams of 
different types are identical, or if the difference between them is only minimal, 
these coins can serve as a valid partnership capital. Any change in the value of 
the coins subsequent to the contracting of the partnership is to be disregarded. 
The division of profits and losses as well as each partner's share of ownership in 
the joint property is determined by the value at the time of investment of the 
capitals of each. A partnership in which the investment of one party consists only 
of dinars and that of the other only of dirhams is not permitted. If, at the outset 
. Oftheif negotiations;the-tWO' parties-happenecl4ochave"in-their,possession dinars . . 
and dirhams of corresponding type, a partnership in these would be possible 
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between them since no element of money exchange would be involved (Sahnun, 
1905, Udovitch, 1970b). 
2.8.2 Goods 
Capital can be provided in terms of goods except for a certain category of 
foodstuffs as all licit goods are eligible to become part of the joint capital of a 
partnership. For Malikites, all kinds of goods both measurable and non 
measurable ones (i.e. the commodities which cannot be compensated for by 
similar commodities), can be part of the capital if an evaluation according to the 
market price prevalent at the date of the contract has been carried for these goods 
(Sahnun, 1905). For Shafi 'ites only measurable commodities, which if destroyed, 
can be compensated for by similar commodities in quality and quantity, can be 
part of the capital (Usmani, 1999). According to Hanafites, the measurable 
commodities can be part of the share only if they have been mixed with the other 
part of capital provided by the other partner (Usmani, 1999). Therefore, for both 
Shafi 'ites and Hanafites, non-measurable goods can not contribute to the capital. 
It seems that the view of Malikites is simple and more reasonable, and meets the 
needs ofmodem business (Usmani, 1999). 
2.8.3 Credit 
Contrary to the Hanafites who permit credit partnership, Malikites consider 
partnership in obligations to be permissible; partnership is permissible only on 
the basis of property (amwal) or manual labour. In addition Malikites request that 
all prospective partners participate in the negotiation of credit purchase 
transaction to recognise its validity (Sahnun, 1905). 
2.9 Purchase, Sale and Expenses 
2.9.1 Purchase and Sale 
As mentioned, for Malikites in mufawadah, the liability for obligations arising 
from the commercial activity of the partners is joint and several, even if the 
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particular transaction was conducted by one of them only. This applies to the 
rights and obligations pertaining to all purchases, sales, and debts, both those 
related to partnership business and those connected with the household affairs of 
the individual partners (Sahnun, 1905). 
For Hanafites in i 'nan, debts owed to and by each individual partner cannot be 
collected from, or claimed by, his associate. The same principle applies to the 
various problems connected with purchase and sales on behalf of the partnership. 
This is because the return of merchandise on these grounds is a right pertaining 
to the party directly involved in the transaction. A constituent does not have the 
right to dispute with the seller for something purchased by his agent (Udovitch, 
1970b ). If one i 'nan partner grants a postponement in the payment of a debt owed 
to the partnership, the postponement is not bound to his colleague, and the latter 
can demand payment of his share either from the debtor or from his partner 
(Udovitch, 1970b ). Either partner may rescind a purchase or sale made by the 
other if he does so before the transaction is consummated. !'nan partners also 
possessed the right of giving and taking pledges. However, only the partner 
conducting the sale, for example, could receive a pledge as a guarantee of 
payment. In case of non-payment, he would be obligated to compensate his 
colleague for the latter's share. 
2.9.2 Expenses 
Malikites believe that all business expenses should be covered by partnership 
funds in mufawadah contracts. Money spent or debts incurred for such activities 
as travel, or for the acquisition, transportation, and maintenance of company 
property, can be recovered from the joint capital (Udovitch, 1970b, Sahnun, 
1905). The disposition of personal and family expenses of the mufawadah 
partners varies with their marital status. If both are single, or if both are married 
with families, all their regular personal expenses are on the partnership account. 
Otherwise, they are required to render an account of their personal expenses, and 
·me- diffetencecbetween· the-singlec and married"partnerc',s-,expenditures.are.to J>~ 
covered from the latter's personal funds. Personal expenses covered by the 
partnership include only the necessities of daily life; luxury items are explicitly 
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excluded (Udovitch, 1970b, Sahnun, 1905). Similarly, for Hanafites, business 
expenses like hiring services are in the same category as purchase; and since a 
partner possesses the right to buy, he also possesses the right to hire. In respect of 
hiring expenses, if a partner hires services in connection with their common 
trade, the hired person can only claim his fee from the partner by whom he was 
hired and has no claim against his colleague. The partner who did the hiring can 
then demand half of this fee from his colleague. This applies, if the hire is 
connected with their common trade and if they are partners in selling and buying. 
If it is not connected with their trade then an i 'nan partner is not bound to pay for 
any service hired by his colleague. In respect of travel expenses Hanajites law 
allows the i 'nan partner to charge them to the joint fund (Udovitch, 1970b ). 
2.10 Stipulation of Management, Securities and Work 
2.10.1 Management 
The normal principle of shirkah (musharakah) partnership is that every partner 
has the right to take part in its management and to work for it. However, the 
partners may agree upon a condition that the management shall be carried out by 
one of them, and no other partner shall work for the musharakah. But if such a 
condition has been put in the contract of musharakah in express terms, the 
sleeping partner shall be entitled to the profit only to the extent of his investment 
and the ratio of profit allocated to him should not exceed the ratio of his 
investment (Usmani, 1999). 
In general, a partner in an i 'nan partnership does not have the rights to enter into 
another partnership with the wealth of the partnership, nor to mix up his goods 
with the goods of the shirkah; otherwise he will be liable for any resulting loss. 
In addition he cannot give an interest-free loan (qard-hasan) to someone from 
the wealth of the partnership, nor can he accept a qard for the partnership nor can 
he purchase on credit beyond the limit imposed by the assets of the shirkah, as 
tliis ~\\F6Ul<nunounrto_,istidanah c(buying and,- selling~on,credit) for:-cWhiGhcsp~cial 
permission is required from the other partners (Nayzee, 1999, Majallat, 1923). 
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In an i 'nan partnership based upon a general wakalah (agency contract); a 
partner has the powers to pledge/mortgage the assets of the partnership and also 
accept such pledges, and to enter into a contract of partnership with another on 
account of the shirkah (Nayzee, 1999). By contrast he can not give a qard or 
accept one for the partnership nor have the right to give the property of the 
partnership as a gift (Al-Kashani, 1968). 
2.1 0.2 Securities and Guarantees 
No security should be taken from the partner as such, from the point of view of 
Islamic law; only one sort of security is allowed, and indeed required, by some 
Islamic banks, such as the Sudanese banks. This is a security against the risk of 
negligence or wilful wrongdoing of the partner or his non-compliance with the 
terms of the partnership contract. The business risk inherent in the partnership 
and its outcome cannot be secured (Majallat, 1923). 
2.10.3 Work 
!'nan partnership requires that work in the capital of the partnership is stipulated 
for all the partners, but again it does not require all the partners to actually work. 
A partner has the right to give up work in the partnership with an excuse or even 
without an excuse. This act of the partner, if committed, has no bearing on the 
ratio of sharing profits stipulated in the contract. If work is stipulated for one 
partner alone, the contract will not be considered an i 'nan, because of the lack of 
the requisite conditions, and the relationship between the parties will become a 
mudarabah constituted with the work shirkah, if the working partner is allocated 
a higher ratio of profits (Nayzee, 1999). Work possesses a specific value when 
the value thereof is estimated. That is to say, labour is valued when the worth 
thereof is assessed. The work of one person may be proportionately more 
valuable than the work of some other person (Usmani, 2002). If two partners in 
i 'nan partnership stipulated that both of them shall work in the business, it may 
legally be agreed that-ene of them shall-have~agreater share of-the" profits than 
the other since the skill of one in trading may be greater and his output of work 
larger and more valuable. It may legally be agreed that work shall be in equal 
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shares, but that the profit devoted to work and wages shall be unequal and vice-
versa, i.e. they can have unequal work with equal profit shares devoted for work 
(Majallat, 1923). For example the partners may legally agree that the work shall 
be performed in equal shares and that the profit devoted to work shall be divided 
by the ratio of two thirds to one third, the reason being that one may have more 
expertise in his craft, and consequently, his work may be better. 
2.11 Comparison between the Hanafites I'nan and the Malikites 
Mufawadah 
The Malikites mufawadah is almost identical to the simplest form of the 
Hanafites i'nan partnership (Nayzee, 1999), an i'nan based upon wealth with 
agency contract (Wakalah) alone, not a contract of surety (Kafalah). 
Both contractual partnerships include a contract of agency. Thus, each of the 
partners is the agent of the other to deal with property, that is to say, to buy or 
sell, or to work for a wage for some other person. Consequently, in all 
partnership there is a condition that the partners shall be of sound mind and 
perfect understanding, as in the case of agency (Majallat, 1923). 
In both contractual partnerships partners are trustees for the other, and the 
property of the partnership in the possession of either is considered to be 
property entrusted for safe-keeping. If the property of the partnership is 
destroyed while in the possession of one of them without any fault or negligence 
on his part, he is not liable to make up the loss to the share of his partner 
(Majallat, 1923). However, the two forms differ in the following respects: 
(i) The Hanafites i 'nan permits the sharing of profits in ratios different 
from the ratio of the capital contributed. The Malikites mufawadah 
requires that profits always follow capital contribution. 
(ii) The Hanafites permit the stipulation of excess work by one partner, 
buCdo not insist upon"actualwork The·Malikites-mufawadahrequires __ 
work in proportion to the capital contributed and insists on actual 
work. 
50 
(iii) The Hanafites i 'nan permits, by virtue of the contract alone, a partner 
to buy on credit within, the capital limit. The Malikites mufawadah 
stipulates that special permission is needed for this and requires that 
all partners be present at the time of a credit purchase. 
2.12 Dissolution and Termination of the /'nan and Mufawadah Partnership 
The partnership contract can be terminated by the will of the partners or without 
their will. Termination of a partnership can occur either after the closure of the 
business or without closure of the business. Dissolution, in addition, can take 
place: by agreement; by mandatory dissolution; or by dissolution by the court. 
Generally, the following are the most common reasons which lead to the 
dissolution of a shirkah partnership contract. 
2.12.1 Rescission (Faskh) by either Party or Dissolution by Court because of 
Violation of the Contract 
Every partner has a right to terminate the musharakah at any time after giving his 
partner notice to this effect (Al-Kashani, 1968). The dissolution because of an 
abrogation of one of its partners does not become effective until the other partner 
becomes aware of his colleague's action. In this case, ifthe assets ofthe shirkah 
are in cash form, all of them will be distributed pro rata between the partners. But 
if the assets are not liquidated, the partners may agree either on the liquidation of 
the assets, or on their distribution or partition between the partners as they are. If 
there is a dispute between the partners in this matter i.e. one partner seeks 
liquidation while the other wants partition or distribution of the non-liquid assets 
themselves, the latter shall be preferred, because after the termination of 
musharakah, all the assets are in the joint ownership of the partners, and a co-
owner has a right to seek partition or separation, and no one can force him to 
seek liquidation. However, if the assets are such that they cannot be separated or 
partitioned, such as machinery, then they shall be sold and the sale-proceeds shall 
b«:f aistril:mted- (U smani, 1999): If one -of,the partners wants -termination- of-the 
musharakah without closing the business, while the other partner or partners 
wish to continue with the business, this purpose can be achieved by mutual 
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agreement. The partners who want to run the business may purchase the share of 
the partner who wants to terminate his partnership, because the termination of 
musharakah with one partner does not imply its termination between the other 
partners (Sahnun, 1905; Udovitch, 1970a; Al-Kashani, 1968). To conclude, the 
partnership may also be dissolved by one of the partners, provided the others are 
informed thereof. Cancellation by one without the knowledge of the others does 
not bring about the dissolution of the partnership. 
2.12.2 ][)eath and Incapacity of one of the Partners 
The death of one of the partners results in the immediate termination of a 
partnership regardless of whether or not the surviving partner is aware of this 
event. The partners' rights and obligations are limited to the business transacted 
up to the time of their benefactor's death. Similarly, if any one of the partners 
becomes insane or otherwise becomes incapable of effecting commercial 
transactions, the musharakah is terminated (Al-Kashani, 1968). The Majallat 
(1923) states that the death of one of the partners, or his affliction by permanent 
madness, causes the dissolution of the partnership. However, if there are three or 
more partners, the dissolution of the partnership only affects the one who dies or 
goes mad and the partnership subsists as regards the others. 
2.12.3 Complete Destruction of the Capital Wealth ofthe Partnership 
When the subject-matter of the partnership is wealth, it is terminated when the 
wealth is entirely destroyed, before transactions on it have commenced. This is 
the case when it is formed with standard currencies like dinars and not a mixture 
of currencies (Usmani, 1999). 
2.12.4 Termination of the Shirkah Period if it is for a Limited Duration 
The partnership is terminated by the mutual consent of the partners, by the 
accomplishment of its aim and by the expiration of the term stipulated in the 
contiacf (Siiliiiiin~ T9057'Udovitch~ l'970b ): 
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2.13 Conclusion 
A musharakah partnership is represented by mufawadah for Malikites and i 'nan 
for the other schools when its subject matter is wealth. While all schools agree 
that loss distribution must conform to the investment ratios, only Malikites and 
Shaft 'ites believe that the ratio of the share of a partner in profit must conform to 
the ratio of his investment. 
The liability of the partners is unlimited for the debts of the shirkah when the 
partners are acting according to and within the authority, granted to them. The 
capital for partnership can take the form of cash, goods, and/or other property. 
However, it cannot consist of forbidden commodities such as pork or wine, nor 
can the formation of the joint capital involve any kinds of riba. The normal 
principle of shirkah partnership is that every partner has a right to take part in its 
management and to work for it. As far as the guarantee provided, no security 
should be taken from the partner as only one sort of security is allowed, and 
indeed required, by some Islamic banks, and that is a security against the risk of 
negligence or wilful wrongdoing of the partner or his non-compliance with the 
terms of the partnership contract. 
There is, however, a substantial difference between shirkah as it existed in the 
early and medieval periods and as it exists now. This is to be expected. A 
dynamic system cannot continue to remain a replica of the past in an entirely 
different international and domestic milieu. Economies have become more 
complex and the international financial system has also followed suit in 
responding to the new challenges that it is facing. The financial system does not 
consist any longer of just banks. Hence, the discussion presented in this chapter 
provides a good ground for the musharakah in the modem world. The next 
chapter, therefore, will discuss modem musharakah as experienced presently. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework for Financing Entrepreneurs 
through Musharakah Scheme in the Banking System 
3.1 Introduction 
Having seen the rules governing shirkah and musharakah in the traditional.fiqh, 
it is sometimes presumed that musharakah is an old instrument which cannot 
keep pace with the ever-advancing need for speedy transactions. In fact, Islamic 
finance principle has not prescribed a specific form or procedure for 
musharakah. Rather, it has set some broad principles which can accommodate 
numerous forms and procedures. A new form or procedure in musharakah cannot 
be rejected merely because it has no precedent (Usmani, 2002). Scholars and 
bankers revitalised these partnerships when Islamic banks began to expand in the 
mid-seventies. Islamic banking is presumed to be based on two new techniques 
that fully satisfy the Islamic law (shari 'ah). The two legal forms are known in 
Arabic as musharakah and mudarabah business arrangements. Musharakah has 
been described as one of the best financial methods of Islamic banks as long as 
its terms and conditions are carefully observed (Saeed, 1999). 
In the banking system, the method can be carried out in a slightly different way 
as the bank is a separate entity which usually finances thousands and thousands 
of entrepreneurs and businesses at the same time so it is almost impossible to 
carry out its duty as a normal partner in every contract. In general, the bank 
would contribute to the capital of the venture and leave the management to the 
partner (Saeed, 1999). Musharakah has been conceived in Islamic banking as a 
mechanism which could bring together labour and capital for the socially 
beneficial production of goods and services. It can be used in all occupations 
\\'llich are run according to profit motives. Although several writers on Islamic 
banking -appear ~o use -the te~ . m~~h~rakah in th~ s-~n~~-of -p~rticipation in · 
investment projects, the term is used by Islamic banks in a much broader sense 
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(Ibrahim, 1987). For these banks, musharakah can be utilised for purely 
commercial purposes which are usually of a short term nature, or for 
participation in the equity of medium to long term projects. 
It is important to clarify that the partnership finance meant by this study is the 
one which establishes a relationship between two or more persons (one of them 
being the bank) carrying out efforts to manage a business in common with a view 
to profit (Al-Harran, 1993). The definition provides us with the requirements for 
a partnership in that there must be a business, that it must be a continuing 
business (carrying on), and that it must have the capability of making a profit and 
there must be a positive effort. Neither the equity finance which consists of the 
combination of sole proprietorship and partnership nor joint stock companies, 
nor cooperation is part of the scope of this study. 
This chapter discusses the main features of musharakah when carried out in the 
banking system to finance potential entrepreneurs. 
3.2 Definition 
Musharakah is a word of Arabic origin which literally means "sharing and 
jointly participating". In the context of business and trade it means a joint 
enterprise in which all the partners share the profit or loss of the joint venture 
(Usmani, 2002). Musharakah in terms of Islamic banking can be defined as a 
"form of partnership where two or more persons (one of them being a bank) 
combine their capital and labour together, to share the profits, enjoying similar 
rights and liabilities" (Usmani, 1999). 
3.3 Profit and Loss Distribution 
3.3.1 Distribution of Profits 
When a favourable return occurs in a musharakah project, the net return will be 
distributed to both parties according to the contract. This will mean that the 
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proportion of the distributed profit between the partners must be predetermined 
and agreed upon at the time of signing the contract. It is worth mentioning that it 
is allowed to agree, upon distribution, a proportion different to the proportion of 
the capital contribution. The ratio of profit for each partner must be determined 
in proportion to the actual profit accrued to the business, and not in proportion to 
the capital invested by him. It is not allowed to fix an amount in a lump sum for 
any one of the partners, or any rate of profit tied up with his investment (Ibrahim, 
1997). 
In addition, if a favourable return occurs, the contract will specify the percentage 
of distributed profit as an exchange of management and the percentage of 
distributed profit as a capital price. To illustrate, if the total net profit is 
represented by P, then we will have 
P =Pm +Pe 
Where Pm represents the profits as an exchange of capital management and Pe 
represents the profits as an exchange of capital (Ibrahim, 2004). Each of these 
amounts will be distributed according to the agreed share. 
The contract, as mentioned, will specify the percentages of the distribution 
devoted to the capital share, supposedly it is Rbe% for the bank then the 
entrepreneur will have to have (100- Rbe)% which represents the entrepreneur's 
profit devoted to capital (Ree). Likewise the distribution devoted to the 
management will be Rbm for the bank and (1 00 - Rbm)% is the entrepreneur 
share of profits denoted for management (Rem). According to Ibrahim (2004), 
the following equations are recognised: 
Pbe = Pe x Rbe% 
Pbm = Pm x Rbm% 
Pee= Pe x (100- Rbe)% 
Pem ~-p~ ---;;_-(TOO-Rb~)% 
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Pbe represents the share of the bank on the profit devoted to the capital and Pbm 
is that devoted to management, Pee and Pem represents the share of the 
entrepreneur on the profit devoted to the capital and and to the management 
respectively. Therefore the total profit distributed for the bank (Pb) and 
entrepreneur (Pe) will be 
Pb = Pe x Rbe + Pm x Rbm 
Pe = {Pe x (100-Rbe)%} + {Pm x (100-Rbm)%} 
This distribution can be done in another way when the profit devoted to 
management for both parties refers to the total net profit in the agreement. In 
such cases we have the total net profit 100% distributed to four collections as a 
percentage of the 100% as follows 
Rbe + Rbm + Ree +Rem= 100% 
P = Pbe + Pee + Pbm + Pem 
Therefore the total net profit distributed to the entrepreneur (partner) will be 
equal to the combination of his/her profit denoted for the management and the 
capital share. 
However, it is possible that if a partner puts into effect more effort, or has more 
experience, he or she can take an additional percentage of the profits in lieu of 
his labour/expertise as well as the capital, not only the capital share. 
3.3.2 Losses 
Losses, on the other hand, have to be distributed according to the capital 
contribution. In another words, losses are distributed according to the investment 
shares even if it is different to the profit distribution (Ibrahim, 1997). 
Therefore~ -.,... -.--,, 
Lb= (Cb/C) X L 
Le= (Ce/C) x L 
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where Lb represents the bank's share of loss, Lethe entrepreneur's share of loss, 
Cb represents the capital share of the bank and Ce the share of the 
entrepreneur., C is the total capital, and L represents the total loss. 
3.3.3 Management Share of the Profit (Hamesh Al-Edarah) 
Profit-sharing ratios are determined by many factors. One of which is an 
entrepreneur or firm's past and expected performance. Banks do not claim a 
share in the profits on an equal footing, which otherwise would mean sharing 
profits in strict proportion to the bank's financing of the capital of an 
entrepreneur. In a musharakah practice, the bank's role is limited in most cases 
to the provision of capital, whereas the customer, besides providing his share of 
the capital, also uses their labour, skill, enterprise and expertise. 
Therefore, the contract rules evaluate the contribution of the management, labour 
and skills by devoting and specifying a portion of profit for it. This portion is 
called management share of the Profit (Hamesh Al-Edarah ). The management 
bonus is payable to the entrepreneur under one of two cases, either on the basis 
of the whole profit regardless of its quantity or on the basis of achieving the 
projected profits. If profits fall below the projection, banks may allow a 
management share of profit at a lower rate rather than cancelling it altogether. 
Consequently the entrepreneur who achieves a higher rate of profits can earn a 
higher percentage of bonuses, which, as mentioned, shall be specified in the 
agreement (Akhtar, 1997). 
Broadly speaking, a musharakah contract determines the management share of 
the profit for both parties, the bank and the customer, through mutual agreement. 
However getting a fair proportion of the profit is a problem, as the entrepreneur 
will try to overvalue his management effort and then accordingly he will ask for 
a high percentage of the profit. By contrast, the bank will try to underestimate his 
effort. T~ms, a proper and fair methodology and calculation is needed and the 
estimation of the management sha~e of the pr~fit ~h~uld not be ieft entirety to 
negotiations. 
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Ibrahim (2004) suggested two approaches for the calculation; the residual 
approach and the imputed market share approach. The residual approach requires 
knowledge of the rate of return on each unit of the capital invested in previous 
similar projects. Subsequently, we have to deduct the share profits from the total 
expected profits and then divide the result by the total expected profit (Ibrahim, 
1999). To have the management profit as a residual requires knowledge of rate of 
return on each unit of the capital invested in previous similar projects. To 
illustrate, we can denote management profit by PM, the expected profit by P, 
capital investment by C, and lastly, the rate of return Rc. Thus in this approach, 
according to Ibrahim (2004), an estimation of the share profit can be calculated 
from the product of the volume of capital invested multiplied by the rate of return 
on each unit of capital (Ibrahim, 1999). The subsequent equation to estimate the 
management share of the profit can be obtained from the following: 
PM= {P- (C xRc)}/P 
Additional incentive to the entrepreneur can be granted, whereby the bank can 
determine a maximum rate of return of total capital used in the project, above 
which the bank will be ready to sacrifice additional profit for the partner. In the 
current situation, the partner sometimes gets this incentive through increased 
management share, over and above the limit determined by the contract. 
However, the modification outlined is neither operational nor easier to calculate 
as it is not easy in many profit and loss cases to calculate either the expected 
profit or the expected rate of return per unit of capital. 
In the second approach, the imputed market share approach, the evaluation will 
be made through using the current local market price divided by the total 
expected profit and, therefore, the profit can be calculated using the following 
equation: 
PM= CLMPIP 
where -p M is· the 'management profit; cp is the expected-.profit, CLMP denotes· the-
current local market price. A weighing system can be used for factors such as 
qualifications, experience, and volume of capital, sensitivity of the project and 
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additional incentives for the management (Ibrahim, 2004). If the project is wholly 
managed by the entrepreneur, the management share of profit, in addition to his 
profit share. If the bank is involved in management, part of the fees is paid to the 
bank. The management share usually ranges between 10% and 30% of the profit, 
depending on the entrepreneur's bargaining power and on the nature of the 
project (for example, if the activity requires special skills the share of the 
entrepreneur is greater). 
3.4 Guarantee (Collateral) 
3.4.1 No Collateral Needed (Intangible Guarantee Concept) 
Profits produced in musharakah are not guaranteed, and as a result, the 
entrepreneur does not assure, secure or guarantee profits. Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that musharakah does not require strict collateral guarantees and 
does not leave the partner (entrepreneur) with a heavy burden of debts, post-
dated cheques or any other kind of obligations. For this reason, concentration 
should be on certain factors, among which are the feasibility of the project, the 
skills of the customer and his history and lastly the objective situation of the 
market and its risks (Abdouli, 1991). Taking the personal features of the potential 
entrepreneur as a part of the factors can be considered as an intangible guarantee. 
No doubt, this increases risks on one hand, while promoting a new service on the 
other hand. Specifically, by taking intangible assets, such as education, skills, 
experience, and honesty, as collateral, Islamic banking breaks this discriminative 
barrier and offers an equal opportunity to all potential producers to improve their 
well-being and that of the society. 
It has been observed that the existing banking institutions prefer to grant 
financial facilities to those clients who, apart from enjoying a good business 
reputation, are also able to offer sufficient collateral security mainly in the form 
of valuable assets. This practice seems quite reasonable from the risk point of 
view, liowever, the -rioii-hingibfe7 cOIIaferaT'liolOefs are Unjusfiiiaolf deprived of 
obtaining the necessary financial accommodation. The existing practice of 
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demanding collaterals for the purpose of granting financial accommodation 
stems from the fact that Western Banking institutions are primarily concerned 
with profitability rather than social imperatives (Abdouli, 1991). The imposition 
of tangible collaterals as a necessary condition left small businessmen and 
farmers trapped in a vicious circle: they cannot get access to finance unless they 
offer sufficient collateral, they cannot possess tangible collaterals unless they 
build a strong productive base; they cannot improve their productive base unless 
they get access to finance; back to the starting point they cannot get access to 
finance unless they offer sufficient collaterals. Hence, there is no solution for the 
endless vicious circle. Besides this, there is no real consideration for their 
management skills or the feasibility of the project, since you can get the credit as 
long as the risk is low and the capital with its interests is well guaranteed 
(Abdouli, 1991). 
This rmses the fundamental question of whether intangible assets such as 
education, experience and skills can be regarded as equal collateral as less than 
tangible assets. The answer depends very much on the banking system prevailing 
in the society as well as the practice carried out. By using the musharakah mode 
of finance in the Islamic banking system, the answer might be yes. Islamic 
banking balances the priority of the needs of society and common interest with 
individual profit and private interest. Since the primary concern of the banking 
institution is both the maximization of profitability and of social imperatives, the 
tangibility of assets, as a pre-requisite to accessing finance loses its importance. 
Moreover, the granting of credit to an educated, yet financially poor person could 
be even more beneficial to both social justice and long term growth. 
Some successful practices of lending without collateral for small businesses 
might prove the possibility of such a theory. One well-known success story is 
that of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which charges a lower market rate of 
interest to finance small and medium enterprise SMEs, without the need for 
collateral. It is maintained that the crucial factor in the success of the Grameen 
model is a cheap system of assessing creditworthiness, through local knowledge 
and group pressure (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). Some suggestions advised 
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to use the group lending idea in financing musharakah to small and micro 
business in order to reduce the administrative burden on bank staff and at the 
same time provide alternative security against possible default (Abdalla, 1999). 
Musharakah agreements could be concluded individually or with members of a 
group of five clients for example, who mutually select each other before applying 
to the ban1<.. Group collateral would be in the form of security required by the 
bank against fraud or misuse of funds. Monitoring of musharakah could be 
undertaken by the group leader in collaboration with bank staff. Each group 
which fully honours its commitments could be rewarded by a larger future 
"finance" to each member of the group. This would constitute an additional 
incentive for honouring commitments (Abdalla, 1999). Consequently, this will be 
serving the overall banks favour. 
However, this proposal does not give a solution for financing medium and large 
enterprises. In addition, the price which might be paid here is high cost and high 
risk, as following up many financed projects on the profit and loss sharing 
scheme might increase both the risk and the cost. 
3.4.2 Tangible Guarantee 
Nonetheless, in most practices, the bank (the financier) who does not usually 
perform in a full management capacity, normally asks for a guarantee against any 
losses caused by the partner as a result of his mismanagement or negligence. 
Therefore, the customer might have to provide acceptable collateral, such as: 
(i) A real estate guarantee of a value equal to or more than the volume of 
financing; 
(ii) A bank ownership guarantee, which is used when the bank finances a 
means of transport through a diminishing musharakah, in which case 
the vehicle is registered as a property of the bank until the partner has 
paid all the instalments; 
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(iii) Two reputable guarantors (personal guarantee of a third), and he or 
she should sign promissory bank notes; and 
(iv) In the case of financing raw materials, the bank usually supplies only 
part of the raw materials to the partner, depending on his or her 
payment of instalments (Ibrahim, 2004). In case of musharakah for 
exporting or importing, and in order to secure himself from any 
negligence on the part of the customer, the bank may put a condition 
that it will be the responsibility of the customer to export the goods in 
full conformity with the conditions of the Letter of Credit. In this 
case, if some discrepancies are found, the exporter alone shall be 
responsible, and the financier shall be immune from any loss due to 
such discrepancies, because it is caused by the negligence of the 
exporter (Usmani, 2002). 
Alternative types of security against possible misuse of funds could be 
introduced, e.g., pawning of valuable possessions (such as jewellery) when 
lending to female entrepreneurs. 
In all cases, being the customer's partner, the bank will be liable to bear any loss 
which may be caused due to any reason other than the negligence or misconduct 
ofthe customer (Usmani, 1999). 
3.5 Types of Modern Musharakah 
Partnership financing can be categorized according to the duration of the project 
and or the nature of the project. Depending on its duration, it can be classified as 
a short, medium or long term musharakah. According to the nature of the project, 
it can be classified as impermanent, permanent and diminishing musharakah. 
While in a permanent continuous musharakah, the partnership is supposed to 
exist forever and the shareholder might be looking for either capital gain, or 
profit, or both. In an impermanent partnership, it finishes within a specific period 
mentioned in the contract, or defined by the purpose of the project, or by 
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finishing a single transaction. In an impermanent partnership the shareholders 
mainly look for profitability. A diminishing partnership is one in which the 
bank's share in the partnership diminishes gradually through repayment, leaving 
the venture/asset/project to be wholly owned by the client. 
3.5.1 Types of the Partnership Musharakah According to the Duration of 
the Project 
Musharakah partnership can be for either an indefinite period, as in the case of 
the stock of joint stock companies, or a definite (short, medium or long) period as 
in the case of participatory finance through musharakah when it is for a specific 
period, or shares in partnerships when only profits are targeted not the capital 
gain (EI-Bhasri and Adam, 1997). A short-term financing is usually for the 
financing of working capital for one production period, season, fiscal year, or 
even a certain operation which involves a production period ranging between 3 
and 12 months' duration (Al-Harran, 1997). The long-term financing covers 
financing of capital assets extending over a period of more than three years. 
3.5.2 Types of the Partnership Musharakah According to the N a tore of 
the Project 
3.5.2.1 Impermanent Normal Musharakah (for a specific period) 
An impermanent musharakah agreement is normally for one specific purpose, 
such as the purchase and sale of a machine or a commodity. Both the bank and 
its partner contribute to the capital, but it is the partner who undertakes the 
management of the buying, selling, marketing and account-keeping related to the 
transaction. The bank's function is to finance its share of the transaction, to 
provide necessary banking services like the opening of letters of credit where 
necessary, and to monitor the progress of the musharakah through the current 
account and other periodic progress reports from the partner (Usmani, 2002). An 
impermanent normal musharakah is usually used for commercial purposes. A 
commercial musharakah contract is useful for an Islamic bank as it can be 
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liquidated quickly, the turnover of capital is higher, and therefore, the return will 
also be generally higher. The bank's activities in advancing finance on the basis 
of a commercial musharakah to a large number of ventures; serve to diversify 
and minimise risk in its investment operations. Impermanent normal musharakah 
partnership financing can be either for financing of a single transaction, financing 
of working capital or sharing in the gross profit only. 
3.5.2.1.1 Financing of a Single Transaction 
Musharakah can also be used for financing a single transaction. This instrument 
can be employed as an example for fulfilling the day-to-day needs of small 
traders and financing imports and exports. This is demonstrated when the 
exporter (the entrepreneur) has a specific order from abroad in which the sale 
price of the exported goods is well known before hand. Since the exporter 
doesn't have the ability to, or does not want to, finance the whole transaction, he 
might apply for musharakah finance. The bank can easily calculate the expected 
profit and, if it is decided to take it further, both of them will share the amount of 
export bill at a pre-agreed percentage as well as sharing the profit according to 
the predetermined ratios and sharing the loss according to their share of the 
capital (Usmani, 1999). 
3.5.2.1.2 Financing of Working Capital 
In this situation, the customer would have an asset from which he can make 
revenue but he does not have the ability to finance the working capital. So he 
seeks the finance needed from the bank on the basis of sharing the production 
brought out from this project according to their contribution. The assets will be 
hired for a suitable period. The depreciation of the asset for the whole 
musharakah period will be calculated, and added to the capital share of the 
partner. All liquid and non-liquid assets of the business are evaluated, and the 
profit may be distributed on the basis of this evaluation. The net income is 
distributed in accordance with the agreement of the contract (Usmani, 2002). 
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The profit can be determined before all the assets of the business are liquidated, 
in case the working partner has purchased the share of the financier in the assets 
of his business, and the price of his share can be determined on the basis of 
valuation, keeping in mind the ratio of the profit allocated to him, according to 
the terms of the musharakah. In case of loss, however, any decrease in the total 
value of the assets should be divided between them exactly according to the ratio 
of their investment. The working capital finance therefore, caters for both 
production and management, thus leading to increased incomes for income 
groups which do not own capital (Usmani, 1999). 
3.5.2.1.3 Sharing the Gross Profit Only 
In a business with a large number of fixed assets provided by the two partners 
(industrialists), particularly in a running industry, it is easier to finance 
musharakah using the rule of sharing the gross profit only as it will be difficult to 
evaluate all the assets and calculate indirect expenses, like the depreciation of the 
machinery, salaries of the staff, etc., which might cause accounting problems and 
might lead to some disputes between partners. Musharakah can be used to solve 
difficulties when the parties may agree on the principle that, instead of net profit, 
the gross profit will be distributed between the parties, that is, the indirect 
expenses shall not be deducted from the distributable profit (Usmani, 2002). All 
the indirect expenses developed from any assets shall be borne by the owning 
partner of these assets, and only direct expenses (like those of raw material, 
direct labour, electricity etc.) shall be borne by the musharakah. If the assets 
were provided by one partner (industrialist), only the percentage of his profit 
may be increased to compensate him to some extent otherwise the parties may 
agree that the musharakah portfolio will pay an agreed rent to the partner for the 
use of the assets, like machinery and the building owned by him. This rent will 
be paid to him from the musharakah fund irrespective of profit or loss accruing 
to the business. 
Hence the arrangement of sharing the gross profit and excluding the indirect 
expenses may be justified on the grounds that, in such a case it is not possible or 
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it is difficult to differentiate between the costs belonging to musharakah and the 
costs belonging to other operations, and the whole cost of these expenses cannot 
be imposed on the musharakah only. 
3.5.2.2 Diminishing Musharakah: (Decreasing Participation) 
Decreasing participation or diminishing musharakah is defined as a partnership 
whereby the bank enables the partner to gain ownership of the project gradually, 
according to the conditions set out in the musharakah contract. This contract will 
gradually lead to the entrepreneur's ownership of the asset which was the subject 
of the musharakah project solely, as he will buy the bank's shares until he 
becomes the sole owner of the asset. Customers of this form of musharakah are 
those who are not interested in the bank's continued co-participation in their 
projects, and who wish to gain ownership of the project in the shortest possible 
time. The financier (the bank) makes a binding promise to sell its ownership 
shares ofthe enterprise in installments (Boualem and Khan, 1995). 
The entrepreneur voluntarily buys the share of the financier at the pnces 
prevailing at the time of sale, so that at the maturity of the contract, the 
entrepreneur becomes sole owner of the project (Boualem and Khan, 1995). The 
researcher assumes that entrepreneurs prefer to own the enterprise in the first 
instance. It has been argued that in certain economic activities the need for the 
contractual and gradual termination of the financier's ownership is necessary. 
These activities include, for instance, entrepreneurial and investment promotion 
activities, developing agricultural firms and housing (Usmani, 1999). 
The entrepreneur enters into a diminishing musharakah under a Shirkat Al-milk 
(joint ownership) agreement with the bank. The customer pays, for example, 
20% as the initial share to co-own the asset (i.e. a house, etc.) whilst the bank 
provides the remaining balance of 80%. The customer will then gradually redeem 
the financier's 80% share at an agreed portion, until the house is fully owned by 
the customer. 
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Secondly, the bank leases its share (80%) m the house ownership to the 
entrepreneur under the terms of ijarah, i.e. by charging rent. The entrepreneur 
agrees to pay the rent to the bank for using its share of the property, or the 
entrepreneur can buy the shares held by the bank at the end of each financial 
period, raising his share to 100%. The periodic rental amounts will be jointly 
shared between the customer and the bank according to the percentage of share 
holding at the particular time, which keeps changing as the customer redeems the 
financier's share (Boualem and Khan, 1995). The customer's share ratio would 
increase after each rental payment due to the periodic redemption until 
eventually fully owned by the customer. 
Bendjilali and Khan (1995) and Usmani (2002) basically agreed on the 
implementation of diminishing musharakah. They argued that the product would 
help people rely less on other financing methods (such as murabahah). 
While the instalments should be fixed from the beginning, the price of the asset 
and the inflation might affect the evaluation of the asset. The evaluation of the 
fixed assets in a diminishing (self-liquidating) musharakah needs a modification. 
Banks do not usually re-evaluate the asset at different times when part of the 
repayment is made. Inflation is not taken into account, and hence a diminishing 
musharakah is to the disadvantage of the bank. Re-evaluation of the assets 
should be undertaken and the volume of payment can be considered as a ratio of 
the value at the time of payment. For full payment of the value of the asset, the 
addition of these ratios must be equal to unity. As suggested by Ibrahim (2004), 
if P 1, P2, P3, P4 and so forth are payments in periods 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively, and 
VI, V2, V3, V4, and so forth are values of the asset in each payment period 
respectively, then at the time of full payment, 
PJ/Vl+ R2/V2+R3/V3+R4/V4+ ... = 1 
Adjustment of the partners' shares has to be modified each period in accordance 
with the changes that may have occurred after each part payment (Ibrahim and 
Vijaykumar, 2003). 
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It should be stated that the concept of diminishing musharakah is not confined to 
home ownership only. It can also be applied to other forms of acquiring assets 
such as buying a car or a taxi for earning income by using it as a hired vehicle 
(Meera and Abdul Razak, 2005). 
3.5.2.3 Permanent or Continuous Participation 
Musharakah can also be adopted for continuing businesses. The partners agree 
on the share of the profits to be allocated to the entrepreneur for his management, 
and the balance is shared in the same proportion as their respective investments 
(Harper, 1994). 
3.6 Differences between Musharakah and Conventional Partnership 
Among the many differences, there are two which stand out between the 
conventional partnership and the musharakah form of partnership. These are the 
likely limitations of the period of contractual musharakah form of partnership, 
and the liability for losses in the two forms of partnership. Whereas conventional 
partnership is usually not specified for a limited period of time, musharakah is. 
In limited conventional partnership, one partner can have unlimited liability 
beyond his/her capital contribution. In musharakah all partners have unlimited 
liability (Ibrahim, 1999). 
However, if a musharakah is registered according to company law, then the 
limited liability of their shareholders will apply. They cannot be held liable for 
more than the amount of capital they have invested. This requirement makes it 
necessary to regard the musharakah as an entity separate from the individuality 
of the shareholders. This common practise law (urj) has given way to safe and 
stable musharakah resulting in big commercial organizations and flourishing 
businesses, while the liability is not limited if it is recognised as a partnership 
(Al-Harran, 1995b ). However, most of the short term musharakah agreements 
are considered as partnerships, which means no limited liability is valid. Hence, 
if negative returns and losses occurred, liability will extend to the partners' 
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private money collectively, regardless of their actual contribution in capital and 
management. In addition to these differences, in musharakah loss distribution, 
partners can not agree upon a ratio of distribution different to capital share, but in 
partnership they can. While it is allowed to fix the amount of profit for one 
partner in a conventional partnership, the profit should be distributed using a 
ratio in the musharakah scheme. To conclude, musharakah is just a kind of 
conventional partnership with special conditions. 
3. 7 Follow-up Procedures and Supervision 
Broadly speaking, effective bank supervision is the key to achieve financial 
efficiency and stability. The key objective of supervision is to maintain stability 
and confidence in the financial system, thereby reducing the risk of loss to 
depositors and other creditors. This remains especially in PLS modes as the 
banks face moral hazards and adverse selection. Staff should encourage and 
pursue market discipline, and enhance market transparency and surveillance 
(Khan and Ahmed, 2001). Therefore, staff must gather information both onsite 
and offsite its partnership projects, and must practise their authority to enforce 
decisions whenever needed. Therefore, the staff especially those working in 
supervision and following investments, must understand the nature of the 
business undertaken by banks and entrepreneurs and ensure as much as possible 
that the projects and the risks incurred by the customer are being adequately 
managed. Effective banking supervision requires that the risk profile of 
individual customers be assessed and supervisory resources allocated 
accordingly. Supervisors must ensure that banks have resources appropriate to 
undertake risks, including adequate capital, sound management, effective control 
systems, and accounting records (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). 
Effective supervision of banks ensures that projects invested function safely and 
soundly, so that the financial system can attain the full confidence of the bank's 
intermediation role. Supervisory systems are expected to depend on the socio-
political and legal frameworks prevailing in different countries. Hence there 
cannot be a standardized supervisory system to be followed in all jurisdictions. 
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Different countries use different methods and approaches to assess bank risks. 
These approaches are however, converging on one important point, namely, risk-
based formal and systematic supervision shall gradually be adopted in order to 
make supervision effective (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). 
To carry out this mission, Islamic banks also need help in the field of training. 
Currently, every bank has to arrange its own training programme. The central 
banks in Muslim countries could help by initiating a programme to train the staff 
of all banks in Islamic banking, thereby reducing the overhead costs of these 
banks. The central banks may also make arrangements for the training of 
businessmen and entrepreneurs in the maintenance of proper accounts and in 
having a proper understanding of Islamic banking. A programme to inform the 
public about the nature of Islamic banking could also be very useful (Chapra and 
Khan, 2000). 
The establishment of shared institutions to perform the various tasks that these 
banks have to perform themselves at present is one of the most indispensable 
needs of Islamic banks. The establishment of such institutions will help to reduce 
the overhead costs of Islamic banks and raise their profitability. Most Muslim 
countries do not have private credit rating agencies to provide banks with 
information about the credit rating of counter-parties. Without such information, 
it will not be possible for these banks to move into the relatively more risky 
modes of mudarabah and musharakah financing. The establishment of such 
agencies will also greatly help enhance market discipline (Chapra and Khan, 
2000). 
Investment departments' staff should regularly visit musharakah projects and 
check bookkeeping, marketing of products, account receivable and collection 
procedure. These arrangements tend to ensure the safety as well as the 
profitability of the bank's investment. The bank should constantly watch its 
interest by focusing on the overall performance of the project. 
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Follow-up and close supervision is one of most important factors contributing to 
the solution of problems and the elimination of obstacles that face the partner 
entrepreneur in the running of operations and the marketing of the finished 
product. Follow-up also limits the chance for any possible dishonesty on the part 
of the partner (e.g. unrecorded sale of the product or materials, or tampering with 
the records, etc.) (EI-Bhasri and Adam, 1997). 
One of the main problems facing musharakah financing is the increasing burden 
of monitoring and follow-up, especially with the expansion of bank operations. 
Another important aspect is the ability of the bank to recruit the right type of 
personnel, those who are dedicated, qualified, competent, patient and business-
minded. This remains to be the biggest challenge; the success of musharakah 
depends, to a great extent on building trust between the bank and its partner to 
avoid fraud and dishonesty. How a bank could build such trust remains another 
challenge (Abdalla, 1999). 
In line with this, according to Ibrahim (1999): the bank requires the musharakah 
entrepreneur to observe the following conditions: 
(i) A proper bookkeeping system should be followed which reflects 
bookkeeping and accounting records, administrative activities, 
marketing policies, accounts receivable as well as collection 
procedures; 
(ii) There should be a separate bank account for the joint venture; 
(iii) Project materials should be properly stored with withdrawals made as 
agreed by both parties. Material purchases should be supported by 
invoices and should be limited to the quantities and types specified in 
the partnership contract; 
(iv) Sales revenues should be deposited in the venture account regularly; 
(v) The partner is required to submit periodic reports showing the details 
of the operations; 
(vi) The client should adhere to the dates set for the commencement and 
liquidation of the venture project 
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(vii) And above all, both field follow-up and office follow-up should be 
used. To elaborate, visits to the projects should be made to check 
materials, documents, performance and management. In addition to 
that office checking, follow-up should be carried out which includes 
checking documents and reports, meetings with clients, and training 
clients to improve management skills. 
The primary reasons for monitoring, therefore, are: 
(i) To keep track of project progress; 
(ii) To provide feedback on the project management; 
(iii) To serve as a warning mechanism for project management; and 
(iv) To help prevent or solve problems encountered during project 
implementation 
(Al-Harran, 1995b) 
Project failures on the part of the bank to follow-up the operations closely may 
be because of distance, the lack of marketing outlets and the inexperience of the 
staff (EI-Bhasri and Adam, 1997). For example, in financing small businesses, 
the close proximity of the business location to the bank's branch has been found 
to be helpful. This enables close supervision by the bank representatives, and 
easier contact on the part of the partner. It also facilitates the regular deposit of 
sales proceeds. 
The Grameen bank experience sheds light on the success of using group lending 
methods, which, by analogy, might be used in financing musharakah only to 
small and micro businesses (Abdalla, 1999). To elaborate, musharakah 
agreements should be concluded with members of a group of five clients, for 
example, instead of on an individual basis. Those members of each group 
mutually select each other before applying to the bank. Then, group collateral 
would be taken by the bank, which means if a fraud or misuse of funds has been 
proved against any member, then the whole group will be responsible. 
Additionally, monitoring of musharakah could be undertaken by the group leader 
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in collaboration with the bank staff (Abdalla, 1999). This will reduce the 
administrative burden on bank staff and at the same time provide alternative 
security against possible fraud or misuse. 
3.8 Marketing the Product of the Entrepreneurship 
In Musharakah the bank may take an active role in marketing partnership 
products, thus reducing the marketing burden of the entrepreneurs. The goal here 
is to help partners fetch good prices for their products which are often low at the 
production time or facing high competition. Marketing involves providing 
channels whereby products are distributed from producers to consumers. In 
agricultural projects, for example, the price which a crop fetches at harvest time 
is usually lowest in the area of production. Thus, the problem is related to storage 
and transportation. Storage is still difficult though it is receiving a good degree of 
consideration. 
Another way to carry out the role of marketing is to establish a subsidiary 
company to play the role for all similar products created by different partnerships 
and entrepreneurship projects. The marketing subsidiary company will take over 
the function of middlemen in the traditional marketing system, while giving 
better prices for their catches, and at the same time promoting the partnership 
goods in the marketing activities so as to encourage their self-reliance. The main 
aim is to promote and to reduce wastage to meet the demand of consumers. The 
marketing subsidiary will be able to offer higher prices to the customers and 
partnership because it sells productions directly to its retailers and wholesalers 
without going through the various middlemen, and with all the mark-up going to 
the company. The marketing subsidiary will also be responsible for promoting 
new channels for marketing (Al-Harran, 1995b). 
Primarily, the marketing subsidiary companies objectives are: 
(i) To collect and distribute the goods to various places within the state 
or outside the state or to export markets; 
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(ii) To provide the direct link between the producer and the consumer, by 
reducing the role of the middleman; 
(iii) To provide up-to-date information on market prices for goods under 
sale, so that the price will not be easily manipulated by the 
middleman; 
(iv) To encourage the customer to be involved in distribution activities as 
partners or shareholders of the marketing subsidiary. 
(Al-Harran, 1995a) 
The marketing subsidiary will provide transportation to the various markets, 
suitable storing like refrigeration facilities, warehousing and so on. Taking part 
in the marketing mission, this would no doubt broaden the bank's scope of 
knowledge and develop its business skills, this being another asset to the bank. 
This business skill is transferred to entrepreneurs in the process of musharakah 
financing and adds to the merits of this method of financing from the 
entrepreneur's perspective (Abdalla, 1999). As a result a proper follow-up, good 
performance, high profitability and low risk can be favourable gains for 
increasing the profitability of the banks and its share holders as well as the whole 
community (Al-Harran, 1997). 
3.9 Securitization of Musharakah 
Musharakah can be securitized, especially in the case ofbig projects where huge 
amounts are required to which only a limited number of people can afford to 
subscribe. Every subscriber can be given a musharakah certificate which 
represents his proportionate ownership in the assets of musharakah, and after the 
project by acquiring substantial non-liquid assets, these musharakah certificates, 
can be treated as negotiable instruments and can be bought and sold in the 
secondary market. This represents the difference between bonds and musharakah 
certificates as the bond stands as a loan associated with interest and has nothing 
to do with the actual business and its outcome while the musharakah certificate 
on the contrary, represents the direct pro-rata ownership of the holder in the 
assets of the projects. If all the assets of the joint projects are in liquid form, the 
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certificate will represent a certain proportion of money owned by the project, so, 
if sold it will mean unequal money exchanged for money which is not allowed in 
shari 'ah. In contrast, when the capital provided is used for buying assets like 
machinery, raw material, furniture etc., the musharakah certificate will represent 
the holders' proportionate ownership in these assets (Usmani, 1999). However, 
trading in these certificates is not allowed when all the assets of the musharakah 
are still in liquid form like cash or advance due from others. For a valid trading 
of the musharakah certificates acceptable to all schools except the Hanafites it is 
necessary that the portfolio of musharakah consists of non-liquid assets valued at 
more than 50% of its total worth. For the Hanafites School trading is allowed 
even if the non-liquid assets are less than 50%, but the size of the non-liquid 
assets should not be negligible (Usmani, 2002). 
3.10 Musharakah and Inflation 
In countries with high inflation, musharakah preserves the real value of capital 
invested that is, at the time of selling the two partners may decide to delay selling 
in anticipation of higher prices (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). The sale of 
goods of the joint project can be postponed until the price rises to a level at 
which it is profitable to sell the products. It has thus an in-built indexation which 
hedges against inflation. Musharakah neutralizes the effect of inflation because it 
boosts the prices and augments profits which banks share with clients. The 
settlement of projects financed is always based on current market prices and not 
on the prices which existed at the time of writing the contract. The amount of 
money recovered by each partner is based on a proportion of the profits actually 
earned. Thus, it is automatically adjusted for the inflation (Akhtar, 1997). 
Compared with murabahah, the fixed nature of the mark-up during the contract 
period, which at times may stretch to a number of years, poses a severe problem 
and undermines the bank's profit performance. This in tum could prevent banks 
from raising the rate of return paid to their investment-deposit holders, who stand 
to lose the purchasing power of their deposits due to prolonged- inflation 
(Najmabadi, 1999). 
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3.11 Economic Risks 
Compared with the non-PLS mode of finance, PLS modes are more risky, PLS 
can not systematically be made dependent on collateral or other guarantees and 
the administration of PLS modes is more complex compared with non-PLS. 
These activities include the determination of profit and loss sharing ratios on 
investment projects in various sectors of the economy, and the ongoing auditing 
of financed projects to ensure that Islamic banks' shares are fairly calculated. 
Therefore, in order to safeguard funds and realize profits, Islamic banks would 
need to rely on a set of appropriate policies and adequate infrastructure for 
portfolio diversification, monitoring and control in PLS modes rather than non-
PLS modes. Risk of loss, dishonesty, revealing the business secrecy, and 
unwillingness to share the entrepreneurship profit are the main concern in 
financing through the musharakah scheme. 
3.11.1 Concerns about PLS and Musharakah Finance Scheme 
Financing entrepreneurs through musharakah is more likely to pass on losses of 
the business to the banks and consequently this loss will be passed on to 
depositors. Hence, the depositors, having being constantly exposed to the risk of 
loss, will not be willing to deposit their money in these banks. As a result their 
savings will either remain idle or will be used in transactions outside of the 
industry of banking channels. In the final stage, this will lead to these savings not 
contributing to the economic development at the national level (Usmani, 2002). 
It important to study, with more depth and precaution, the risks, guarantee if 
needed, and the potentials of the business if relevant. Since these projects will be 
feasible studies, then risk management can be developed to minimise the exposed 
risks and to maximise the expected profitability. Therefore, it is more likely that 
over time through accumulated experiences, these banks will be able to develop 
their own approaches and accept only those projects which fulfil the need of 
achieving higher profitability (Usmani, 2002). 
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3.11.2 Dishonesty 
In financing entrepreneurs through musharakah, some dishonest clients may take 
advantage of the musharakah instrument by not sharing any return with the bank 
by hiding the real earning of the entrepreneurship and claiming that it has 
suffered a loss or revealing an underestimated profit achieved, in which case the 
bank will jeopardise not only the profit but also the capital (Usmani, 1999). 
Compared with Islamic banks, in conventional banks, the defaulters have always 
created the problem of bad debts. However, undoubtedly, the apprehension of 
dishonesty is more severe for Islamic banks. To overcome the problem the 
following proposals can be suggested. 
First of all, a well designed system of auditing should be implemented whereby 
the accounts of all the entrepreneurs are fully maintained and properly controlled. 
Secondly, credit scores should be applied to measure entrepreneurs' risks. It is 
worth mentioning here that there is an urgent need for a data system about 
entrepreneurs' history and work thought credit scores to measure the risk brought 
from the entrepreneur. If any misconduct, dishonesty or negligence is established 
against a client in any bank, he might be subject to punitive steps, and may be 
deprived of availing any facility from any bank in the whole country, at least for 
a specified period. However such an approach is yet to be implemented in Sudan. 
Thirdly, banks might agree to finance a high risk musharakah on a selective basis 
to a number of clients, considered to have integrity beyond all reasonable doubt. 
Lastly, there are some sectors where there is not much room for misconduct, 
negligence and dishonesty to be an obstacle for financing through musharakah 
such as Import and Export. Almost every essential thing will be known e.g. the 
exporter will have the specific order from abroad, the prices will be agreed, the 
costs will not be difficult to determine, payments will normally be secured by a 
letter of credit, and the payments are made through the bank itself. Similarly, 
financing of imports may be designed on the basis of musharakah with some 
precautions, as explained earlier. Therefore dishonesty will not be an obstacle 
against using musharakah instruments (Usmani, 2002). 
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These steps will serve as strong prevention against hiding the actual profit or 
committing any other act of dishonesty. Otherwise, the clients of the banks 
cannot afford to show artificial losses constantly, because it will be against their 
own interest in many respects. It is true that even after taking all such 
precautions, there will remain a possibility in some cases where dishonest clients 
may succeed, but penalizing steps and the general atmosphere of the business 
will gradually reduce the number of such cases. 
3.11.3 Secrecy of the Business 
Another assertion is that, by making the bank a partner in the business of the 
client, it may disclose the secrets of the business to other traders through the 
bank. This obstacle in many cases is almost theoretical as banks do not usually 
interfere deeply with management affairs, which causes another problem for 
musharakah projects. However, a suggestion can be made to include a condition 
in the contract which prohibits the bank either from interference with 
management affairs or disclosure of any information about the business to any 
person without prior permission of the entrepreneur (Usmani, 1999). 
3.11.4 Entrepreneur's Unwillingness to Share Profits 
It is argued that some entrepreneurs are not willing to share with the banks the 
actual profits of their business. Their reluctance is based on two reasons. Firstly, 
they think that the bank has no right to a share of the actual profit, which may be 
substantial, because the bank has nothing to do with the management or running 
of the business, as well as any creativity that might be involved in the business, 
so why should they (the entrepreneurs) share the fruits of their labours with the 
bank who merely provides the funds? To overcome this concern, fair and proper 
measures should be taken to estimate the management's role in the profit, and 
this should be reflected on the management's share of profit denoted to the 
entrepreneur. 
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Secondly, it is further contended that information about the real profit might be 
passed through their banks to tax authorities, and so the entrepreneurs' tax 
liability increases accordingly (Usmani, 1999). In fact, many countries charge 
unreasonable tax, regardless of the kind of finance the entrepreneur has 
succeeded to secure. In this regard, a recommendation to change tax policies and 
laws should be passed down to the parliaments of these countries for a fair tax 
system. In addition, before entering into a partnership agreement, banks are 
required to review the purpose, prospects, and future operations under the 
proposed partnership agreement, and ensure that the expected profit will be 
realised and visible to cover estimated tax, and that the partnership capital will 
be, in all probability, safe and secure throughout the duration of the agreement, 
and that the partnership agreement can be terminated at the end of its duration 
accordingly (Usmani, 2002). 
3.12 Conclusion 
A musharakah contract covers both finance and management terms to which 
both parties must adhere. In addition, the contract should provide the percentages 
of profit and loss distribution after deducting all agreed upon costs including 
insurance cost. The contract will also determine the possibility of the joint 
storage of raw materials. In order to carry out transactions, a joint account will 
be opened in the name of the partnership in which both withdrawals and deposits 
from sales are made according to the contractual terms (Ibrahim, 1999). In case 
of financial loss, these unfavourable returns will be distributed to both parties 
according to the capital share unless it has been proved that it is a natural and 
direct cause of neglect, abuse or violation of terms agreed upon by the party 
undertaking the management and operation of the venture, in which case such 
party shall bear the cost of all damages (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). The 
musharakah scheme puts great emphasis on the transaction itself, rather than the 
creditworthiness of the partner. No strict security should be demanded unless it is 
against possible fraud or repayment-evasion, not against the risk of losses. Any 
advancement demanded is made to cover the share of the partner in the venture 
and not as a security against losses (Thomas, 1995). 
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In a sense, however, musharakah partnerships require no more of the banker, or 
his customer, than is required in a genuine business-based relationship, as 
opposed to one based mainly on security. If the bank genuinely bases its decision 
on an appraisal of the entrepreneur and the earning capacity of his proposed 
investment, and monitors the account on a regular basis in order to forestall 
problems, he will need to be as familiar with the business as a banker who has 
invested in a musharakah partnership (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). 
The scheme has many advantages, although its application is not without 
constraints and its theory raises some concerns which can be overcome if the 
method followed some recommendations. 
The following concluding remarks may be obtained from this chapter: 
(i) Musharakah finance through Islamic banks is a contractual agreement 
between the bank and the customer (partner or entrepreneur), using 
both human and financial resources to distribute whatever profit and 
loss they make in accordance with capital and human resources 
invested (Thomas, 1995). 
(ii) The unique feature of musharakah is that the bank shares profits as 
well as losses with the customers, and hence he or she shares in the 
business risk. 
(iii) It is a suitable mode of financing for both working and fixed capital. 
The customer does not have to contribute in cash to the proposed 
investment. His or her share might be in kind (inputs), labour, and/or 
rent of machines or equipment. Also, he or she is rewarded for his/her 
entrepreneurship, since in relatively profitable ventures the return on 
investment is much higher than other modes of finance (Abdalla, 
1997). Another important advantage of Musharakah is that the 
customer does not have to contribute a large share of money. 
(iv) As musharakah finance puts great emphasis on the transaction itself, 
rather than the creditworthiness of the partner, no strict security 
should be demanded. Islamic financing does not require the partner to 
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present securities against possible losses. Any advancement 
demanded is made to cover the share of the partner in the venture and 
not as a security against losses. However, banks may demand security 
against possible fraud or repayment-evasion, mismanagement, and 
not against the risk of losses (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). 
(v) Musharakah finance needs personal acquaintance with the client and 
his behaviour, in addition to continual supervision and follow-up by 
the bank's management, which are necessary requirements in the 
absence of conventional guarantees. In other words, it creates 
incentives for the capital provider to monitor and assist his partner. 
(vi) Musharakah is also a flexible, easily understandable form of 
financing. 
(vii) Musharakah achieves the risk diversification objective by distributing 
musharakah fund among different customers, different amounts, 
different type of projects, etc ... 
(viii) Both the bank and the customer (the two partners) have the right to 
withdraw under certain conditions if it causes no injury to either 
partner, if communicated to other parties (Ibrahim, 2004). 
(ix) It seems that the musharakah mode of finance can also be modified to 
be used to supplement the Western lending method. 
(x) Musharakah links the use of funds directly to social and economic 
priorities, and it directly rewards and provides more incentives to 
human labour, thereby drawing non-bankable classes into the 
productive circle of the economy (Al-Harran, 1995b). 
(xi) Musharakah system protects both parties against inflation. It also 
avoids the necessity of demanding repayment from people who have 
already lost their livelihood. 
The research so far presented a discussion on musharakah from both fiqh and 
economics prospectives. The next chapter covers broadly the Sudanese economy 
and monetary policy with the objectives of providing a policy framework within 
which musharakah and in particular Islamic finance operates.. Hence, it 
discusses the performance of the Sudanese economy and demonstrates the 
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important characteristics of the credit and monetary policy of the Central Bank of 
Sudan. In addition, the further chapter (Chapter Five) focuses on the Sudanese 
banking industry by providing an overview of the historical developments in the 
Sudanese banking industry and its performance using some selected banking and 
financial indicators. Both chapters aim at locating the musharakah financing in a 
larger macro-economy context, which further aims to build a strong foundation 
for the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 4 Sudan: Economy and Monetary Policy: an Overview 
4.1 Introduction 
Sudan, the largest country in Africa and the Middle East, is located in the north 
eastern part of the African continent. The country encompasses an area of about 
250.6 million hectares (1 million square miles), bounded on the north east by the 
Red Sea and on the other sides by nine African nations. It borders Egypt to the 
north; Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east and southeast; it also shares its southern 
border with Kenya and Uganda, its south-western border with the Central 
African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; its western border 
with Chad and its north-western border with Libya. The Sudan lies within the 
tropical zone between latitudes 3° and 22° north and longitudes 22° to 38° east 
(CSS, 2001). The total area of the country is 2,505,813 square kilometres. The 
country is divided administratively into 26 States (Country Studies, 2006). 
The total population in 2005 was just over 36 million of which 51% are male and 
49% are female with an annual population growth rate of 2%. 15% of the 
population live in the capital Khartoum. The number of births per 1,000 
populations is 38; the number of deaths is 10. The infant mortality rate per 1,000 
live births is estimated at 125. The average number of lifetime births per female 
is 5.7. The crude birth and death rate are 37.8% and 11.5% respectively (WB, 
2006a). 
The Legal system in Sudan is based on both shari 'ah law and English common 
law as of 20 January 1991 when the government imposed shari 'ah law in the 
Sudan and after 2005 the shari 'ah has only been observed in the northern states; 
according to the peace agreement, shari 'ah law applies to all residents of the 
northern states regardless of their religion; the southern legal system is still 
developing following the civil war (Ahmed, 2005). 
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Macroeconomic performance has been quite poor in Sudan in the nineties. 
Economic indicators have nearly stagnated after 1999. Sudanese economic 
growth is one of the concerns as it might influence the banking performance. 
However, the economic performance has not been the same since 1990 as it 
witnessed an improvement after 1999. 
As far as the credit policy is concerned the central Bank of Sudan started issuing 
annual financing (credit) policies since the early 1990s. To suit the purpose of the 
Islamic profit and loss sharing system, the credit policy was changed to a 
financing policy. The Islamic system does not provide credit, but finance 
production. Moreover, the basic functioning of the Central Bank in which there is 
full Islamization of the banking system is the same as a conventional bank, but 
the mechanism is different. The policy is designed to support government plans, 
the objectives of which are usually achieving self-sufficiency, increasing 
production, reducing inflation, and stabilising exchange rates, thereby promoting 
the image of Islamic banks as comprehensive, full service banks (Ibrahim and 
Vijaykumar, 2003). 
To get an overall idea of the economic environment in which the banking system 
works in Sudan, this chapter discusses major characteristics of the Sudanese 
economic activities and identifies empirically, through the common economic 
indicators, the performance of both the Sudanese economy and the credit policy. 
This chapter examines the obstacles facing the economy and the limitations set 
by the credit policy for the banking sector. It should be noted that the bank's 
finance through musharakah is more likely to be correlated with country 
economic performance. 
The rest of the chapter will be as follows: the second section discusses the 
Sudanese economy performance; the third section demonstrates the important 
characteristics of the credit and monetary policy of the central bank of Sudan. 
The last section is devoted to conclusions. 
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4.2 Economic Performance 
4.2.1 Economic Resources 
4.2.1.1 Water and Land Use 
Sudan extends from the hot arid north to the tropics in the south with diversified 
ecosystems that provide immense fertile land of about 80 million hectares, 
natural pastures of about 24 million hectares, and a forest area of about 64 
million hectares. Over 40% of the total area of Sudan consists of pasture and 
forests and the remaining land is desert or semi-desert (Country Studies, 2006). 
Arable land constitutes about one third of the total area of the country, however 
only 21% of this arable land is actually cultivated. Natural pasture provides 
grazing land for nearly all livestock. The annual production of animal feed is 
estimated at 78 million tons of dry matter. Production is subject to fluctuations 
from one year to another, affected by varying quantities of rainfall and fire 
hazards. Forests are exposed to continuous removal and clearance either for 
agricultural expansion or for fire wood consumption (MFNE, 2002). 
As Sudan is a country with an enormous national resource base and a huge 
agricultural potential, it goes without saying that all efforts to produce more 
human food from agriculture should be effectively undertaken. 1 The Sudan is 
also gifted with plenty of irrigation water from the River Nile and its tributaries, 
rains, as well as underground water reserves. About 75% of the population of 
Sudan predominantly subsist on agriculture (The World Bank, 2006). 
4.2.1.2 Primary Economic Resources 
Although the country has been trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton and gum 
Arabic remain its major agricultural exports. Grain sorghum (dura) is the 
principal food crop, and wheat is grown for domestic consumption. Sesame seeds 
and peanuts are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. 
1 One feddan 1.038 acres or 0.42 hectares. 
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The available resources in terms of arable land, water and livestock suggest that 
agriculture in Sudan provides the best opportunities for future economic growth 
and development. Yet, the country's agriculture is largely traditional and is 
characterized by low and fluctuating productivity, which means that 
modernization and development are imperative (Elhiraika and Ahmed, 1998). 
Sudan remains a net importer of food. Problems of irrigation and transportation 
remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy. 
Livestock production has vast potential, and many animals, particularly camels 
and sheep, are exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. 
Fishery resources are around 300,000 tonnes per year, but only 60,000 are 
exploited at the present time. Sudan is rich in mineral resources such as gold, 
chrome and cement (Ibrahim, 2004). 
4.2.2 Other Resources 
Oil production and export are taking on greater importance since October 2000. 
In addition to its natural, agricultural and animal resources, Sudan abounds with 
potential mineral wealth of which petroleum, now exploited, is the most 
important with prospects for additional reserves. Gold mining and exports are on 
a rising trend while numerous minerals such as iron ore, copper, mica, zinc, 
chromate and manganese together with non-ferrous resources such as plaster, 
lime and black sand are also available in appreciable quantities and potentially 
tradable (Osman, 1999). This could pose a real base for industrial development. 
4.2.3 Current Political Situation 
The political situation in Sudan is complex. Since independence from the UK in 
1956, Sudan had three democratic elected governments and four military coupes. 
Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars during most of the remainder 
of the 20th century. The first civil war ended in 1972, but broke out again in 
1983 and continued for over a period of two decades. After a 1989 military coup, 
the circle of Islamic National Islamic front party ruled. Peace talks gained 
momentum in 2002-2004 with the signing of several accords. On July 9, 2005, 
pursuant to a January 2005 final peace agreement that ended the decades-long 
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civil war between the government in Khartoum and the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army\Movement SPLA \SPLM that had cost millions of lives a 
' 
government of national unity was established under an interim constitution. 
These protocols signed as part of the peace agreement include Machakos 
protocol of July 20th 2002; Security Arrangements Agreement of September 25th 
2003 and Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing of January 7th 2004. Under 
the January agreement, which included compromises on political representation, 
self-determination, and distribution of oil resources, the leader of the main 
southern rebel group, was named vice president as well as the president of the 
southern Sudan government. The agreement granted the southern rebels 
autonomy for six years, after which a referendum for independence is scheduled 
to be held. 2 The wealth-sharing agreement signed as part of the peace agreement 
establishes a framework for sharing and managing oil resources, delineates 
taxation powers between the national and southern governments, allows 
conventional banking in south Sudan, provides for the introduction of a new 
national currency, establishes a process to address land claim issues, and 
organizes the relations of the national and southern governments with external 
donors. The agreement establishes a national petroleum commission responsible 
for managing the oil sector, confirms the principle of saving part of the oil 
revenue, provides 2% of net oil revenues to oil producing states, and divides the 
remaining net oil revenues (from oil produced in the south) equally between the 
national and southern governments. The wealth sharing agreement institutes the 
right to have a dual banking system in Sudan during the Interim Period. An 
Islamic banking system shall operate in Northern Sudan and conventional 
banking system shall operate in Southern Sudan. In addition, the right to 
establish, during the Pre-Interim period, the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS), as 
a branch of the Central Bank of Sudan (BOS), which will provide conventional 
banking facilities urgently. 
In Darfur, the western region, a civil war started in 2003 mainly between the 
Arab Janjaweed militia and African militias. The situation has been labelled the 
2 For the full context of the Peace agreement see www.gurtong.org. 
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worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. It has left about 200,000 people 
dead. An estimated 2 million civilians have been displaced from their homes. 
Sudan has also faced large refugee influxes from most of its neighbouring 
countries, primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Chad, and armed conflict, 
poor transport infrastructure, and lack of government support have chronically 
obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations (CIA, 
2004). 
Sudan's economy, therefore, faces instability, conflict-damaged infrastructure 
and mismanagement. 
4.2.4 Economic Performance: 1990-2006 
In 1989 in an attempt to reverse the economic decline, stimulate economic 
growth and the heavy dependence on commodity aid and external foreign 
assistance which has taken place before, the government embarked on a medium-
term three-year economic programme referred to as the national economic 
salvation programme 1990-1993. With economic liberalization as an overall 
objective, the programme sought to reallocate resources to enhance production 
particularly in agriculture in order to achieve food security and to generate export 
surplus; to boost the role of the private sector; to remove price and exchange rate 
controls; to privatize public entities; and to achieve financial stability. By 1992 
several price and exchange rate controls were removed (Elhiraika and Ahmed, 
1998). However, these three years together with the following two years, in 
which the full adoption of Islamic modes of finance in 1990 took place, were the 
most dramatic years in the recent economic history of Sudan. Financial 
institutions were among the vital state institutions the government attempted to 
transform into partisan sources rather than national institutions through its 
corporatist policies. Moreover, the government attempted to create a new class of 
entrepreneurs by massive redistribution of wealth to government-party loyalists 
through fiscal and monetary policy, inCluding a heavy inflation tax (Elhiraika, 
2004). This, together with efforts for general economic development and winning 
the war militarily led to uncontrollable government spending, massive domestic 
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borrowing, three digit inflation rates, exchange rate collapse, and financial 
disintermediation due to macroeconomic instability and loss of public confidence 
in the financial sector. 
The principal causes of the disorder have been the violent, costly civil war, an 
inept government, an influx of refugees from neighbouring countries, as well as 
internal migration, and a decade of below normal annual rainfall with the 
concomitant failure of staple food and cash crops. During the nineties half of the 
Sudanese budget, more than $lmillion a day, was spent on the continuing civil 
war. 
The relation with IMF was not an exception to the bad situation. After becoming 
the world's largest debtor to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 
the IMF took the unusual step of declaring Sudan non- cooperative because of its 
non-payment of arrears to the Fund. After Sudan backtracked on promised 
reforms in 1992-1993, the IMF threatened to expel Sudan from the Fund. In 
1993, the IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights and the World Bank suspended 
Sudan's right to make withdrawals under effective and fully disbursed loans and 
credits. Lome Funds and EU agricultural credits, totalling more than one billion 
Euros, were also suspended. To avoid expulsion, Khartoum agreed to make token 
payments on its arrears to the Fund, liberalize exchange rates, and reduce 
subsidies, measures it has partially implemented. The relation with the IMF was 
restored in the late 90s (Kireyev, 2001). 
Later, the relation with both International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank considerably improved; hence IMF issued many certificates assuring the 
progress of Sudan's economic performance for increase of growth rates, a 
declining inflation rate and stabilization of exchange rates which in tum 
encouraged Arab and regional investment funds to enhance their relations with 
Sudan and financing developmental projects. 
Sudan has turned around a struggling economy with feasible economic policies 
and infrastructure investments, but it still faces formidable economic problems, 
starting from its low level of per capita output. From 1997 to date, Sudan has 
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been implementing IMP macroeconomic reforms. The government has 
formulated a medium-term reform programme covering 1998-2003 which aims 
at achieving an average real GDP growth of 6% a year, reducing inflation to 5% 
by the end of the plan, and improving Sudan's external accounts, by addressing 
long-standing structural rigidities, mobilizing private savings, and encouraging 
foreign direct investment (IMP, 2005). 
There have been, however, aggravating factors; the International unpopularity of 
the military government caused a drying up of transfers (aid and concessionary 
loans) from abroad, which led to an increase in the inflationary pressures in the 
economy, since the government compensated from the Central Bank (Stiansen, 
2004). In 1999, Sudan began exporting crude oil and in the last quarter of 1999 
recorded its first trade surplus, which, along with monetary policy, has stabilized 
the exchange rate. 
4.2.5 Selected Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators of Sudan 
Table 4.1 depicts the performance of the macroeconomic indicators over the 
entire period considered. 
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Table 4.1 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators of Sudan, 1990-2006 
GDP, GDP GDP Agt;iculture Industry Services Exchange Inflation, 
current per growth GDP.sbare & GDP rate SD 3 annual 
prices capita, rate Mining share percent 
Billions current GDP change 
u.s. prices share 
dollars Billions 
u.s. 
dollars 
1990 24.45 949.299 -5.4 0.45 
1992 33.7 
20064 37.571 1,089.86 12.1 222.8 7.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Bank of Sudan and the IMF 
4.2.5.1 GDP Growth 
Generally, if the researcher divides the period into five-year sub-periods starting 
1990, the GDP has increased massively in 2005 compared with 1990, 1995, and 
2000 as shown by table 4.1. The only possible explanation of the GDP growth 
decrease in 1994 is in terms of rainfall as the economy is dominated by 
agriculture and agricultural output is largely rain-driven. Current GDP per capita 
of Sudan decreased 5.4% in 1990 then grew 5.9%, 6.7% and 12.1% in 1995, 
2000 and 2005 respectively (MFNE, 2006). In 2005, the Sudanese economy is 
considered the fifth fastest growing economy over the world (MW, 2006). 
3 The currency for the period before 1999 is Sudanese pounds SP and after is Sudanese Dinar SD 
where 1 SDD equals 10 Sudanese pounds SP. 
4 The GDP for 2006 estimated by the International Monetary Fund. 
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Iiiflation 
consumer 
prices 
2000=100 
154.086 
It is possible to conclude that there has been a positive growth of the GDP 
because of increased contributions from various sectors especially the 
contribution of the Oil sector. The performance of Sudan's economy at a macro 
level has been impressive: GDP growth since 1990 averaged 5.5%. 
4.2.5.2 Contribution of Different Sectors to the GDP 
As a result of dependence on agriculture, GDP growth figures have fluctuated 
wildly and there were a series of recessions in the 1980s and 1990s (Hussein, 
2003). Since 1993, however, growth has been steady, at 3-6% a year in real 
terms. Agriculture remains the dominant sector but the emergence of the oil 
sector has begun to shift the balance. As table 4.1 shows the share of agriculture 
in the GDP fluctuated between 28.7% and 49% in 1990 and 2006. This wide 
fluctuation indicates erratic changes in agriculture production due mainly to 
weather conditions, the civil war that displaced millions of rural families, lack of 
investment in agriculture, and so on. The general upward trend in the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP reflects intensified government effort aimed at 
achieving food security during that period. In the period 1990-1999, the trend of 
real GDP was very much related to that of real agricultural GDP (Elhiraika, 
2003). 
Agriculture, before exporting oil, which accounts for an average (1990-2001) 
contribution of 41% of GDP, has recorded an average (1990-2001) growth rate 
of 8%. Cultivable area has expanded from 7.7 million hectares in 1989 to around 
17 million hectares in 2001 (MFNE, 2006). Animal wealth has also recorded an 
increasing number of heads from 60 million in 1989 to around 128 million in 
2001, and its contribution to GDP has risen to more than 20% since mid 1990s. 
These developments have been associated with strong macroeconomic policies 
and favourable climatic conditions. Henceforth, food security has improved and a 
strategic grain food reserve was built to safeguard for seasons of uneven rains in 
addition to stabilize~prices. It-is clear from Tabl~-4, 1 t]Jat th~- rate_ Qf grs>'Y!b of_t4e_ 
GDP has declined from 6.4% in 2002 to 4.9% in 2003 basically due to a decrease 
in growth of the agricultural sector. The growth rate of the agricultural sector in 
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its two parts, the agrarian and animal, has noticeably decreased from 7.3% in 
2002 to 5.2% in 2003 mainly due to deterioration in the traditional rain-fed 
agriculture. 
The economy before 2001 depended heavily on agriculture for employment, 
production and consumption. The share of agriculture in Sudan's gross domestic 
product and exports during the period 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 was around 30%, 
43%, 46% and 38% respectively (Elhiraika and Ahmed, 1998). 
The industrial sector still depends on agricultural raw material inputs such as 
vegetable oil, sugar cane, cotton, hides, skins etc ... With more development of 
these natural resources agro-industrial potential investment opportunities will 
thrive and encourage manufacturing of agricultural-related means of production 
required for improving productivities of both plant and animal sectors (WB, 
2005). The industrial sector share of GDP has attained 15.3% during the period 
1990 - 2001. Its output growth is mainly ascribed to intermediary industries, 
mining and quarries whereas petroleum production and petroleum exports have 
started to influence a change in production structure and output. After 2000, for 
example, the value of the manufacturing and mining sector grew by 30% in 
nominal terms (a 12% real rise) lifting its share of GDP to almost 7%, compared 
with 15% in 1995. 
The contribution of the industrial sector to the country's GDP remained small, 
around 15% in 1990 and 1995 then over 20% after 2000. Sudan got a significant 
boost when its oil exports began in 1998, turning a $300 million annual bill for 
petroleum products into a source of revenue that could earn $1.2 billion 
(Hussein, 2003). 
The contribution of the services sector to the country's GDP was more than half 
in the early nineties then decreased to 40% in the mid nineties then to 30% in the 
new millennium compared with 54% in the 1980s. This is mainly due to 
macroeconomic policy bias favouring the real productive sectors (MFNE, 2006). 
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4.2.5.3 Inflation 
As table 4.1 shows inflation has been reduced from 132% in 1996 to less than 8 
percent in 2006. The Government's strong economic reform package contributed 
to high economic growth starting in the late 1990s. The start-up of oil production 
and favourable weather conditions for agricultural production also helped to 
sustain growth. Higher growths, together with economic reforms, have increased 
the government's budget revenues. However, widespread poverty, highly skewed 
income distribution, and inadequate delivery of social services remain serious 
problems (WB, 2006b). The monetization of the government's budget deficit 
created severe inflationary pressures in the past and price rises averaged over 
56% a year in 1995-1999. In 1996 money supply growth reached 88%. This fell 
to 28% in 1999, and the fall was reflected in the sharp downward trend in 
inflation. Annual price increases fell from 133% in 1996 to 46% in 1997, when 
the structural adjustment process began, and to under 20% in 1998-1999 
(Elhiraika, 2004). The trend continued into 2000 with inflation falling to 10%. 
Sudan has benefited from lower import costs over the recent years, as average 
international non-oil commodity and manufactured goods and prices have fallen. 
The Sudan economy has been transformed from an economy with very high rates 
of inflation in the mid-1990s to a more stable economy where the inflation rate is 
at a single digit level after 2000 as seen from table 4.1. The estimated rate of 
inflation for 2006 is 8.3%. 
4.2.5.4 Exchange Rate 
The Sudanese exchange rate policy in 1990s is characterised by inconsistency in 
objectives, confusion, loss of control over foreign exchange and payments. Also 
the remittance of Sudanese working abroad that tended to play a major role in 
shaping exchange rate policy. In the early 1990s dealing in hard currency was not 
allowed outside the banking industry (IMF, 2005). Later in the second half of the 
·--- .. ;--·- - -,- ~--=-oo-.,:::-·- ·----o-----··-----,--;_,_-- -- .. --~ -;-;-,-------,·: - ------:-:- -;;-~,~- ~---~- ~. ------- - :;:--.r·-· ~----; 
1990s, the authority allowed only exchange currency agencies to buy and sell 
hard currency then developed to the full demand and supply mechanism of 
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deciding the price of these currencies, in which the government was able to 
stabilise the exchange rate value in the late 1990s. Furthermore in 2000s, the 
currency is no longer volatile but very stable and determined by the market. 
Since 1980, for more than 15 years, the exchange rate increased but improved 
later. During the period 1990-1995, the exchange rate deteriorated seven times. 
Since late 2004, improved market fundamentals coupled with a move towards a 
market-driven exchange rate have led to an appreciation of the dinar. In 2005, the 
economy grew at a fast pace and higher oil prices led to a 35% increase in oil 
exports. In addition, foreign direct investment rose sharply from US$1.8 billion 
in 2003 to US$3.8 billion in 2005. During the last year, the currency appreciated 
by 12% and 17% in nominal and real effective terms, respectively (IMF, 2006). 
The current exchange rate is over LS 2600 per dollar, up from only LS 18 in the 
late 90s (IMF, 2006). 
4.3 Monetary and Credit Policy 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Monetary and financial policy has, since the early 1980s, been increasingly used 
in developing countries including Sudan to meet the challenges of both short 
term stabilization and long term adjustment. In Sudan, however, monetary policy 
has consistently been used to simultaneously attain both stabilization and growth 
objectives. Yet these objectives may not become complementary. For instance, 
while stabilization requires containment ofbank credit, growth requires increased 
mobilization and efficient utilization of financial savings (Elhiraika, 1998). 
The main aims of the Bank of Sudan (BOS), as mentioned in its establishment 
law, are to regulate issuance of currency and coins, to help regulate the banking 
system, the monetary and credit systems in the Sudan, and to work to ensure 
financial stability, to achieve economic development in the country in a 
systematic. and a oalanced fashioil,-ttY consolidate extemalc·currency stability, to 
be the bank of the government and its advisor in financial affairs and to manage 
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credit by determining general and sector credit ceilings (BOS, 1990-2006; BOS, 
1990-2005). 
In Sudan, credit policy has, since the early 1980s, been progressively restrictive 
concerning the size and sectoral allocation of credit. Quantitative credit control 
consisted of a direct ceiling on bank lending to the private sector, with the hope 
of curtailing money growth and inflation. Meanwhile, selective credit control 
was implemented to enhance economic growth by means of channeling credit to 
perceivably more productive sectors and related activities. The priority sectors 
encompassed agriculture, manufacturing, export and transport for which medium 
and long terms loans were particularly encouraged to finance working as well as 
fixed capital. In the late 1970s and as part of a stabilization programme inspired 
by the International Monetary Fund, commercial banks were directed to extend at 
least 10% of their total advances in the forms of development loans. As from 
1986 onwards, this policy was further tightened to limit commercial banks' 
advances under the ceiling. To reduce the risk inherent in agricultural credit in 
particular, consortium financing was encouraged (Elhiraika and Ahmed, 1998). 
It is possible to conclude, therefore, since BOS establishment in 1960 up to 1984, 
the year in which the Islamic laws were introduced, the BOS continued to use 
both direct and indirect financial policy instruments that facilitate it to supervise 
the credit policy as it used to control the quantity of money through interest rates, 
changing the ratios of monetary reserves, directives by way of determining 
maximum levels of financing (credit ceilings), and through other supervisory 
measures. The bank also carries out its administrative and banking control roles 
according to its laws, which were amended several times to cope with the 
financial and economic policies of the country the last of which was in 1993 
(BOS, 1990-2006). 
The objectives of a central bank in an Islamic economy do not differ 
fundamentally from those of a conventional bank. Ensuring the stability of the 
currency has been -noted in the history of Islamic scholarship~ .on econon;ric _ 
matters. However, the real difference between the two types of central banks is in 
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the instruments that each can employ to achieve their common objectives (Khan, 
2002). 
After the Islamization of the banking system, the Bank of Sudan continued to 
carry out its roles to entrench Islamization of banking through the establishment 
of the shari'ah High Supervisory Board in the Bank in 1993. This was to ensure 
that the banking operations are free of traces of usury related practices (BOS, 
2006). 
Usually whenever needed, the shari 'ah High Supervisory Board in the Central 
Bank issues a number of fatawa (edicts), and resolutions in many aspects. It 
participated in training courses related to Islamic banking practices, and 
Accounting Standards for Islamic financial services and offered consultations 
pertaining to Islamic legal aspects. 
The monetary policy of the BOS, called the financing policy, and its control 
instrument for the period 1990 - 2006 represents a unique one, as it reflects the 
experience of full Islamization of the banking system. Since the Islamization of 
banking has been completed the bank of Sudan has got rid of the treasury bills 
and government bonds instruments on which interest rates were applied. In their 
place the Bank has issued financial certificates that conform to the Islamic 
system (BOS, 1990-2006; BOS, 1990-2005). Since the beginning of the three 
years economic programme (1990-1993), the Bank of Sudan carried out 
financing policies that aimed to revitalize the Sudanese economy (BOS, 1990-
2005). In 1994 the BOS, in a pioneering move, embarked upon issuing the first-
ever musharakah bonds (Shahama) in order to finance governmental projects. 
The BOS establishes its money and credit policy keeping in mind the 
requirements of the economic development of the country and other macro 
economic situations. The objectives of the credit policy are stated in the circulars 
of the central bank issued to the commercial banks from time to time (usually 
each yeat} For example, the o5je-ctives of the credit policy operative in- 1990 are 
said to be: stabilizing the exchange rate, developing exports and maximizing 
revenue through exports, bridging the balance of payment deficit, encouraging 
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investment, organizing the role of the private sector in expanding domestic 
production and limiting the imports of luxury and other non basic commodities 
(Ahmed, 2000). 
The comprehensive banking policy for (1999-2002) was issued targeting the 
development of the banking system at different aspects, development of 
management of liquidity, and entrenching the Islamization processes in the 
banking system. To implement those policies an annual specific work 
programme is laid down for every year. 
The following instruments are used by the BOS to control and regulate the 
banking system in the country: 
4.3.2 Credit Ceiling 
The credit ceiling is the most important tool of monetary management and 
banking control in Sudan. It aims to control both the volume and the direction of 
credit. It is applied to all banks; however, the centr~l bank determines the credit 
ceiling for each bank separately. The financial resources of the commercial bank 
defined as the total deposits and capital of the bank are the main criterion for 
determining the credit ceiling. The higher the financial resources of the bank, the 
higher the credit ceiling imposed on it. Banks with more branches are also 
usually given a higher ceiling. There is also sometimes, the possibility of having 
the ceiling expanded. The central bank takes punitive action if any bank exceeds 
its credit ceiling (Ahmed, 2000). 
The objectives of the credit ceiling are: to provide incentives to production, to 
improve the balance of payment position and to help regulate the money supply 
and control inflation. The credit ceiling determined by the central bank of Sudan 
takes into consideration the following factors: the sources of the bank including 
the paid capital, subsidiary companies and deposits, the bank's financial 
performance;~thecbank's ·share-in various-subsidiary.-public-companiescand.the 
nature of the bank concerned, the bank's financing expectation (BOS, 1990-
2006). The following are used as tools for credit ceiling limits. 
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4.3.2.1 Priority Sectors Share 
A central bank should co-operate with other authorities to achieve a balanced 
economic growth and development, characterised by an equitable distribution of 
income and growth. Therefore, a central bank may pursue a policy that decides 
the distribution of the Islamic banks' fund according to the need in different 
sectors of the economy -industrial, commercial and agricultural etc. Accordingly, 
the Bank of Sudan, as a central bank, issues a set of regulations and financial 
policies to realize its annual objectives. The extension and enforcement of these 
regulations concerning financing contracts are set to monitor and control money 
supply and demand, to direct the available fund to certain sectors according to 
the economic policy adopted, to protect the depositors, to reduce uncertainties 
arising from the present structure of property rights that tend to discourage 
private investment and to fund small producers. 
The BOS, therefore, annually announces combined credit ceilings for what are 
called priority sectors, (Craftsmen, Professionals and Small Producers including 
Productive Families, Agricultural Sector, Industrial Sector, Export Sector, 
Mining and Energy Production Sector, Co-operatives, Investment in Shares, 
Cultural and Media Production, Private Sector Investment in Rural Services, 
Low Cost Housing Sector, Transport and Storage Sector). For example, in 1990, 
monetary policy stipulated 80% of the total bank ceiling for priority sectors, with 
40% ceiling for agriculture alone. The priority sectors' share was further raised 
to 90% and agriculture to 50% in 1993. This policy continued although overall 
credit ceilings were relaxed in October 1994 (BOS, 1990-2006; BOS, 1990-
2005). Financing to the priority sector share reached 95% of the total banking 
finance in 1998, reduced to 90% in 2000 and 2001. Almost half of this volume of 
finance is earmarked for the agricultural sector as stipulated by the financing 
policies of the BOS. For the early nineties each bank was required to allocate a 
percentage not less than 10% of the total banking finance to social development 
activities, (productive families, small producers, handicraft, and professionals). 
The-tenti oT finance Tor this sector may be tWo years maxirnurn-(BOS, 1990:. 
2006; BOS, 1990-2005). 
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4.3.2.2 Credit Ceiling Tools for Modes of Finance 
One can notice that the policies of the BOS are concentrating on financing 
certain sectors like the agricultural sector more than contracting out these funds. 
However, there are some regulations that control the finance contracts. For 
instance, the BOS operates three regulations: setting the first instalment 
percentage and the capital sharing percentage in musharakah, setting the 
minimum ceiling for the partner to invest within any murabahah project; setting 
the maximum permissible profit margins for murabahah. The BOS annually sets 
the objectives of financing policies, and rules governing extension of banking 
finance, as well as liquidity management through setting and monitoring 
quantitative monetary targets such as murabahah margins, customers' share in 
musharakah and administrative margins under a murabahah contract. Moreover, 
statutory reserve requirements and financing window requirements are also set 
(Ibrahim, 2006). These tools are discussed below: 
4.3.2.2.1 Minimum Percentage of the Capital Sharing for Entrepreneurs in 
Musharakah 
Overall for the period 1990-2005, we see a gradual increase of the minimum 
percentages of the capital sharing of the entrepreneurs in musharakah projects. 
For instance, for internal trade, it comprised 50%, 55%, 60%, and 70% for the 
period beginning 1993. For the priority sectors during the same period, it was 
20% for three years, which then increased to 25%, and then up to 40% (BOS, 
1990-2006; BOS, 1990-2005). It should be noted that the same gradual increase 
exists in regard to financing the production sector. This may indicate an intent to 
discourage the use of musharakah. The researcher will demonstrate in details 
these percentages for the period of 1990-2005 in chapter nine. 
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4.3.2.2.2 Profit Margins and the Minimum Ceiling for Murabahah 
Murabahah was regulated by using a policy that set the minimum ceiling for the 
customers to take a murabahah fund. Then another policy, the maximum profit 
margins policy, was added in 1995. In general, the goals of these policies in 
addition to its monetary goals, is to discourage the customers from using 
murabahah and to persuade them to move to other finance methods. That is more 
obvious when we see that the use of murabahah or sa/am in the internal trade 
was prohibited during this period (BOS, 1990-2006), as the researcher will 
present, this policy did not meet with much success. One can notice that 1999 
was the first year that these policies were left to negotiation between the bank 
and the customer in these finance methods as well as the marketing of banking 
services (Ahmed, 2003). 
The cost of borrowing on average remains high in Sudan, giving the profit 
margins and a minimum ceiling for murabahah, which will be demonstrated in 
the empirical chapters. For example in the period 1990-93 the average minimum 
ceiling for the customer taking a murabahah fund in priority sectors, cooperative 
sector for production purpose and cooperative sector for non-production purpose 
were 25%, 10% and 25% respectively. After 1995, BOS depended on profit 
margins to control murabahah more than the minimum ceiling. The range for 
murabahah profit margins in priority sectors were between 30% - 45% in the 
nineties and 18%- 15% after 2000. After 2002 the percentage in all sectors has 
been left to individual banks to decide. 
To summarise, discriminatory minimum mark-up for murabahah varied between 
36% and 48% until 1998. After 2001, the margin has been left to the individual 
banks to decide (BOS, 1990-2006; BOS, 1990-2005). 
4.3.3 Cash Reserve Ratio 
Changes in tlie reser\re ratio nave not been frequent. In November 1986, a new 
credit policy was announced in which the cash reserve ratio for commercial 
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banks was raised to 20% from 12.5%. However, in 1988 it was 18%, raised to 
20% in 1990, and 30% in 1993, then reduced to 26% in 1997 and to 15% in 2001 
(BOS, 1990-2006). 
4.3.4 Instruction and Directives 
The BOS also issues other directives and establishes the ground rules for 
commercial banks keeping in mind local conditions and national economic 
interests. For example, the credit policy adopted for 1990 prohibits financing the 
working capital and domestic trade for these commodities. Similarly, the 
refinance of imported goods is prohibited whether the imports have been made 
through official or free market channels. 
4.4 Conclusion 
To sum up, over the nineties the economy of Sudan was characterized by severe 
macroeconomic instability as indicated by high and accelerating internal and 
external imbalances, rapid exchange rate depreciation, however, the current 
economic situation within Sudan is much better than it was in the late 70s, 80s 
and 90s. In the last five years Sudan's economic performance in recent years has 
been improved. Growth has been robust, inflation has been at single-digit levels, 
and important reforms were undertaken. The authorities attained macroeconomic 
stability, lifted price controls, set up liberal foreign investment and foreign 
exchange regimes, pursued an ambitious privatization and enterprise-
restructuring programme, and began a second phase of reforms to liberalize the 
trade regime (IMF, 2006). 
On average, all macroeconomic indicators worsened during 1990-1998. Average 
price inflation stood at 68% per annum, broad money supply grew at 58% and 
the ratio of money stock amounted to only 12% of the GDP suggesting massive 
disintermediation. The dramatic change in the performance of the Sudanese 
economy -since 1998 could-be attributed to a number of factors-that -include: (-1) 
economic reforms; (2) favourable weather conditions affecting agriculture; and 
(3) high investment in oil sectors and related services. While the stabilization 
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measures and economic reforms have been carried out without external aid or 
technical assistance and achieved success in setting high growth rates for the 
economy, external debt and its accumulated arrears remain to be a problem 
facing future development of the country. 
In addition, stabilization measures have been facilitated by oil exports which 
gained prominence during the past few years. Oil exports increased from zero 
level in 1998 to reach US $ 276 million in 1999 accounting for 35% of overall 
export earnings. In 2004 oil export reached US $ 3.097 billion accounting for 
81% of exports (BOS, 1990-2006; BOS, 1990-2005). With the inflow of foreign 
direct investments and oil revenues, the economy of the Sudan witnessed a boom 
in real estate development in major towns, coupled with road construction, 
development in telecommunications, electrical power supply and investment in 
food processing industries. However, despite this development, most rural areas 
and national agricultural development has not directly benefited resulting in 
accentuating poverty and continued rural migration (Hussein, 2003). The 
economy has been growing at a fast pace and macroeconomic conditions have 
been stable. Real GDP grew at an estimated rate of 8.5% in 2005, owing mainly 
to a recovery in agriculture and robust activity in construction and services. 
Average inflation in 2005 was contained at 8.5%. At end of February 2006, the 
12-month rate of inflation was 5.8% (IMF, 2006). 
As far as the monetary and credit policy concern and in the absence of a well 
developed money market, the BOS uses the legal reserve requirement ratio credit 
ceilings, and other direct methods of credit control as the main instruments to 
implement its credit policy (BOS, 2006). Until 1990, the policy instruments of 
the Bank of Sudan were limited. Some new instruments were announced in 1998 
with the hope of introducing indirect liquidity management tools. In 1998 the 
BOS had introduced shari 'ah compatible new instruments of indirect second-
generation financial instruments of policy and liquidity management, as well as 
modifying the existing ones to strengthen monetary mechanism (BOS, 1990-
20-0(); BOS, T990=2005): Tne credit policy duringcthe 4ast,l5 years includes,three 
main components, the first is the credit ceiling which consists of stipulating the 
share of some economy sectors of the overall finance, the minimum capital for 
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entrepreneurs in a musharakah contract, and minimum credit ceiling paid by the 
customers in a murabahah as a percent of the total price of the goods, the 
maximum profit margins charged by banks in a murabahah and setting the share 
of the priority sectors over the total banking finance. 
The BOS usually imposed detailed requirements for banking finance, dividing 
the economy into priority sectors and sub-sectors for which the banks were 
required to extend credit. Financing agriculture was a priority, other sectors were 
less of a priority, and some were prohibited from bank financing. 
Selective methods of credit control are used to affect the direction of credit and 
certain guidelines are provided to allocate available credit to different sectors. In 
the present credit policy sectors, exports industry agriculture, handicraft and 
medium and long term investment projects are identified as priority sectors. A 
minimum of 80% of total credit provided to sectors other than the priority sectors 
may not exceed 20% of the credit ceiling approved for the bank (BOS, 1990-
2006; BOS, 1990-2005). 
The second tool is the reserve ratio. With an effective credit ceiling the reserve 
ratio is in practice redundant. Similarly, other instruments of indirect monetary 
control such as open market operations and the discount rate, which work 
through the reserve money department, are also virtually redundant. For the 
former policy to work, there needs to exist a relatively well organized financial 
and security market, and the bank was hardly used since commercial banks often 
suffered from excess liquidity rather than the reverse. Under these circumstances 
the BOS has frequently referred to additional methods of direct monetary control 
including prohibition of inter-bank lending (Elhiraika, 1998). 
Lastly, the third tool is direct instructions issued by the central bank. These tools 
are usually contained in the BOS circulars and directives which are issued from 
time to time to execute the money and credit policy of the central bank. Other 
instruments are margins of letters of credit, foreign exchange transactions and 
directives in inter-bank lending (Ibrahim, 2006). 
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It is also worth noting that the only permitted techniques of providing finance are 
murabahah and musharakah. Mudarabah as a means of finance is prohibited. 
The main difficulty faced by commercial banks in the implementation of the 
credit policy of the Central Bank is that most of the deposits at commercial banks 
are of short term projects. The incompatibility of the goals and means of 
monetary policy has been identified as the main constraint on the efficient 
implementation of monetary policy (Ahmed, 2000) 
The Comprehensive Banking Policy of 1999/2000 and the following policies 
were explicit in advising banks to extend social support for productive families 
and poor sections of the community. It also called on the banks to move 
gradually from murabahah to musharakah mode of finance. The range for 
murabahah margin in 2001 and 2002 was 12-15%. 
The financing regulations of the Bank of Sudan are still under modification, and 
lacks proper identification of the musharakah share of banking finance despite 
more than 15 years having passed since 1990 (Ahmed, 2004). 
Having presented the developments in the Sudanese economy and monetary 
policy in this chapter, the next chapter studies the Sudanese banking industry to 
illustrate the trends and developments in a particular parry of the Sudanese 
economy. Hence, chapter five provides an overview of the history of the 
Sudanese banking industry and its performance using some selected banking 
finance indicators. It is expected that it further provides contextualisation for the 
main aim of this study, namely the performance of the musharakah financing in 
Sudan. 
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Chapter 5 The Sudanese Banking Industry: History and 
Performance Overview 
5.1 Introduction 
The Sudanese banking system, unlike many other African and Arab systems, has 
gone through very frequent changes since independence in 1956. These changes 
were a direct result of frequent changes in the political system as well as the 
economic and financial policies adopted to follow the ideological beliefs that 
existed within these political systems. One of these major changes is the rotation 
between democratic and military governments smce independence. 
Consequently, changes in economic policies occurred ranging from relative 
freedom and federal economic types to intervention and outright central 
economic ones. Shifting to Islamic banking was no exception. 
The emergence oflslamic banks in Sudan started with Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB) 
in 1978. The introduction of FIB led to an unusual growth of Islamic banks 
which were able to attract new depositors who had been previously reluctant to 
deal with the existing interest based banks. In fact the decision of the Nimeiri 
government to apply Islamic shari 'ah in September 1983 gave a great boost to 
Islamic banking. In 1984 a law was issued changing the whole banking system to 
obligatorily operate according to the shari 'ah guidance. Since Nimeiri's removal 
from government in 1985 up to 1990 the Islamization was not taken seriously. 
From 1989 and onwards the Islamic direction in all financial transactions 
especially the banking System took on a very wide and deep direction. In fact 
Islam was taken, as a wider way of life, not merely restricted to financial 
transactions in the economy. The new 1992 Act organizing transactions in the 
banking system was very instrumental in changing the nature of the banking 
system away-from its colonial- nature. It should also be noted thaHhe -intentions. 
of nationalization, that took place in the seventies, largely delayed the more 
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efficient development of the Sudanese banking system. 
Sudan's financial sector is small and under-developed after over two decades of 
civil conflict. In order to have an idea about the banking environment and 
operations, which is the subject matter of this research, the researcher attempts to 
discuss the emergence of the Islamic banking, and to assess the overall 
performance of the banking industry and, therefore, this chapter demonstrates 
some selected indicators and gives a fundamental background about these 
performances in the banking sector. The second section is devoted to the history 
of the Sudanese banking industry; the third section discusses the performance of 
the banking industry. The last and fourth section is devoted to any conclusion 
drawn from the previous sections. 
The Sudan provides a umque example of a modem attempt to recreate the 
banking system according to Islamic principles. This chapter is meant to shed 
light on the genesis of the Islamic banking within the history, and the 
performance of the banking industry in Sudan. 
5.2 History of the Sudanese Banking Industry 
5.2.1 The Banking Industry 1956-1983 (Independence and Nationalisation) 
5.2.1.1 Post Independence Period: 1956-1969 
At birth, Sudan inherited a traditional banking system, which was introduced 
earlier when the country was a part of the British Colony. The commercial banks 
were part of the foreign institutions and there was neither a central bank nor local 
currency (Abdel Mohsin, 2005). The financial institutions that existed before 
independence were mainly the National Bank of Egypt (NBE), Barclays DCO, 
the Ottoman Bank, Banque Misr and Credit Lyonnais. They were all branches of 
foreign banks. In 1950 foreign capital was in full control of the banking and 
insurance sector. Bafchiys bimk viffifally ~controlled -the banking sector up -to 
independence. Afterwards, competition led to the establishment of new foreign 
banks including branches of the French owned credit Lyonnais and of the other 
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Egyptian, Ethiopian, Jordanian based banks. The year 1956 witnessed the 
establishment of two banks, the first national bank (Sudan Commercial Bank) 
and a branch of the Arab Bank (Jordon). In 1957, when the branches of foreign 
banks became reluctant to undertake assisting agriculture as a result of the cotton 
failure, the Ministry of Finance decided to establish an agricultural specialized 
bank, namely the Agricultural Bank of Sudan which started its operation in 1959. 
After Sudan achieved independence, there arose a need for a Central Bank to 
replace NBE which opened in Khartoum in 1901 and obtained a privileged 
position as banker to and for the government as a semi-official central bank 
besides being a commercial bank. It was serving as the fiscal agent and lender of 
last resorts for other commercial banks (Bank of Sudan, 2006). A need for a 
Central Bank became exigent after the independence when the government 
embarked upon grand scale economic programmes which necessitated effective 
monetary and financial policies that would cope with those ambitious Sudanese 
economic programmes (Shaaeldin and Brown, 1985). A Sudan Currency Board 
(SCB) was established in 1957 to start issuing a national currency which took 
over this responsibility in place of the NBE in 1958. There after, the Bank of 
Sudan commenced its functions in February 1960, to become one of the first 
operational central banking institutions in Africa, with the main aims of 
regulating issuance of currency and coins, to help regulate the banking system, 
the monetary and the finance systems in the Sudan, and to work to ensure 
financial stability, to achieve economic development in the country in a 
systematic and a balanced fashion, to consolidate external currency stability, to 
be the bank ofthe government and its advisor in financial affairs (Bank of Sudan, 
2006). 
In addition, in 1958, the Ethiopian Commercial Bank was allowed to open a 
branch in Khartoum as a token of good relations with Ethiopia. The Credit 
Lyonnais accepted that the government take over 60% of its capital and was 
renamed "El-Neilein Bank" (Ali, 1977). In 1961 and 1967 two governmental 
· specialized banks started, one in industries·t"inancing {Industrialc Bank of- Sudan 
1961), the second in housing finance (Real Estates Bank 1967). In addition, in 
1969, the National and Grindleys was established taking over the assets of the 
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Ottoman Bank (Ali, 1982). The sixties witnessed a gradual 'Sudanisation' of 
banking. 
Therefore, the structure of the Sudanese banking system between independence 
and just before the nationalization period included the Central Bank, six branches 
of foreign banks, two commercial and national mixed banks and three specialised 
banks. 
5.2.1.2 N ationalisation Period: 1970-1975 
Prior to 1970, the commercial banks in the Sudan were, with the exception of the 
Sudan commercial banks, all foreign owned (Ali, 2001). Policies emerged that 
nationalization was imminent when Nimeiri ended the second democracy in 
Sudan's post independence period. On May 1970, one year after the coup, 
Nimeiri declared the nationalization of all banks and foreign branches, firms and 
business of many members of the foreign communities as well a famous 
Sudanese business family. It even included the only national bank, Sudan 
Commercial Bank, which was established in 1960 (Ali, 1982). 
After nationalisation, Barclays DCO, National and Grindleys, The Ethiopian 
Commercial Bank, The Arab Bank, and Banque Misr became State Bank for 
Foreign Trade, Omderman National Bank, Juba Commercial Bank, Red Sea 
Commercial Bank and Peoples' Cooperative Bank followed suit. El-Nei/ein 
Bank, Sudan Commercial Bank and the specialized banks retained their names, 
but all in addition to the foreign banks came under direct government control. 
The Bank of Sudan had, however, absorbed the NBE and whatever 
responsibilities it used to shoulder in pre-independence Sudan (Bank of Sudan, 
1990-2005). 
Among many, the main objectives of nationalization at the time were to promote 
exports and enhance their proceeds, attract the savings of Sudanese working 
iioroaa~'(SW A), promote competition-among banks to improve banking ser;v.ices 
in rural and distant areas, and ending of foreign control over national capital 
(Shaaeldin and Brown, 1985). 
110 
In 1973 some banks changed their names to initiate some openness after the 
tough nationalisation period, in the following way: State Bank for Foreign Trade 
(1970) became Bank of Khartoum ( 197 5), El-Nilein Bank merged with Red Sea 
Commercial Bank (1973), Omderman National. Bank (1970) merged with Juba 
Commercial Bank for Juba Omderman Bank (1973) then was renamed Unity 
Bank (1975) (Ali, 1982). Others remained as they were, Sudan Commercial 
Bank, Peoples' Cooperative Bank, Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Industrial Bank 
of Sudan, Real Estates Bank. Moreover, in 1973 a Sudanese Savings Bank was 
established. 
5.2.1.3 The Emergence of Islamic Banking and the Establishment of Faisal 
Islamic Bank in the Seventies 
In 1978 Faisal Islamic Bank, which was the first distinctly Islamic financial 
institution to set up offices and do business in the Sudan whose principal patron 
was the Saudi prince, Muhammad Ibn Faisal Al Saud, started operations in 
Sudan. FIB was established on terms which were very similar to those granted to 
the Faisal Islamic Bank to operate in Egypt the previous year (Ahmed, 1997). 
The Faisal Islamic Bank was established by a special Act of Parliament (the 
Faisal Islamic Bank Act) and was registered as a public limited company under 
the Company Act of 1925, and commenced its operations in 1978. At the 
ideological level, the revival of Islam was closely associated with drive for 
extension of capital accumulation in the region. It is also important to note that 
the revived interest in Islamic banks followed the oil boom and massive 
accumulation of petro-dollar surpluses in the Middle East after 1973. Members 
ofthe Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movement originated from Egypt, and its 
political arm, the National Islamic Front, played a prominent role on the board of 
directors of the Faisal Islamic Bank, thus strengthening the bank's position in 
Sudan (Stiansen, 2004). 
The unpreceoented parliamentary :Act-gave the~bank very~valuable concessions 
denied to other commercial banks, such as tax exemptions on all assets and 
profits, as well as employees' salaries and pensions, and complete freedom to 
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transfer and use its own foreign currency deposits as well as guarantees against 
confiscation or nationalization. 
The paid up capital of Faisa/ bank increased aggressively from 0.6 to 2 million 
Sudanese Dinars in less than 4 years, the average growth rate was 70% making 
the bank much better capitalised than commercial banks (Faisal Islamic Bank, 
1979-2005). This increase represented 17% and 30% of the total paid-up capital 
of 18 commercial banks at that time, both private and national. During that time, 
the shares were divided between Saudis, Sudanese and other Muslims in the ratio 
of 4:4:2 respectively (Shaaeldin and Brown, 1985). 
The claim that the Faisal Islamic bank is first and foremost a Muslim institution 
has been effective in distilling certain sensitivities in Sudan to the penetration of 
foreign capital, and in particular, to the foreign banks (Ali, 1977). The Faisal 
Islamic bank is, therefore, perhaps the most significant of all policies and 
developments in the Sudanese banking witnessed in the seventies and early 
eighties because of its gradual emergence as a new finance capital (Shaaeldin and 
Brown, 1985). 
Nonetheless, many years later claims were raised that some members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood favoured other members of the movement, and political 
criteria carried more weight than the quality of the business proposal (Stiansen, 
2004). Internal audits and audits by the Bank of Sudan revealed that in many 
banks, members of the board of directors and/or senior management 
monopolized borrowing, and the default rate on such loans was in general very 
high (Ahmed, 1997). 
A striking feature of the formative phase of Islamic banking in the Sudan was 
how closely the different banks were associated with different political groups. 
The Sudanese Islamic bank SIB had close ties to the a/ Khatmiyyah Sufi group 
and therefore also to the Democratic Unionist Party. The Tadamoun Islamic bank 
TIB liad very Close links to the~Muslim~Brotherhood"Notably, the Umma Party, 
the biggest party at that time did not have its 'own' bank (Stiansen, 1999). 
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All these banks succeeded in attracting more depositors, and hence, more 
branches were opened all over the Sudanese States. 
5.2.1.4 1975-1983 
A new Investment Act in 1976 was passed in an attempt to attract foreign 
investors in all fields. As a result of these policies a number of foreign and local 
bank branches were established together with Islamic banks in the period 
between 1976 and 1983 when the banking system was finally Islamised. It is 
interesting to note however that at this stage it has been mainly US regional 
capital that moved in replacing the early European influence in Sudanese 
banking. However, this period was characterised by political and environmental 
crisis, which led to structural changes in the country (Bashir, 1999). 
In the seventies some foreign banks had opened branches in Sudan namely Abu 
Dhabi National Bank (UAE), BCCI, Citibank (American), Sudanese French 
Bank, Oman Bank Ltd (Jordan) (name changed to Al Mashriq Bank in 1982), 
Sudanese Ahli Bank, Middle East Bank (liquidated in 1992), the Pakistani owned 
Habib Bank, the Bank of America, International Bank of Credit and Commerce, 
and the Islamic Bank for Finance and Development. 
As yet these banks had been restricted from dealing with Sudanese citizens 
although they could open accounts for import-export agents and Sudanese 
nationals working abroad (Shaaeldin and Brown, 1985). 
The Sudanese banks established in the same era are National People's 
Development Bank (1982), National Export & Import Bank (NEill) (1983), and 
Blue Nile Bank (BNB) (1983). The unusual success and attraction of Faisal 
Islamic Bank encouraged others to establish similar Islamic banks namely the 
Sudanese Islamic Bank SID in 1983 and Islamic Development Cooperative Bank 
IDCB in 1983 and Tadamoun Islamic bank TID in 1984 
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5.2.2 First Islamization Period: 1983-1985 
The adoption of the Shari 'ah Law was realized in September 1983, but the full 
Islamization of the Sudan Banking system was completed in 1984. The 1984 
Civil Transactions Act prohibited the use of interest in the whole system and 
many other financial transactions (Government of Sudan, 1984). The banking 
system was directed by the Bank of Sudan to use Islamic formulae in financing 
their activities. 
The Islamization of the banking system in Sudan was initiated by a presidential 
order from President Nimeiri instructing the Governor of the Bank of Sudan to 
implement the process immediately. This resulted in an immediate instruction 
from the Governor to the conventional banks to make themselves Islamic as from 
July 1, 1984 allowing them only a few months' time. This left virtually no time 
for advance studies or preparations to be taken by the conventional banks to 
convert themselves Islamic. As a result, most of the banks tried to replace 
interest transactions with murabahah. No committee conversed in religious 
guidance was formed and consulted. Lack of carefulness was also noticed by the 
incident that no supervisory techniques for Islamic banks were designed by the 
Central Bank (Stiansen, 1999). 
During this sub-period the following banks were established: Baraka Bank Sudan 
(1984), Islamic Bank for Western Sudan (1984), The Sudanese Saudi Bank 1986, 
National Workers Bank (1988) and A/ Shamal Islamic Bank (1989) (Ali, 2001). 
After the 1985 popular revolt which ended the 16 years of Nimeiri rule, the 
transitional government had given over the country after ruling for one year to 
the political parties. The political parties, especially the Umma Party, were very 
critical of the application of Shari 'ah laws in September 1983. As a result of that, 
the banking system was prohibited from using the concept of interest. Therefore, 
banks were given, during the third democratic period, the choice to use the 
Islainic forffiuHie or a1tefmitively, what was innovated, by the Umma party as, the 
Compensatory Return. This was considered especially by the National Islamic 
Front as riba and reversal of Islamic shari 'ah as adopted by the Islamic banks 
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(Ali, 2001). After 1985 many of the traditional banks reverted back to their 
conventional practices. On the other hand Islamic banks were forced to operate 
in an extremely hostile environment characterised by negative media coverage, 
lawsuits, and heavy regulations. Meanwhile, the Sudanese economy was 
suffering from serious structural problems; drought hit the country, unsuccessful 
economic policy appeared clearly in the high devaluation of the Sudanese 
pounds, and high increase of external debts (Bashir, 1999). 
It is notable that, this period witnessed the establishment of new banks on an 
ethnic and professional basis. For example, while the Islamic Bank for Western 
Sudan was initiated by businessmen and citizens from Western Sudan to develop 
the Western Region, AI-Shamal Islamic Bank was established in 1990 mainly by 
sponsors from Northern Sudan together with the Sudanese from the north 
working abroad as well as some Arab businessmen. By contrast, the National 
Workers Bank was established by the Sudan Workers Union. This could be 
attributed to the overall disenchantment of various regions and professional or 
unions' groups with the content of development. Many, especially those from 
Western Sudan, thought that the central government was giving lip service to 
their development. Such and other sentiments emerged in the 1985 revolt 
reflecting the marginalization of the rural poor especially in Eastern and 
Northern Sudan. The Ivory Bank as a bank for the South came later (Ali, 2001). 
5.2.3 Post Islamization Period: 1985-1989 
Nimeiri's programme of Islamization proved to be the regime's swan song. In 
1985, the people took to the streets to protest the escalating economic crisis and 
abuses of power, and the military intervened, installing a transitional 
government. Composed of both serving soldiers and civilians, the transitional 
government suspended some Islamic laws, but basically the Islamic nature of the 
judicial system remained intact when the democratically elected government of 
Sadiq al-Mahdi came to power in 1986. 
Upon the reassessmg of the banking law from the new prime minister, the 
Governor of the Bank of Sudan issued a circular called The Banking Tariff- the 
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compensatory rates on October 1987, by which some banks reverted back to 
dealing with interest. The brief circular contained neither a technical definition of 
compensatory rates nor an explanation of how such rates were different from 
interest rates (Stiansen, 1999). The introduction of compensatory rates did not, 
however, lead to the phasing out of murabahah contracts. The reason was quite 
simple: while the compensatory rates effectively capped the banks' return on 
loans (at rates that were below inflation), there was no upper limit on the mark up 
implied in murabahah sales. Consequently continued use of the most adaptable 
Islamic financial technique enabled bankers to increase their profits and beat 
inflation (Stiansen, 2004). 
Described as a means of enriching the Islamic experience and meeting the needs 
of the contemporary economic situation, the contemporary rates were set at 27% 
per year for all debt accounts, except for loans for the industrial, agricultural and 
export sector, whose compensatory rate was set at 24% per year. For credit 
accounts and savings accounts, the compensatory rates were fixed along a scale 
beginning at 2% for three months deposits and 20% respectively. The rates for 
pensions and life insurance premiums were equal to the rate saving accounts 
(Stiansen, 2004). 
5.2.4 The Second Islamization Period: 1989-2005 
The military government that took over in June 1989, was known later to have 
been supported from behind by the National Islamic Front Party NIF. In June 
1989 all the banking system was Islamised, thus eliminating the choice given to 
banks to operate on a two tier arrangement as it was before (Ali, 2001). 
The military coup of June 1989 led to abolition of compensatory rates, and in 
1990 the government tried to be more principled in the application of the Islamic 
laws in the banking sector. In this respect the first effort was to supplement the 
Company Law of 1925 with the new Banking Regulation Law of 1991 and the 
Compendium- of Administrative and Financial =.Penalties against Banking _ 
Violations of 1992. But these laws and regulations did not address the issue of 
Islamic finance as such, even though several paragraphs established that no 
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banking law or practice could contradict the shari 'ah, the new laws did give, the 
Bank of Sudan the right to fix profit margins, fees and commissions, and to 
decide procedure for the calculation and distribution of profits (Stiansen, 1999). 
In 1991 two steps were carried out; one was the privatization of the Sudan 
Commercial Bank that came under the ownership of the Farmers' Bank for Rural 
Development as a holding company. In the same year a law was passed called 
Organization of Banking Operations Act which aimed at bringing under the Bank 
of Sudan's supervision and for the first time, many other institutions that deal in 
financial resources such as, insurance companies, local financing funds, and the 
companies that deal in financial resources (Ali, 2001). 
In the same year, BOS freed the decision to commercial banks to establish 
commercial bank branches not as it used to be before in which a complicated 
procedure needed permission from the BOS. This encouraged many commercial 
banks to explore the regions of potential economic activities and then decide to 
open branches there to attract more resources. 
In order for the Bank of Sudan to enhance its control over the banking and 
financial system, regulations were enunciated. In 1992 status and rules were 
made to take care of administrative and financial penalties for banking 
irregularities. A more comprehensive attempt by the government to detail proper 
Islamic financial procedures came in March 1993 when the Bank of Sudan's 
Supreme Board for shari 'ah Supervision issued a circular setting out 
requirements of legal murabahah contracts. The objectives of the shari 'ah Board 
were the deepening of the Islamization of the banking system foremost, the 
issuance of fatwa and advice on how to solve problems on the basis of shari 'ah 
as well as training the staff of these banks and deepening in their minds the 
Islamic methods and formula. In order to spread Islamic shari 'ah culture, all the 
commercial banks followed Bank of Sudan in establishing their own shari 'ah 
Supervisory Unit. This was to ensure that the banking operations were free of 
traces of- usury like practices; In, this way "-a~full~shari 'ah- supervision _of the 
Sudanese banking system was achieved in all banks as well as in the Bank of 
Sudan. 
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In an effort to mobilize resources for development, a Securities Market was also 
established in August 1992 for the first time in Sudan's recent history. It formally 
started its operation in January 1995. 
In 1993 three more banks came into existence namely; AI Safa Credit Bank, 
(which started originally as an Investment bank); Omderman National Bank, 
which is a form of military bank and Animal Resources Bank which aims to 
develop and promote the animal resources of the country (Bank of Sudan, 1990-
2005). 
During this period, certain commercial and development banks belonging to the 
State were merged: Unity Bank and National Export Import Bank were merged 
into Bank of Khartoum and renamed Bank of Khartoum Group. The Industrial 
Bank of Sudan was merged into El-Neilein Bank and renamed as El-Neilein 
Industrial Development Bank Group. The Middle East Bank and BCCI were 
liquidated. Oman Bank Ltd was renamed as Al Mashriq Bank (Bank of Sudan, 
1990-2005). In addition, in order to reshape and reorganize these banks, the 
banks were required in 1994 to restructure their financial positions in accordance 
with the recommendations of Basle Committee within three years starting 1994 
(Kireyev, 2001). 
In the same year (1995) an important development took place, which was the 
emergence of a new bank named Ivory Bank, whose major objective was to 
finance human development in the Southern Region. In fact the bank is 
supported by the government and is almost fully manned by trained bankers from 
the Southern Region (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
These years were very intensive years during which a form of 'keeping the 
system' was undertaken to fall in line with the liberalization policy adopted, as 
well as to raise the standards of the commercial banks to fall in line with 
international requirements of capital and efficiency as enunciated by the Basle 
Committee (Kireyev; tOOl). 
In 1996-1999 further developments took place; the Sudanese Savings Bank was 
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converted into the Savings and Social Development Ban1c Two commercial 
banks ceased to operate as Citibank (1998) opted for voluntary closure and Nima 
Bank was liquidated in 1999 (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
5.2.5 The Dual Banking System: 2005 and After 
In 2006 a joint partnership between Ahli Bank and Audi bank (Lebanon) 
established Ahli Audi Bank with $75 million paid capital in an exchange of 75% 
of the Ahli Bank's share. In addition, El-Neilein Bank was sold to Alsalam Bank 
(United Arab Emirate Investments) (Alray Ala'm, 2006). 
In Dec 2006 the Sudanese currency was changed to the Pound instead of Dinar, 
as for the south, according to the Peace Agreement started by the southern Sudan 
where Ethiopian, Kenyan and Sudanese currency was in use before the peace. 
For the north the change will take place at the end of2007. 
According to the peace agreement, the BOS were restructured, during the pre-
interim period, so as to reflect the duality of the banking system in Sudan. Two 
sets of banking systems were developed in 2006 one Islamic and the other 
conventional. The Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS), headed by a deputy 
governor of BOS, is managing the conventional window using conventional 
financing instruments in implementing the same national monetary policy, set by 
the BOS in the north for the Islamic banks, in southern Sudan. 1 In addition, in 
2006, Kenya's biggest retail bank, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), opened two 
branches in 2006 in southern Sudan. However they are more open to 
organisations than individuals, since the two cities in which the branches operate 
serve as the headquarters of the United Nations and various aid agencies working 
in southern Sudan and the economic activity seen there has been concentrated on 
the work of aid organizations. 
A dual banking system presents both opportunities and challenges for improved 
financial -intefifle&atio1:f and management. The coexistence of Islamic- and 
1 For the full context of the Peace Agreement see www.gurtong.org 
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conventional financial institutions will undoubtedly increase competition and 
expand the range of financial services to attract greater savings and borrowing by 
Muslims and non-Muslims. At the same time, managing a dual banking system 
should not present any serious challenge in view of the experience of the BOS in 
supervising and regulating both interest-based and Islamic institutions in the past. 
In fact, in most countries where Islamic banks exist, there is a dual banking 
system. These countries include Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates. Dual banking systems in these countries significantly contribute 
to financial development while presenting no serious banking management 
problems. 
It is expected that the dual banking system would enhance public confidence in 
banks and open the door for them to mobilize greater resources. Coexistence of 
Islamic and interest-based financial institutions will also widen the array of 
financial products available to savers and investors, while competition within and 
between the two segments is expected to improve the quality of services. 
Meanwhile, there is a wide scope for cooperation between Islamic and 
conventional financial institutions. Conventional banks have been offering 
Islamic financing facilities since the early 1980s, both within and outside the 
Muslim world (Wilson, 2002). 
The competition between Islamic and conventional banks might not be strong 
since Islamic banks are allowed only in the north and conventional banks in the 
south. However, Islamic banks may compete with conventional banks in some 
areas but there are many areas for them to cooperate and complement each other. 
There is no reason for a dual banking system to disrupt the basic functions of the 
financial system, especially regarding the development of efficient payment 
mechanisms. 
As far as the regulatory and monetary policy for the case of a dual banking 
system is concerned, it is possible for the Central Bank, in theory and practice, to 
regufate-tslamic and conventionarnahks with~speciallaw(s)· for-each·segment 
(Chapra and Khan, 2000), notably, that many of the regulation measures 
developed by the Basel Committee are also applicable to Islamic banks with 
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some modifications. However, the mission is not simple nor is it easy to control 
and monitor a system with an interest based system and another one that is 
equity-based with PLS instruments (Elhiraika, 2004). 
The policy implication of this duality is that macroeconomic policy framework 
will have to take into account the needs on the one hand of a post-conflict 
economy of the south, and on the other the requirements of economic stability of 
the economy of the north. For the economy of the north the IMF has already 
established stringent monetary and fiscal targets aimed at maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. Such a policy prescription is consistent with the 
required GDP growth rate of 6.7% over ten years in order to reduce poverty by 
half in northern Sudan by the year 2015. Sudan (i.e. northern Sudan) has already 
achieved this rate according to the IMF and what is needed is to maintain 
macroeconomic stability. 
5.3 The Performance of the Sudanese Banking Industry 1990-2005 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The Sudanese banks are very small by international standards. The paid capital 
together with the reserves of the Sudanese banking industry as a whole, at the 
end of 2005 was 183862 million Sudanese Dinar (SD) ($750 million) with an 
increase of 27% compared with the year before (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). The 
deposits for the entire banking system were SD 977,595 million ($3910 million) 
in 2005 with an increase of more than half compared with 2004. While the credit 
capacity used in 2005 was SD 700018 million ($2800 million), the total asset of 
the Sudanese banks was SD 1530310 million($ 6121 million). The share of the 
lending capacity over the total sources in 2004 was 71%, while the share of the 
capital and reserves and profit are 26% and 3% respectively (Bank of Sudan, 
1990-2005). 
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5.3.2 Selected Banking Finance Indicators 
Table 5.1 summarizes some selected financial and performance indicators of the 
Sudanese Banking system during 1990-2005. 
Table 5.1 Selected Banking Finance Indicators 
Deposits Total Change Deposits Total Banking Finanee Finanee 
Million deposit/ on /liabilities finanee finanee /assets /deposits 
dinars GDP deposits % /GDP % % 
% 01! % 
1990 1650 1.5 301 767 7 13 48 
2986 
1992 9445 77.1 64.4 10.1 22.7 
1994 10073 17.5 
1996 42 50 
120113 24.14 2.1 14 
197224 79224 22 40.2 
2002 9.1 32 59.4 4 
2004 646649 36.7 436391 7.9 41.8 
Source: IMF, Bank of Sudan annual reports and the researcher calculation 
5.3.3 Deposits, Finance and Assets 
According to table 5.1 the Sudanese Islamic banks succeeded in attracting people 
to deposit in them, since the total deposits increased from SD 1650 million in 
1990 to more or less one billion Sudanese Dinars in 2005. Deposits as a share of 
the GDP increased as well from 1.5% to more than 14% in 1990 and 2005 
respectively. Moreover, these Islamic banks succeeded in financing many areas, 
as their total finance increased from SD 767 million in 1990 to more than SD 700 
million in 2005. All these can be attributed to the increase in the demand for the 
new Islamic Banks and their branches in all the regions of Sudan (Abdel 
Mohsin, 2005). 
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However, total deposits as a percentage of GDP are very low by any standard. 
The ratio was up to 15%, compared to more than 40% in Egypt and Jordan, 
respectively. Investment deposits have never exceeded 2% of GDP in the 1990s 
(Hussein, 2003). The average finance to economic sectors as a percentage of 
GDP was less than 6% in 1990-2005. 
The demanding deposit accounts have succeeded in attracting more depositors 
compared to investment accounts as the share of the demanding deposits in 
national currency is over 80% of the total deposits in most of the Sudanese 
banks. On the other hand, saving and investment deposits remain relatively small 
(Hassan and Hussein, 2003). Despite the high growth rate of saving and 
investment deposits compared with current deposits reported by some researches 
(Ibrahim, 2006), the short-term current and demanding account deposits and 
long-term saving and investment deposits is still exactly evenly distributed. 
Ibrahim (2006), referring the majority of Sudanese Islamic Banks (Sills') 
preference of demand deposits to the fact that the majority of the Sills do not 
wish to share profits with them while they can still use the short term deposits for 
short term finance, compared with a few Sills who are hunting to attract 
investment deposits. However, Kireyev (2001) argues that this phenomenon is a 
reflection of the cash nature of the Sudanese economy, where individuals prefer 
to have instant access to their funds. Similarly, in the same direction, Hassan and 
Hussein (2003) argue that this phenomenon reflects the failure of the banking 
sector to offer investment opportunities to suit potential depositors. 
In addition, for the reason that inflation rates in the 1990s were much higher than 
any profits that banks might distribute to depositors, individuals invested heavily 
in properties instead of banks deposits which can be seen clearly from the share 
distribution of the foreign currency deposits as it is almost 50% for each demand 
and investment deposit in the same year. Indeed, the banks themselves used to 
invest in the property sector until 1995, when the Bank of Sudan (BOS) 
· prevented tli.epracticeo(Bafik of Sudan, 1990'-2006);-
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Hussein (2003) further added that the average volume total of commercial banks' 
deposits in the period 1990-1994 was about 52.4% of that in 1980-1984, but the 
decline in commercial banks' assets was less accentuate. This decline is in 
contrast with the experience of Iran and Pakistan, where Islamic instruments 
resulted in an increase in such deposits. However the share of medium and long 
term lending in total bank credit has increased in the post Islamic period. This 
was perhaps due to the fact that the credit policy continued to encourage such 
type of credit while restricting the volume of the other as well as total loans. 
Indeed, when much of bank lending capacity remained unused, the volume of 
medium and long term loans fell dramatically in real terms (Elhiraika, 1998). 
The assets composition of the Sudanese banks also contrasts with other Islamic 
banks in other countries. In Sudan, banking finance to economic sectors 
constitutes a small fraction of total assets. Sudanese banks maintain a large 
proportion of their resources in liquid assets since short-term deposits dominate 
the liabilities side of the banking balance sheet (Hassan and Hussein, 2003). 
Reports show that banking finance to economic sectors as a percentage of total 
assets accounted for 14%, 21%, 17.5%, 14.4% and 11.5% in 1995, 96, 97, 98, 
99, respectively. Sudanese banks are mainly engaged in non-fund financial 
services whereby off-balance sheet transactions generate 46% of the banking 
income, compared to 37% from banking finance to economic activities (Hussein, 
2003). Several banks extract almost 70% of their net profits from administration 
fees and charges imposed on customers (Kireyev, 2001). However, banking and 
finance as a percentage of the GDP has decreased in the 1990s but increased 
between 2000 and 2005. 
Hussein (2003) points out that banking finance (in real terms) declined by 46% 
in 1990-2000. The growth rate of banking finance to private and public sectors 
were 82% and 20%, respectively, through the 1990s. Kireyev (2001) points out 
that finance to the private sector (in real terms) was shrinking annually by 16% 
between 1991 and 1993, 1.5% between 1994 and 1996, and 6% in 1997-99. 
Overall, finance -to th{f private-sector declined -by Q.3% -in-1990-1999; Among 
other reasons, Kireyev (200 1) argues that the decline in banking finance in the 
1990s is due to the fact that Sudanese banks do not have much access to lines of 
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credit from abroad, inefficiency of the banks and the excessive BOS intervention. 
The capital and deposit bases are not sufficient for increasing finance. Banks 
consider the risk of extending finance to all sectors, other than trade, high. 
The cost of borrowing remains high in Sudan. For instance, the murabahah real 
rate of return was in the range of9.7-16.7% in 2000. In addition, Sudanese banks 
prefer to buy the Central Bank musharakah certificates with a higher rate of 
return compared to financing private sector (Hussein, 2003). 
As table 5.1 shows, the advanced finance to economic sectors was, as a 
percentage ofGDP, on average less than 3% in 1991-2001. The ratio of financial 
resources to GDP did not exceed 12% and total banking assets to GDP was about 
20%. The adaptation of the Sudanese banking system to the requirements of the 
Basle Commission's capital sufficiency standard requires the banking system to 
look at internal problems rather than external, including their role in alleviating 
poverty. In general, finance over assets ratios has improved which indicates the 
increase of the lending capacity. This was the case with finance over deposit 
ratios. 
Finance-to-deposits ratio provides a measure of risk taken as demonstrated by the 
degree to which resources are extended. It gives an indication of the ability of the 
banking system to mobilize deposits to meet credit demand. In Sudan, the 
average ratio of finance to deposits was 40% in the 1990s. This indicates no 
pressure on the whole banking system, and a high level of liquidity to respond to 
shocks. But the low ratio also reflects weak inflow of financial resources into the 
development process of the country. This percentage has increased after 2000, 
when it reached 71% in 2005 as shown in table 5 .1. 
5.3.4 Profit and Expenses 
The profits of the Sudanese banks are very low compared to international 
--standards, where the ratio-of-total-expenses"to-total--revenues exceeds 55 % in all 
Sudanese banks apart from the foreign ones. For example, the ratio of total 
expenses to total revenues reached 98 % in public and joint banks in 1997. Total 
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expenses exceeded total revenues by 30 % in government banks in 1999 (Bank 
of Sudan, 1990-2005). Kabir and Hussain (2003) argue that low efficiency in 
assets management, high ratio of non-performing loans, and low productivity of 
labour are the main hurdles to increasing operating revenues in Sudanese banks. 
In addition, the high total expenses are due to the absence of good governance, 
high staff and administration cost, the small size of Sudanese banks, and the slow 
process of introducing modem technology to banking operations. The average 
staff and administration costs in the Sudanese banks is 9 % of total assets and as 
high as 20% in some banks (Kireyev, 2001). However the last five years 
witnessed some mergers and, administrative reform was conducted which 
resulted in the reduction of the staff, and the merger and reduction of branches 
and departments to control operational expenses. The bank is also gradually 
implementing the Basel Committee measures for the control of various risk 
aspects. 
The currency circulated outside banks as a percentage of currency circulated 
inside the banking system has always been above 90% since 1990. For example, 
the currency outside the banking sector was 92% in 1995, 91% in 1996 and 1997, 
and 95% in 1998 and 1999 (Hussein, 2003). Therefore, the performance of 
deposits is relatively at an acceptable level. 
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5.3.5 Sectoral Distribution of Financing 
The sectoral distribution of banking finance in Sudan is depicted in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Sectoral Distribution of Financing (1990-2005) 
Agriculture Industry Exports Imports Domestic Other Total 
% % % o;o trade % sectors finance 
% (million of 
S.D. 
11 3 
34 22 3311 
35 5273 
18 22 6 24 
27 27 33950 
31 41556 
1998 19 17 4 26 47383 
2000 23 11 21 10 34 
18 
14 13 
13 
10 436391 
7 700018 
Average 23 16 18 3 14 27 124271 
Source: Bank of Sudan annual reports and the researcher calculation 
Up to 1991 , commercial banks ' advances to the agricultural sector stood at less 
than 1% of their total advances. As a result of the National Economic Salvation 
Programme initiatives to activate agriculture and to achieve food security, the 
number of bank branches in rural areas was more than doubled, and the ratio of 
farm credit rose to an average of 18% during the period 1990 - 1993 (Elhiraika, 
1998). 
For the period 1990-2005 the table 5.2 displays the massive increase on the total 
finance starting from SD 767 million in 1990 to SD 470025 million in 2005. This 
increase in financing is not evenly distributed among sectors. The agricultural 
and industrial share is an average of 40 per cent of the total banking finance. The 
share of trade-related financing (exports, imports and local trade) shares is over 
35%. 
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The table 5.2 also shows the decrease of financing agriculture as it reached 7% in 
2005 while it was 35% in 1993. By contrast, it is possible to conclude that the 
sectoral distribution of finance during this period favours trade and commerce. 
As the decrease in agriculture finance was in favour of the increase of local and 
domestic trade finance, while it is the other way around from 6% in 1994 to 32% 
in 2005. It is worth noting that since 1999 no minimum finance is required for 
the agricultural sector, financial institutions are free to allocate finance to 
different sectors of the economy without BOS intervention. Moreover, Ibrahim 
(2006) reported that the analysis of sectoral lending in 1990-2005 shows that 
about 74% of the combined total lending of commercial banks was directed 
towards modem agriculture, industry, and exports. Small producers shared only 
6% of the total lending. These led Tarik ( 1996) to conclude that the emerging 
corpus of facts about the operations of Islamic banks over the last two decades 
sheds serious doubt on their ability to perform this role (channelling financial 
resources into long-term investment projects in productive sectors of the 
economy on the basis of equity) which is vital for economic growth. 
5.3.6 Nonperforming Loan (Investment) 
Non-performing loans as a percentage of total banking finance is quite high in 
Sudanese banks. For instance, Abdullah et al (2000) show that according to the 
BOS publications the non-performing loans ratio was 44%, 24% and 16% in 
1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. The non-performing loans ratio is higher in 
public banks compared to the joint banks. For example, in 2000 the non-
performing loans ratio was 28% in public banks and 17% in joint banks (Bank of 
Sudan, 1990-2005). The increase in non-performing loans as a percentage of 
total finance in the late 1990s was mainly due to the decline of the overall 
finance activities. Also the high level of non-performing loans is due to the tight 
definition that the BOS use of such loans whereby an overdue loan by one month 
is considered as non-performing. 
Non-performing- loans- to total loans reached 17% in 2000, and there is a 
declining trend thereafter. This reflects poor credit performance and defaults of 
big clients. However, the ratio has fallen consistently in recent years to 14.5%, 
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8.9% 6.9% in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. During the same period, capital 
adequacy ratio for the banking system increased from 10.8% to 12% (IMF, 
2006). In 2005 while credit expanded rapidly during the year, the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans decreased from 8.9% in December 2004 to 
6.9% at the end of 2005. The asset quality of banks also improved. As of 
December 2005, a total of 18 banks (out of 29 banks) complied with capital 
adequacy requirements. As for the concentration of credit, almost 40% of the 
increase in credit to the private sector was granted by a single bank (IMF, 2006). 
It is worth noting that foreign banks did not record non-performing loans because 
they mainly engage only in trade transactions with low risk of default. Abdullah 
et al (2000) examined the non-performing loans for 1994-1998. They conclude 
that among the Islamic modes of finance, murabahah is the main contributor to 
non-performing loans. The exports sector has the highest non-performing loans 
as a percentage of total non-performing loans (38%). Furthermore, 28% of the 
non-performing loans are due to defaults in the agricultural sector. Ahmed (2005) 
has reached other findings for the period 1993-1999, for him musharakah was 
the main contributor with 49% compared with 41% for murabahah. 
There are several reasons behind the increase in non-performing loans: First; the 
absence of the price mechanism to allocate finance among different sectors and 
projects led by bankers to use other and less efficient measures to screen 
potential investments. Secondly; banks do not have sufficient information on 
customers and investment opportunities. Thirdly; the performance of the main 
economic sectors (agricultural and industry) are vulnerable to several external 
factors such as drought and change in foreign prices (Abdullah et al., 2000, 
Ahmed, 2005). 
Since 1999 the BOS has pursued a tight policy in dealing with non-performing 
loans. Banks should report on their non-performing loans to the BOS on a 
monthly basis and penalties are imposed on noncompliant banks. If non-
performing-loans-do not exceed 10% of a bank's finance,- the BOS encourages 
the management of the bank to take corrective actions (Bank of Sudan, 1990-
2005, Bank of Sudan, 1990-2006). 
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For banks which have non-performing loans above 10%, the BOS request the 
bank to prepare a debt recovery plan which should be approved by the BOS. The 
bank must implement the recovery plan within a month of the approval, 
otherwise penalties are imposed. If non-performing loans do not exceed 10% of 
the bank's finance, the BOS encourages the management of the bank to take 
corrective actions (Hussein, 2003). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of Islamic banking in Sudan can be divided into five stages 
(Ahmed, 2005). The first stage commenced in 1977, when the first Islamic bank, 
Faisal Islamic Bank, was established. By 1983, three more banks opened; 
Tadamoun Islamic Bank, Sudan Sudanese Islamic Bank, and Islamic Co-
operative bank. Although these Islamic banks were operating in an environment 
dominated by traditional banking systems, they achieved high growth in terms of 
assets, deposits and profitability. The second stage started in September 1983, 
when the whole financial system started to be converted to the Islamic model. 
During the conversion period, two additional Islamic banks were established; Al-
Baraka Bank Sudan and the Islamic Bank of Western Sudan. This period was 
characterized by political and environmental crises, which led to structural 
changes in the country. The third stage started after the down fall of Nimeiri 's 
government in 1985 and ended with the military coup of 1989. During this 
period, many of the traditional banks reverted back to their conventional 
practices. On the other hand, Islamic banks were forced to operate in an 
extremely hostile environment characterised by negative media coverage, 
lawsuits and heavy regulations. The fourth stage started in 1989, when the whole 
economy was transformed to conform to the Islamic law. The fifth and the final 
phase started after the peace agreement of 2005 in which the BOS were 
restructured, during the Pre-Interim Period, so as to reflect the duality of the 
banking system in Sudan. Two sets of banking system were developed in 2006; 
Islamic and Conventional. 
Some conclusions can be derived from the discussion about the overall 
performance of the banking system in Sudan. First, the reasonably high growth in 
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the volume of deposits and increase in the ratio of total deposit-to-GDP over the 
last years signal a stable confidence in the banking system. The low ratio of 
credit to GDP 1990-2000 reflects the difficulties Sills in Sudan are facing 
providing funds for development. Like wise the finance has witnessed dramatic 
increase as a number as well as a percent of GDP, deposits and assets. Second, 
sectoral concentration of investment is not evenly distributed and is biased 
towards the modem most profitable sectors, including trade, modem agriculture, 
and industry. Third, the banking has undergone substantial liberalization, 
privatization and restructuring and increase in bank capital and strengthened its 
supervision. Moreover, the BOS has been active in the last few years in 
strengthening prudential supervision and reforming the banking system, 
tightening the banks' large share of non-performing loans, enhancing 
profitability, restructuring of banks and increasing the banks' capital, 
restructuring the loans portfolio, and addressing the difficulties facing them. 
Lastly, giving these financial performances demonstrated, Sudanese banking 
finances are not expected to be considered effective for high risk operation nor 
poverty mitigation and financing micro-enterprises, as its performance and 
banking indicators are poor. 
These last chapters play as foundation chapters in presenting the necessary 
literature on musharakah finance and the performance and history of the 
Sudanese economy and banking with the objective of contextualising research 
aim and objectives of this study and its empirical analysis. However, before 
presenting the empirical chapters, it is crucial to devote the next chapter to the 
research methodology utilised in the empirical chapters. Hence, chapter six 
describes the research procedures for data collection both primary and secondary 
especially the survey questionnaire. It also describes the method of data analysis 
pursued in empirical analysis. Furthermore, this chapter provides an outline of 
the research methods used in the fieldwork and presents a description of the 
study sample and the statistical techniques used to analyse the data as well. 
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Chapter 6 Research Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
Tbe term methodology refers to the overall approaches and perspectives of the 
research process and is concerned with issues such as collection of certain data; 
the rationale for the collected data; data collection process and data analysis 
(Stacey, 1969). 
This chapter describes the research procedures for data collection both primary 
and secondary especially the survey questionnaire, and considers the advantages 
and disadvantages of this approach. It also describes the method of data analysis 
pursued in empirical analysis. Generally, the chapter discusses the main issues 
involved in survey design, data collection and data analysis. Furthermore, this 
chapter provides an outline of the research methods used in the fieldwork and 
presents a description of the study sample and the statistical techniques used to 
analyse the data as well. 
6.2 Objectives, Significance and Motivation for Research 
The significance of this study stems from the fact that despite the apparent 
success of Islamic financial institutions in many corners of the world, many 
governments are reluctant to endorse a full scale shift towards Islamic finance. 
Limited knowledge about the economic effects of the profit and loss sharing 
method of the Islamic finance is one of the reasons behind such reluctance. The 
study hopes to contribute to a better understanding among researchers and 
policy-makers as to the likely implications of using musharakah modes of 
Islamic finance. Further, this study seeks to provide an empirical investigation of 
how central bank policies have affected musharakah finance over the period 
1990-2005 in Sudan. 
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Hence, this study aims to examine the scope, techniques, policy, and financial 
performance of musharakah (partnership) method used by the Islamic banks. 
This is expected to produce knowledge quantitatively and qualitatively regarding 
the activities of these banks so that a better understanding of the fundamental 
principles of this system can be reached. The study also aims to examine whether 
the alternative modes of financing and investment operations are successful. 
Further, the study aims to analyse the main obstacles facing Islamic banks in 
financing musharakah and aims to suggest possible remedies. Also, the study 
intends to analyse how staff characteristics, bank characteristics and overall 
environment affect the performance of musharakah finance through the banking 
industry. Specifically, the aim of the study is to closely examine the relations 
between profitability and risk and banking characteristics. 
6.3 Research Method and Design 
The specific study designs used by researchers can affect the findings that are 
produced (Stacey, 1969). There are different research designs in social research, 
and according to Black ( 1999) research methodologies can be classified into four 
categories: historical research, descriptive research, experimental research and 
developmental-action research. This research is more concerned with a 
descriptive and experimental approach. 
What is gomg on (descriptive research)? Why is it gomg on (explanatory 
research)? The basic difference between descriptive and experimental research is 
that the former includes observations that have already occurred, hence a 
researcher measures things as they are (Bums, 2000). 
Stacey (1969) states that social research needs a design or a structure before data 
collection or analysis can commence. For Stacey the major approaches in social 
science include exploratory research, descriptive research, explanatory research, 
and evaluation research. Exploratory research attempts to understand some 
problem or area of study-in a" preliminary way.· Research designs for exploratoqr 
research often rely on direct observation of a limited number of examples of 
what is to be studied. Although exploratory studies do not and are not intended to 
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provide precise estimates of the prevalence of a problem or to test specific 
theories, they can be invaluable in mapping domains of study or clarifying the 
feasibility of specific research strategies and tactics (Stacey, 1969). 
Descriptive research usually attempts to examme a few well-developed 
constructs in detail in an effort to estimate the frequency with which certain 
behaviours or relevant characteristics occur in a given population (Black, 1999). 
Descriptive research is undertaken with the objectives to describe relevant 
aspects of the phenomenon of interest from an individual, organisational, 
industrial and other perspective. Data collected through descriptive research can 
provide valuable information about characteristics of the groups and also about 
the relationships between the characteristics. There are two basic descriptive 
research studies: cross sectional and longitudinal. The former measures a 
population at one point in time, while the latter involves data collection at several 
periods in time (Ragin, 1994). 
Explanatory research attempts to investigate the causes of a particular 
phenomenon, not simply to describe them. Such research carefully tests causal 
hypotheses. It also rules out rival explanations (Maxim, 1999). 
Evaluation research attempts to explore whether a given programme is achieving 
its stated goals. Process evaluation examines whether the program is operating as 
planned, whereas outcome evaluation assesses whether the programme achieves 
the impact or effects that were planned for it (Stacey, 1969). 
This research is regarded to be an explanatory research and evaluation research 
since the researcher is trying to investigate the situation for evaluating. This 
study uses sample survey as it was thought to be the most suitable way to achieve 
the research objective especially based on the nature of the data required and the 
purpose for which it was to be used. 
There are two essential methodological approaches to the social sciences; 
qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative research can be interpreted as a 
research strategy that emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of 
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data (Black, 1999). By contrast, qualitative research can be interpreted as a 
research strategy that usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the 
collection and analysis of the data (Miller, 1983). 
In quantitative research, the researcher is ideally an objective observer who 
neither participates nor influences what is being studied. In qualitative research, 
however, it is thought that the researcher can learn the most by participating 
and/or being immersed in a research situation. These basic underlying 
assumptions of both methodologies guide and sequence the types of data 
collection methods employed (Maxim, 1999). 
Quantitative research readily allows the researcher to establish relationships 
among variables, but is often weak when it comes to exploring the reasons for 
those relationships. A qualitative study can be used to help explain the factors 
underlying the broad relationships that are established (Remenyi, 1998). 
For these reasons, the researcher feels that a combination of the literature 
studies, case studies and a survey investigation approach offers the most 
appropriate and satisfactory methodology in carrying out this study. The 
approach of using two or more methods in combination is called triangulation. In 
social science triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that 
diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon the investigated subject 
(Creswell, 2003). Ragin (1994) argues that one of the principal aims of 
triangulation in the social sciences seems to corroborate one set of findings with 
another. Triangulation reduces the risk that a researcher's conclusions will reflect 
only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific method (Black, 1999). 
Consequently, the researcher used the quantitative and qualitative approach to 
analyse the data. 
On the other hand, one of the ways research designs can be classified is by the 
communication methods used to gather primary source data. There are two 
alternatives; first,_Jhe_researcher might observe conditions, events or subjects. 
Secondly, the researcher might survey or question persons about various topics. 
Furthermore, the researcher wishes to utilize both quantitative and qualitative 
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data in our study. This has been necessitated by the fact that for certain issues to 
be analyzed only quantitative data is available, whereas other concepts have only 
data of a qualitative nature (Sekaran, 2003). However, the researcher knows that 
each method has strengths and weaknesses. For example, with primary sources, 
one collects precisely the information he or she wants. One usually can specify 
the operational definitions used and can eliminate, or at least monitor and record, 
the extraneous influences on the data as they are gathered. But secondary sources 
also have their merits, as they can be found more quickly and cheaply (Crano, 
2002). 
Both primary and secondary data were used in the preparation of this study. The 
primary data was acquired through questionnaire surveys, while the secondary 
data was obtained from library references (books, articles and magazines), 
published research, related studies, statistical reports, banks annual reports, 
government and the Central Bank publications and periodical reports. In short, 
studies made by others for another purpose, represent secondary data. In this 
regard it is worth mentioning that some data was often available in formats that 
suit government and banks' planning purposes, but do not cover, broadly, all the 
information required by this research. This highlights a need for reliable 
databanks within each sector, to provide complete and standardized information. 
Time series data relating to macroeconomic performance, monetary and financial 
aggregates and government policies were obtained from official sources 
including annual reports of BOS and the economic survey of the ministry of 
finance as well as other publications. 
However, it must be noted that the study only focuses on the perceptions of the 
investment department employees of the Sudanese Islamic banks. Therefore, it 
does not include the entrepreneurs' perceptions. In addition the qualitative data 
will not include any interviews with the investment department employees. 
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6.4 Data Collection Design 
6.4.1 Research Instruments 
The most popular quantitative technique is the survey, which can be administered 
by mail, telephone, face to face, or more recently by the internet (Miller, 1983). 
In order to collect the appropriate and necessary information for achieving the 
objective of the study, the questionnaire survey technique was used. It is 
reasonable to believe that a questionnaire is the most convenient and efficient 
way to obtain the information needed. The written questionnaire is typically 
more efficient and practical, and it allows for the use of a large sample 
(Oppenheim, 2000; Gillham, 2000; Barnett, 1991). 
6.4.2 Survey Techniques 
As for the main empirical part of this study, the researcher used primary data 
mainly to suit the nature and purposes of the research which were to elicit 
respondents' opinions, perceptions and attitudes. The survey approach using 
questionnaire is thought to be the most appropriate technique in collecting the 
intended primary data. It also allows quantitative analysis to be conducted in the 
testing of inferences and also its potential to generalise the findings (Ryan, 
2002). A questionnaire is a highly structured data collection technique in which 
each respondent is asked the same set of reformulated written questions, usually 
within rather closely defined alternatives (Oppenheim, 2000). 
Questionnaires are an inexpensive way to gather data from a potentially large 
number of respondents. Often they are the only possible way to reach a number 
of reviewers large enough to allow statistical analysis of the results. 
Questionnaires assist the process of collecting data by asking all, or a sample of 
people to respond to the same questions (Miller, 1983). 
--The· survey technique has ·advantages and· disadvantages; the -advantages -of 
questionnaires include cost effectiveness and ease of administration ease of 
analysis through computer software packages; access to hard-to-reach 
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respondents; simple and quick for the respondent to complete and preserve 
confidentiality; and no interviewer bias (Gillham, 2000; Dubois, 1992). 
Disadvantages of questionnaires include: not suitable for complex question 
patterns; data entry is time consuming; errors in completion; and poor quality 
control due to the absence of the interviewer. The questionnaire can be 
conducted through posting to the respondents or personally administrated like 
face-to-face and surveys, telephone surveys, self-administered surveys (mail and 
drop-off surveys) and more recently the internet through e-mail and the World 
Wide Web. 
The mail survey only requires the researcher to post the questionnaire to the 
prospective respondents and wait until it is completed and returned to the 
researcher. On the other hand, using a drop-off survey, the researcher approaches 
a prospective respondent, introduces the general purposes of the survey and 
leaves it with the respondent to complete (Oppenheim, 2000). Essentially, the 
objective is to gain the prospective respondent's cooperation. Normally, the 
researcher returns on the same day or the next day to collect the completed 
questionnaire. In this way a researcher can cover a number of survey locations in 
a single day with an initial drop-off and later collection (Miller, 1983). 
This study adopted mainly face to face surveys and some times the drop off 
questionnaire approach. 
6.4.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Selected Survey 
Techniques 
A face-to-face questionnaire is better than a postal questionnaire, because of the 
difficulties of conducting surveys with any person in Sudan through the post, as 
it is rejected culturally. One of the problems associated with postal 
questionnaires is that people simply enter replies in wrong boxes (Black, 1999). 
Human errors could easily go uncorrected when the respondent is alone (Miller, 
1983). Operation of the face-to-face questionnaire as a suitable instrument for 
data collection is supported by the literature. For example, conventional 
evaluations of business supp01t measures rely on face-to-face questionnaire 
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survey of recipient firms in order to establish the direct benefits of policy (Black, 
1999). 
Hence, a face-to-face questionnaire has several advantages, and a few 
disadvantages. In a face-to-face questionnaire, the researcher has the chance to 
explain the questions to avoid any misunderstanding, and people may be more 
co-operative when all they have to do is talk. In this situation, the researcher and 
the respondent may feel more relaxed and give more reliable information. In 
addition, a face-to-face questionnaire minimises the missing answers and errors. 
Moreover, it helps to create an atmosphere of confidence between the parties, 
namely the researcher and the respondents. In addition, it gives the respondent 
the feeling that there is some interest being shown in them and their role in 
society (Black, 1999). 
The main disadvantage of the face-to-face questionnaire is that with a wide 
geographical area and a large sample it can be very difficult to achieve good 
coverage (Dubois, 1992). This problem was solved in our study because the 
researcher only concentrated on the capital Khartoum. The assistance provided 
by the team of collectors also helped. Other disadvantages of this method are that 
firms may not be able to recall events belonging to the musharakah funds; they 
might recall but make mistakes; they might not be able to articulate events in the 
banks due to the large volumes of the projects, and they might seek to 
deliberately mislead. This problem was solved by setting clear questions in the 
questionnaire depending mainly on ranking factors. 
The drop off technique was used for three reasons (Brannen, 1992): First, it is 
suitable for collecting data about attitudes and opinions and has been extensively 
employed in many similar studies. Secondly, the self-administered approach is 
appropriate for covering a large number of respondent groups and at diverse 
geographical locations as intended in this study. Finally, by using the self-
administered approach the researcher could overcome several constraints of this 
-study"such-asc the unavailability~and inaccessibility of, information~ required to 
construct a sampling frame such as information on customers and depositors of 
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the banks under study and the limited resources (both time and financial) 
available. 
The questionnaire was given to five survey teams to be distributed, consisting of 
students of the Business School at Sudan University of Science and Technology 
which had on-the job training programmes. The team members' task was to 
distribute the questionnaires to employees and explain the purpose of this study. 
The researcher initially held a meeting with the team in which he explained in 
detail each part of, and the actual questions in the questionnaires. In addition, a 
general instruction sheet was distributed to help in explaining how to deal with 
different situations which could arise when conducting the survey. 
6.5 Survey Structure and Contents 
6.5.1 Survey Structure 
The researcher has opted to design a closed type of questions rather than open-
ended questions in the questionnaire design. The advantage of closed ended 
questions are that they can be administered with little direct confrontation and the 
respondent can perform with greater reliability the task of answering the 
questions when alternative responses are given (Oppenheim, 2000). Close-ended 
questions are also easier and relatively quicker to answer. In fact, they require no 
writing and quantification, since they are straightforward (Miller, 1983). 
The kind of questions used and the construction of a questionnaire vary 
according to the type of information required. Thus, the questions have been 
phrased carefully in order to be certain that the desired information is secured. 
Many steps were involved in the construction of a questionnaire. The researcher 
begins with the research objectives, and then goes through the process of 
preparing the questions. 
Tliis a1loWed the researcher to use~appropriate statistical tests in evaluating othe 
empirical findings of the study as to encourage easy response from the various 
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respondents under study. It also enabled uniformity and consistency throughout 
the data collection process. 
The questions themselves were mostly ranking or multiple choices, in order to 
cover a wide range of possible responses. Answering these questions should not 
only be much quicker, but it was anticipated that they should evoke a higher 
response rate. Some questions were open-ended, so that the respondents were not 
restricted in the answers or comments they may have wished to make. It was 
considered that the questionnaire may be too long, but the risk of facing a lack of 
information made this inevitable. 
The questionnaire was originally prepared in English and then translated into 
Arabic by using the back-translation method with great assistance from an expert 
who is fluent in both languages. 320 questionnaires were distributed to staff of 
the Islamic banks and only 250 were returned to the researcher, which are 
sufficient for statistical reliability. Staff were contacted in their offices, houses 
and in the front offices of the head office. 
6.5.2 Questionnaire Content 
The questionnaire was fairly comprehensive consisting of 33 questions, covering 
a wide range of issues aiming to gauge respondent attitudes towards equity 
participation characteristics, objectives and obstacles. The questionnaire covered 
six pages and was separated into 5 parts (see Appendix for a sample of the 
questionnaire used in this study). 
The objectives of the questionnaire were briefly stated on the questionnaire's 
covering letter, which also stated the confidentiality of all information provided 
and that such information was to be used for the purpose of the study only. To 
encourage target groups to participate and respond to the questionnaire the 
anonymity of the respondents must be guaranteed by not asking respondents to 
directlyYdentify.tlieir· organisations: 
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The questionnaire contains five sections; the first section was designed to gather 
information about the respondents' personal profile including gender, age, 
marital status, educational qualification, managerial experience. The second part 
consists of questions about the bank which the respondents work for. The 
preference of musharakah finance is the title of the third section, in which the 
respondents had to give their opinions about the factor/s which effect decisions 
when choosing to fund an entrepreneur using musharakah method and factor/s 
that determine the capability of the customer to be offered finance using 
musharakah method. The fourth section was devoted to the performance and 
management of the musharakah projects. In this section the respondents 
expressed their opinions about the profitability and risk performance, average 
age of the musharakah projects, interference into the management decision, 
awareness of the accurate product cost of the partnership projects, commitment 
to a quality improvement programme for the partnership finance, and satisfied 
with their banks' performance measurement systems for musharakah projects. In 
the last sections the questions were devoted to obstacles and constraints facing 
musharakah finance including factor/s which cause the weakness of following up 
projects from the bank, factor/s which cause the non-performing musharakah, 
and obstacles that hinder musharakah projects. The respondents were given the 
chance in the last questions to give any further comments. The questionnaire is 
concluded with a statement expressing that the identity of respondents will be 
treated in strict confidence and not revealed in the thesis or any other 
publications. If a respondent wishes to receive the conclusions of the study, 
he/she then has to supply his/her contact information. 
6.6 Sample Designs and Sampling Process 
6.6.1 Population and Sampling Frame 
A population is a group of persons, institutions, or events, which are the 
aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated set of specifications 
(Gillham; 2000): For~ instance, -the~ term investment,department staff used- in this -
study defines a population consisting of all the bankers, who are working in the 
investment section of a Sudanese bank. 
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The sampling frame is the list or other record of the population from which the 
sampling units are drawn. Note that not all members of the population of interest 
are included in the sampling frame. The sampling frame may be based on 
telephone directories, city directories, or membership lists of private 
organisations (Barnett, 1991 ). 
Currently, the Sudanese banking system consists of one investment bank, one 
specialized banks, and 27 commercial banks (4 foreign, 2 state-owned, and 21 
jointly owned banks). More than 32% of the Sudanese banks branches for the 
period 1990-2005 are based in the capital Khartoum in which the questionnaire 
took place. In 2005 the number of the branches based in Khartoum was 187. 
Based on the extent of engagement in musharakah finance and regional 
representation, a sample of 8 banks and its branches in Khartoum were sampled 
for closer examination. 
6.6.2 Size of the Sample 
Different authors tend to give different guidelines concerning the minimum size 
of the sample. Rao (2000) states that a sample of more than 30 is thought to be a 
good estimate of the population. For this study the sample was much larger than 
30. In addition, the larger the sample the more accurate the research, while 
increasing the sample size decreases the width of the confidence interval at a 
given confidence level (Jessen, 1978). According to sample sizes larger than 30 
cases and smaller than 500 cases are suitable for most research. In this study, the 
sample is 250 cases. 
In order to minimize the potential random error in the sample selection process, it 
was deemed proper to consider the appropriate sampling technique and the 
sample for the study (Population Centre, 1982). The method of data collection 
for this study was originally planned on the assumption that the ideal sampling 
frame as identified in any research methodology literature would be accessible to 
the researclier. Inthe case bhhis·-study; the idealcsampling-frame would be-the 
lists of all investment department employees and managers of the Sudanese 
banks. The availability of such lists would enable the researcher to sample the 
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population through the use of a table of random numbers which could ensure 
random sampling and prevent bias. However, developing such an ideal sampling 
frame would have been almost impossible, as time and resources were the main 
constraints to this study. Furthermore, to gain access to information on 
respondents' profiles was another critical issue, since all banks are bound by duty 
of secrecy. 
To overcome some, if not all, of the difficulties mentioned above, the official 
statistics and general figures obtained from the Association of the Sudanese 
banks was utilised as the source of reference when determining the sampling 
strategy. Another strategy adopted was to distribute the questionnaire randomly 
to employees at the banks' premises using face to face and drop-off self 
administered methodology. 
According to the association of the Sudanese banks the total number of Sudanese 
bank's (2004) staffwas 16000 in 2004, about approximately 7000 working in the 
capital. Only between 1000 and 2000 are working in the investment department. 
The number of overall staff for the eight selected banks in Khartoum is around 
2500. 
Following the technique introduced by Miller (1983) a purposive decision was 
made on the total size of 200 observations. The researcher started to collect the 
data from 17 Sudanese banks. Due to the limited amount of data that 5 banks 
have released and the inconsistency in the data provided by 4 other banks, the 
researcher had to eliminate 9 banks from the study. The market share of the 8 
selected banks is greater than 90% as the research will discuss in the next 
chapter. 
6. 7 Pre-testing, Pilot Validity and Reliability 
It is regular practice to pre-test the questionnaire with a small sample prior to 
startinR{he, survey~proper,-as-this-minimises ,the, problems "that-omay- arise-when 
producing the final draft. Each survey questionnaire presents its own problems 
and difficulties before it reaches the final draft. Questionnaires have to be 
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designed, and tried out, improved and then tried out again, often several times 
over, until it is certain that they can do the job for which they are intended 
(Oppenheim, 2000). 
Reliability is the consistency of the measurement, or the degree to which an 
instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same condition 
with the same subjects. Validity is the strength of our conclusions, inferences or 
propositions (Miller, 1983). In short, were we right? Validity could be divided 
into two types these are; internal validity and external validity. External validity 
refers to the extent that the results of a study can be generalized, while internal 
validity refers to the degree to which a study exactly reflects or assesses the 
specific concept that the researcher is trying to measure. There are several types 
of internal validity; face validity, content validity, construct validity, predictive 
validity and concurrent validity (Kalton, 1983). Validity is more important, if a 
measure has a high validity, it must also have a high reliability. If it has a low 
validity, it is misnamed and misleading regardless of its reliability (Gillham, 
2000). 
The real difference between reliability and validity is mostly a matter of 
definition. Reliability estimates the consistency of measurement, or more simply 
the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used 
under the same conditions with the same subjects. Validity, on the other hand, 
involves the degree to which your are measuring what you are supposed to, more 
simply, the accuracy of your measurement. Validity is more important than 
reliability because if an instrument does not accurately measure what it is 
supposed to, there is no reason to use it even if it measures consistently (reliably) 
(Gillham, 2000). It has been widely recognized that reliability and validity of the 
instrument used can be improved by using this pre-test or pilot study. 
As in any survey work the quality of the results depends in large on the quality of 
the primary data collected from the respondents. Working on this premise, the 
researcher took all necessary measures to ensure that the data-,collected was of 
high quality in terms of accuracy and reliability. In order to check the content 
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validity of the questionnaires the researcher has contacted some experts in the 
field ofbanking and finance and some academics in Sudan. 
The questionnaire was designed with two goals in mind: relevance and accuracy. 
A questionnaire is relevant if no unnecessary information is collected. Accuracy 
means that the information is reliable and valid. So the sequence and elicit 
wording of the questions were designed in such a way as to promote accuracy 
and informative answers from the respondents. Hence, back to back translation 
was carried out in which the translated Arabic questionnaire was translated again 
into English. The two versions of the English questionnaire were then compared. 
Efforts were made to make the questions as short and clear as possible to avoid 
ambiguity, confusion, and vagueness. In addition efforts were made to avoid 
asking questions that are beyond the respondents' capabilities or knowledge. 
The pilot test for this study was conducted between January and March 2004 in 
Sudan through a convenience sampling procedure. At least three drafts were 
made before the final draft. The questionnaire in English was piloted by 
distributing 10 drafts to Durham University postgraduate students. The 
questionnaire in Arabic was piloted twice in order to make sure that the questions 
were easily understood. The first test was made by distributing 25 drafts of the 
questionnaire to some academics at Sudan University of Science and 
Technology. The second test was made by sending 15 copies ofthe questionnaire 
to some senior staff members of Sudanese banks. Amendments were made 
following these two tests, in order to make the questionnaire clearer. Their 
comments and opinions provided valuable feedback, especially with regard to the 
translation from English language into Arabic and the suitability of some 
questions. Their opinions also gave strength to the final questionnaire. The final 
format was therefore established according to the maximum feasible amount of 
testing. 
Tlie cpilot stUdy~ Was undertaken"- after correcting the initial -draft of the 
questionnaire. This was to ensure that the testing of the questionnaire achieved 
its intended objective. Thus, once the initial draft of the questionnaire had been 
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designed, each question and the questionnaire as a whole was tested and 
evaluated. One of the main objectives of pilot testing is to refine the wording, 
filtering, and ordering, and to control the questionnaire length (Population 
Centre, 1982). In addition, a pilot study is very useful in making sure that the 
translation of the questionnaire will not lead to any misunderstanding of the 
questions. 
6.8 Fieldwork Training and Briefing 
Particular attention was given to the proper handling of the respondents by the 
enumerators, especially in the identification and field selection of respondents. 
Accurate recording of the responses (information) is also given sufficient 
emphasis in order to eliminate the unnecessary non-random bias that may have 
occurred in the data (Wax, 1971 ). This was achieved by having a compulsory 
one day training and briefing session for all research assistants involved. This 
was because accuracy and reliability of data collected during the fieldwork 
depended on the quality performance of these research assistants (Johnson, 
1975). 
The research assistants were thoroughly briefed on the fieldwork techniques, the 
objectives of the survey, the content of the questionnaires, the handling of the 
respondents and the research environment. Other efforts made, included 
meetings every evening to discuss field problems encountered during the day. 
Experiences in approaching the respondents, asking the questions and pacifying 
difficult respondents were shared during these sessions. These debriefing 
sessions also provided some insights into how to assess the data quality and how 
to interpret the data. The data collection occurred between May and December 
2004. 
6.9 Response Rate 
A_visit was undertaken-to the Sudan to collecLthe main field· data.~The major 
survey was conducted between March 2004 and December 2004. In general from 
a total 320 questionnaires distributed, 261 were returned, out of which 250 were 
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usable (valid and completed), thereby yielding a response rate of about 78%. 
This response was considered large enough and sufficient for statistical reliability 
and generalisation (Population Centre, 1982). This high response rate 
undoubtedly improved validity and reliability of the survey since the greater the 
response the more accurately it estimates parameters in the population sampled 
(Pallant 2002). Hence, no further attempt was made to increase the sample. 
Details of the number of questionnaires distributed and the response rate are 
summarised in table 6.1. 
It should be noted that some of the questionnaires were eliminated because they 
contained too many missing items or some contradictions in the answers 
occurred either by mistake or by misunderstanding of the questions which might 
affect the results of the study. 
Table 6.1 Sample Breakdown and Response 
6.10 Analysing the Data 
6.1 0.1 Software for Data Analysis 
Once the questionnaires had been collected and once the data had been entered 
into the SPSS software and the data file had been checked for accuracy, the next 
step in~oJyed_fonnatting Jhe r~w f!<!t'! into a fonn. that could be used to conduct 
~--- -~- - ~-- --- -.=---,-•":,=--; ---:"~ - - -~---=- --
analysis and to test the research hypothesis. The researcher calculates the total 
scale score as an effective procedure which can be used to manipulate data sets 
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(Allison, 2002). This results in a new variable at the end of the data set. If any 
items had missing data, the overall score would also be missing. The created 
variable, with its full details, was recorded for a clear guide to the study. 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) is possibly the most widely 
used computer software for the analysis of quantitative data for social scientists 
(Norusis, 2004). Using this powerful software all data assembled from the 
questionnaires' data for this research study was defined and entered by the 
researcher. Because of the nature of the data and research questions, descriptive 
statistical methods were used. These methods include frequencies, percentage 
and means, in order to clarify the differences between the different characteristics 
and performance. 
6.10.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Once the data is collected, the first step is to describe it using statistical measures 
such as the mean and median (central tendency), and standard deviation 
(variation) (Haberman, 1974). The idea is that for a particular item on the 
questionnaire, the researcher computed the mean value that underscores the 
respondents' behaviour with respect to the stated research question and/or 
hypothesis. 
6.10.3 Statistical Technique 
Choosing the correct statistical technique to analyse data is one of the difficult 
parts of the research process. When making this selection, a number of different 
factors have to be considered, such as the type of question, the type of scales, the 
nature of the data for each variable and the assumptions that must be met for 
each of the different statistical techniques. Identifying the statistical techniques 
used in other related studies should also help in choosing the correct one (Jessen, 
1978). 
There are a number of steps that can help the researcher to navigate through the 
decision-making process for the questionnaire. First, what questions does the 
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researcher want to address? Any researcher should write a full list of all the 
questions, he or she would like to have answered in his or her research. Some 
questions could be asked in a number of different ways. These alternatives can 
help to cover each of the areas of interest (Ragin, 1994). Second, what is the 
nature of each variable? Knowing the level of measurement for each variable is 
very important. Different statistics are required for variables that are categorical 
and continuous. Variables may be categorical (also referred to as nominal level 
data), ordinal data (rankings: 1st, 2nd, 3rd), or continuous (also referred to as 
interval level data) (Jessen, 1978). 
While the description of data gtves some information and ideas about the 
questionnaire, only testing gives a clear answer regarding a given question. The 
test generally depends on the nature of data at hand (Leach, 1979). The third step 
is, therefore, to decide the nature of statistical techniques, as to whether a 
parametric or a non-parametric statistical technique will be used. Testing is 
critical in statistical analysis. Statistical techniques are classified into two main 
groups: parametric and non-parametric. Parametric techniques assume that the 
underlying distribution of scores is normal. In addition, each of the different 
parametric techniques contains other additional assumptions that must be 
checked before carrying out the analysis. Only non-parametric statistical 
techniques are used in this study (Sprent, 2001 ). 
6.10.4 Statistical Tests 
6.10.4.1 Chi-square for Independence 
The chi-square test for independence is used to determine whether two 
categorical variables are related. It compares the frequency of cases found in the 
various categories of one variable across the different categories of another 
variable (Gibbons, 1976). Two categorical variables with two or more categories 
in each are needed. The lowest expected frequency in any cell should be 5 or 
more forcthe main assumption. In- addition, the significant value needs-to-be .05 
or smaller, otherwise the result is not significant (Antonius, 2003). Mainly this 
test was used in this study to identify the relation and cross-tabulation between 
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different nominal variables. For example, the test was used to discover the cross 
tabulation between the preferred mode of finance and the eight sampled banks, to 
identify which banks prefer musharakah finance. 
6.10.4.2 Chi-square Goodness-of-Fit Test 
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test, also referred to as the chi square test for a 
single sample, is a non-parametric test employed in a hypothesis testing situation 
involving a single with nominal and categorical data (Sheskin, 1997). The chi-
square test for goodness-of-fit tests the hypothesis that the distribution of the 
population from which nominal data are drawn agrees with a posited distribution. 
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test compares observed and expected frequencies 
(counts). This test is basically the sum of the squares of the differences between 
the observed and expected frequencies, with each squared difference divided by 
the corresponding expected frequency. Two values are involved, an observed 
value, which is the frequency of a category from a sample, and the expected 
frequency, which is calculated based upon the claimed distribution. Goodness-of-
fit tests test the conformity of the observed data's empirical distribution function 
with a posited theoretical distribution function by comparing observed and 
expected frequency counts (D'Agostino and Stephens, 1986). 
The purpose of Chi-square goodness-of-fit test is to see ifthe sample comes from 
the population with the claimed distribution. Another way of looking at that is to 
ask if the frequency distribution fits a specific pattern. The chi-square goodness-
of-fit test has been used to differ between sample characteristics. For example, 
the result of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test was used to identify reasonable 
likelihood that the differences in the Islamic finance methods preference in the 
sample data can be attributed to chance so as to recognize whether these 
preferences are significant or not. 
6.10.4.3 The Friedman Test 
The Friedman test is a non-parametric statistical test developed by the U.S. 
economist Milton Friedman. Similar to the analysis of variance ANOV A 
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measures, it is used to detect differences m treatments across multiple test 
attempts. The procedure involves ranking each row (or block) together, then 
considering the values of ranks by columns (Conover, 1999). 
The Friedman test frequently called a two-way analysis on ranks is the 
nonparametric equivalent of a one-sample repeated measures design or a two-
way analysis of variance with one observation per cell. Friedman tests the null 
hypothesis that k related variables come from the same population. For each case, 
the k variables are ranked from 1 to k. The test statistic is based on these ranks 
(Hollander, 1999). 
The Friedman test first ranks the values in each matched set (each row) from low 
to high. Each row is ranked separately. It then sums the ranks in each group 
(column). If the sums are very different, the p value will be small. Prism reports 
the value of the Friedman statistic, which is calculated from the sums of ranks 
and the sample sizes (Field, 2005). The rank order is particularly important for 
this study in that it indicates respondents' opinions in terms of their perception of 
the importance of a specific problem or an issue and their preferred solutions 
from the alternatives provided. For example, while the respondents were 
provided with some obstacles usually face musharakah finance and were asked 
to rank them according to their importance. In such a context, this test was used 
to identify the relevant significant importance of these selected obstacles and to 
rank their means accordingly. 
6.1 0.4.4 One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOV A) 
This is similar to at-test, but is used with more than two groups to compare their 
mean scores on a continuous variable. It is called one-way because it measures 
the impact of only one independent variable on the dependent variable. It 
compares the variance between the different groups, with the variability within 
each of the groups. The variance between the groups is given by an F ratio. A 
large F ratio indicates that-there is more variability between the groups.·· In this 
case, the null hypothesis that states that the population means are equal can be 
rejected (Sprent, 2001). Regarding using ANOVA in this research, it was used to 
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identify any significant differences, for example, in the degree of profitability 
and risk between different modes of finance including musharakah. 
All the above statistics are calculated using SPSS that provides the value of the 
statistic and the critical value P. In general; the 5% level is widely accepted as a 
reasonable level of significance. 
6.11 Difficulties and Limitations 
It is normal in this kind of empirical research to face difficulties. As for this 
research, there were some difficulties that the researcher tried to overcome and 
dealt with appropriately. 
Due to the situation in Sudan in the year of the data collection and taking into 
consideration the information system in Sudan, some crucial parts of the data 
were difficult to collect. Part of the required secondary data was not properly 
recorded; some of it was sensitive to share like nonperforming debts and 
investments. Part of the required data was unavailable. Some respondents were 
unavailable, reluctant or declined to participate in the survey. Some significant 
items marked non-response in the survey resulted when some respondents 
refused to give the answer to particular questions. Some changes in the Sudanese 
financial system occurred because a dual system (conventional and Islamic) 
came into effect after the peace agreement was signed which means there is 
much merit in a new investigation as well as much more data to update. 
For the information which is not available through official statistics, the 
researcher succeeded to seek out other sources to get an idea of the scale and 
nature of the research problem. The researcher had to go through thousands of 
files to collect some quantitative data, reaching some bankers was of some 
difficulty. All these were time consuming. 
Due to the above reasons, the data was collected in eight months instead of 3 
monthscas wascoriginally·planned~ Without the researcher' S"personal relationship, 
contacts and network the gathering of research data could have taken even 
longer. The researcher's personal positive relationship was very important in 
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facilitating the fieldwork. Indeed, undeveloped civil society plays an important 
role in people's willingness to respond to questionnaires and interviews (Wax, 
1971). 
As mentioned earlier, this study is limited to the Islamic banks' employees' 
perception in Sudan and does not include entrepreneurs' perceptions. In addition, 
qualitative data assembled for this study does not include any interviews with 
those employees. 
The results of the survey research of this study are generally applicable to the rest 
of the Sudanese states around the country, based on the fact that the Sudanese 
society is mostly homogeneous, and any segment of the population should be a 
fairly accurate representation of the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this 
study does not claim that the sample is a representation of all musharakah 
projects in other countries. Thus, the study is limited with the experience of 
Sudan. However, it can be suggested that further research to study other 
countries are needed to have a comparative understanding of the performance of 
musharakah. 
6.12 Conclusion 
The methodology employed in this thesis was for obtaining sufficient 
information to satisfy the basic requirements of the thesis. 
In the case of the questionnaire used the number of respondents should prove 
adequate for interpreting the situation. The final questionnaire benefited greatly 
from the pilot study, which proved invaluable for framing the appropriate 
questions. The success of the statistical analysis can be judged from the results 
obtained in following chapters which should enable the significant variables to 
be determined and to judge their affects on the wage determinants in the 
segmented labour market. 
Data from Sudan, which fully adheres to interest-free principles of finance, will 
be used to answer the research questions. Part of the data source is used in the 
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previous chapters, the Sudanese banks' balance sheets and annual reports, which 
provides bank level data for all Sudanese banks for the period 1990-2005. 
Initially some descriptive analysis is provided. Also, the concentration of 
musharakah in the Sudanese Islamic banks each year is provided so as to give an 
indication of the influence of musharakah. The second part of the data is a 
survey data collected from the investment department staff working for the 8 
selected banks. The survey questions are of nominal and ordinal data. Therefore 
non-parametric procedures are best suited to this data. A total of 250 of the staff 
(investment departments' employees only) were randomly sampled. The method 
of investigation is analytical. 
Having presented the research methodology in this chapter, the next four 
chapters will be devoted for the empirical chapters. The next chapter, (chapter 
seven), being the first empirical chapter, presents the profile analysis and sample 
characteristics of the survey and respondents. 
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Chapter 7 Sudanese Banks' Profile Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
It is necessary at this stage to identify the structure of the Sudanese Banks, the 
geographical distribution of their branches, and the market share of the 
musharakah fund among other finance methods. It is also aimed by this chapter 
to identify the banks under study and the banks' selection criteria. In addition the 
official guidelines followed by the selected banks in granting musharakah fund 
are also considered as part of the banks' profile. 
The analysis of the Sudanese banks' profile will enhance better understanding of 
the musharakah finance practice and will help to recognise its prospects and 
obstacles in order to answer the research questions. 
Hence, part of the data source used in this chapter is the Sudanese banks' balance 
sheets and annual reports for the period 1990-2005. Initially some descriptive 
analysis is provided. The concentration of musharakah in the Sudanese Islamic 
banks each year is provided so as to give an indication of the influence of 
musharakah. 
7.2 Structure of the Sudanese Banking Sector 
The institutional structure of the banking sector was stable in the 1990s. Table 
7.1 shows that the total number of banks was in the range of 25-29 in this period 
during which two insolvent banks were liquidated, three public banks were 
merged into the Khartoum Bank to form the largest bank in Sudan, and in 1993 
the merger of El-Neilein Bank and the Industrial Development Bank created the 
second largest bank. The El-Neilein Bank: itself hade been soldjn 2006. In"facUhe 
- -- -~---~ --~ ;:_:_,-~ ~_·-o-c;v----o"---,,--.• ---,c-.. ------:::-~~-~- -- ~-- ··' ., .. ~~-·-.· , ___ _, • 
period after 2000 witnessed the sale of the three governmental banks. Currently, 
the Sudanese banking system consists of one investment bank, one specialized 
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bank, and 26 commercial banks (4 foreign, 2 state-owned, and 20 jointly owned 
banks). 
As in many developing countries, the Sudanese financial sector is dominated by 
a few banks. For instance, the largest two banks, Omderman Bank and Bank of 
Khartoum are government-owned banks with a 25% market share. Those two 
banks held about 40% of the total banking deposits in 2001 (Kireyev, 2001). 
Table 7.1 Structure of the Sudanese Banking Industry 1990-2005 
6 4 
10 4 6 
11 5 
11 5 
11 6 
27 6 3 1 
6 1 
2 11 6 2 
2 11 5 
1 
9 8 3 
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7.3 Geographical Distribution of Branches 
As shown in Table 7.2 there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
branches in the 1990s; by the end of 1997 the number of bank branches increased 
to 695 , from 414 in 1990. By the end of2005 the number of branches increased 
to 517. The soundness of the banking system has also broadly improved in the 
last few years, following the Bank of Sudan's comprehensive banking policy, 
which includes structural and financial soundness reforms and deepening of 
banking technology and Islamization in the banking system (Ibrahim, 2006). The 
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cost of establishing branches in the 1990s was high relatively when compared 
with the 1980s as the inflation rates went up. This made the cost of venturing into 
branch banking and, therefore, enhancing financial intermediation, higher for 
banks in these two decades (Ali, 2001). 
The massive mcrease of branches shows that Sudan's banking system had 
undergone visible changes and this may be in tune with the incessant changes in 
polities and economic and social policies. It is vital to know these institutional 
changes before dwelling on the real achievements of the Sudanese banking 
industry. 
Table 7.2 Geographical Distribution of Branches 
Khartoum 
% 
1990 29 17 4 
30 
27 15 14 576 
29 
28 19 653 
30 
1996 32 
32 
32 13 11 17 686 
32 
2000 33 22 14 17 3 598 
33 
2002 36 20 13 3 497 
37 
34 14 3 
36 
Average 32 22 12 17 3 584 
Source: Bank of Sudan annual reports, Association of Sudanese Banks ' annual reports, and the 
researcher calculation 
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Despite the prominent increase in the number of Sudanese banks and branches in 
the 90s, SIBs are characterized by the regional inequality in the distribution of 
branches. It is clear that there is a high concentration of branches in commercial 
towns compared with rural areas, and in the middle including Khartoum, the 
capital, compared with other regions. From Table 7.2 it may be made clear that 
the Central States, in which 35% of the population live and which are considered 
the most advanced States in terms of development projects, infrastructure, per 
capita income, and standards of living (IMF, 2005), share around 50% of the 
total banks in the country (Hassan and Hussein, 2003). Moreover, the pattern of 
distribution has been more or less the same for the last fifteen years or so. 
Another feature of the SIBs sector is the declining number of branches from over 
700 in 1997 to only 533 branches in 2002. This is a distorted geographical 
distribution of banking facilities, which consequently cannot serve socio-
economic development, particularly in rural areas (Ibrahim, 2006). 
7.4 Distribution of Funds in Relation to Methods of Finance 
In examining the distribution of funds accumulated in Islamic banks according to 
the methods of finance, this section also aims to find answers to the following 
research questions: 
Research Question (1) What is the percentage ofmusharakahfinance among the 
total Sudanese banking finance? 
Research Question (2) Why is musharakah not the priory financial instrument in 
Sudan? 
Figure 7.1 shows the total fund distribution among Islamic finance methods 
namely, musharakah, murabahah, sa/am, mudarabah and other methods in the 
Sudanese banks between 1990 and 2005. The trend in figure 7.1 shows that the 
Sudanese banks prefer murabahah over other types of Islamic modes of finance, 
as murabahah had the biggest share of the fund with an average of 47.3% from 
the overall ftmds: Musharakahis also"a'popularforrn of-finance among Sudanese· 
banks with an average share of 29.3% of total finance. Due to the increase in 
non-performing loans in agriculture, banking finance through sa/am contracts 
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declined from 22% of total banking finance in 1992 to 2% in 2005. Other modes 
of finance constitute a small fraction of total finance. Remarkably, mudarabah 
has never been of more than marginal importance. On the other hand, there are 
many reasons why mudarabah does not play as large a part as musharakah, as 
mudarabah in Sudan works mainly on trade. 
Figure 7.1 Islamic Financing in Sudanese Islamic Banks According to 
Modes of Finance 
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Mudarabah application is confined only to a small number of well-trusted 
entrepreneurs with a good track record, usually well known to the financiers. 
Salam, mudarabah and other methods achieved on average 6.5%, 4% and 13% 
respectively. In general, we can notice that there is a gradual increase for 
musharakah fund as it started with 15% in 1990 and increased to 32% in 2004 
compared with a gradual decrease for murabahah which started with 70% in 
1990 and ended with 38% in 2004. In fact in 2000, musharakah reached its peak 
by holding the largest amount of funds, with 43% compared to 33% for 
murabahah. 
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It must be noted that whilst all Islamic banks and banking operations, all over the 
world, have been dominated by the non-PLS modes, the share of musharakah 
and mudarabah is very low. In Sudan, however, the case is different, as a great 
increase happened in the PLS share. The share of partnership modes of financing 
in Sudan, although not satisfactory, are, nevertheless, better than the general 
trends of Islamic banking compared to other parts of the world, as these formulae 
constitute less than a quarter of the asset portfolio of the world-wide Islamic 
banks (Stiansen, 2004). Yousef (1996) has cited that the mark-up techniques 
shared around 51-60% for Iranian banks and more than that in Pakistan, which 
like Sudan applies full Islamization of the banking system. However, because the 
use of mudarabah in Iran is bigger, the combination of mudarabah and 
musharakah in both Sudan and Iran are almost equal. Yousef (1996) added that 
the share is in the range of 83-90% for banks in the mixed financial sectors in 
other countries. 
The relative proportions of these different types of Islamic assets will, of course, 
have implications for a bank's medium and longer term liquidity. The asset 
structure also has implications for income, with higher income associated with 
musharakah than murabahah. The asset structure and composition will also have 
consequences for bank risk. If problems arise with murabahah these will have to 
be sorted out in a relatively short period or else the asset will be written off. Non-
performing assets based on musharakah may cause problems for years, and there 
will be much less pressure to make provisions until the date of maturity of the 
assets approaches. This, however, means that problems may accumulate 
ultimately threatening the financial viability of the Islamic bank itself unless 
appropriate action is taken. 
Different explanations have been giVen for this lack of equity finance. The 
agency problems, information asymmetric, and moral hazard were among the 
major explanations for the main unpopularity. Some researchers tried to justify 
this through highlighting the influence of management and control on the internal 
governance of the Islamicbanks"(Tag el-Din, 1991); The moral-hazard-thesis-is 
however useful in explaining the present financial activities of Islamic banks, 
namely the dominance of the mark up system. Islamic banks are understood to be 
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financial institutions based on the profit and loss sharing. However, in practice, 
while profit sharing is being widely used in the relationship between the bank 
and the suppliers of funds (depositors), in the relationship between the bank and 
investment agents (i.e. demanders for funds), it is not very popular. It is the 
moral hazard problem which explains the general unwillingness of Islamic banks 
to supply entrepreneurs with funds on the basis of profit and loss sharing. 
Khan and Mirakhor (1989) argue, that the shortage of expertise in PLS financing 
in commercial banks is one of the most important reasons explaining the slow 
growth of PLS modes of financing in Iran. 
Although profit and loss sharing (PLS) modes conform to the real Islamic system 
of finance which stands contrary to the interest-bearing traditional system they 
are, nevertheless, not free from application complications. Al-Harran (1993) 
identified that risk, difficult nature of investment and long-gestation period in 
receiving returns and problems of management as the major reasons why 
Sudanese Islamic banks (Sills) do not undertake equity financing modes. PLS 
modes require adequate experience in management, additional supervisory and 
monitoring roles compared with sales-based modes which are relatively less 
risky and easy to manage. Moreover, PLS modes are subject to erosion of 
investment in the case of a loss that is why ISBs are hesitant to undertake them at 
the initial phases of their operations. Instead they use mostly debt-based sa/am 
and murabahah instruments which shift most of the risk to the client. By 
contrast, Ahmed (2005) has reported that musharakah had less risk compared 
with other modes of finance in two Sudanese banks for the period 1993-1999 
while most of the remaining sampled banks were reported to have no difference 
between their modes performance. However, it is relevant to mention that being 
exposed to risk, in it-self, is not a reason to reject the business. Even the 
conventional banks, which work with interest based system, do not advance 
loans to each and every applicant. They study the risk, the guarantee if needed, 
and the potentials of the business if relevant. Afterwards, only sound proposals 
will be approved~ cJndeed-in the case of musharakah, -Islamic-banks have-to-carry 
out this study with more depth and precaution then risks management can be 
developed to minimise the exposed risks and to maximise the expected 
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profitability (Usmani, 1999). Therefore, it is more likely that over time through 
accumulated experiences, these banks will be able to develop their own 
approaches and accept only those projects which fulfil the need of achieving 
higher profitability. In addition, risk management tools will always contain a 
diversified portfolio of number of musharakah projects as no bank can restrict 
itself to a single musharakah, therefore, it is hardly conceivable that all of these 
musharakahs, or the majority of them will result in a loss. Provided that, some 
loss occurred can be attributed to chance or luck, the rest will only make a loss if 
proper measures have not been taken while high returns are expected for 
exposmg more risks, compared with semi profitability guaranteed projects. 
Hence, if well managed, the possibility of loss for the bank is much less 
theoretical, or at worst equal, to the possibility of loss in a joint stock company 
which will be restricted to a limited sector of commercial activities. Notably, the 
possibilities of loss occurrence have never been a reason for people to stop 
purchase of these shares. The case of the bank is much stronger, because their 
musharakah activities will be so diversified that any possible loss in one 
musharakah will be more than compensated by the profits earned in other 
musharakahs as mentioned before (Usmani, 2002). 
It should also be noted that the Bank of Sudan Annual Report of 2001 admitted 
that the substantial use of murabahah mode of finance in the Sudanese banking 
system is due to the simplicity of this mode and the people's preference (Bank of 
Sudan, 2001). 
Choudhury (2001) believes that the reason that the PLS is not feasible for 
funding short-term projects is due to the ensuing high degree of risk (i.e., the 
time diversification effect of equity). This makes Islamic banks and other 
financial institutions rely on some other debt-like modes, especially mark-up, to 
ensure a certain degree of liquidity. This is again not the case in Sudan as most of 
musharakah finance is a short-term finance. Choudhury (2001) further added, the 
restrictive role of shareholders (investors) in management and, hence, the 
dichotomous financial· structure of PLS-contracts make"them-non-participatory in 
nature, which allows a sleeping partnership. In this way, they are not sharing 
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contracts in a true sense; the transacting parties share financial resources without 
participatory decision-making. 
Dar and Presley (2000) believe that the reason behind the lack of PLS modes in 
Islamic banking practice is because of the fact that PLS contracts are inherently 
vulnerable to agency problems, because entrepreneurs have disincentives to put 
in effort and have incentives to report less profit compared to the self-financing 
owner-manager. But, if this is the case in Sudan, it should apply to both 
musharakah and mudarabah modes of financing as well. However, in Sudanese 
banks as was shown, this is not the case; as Sudanese banks rely on the use of 
musharakah but not mudarabah. Furthermore, Dar and Presley (2000) added the 
imbalance between management and control rights is attributed as a major cause 
of lack of PLS in the practice of Islamic finance. Given this dichotomy, the 
agency problem gets accentuated, which may put the PLS at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis other modes of financing. The reason for the murabahah preference is 
because of a trading technique, as it is an appropriate instrument, given that most 
of the finance provided by Islamic banks is directed to trade financing. 
Part of the explanation is that PLS financing requires expertise which is not 
always available. Another reason is that there are no back-up institutional 
structures such as secondary capital markets for Islamic financial instruments. It 
is possible also that the tendency to concentrate on non-PLS financing reflects 
the early years of operation: it is easier to administer, less risky, and the returns 
are quicker. The banks may learn to pay more attention to equity financing as 
they grow older. 
Ahmed (2005) believes that government pressure has been the major factor 
behind this shift towards more musharakah finance. Two objectives have guided 
government policy in this regard. One objective has been to reduce what de facto 
was the continuation of interest-based lending through widespread use of 
synthetic murabahah contracts. Another aim has been to increase long-term 
finance. Some Bankers have expressed- -strong reservations about the 
Government's preference for the musharakah contract, because they see this 
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contract as much more risky than the murabahah that can commonly be secured 
against liquid assets (Stiansen, 2004). 
To conclude, Islamic banks all over the world have shown strong preference for 
less risky modes of finance, namely the mark up device instead of upholding the 
fundamental principles of PLS. In Sudan, given that some fifteen years earlier 
murabahah contracts accounted for 70% or more of the total, this is an important 
change in the cumulative investment profile of the financial sector because 
murabahah contracts are primarily used for short-term deals, while musharakah 
contracts are better suited for long-term investments. Put differently, a 
murabahah contract is particularly well-suited to finance imports and exports, 
and the musharakah is more a vehicle for equity finance (Stiansen, 2004). 
7.5 Official Guidelines for Musharakah Financing in the Sudanese Islamic 
Banking Industry 
The procedures for musharakah investment, are different from one country to 
another and from one bank to another. However, commonly, the following are 
the normal procedures usually taken by most of the sampled banks: 
7.5.1 Filling out of Musharakah Finance Application Form 
Each potential entrepreneur fills out a detailed prescribed application form 
focusing on his/her personal history, knowledge, experience, names of referees, 
documents, invoices and other certificates required have to be attached e.g. land 
ownership certificate. All applicants, if relevant, have to submit tax and zakat 
clearance certificates. In addition, a full detailed feasibility study of the project 
should be attached, including nature of the project, location, employment, cost-
estimates, expected revenue and profits as well as the contributed amount 
requested and collateral provided if any. 
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7 .5.2 Screening of Application Form 
The bank examines the application in the light of established prudent banking 
practices after careful consideration of customer risks through a customer's 
prevwus dealings with the bank and his/her current management status, 
expertise, record keeping, etc. are given due importance in the screening process. 
The following is part of the screening process: 
(i) Investigation will be carried out into the background of the 
entrepreneur and assessment of his ability to run the project 
successfully; 
(ii) The technical, economic and social feasibility of the project will be 
studied; 
(iii) The projects should be compatible with Islamic shari 'ah law; 
(iv) Providing licence requirements if needed; 
(v) A staff member may make an inside visit to the project to confirm the 
information provided concerning assets and capacity e.g. visiting an 
agriculture scheme and writing a comprehensive report. Full 
consideration will be given to the feasibility study provided to 
calculate the tum over in musharakah trade, profitability and risks; 
(vi) An interview may be conducted with the customer for any further 
information needed; 
(vii) If found feasible, then careful consideration will be given to make 
sure of the compliance of the project file with the investment policy 
adopted by the bank, the branch if any, and the finance policy issued 
by the central bank. 
7 .5.3 Recommendation, Decision and Determination of Profit-Sharing 
Ratio 
If the proposal sounds well in terms of what has been mentioned then the 
investment department officer will make his recommendation to the head of the 
department who will make his recoriunendation to the head of the branch 
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(Ibrahim, 2004). The branch manager decides whether to accept or reject the 
application. 
Funds and finance which may come under the financial powers of the branch 
managers shall be approved locally, otherwise the application sent to the 
headquarters to be studied and evaluated by the investment section who submit a 
note for final approval by the management. It should be noted that the branch 
manager's capacity to approve short term finance is different from one bank to 
another and from one branch to another. Generally, the power of the branch 
manager is restricted by a specific amount of finance per transaction. Before 
making an offer, an interview with the entrepreneur may be conducted for 
negotiation especially to determine capital invested and profit and loss ratios 
including the management share of the profit which once determined, will not be 
alterable (for most of the banks). Those are determined on the basis of profit 
projection compatible with the entrepreneur's past and future expected 
performance. The portion of profit payable to the entrepreneur, as an exchange of 
management efforts, will be subject to achieving the level of profit projected by 
the entrepreneur. 
7.5.4 Signing a Musharakah Contract 
Every bank has a standard typical musharakah contract approved by the bank's 
shari 'ah compliance committee and the national shari 'ah compliance 
committee1• A typical musharakah contract usually contains the following 
character; it is written in third person, past tense. The date may be mentioned in 
the beginning or at the end. The two parties are described by name, profession, 
legal capacity and place of living. The purpose of the investment is explained, 
1 The organizational structure of the Sudanese banks includes the following: First, the board of 
directors is usually composed of ten members and is the top level of authority. They are elected 
by the general assembly for a specified period. Second, an administrative committee from within 
the board members assists it, and is usually composed of three to four members who make 
decisions about urgent matters that need a level of authorization greater than that of the general 
manager. Third; the general manager is responsible for the implementation of the plans and 
achieving the determined goals. Fourth, the shari 'ah committee is responsible for shari 'ah 
compliance. This committee report directly the board of directors. Fifth, the deputy general 
manager, about an average of eight department managers, and a manager for every branch and 
the various rank levels of staff members assist the general manager. 
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and its duration. It is then stipulated that any profit "that God may allow" is to be 
divided according to an agreed percentage. Then the purpose of writing the 
contract is stated in a variety of formulations. The document is signed by the two 
parties. In addition, the most common clauses and stipulations may be 
summarised in the following way: 
(i) The identity of the customer and his legal capacity (that he is sound of 
mind, mature and acting of his free will and under no duress) is 
spelled out in standard phrases, either in the beginning of the contract 
or after his acknowledgement; 
(ii) The customer acknowledgement, iqrar, in which he declares he will 
sincerely work for the partnership and he will do no harm to it and 
will do his best to achieve the high profit for both parties. And no use 
of the partnership capital for an outside operation will be allowed as 
well as acknowledgement of his obligations and duties to the 
partnership; 
(iii) The description of the partnership, purpose, type of currency and its 
amount; 
(iv) The date for commencing and finishing or winding up the partnership; 
(v) Capital invested, profit and loss ratios, management share of the 
profit; 
(vi) Reference to the purpose of writing the document. Reference to God 
as the Best ofWitnesses; 
(vii) Signatures of the two parties to the act, customer and the bank. 
A copy of a typical contract in English is enclosed in the appendix 
7.5.5 Starting the Project and Management Contribution 
After the contract, the capital is usually paid in cash and in advance. However, 
the partner share might be in kind (inputs) e.g. rent of machines or equipment, in 
which the assets of the project are a mixture of liquid (non-monetary or-even in 
instalments) and non-liquid assets. This happens when one partner or more 
cannot provide any cash while he affords to provide his share in a fixed asset or 
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raw material form, while the rest of the capital is still liquid (Ibrahim, 1999). 
Also, he or she is rewarded for his/her entrepreneurship, since in relatively 
profitable ventures the return on investment is much higher than other modes of 
finance (Abdalla, 1997). Co-ordination between the entrepreneur and the bank 
staff should be maintained during all stages of project implementation. In 
practice labour, skills, management, goodwill, credit-worthiness and contacts are 
provided mainly by entrepreneurs (Thomas, 1995). 
In general the following rules are valid (Al-Harran, 1995) 
(i) Every partner is an agent for the other, as all the partners benefit from 
the musharakah business; 
(ii) Every partner enjoys equal rights in all respects in the absence of any 
condition to the contrary; 
(iii) Any condition regarding participation in and administration of the 
musharakah and variation in the share of profit on this ground is 
valid; and 
(iv) Every partner has a right to participate actively in the affairs of 
musharakah ifhe wishes. 
If musharakah has been formed in a limited liability company form, banks can 
exercise the voting rights corresponding to their share of the firm's equity 
capital. Their representatives can sit on the firm's board of directors. Otherwise, 
if it has been in a partnership form, the bank contributes to the management and 
decision making with one or two partners. Each partner represents both the 
partnership and partners and he or she, therefore, enjoys a legal capacity to act 
for himself and on behalf of other partner(s) in dealings with partnership matters. 
As far as musharakah is concerned, the bank has to participate in the 
management of the projects. If it was a matter of a small number of projects, the 
bank may be able to participate in the management of enterprises. But to 
participate in the management of an infinite number of projects, which is 
required by the musharakah contracts, is certainly highly inconvenient. Even if it 
is considered convenient, it must involve an additional cost for the bank. 
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Therefore, in practice most of the management activity especially the day to day 
management is left to the entrepreneur. 
7.6 The Bank Selection Criteria 
Since the researcher is looking for banks which entrepreneurs usually select to 
apply for musharakah finance, it is important to know the criteria for the banks 
selection by entrepreneurs. Many studies have investigated the bank selection 
criteria or the reasons on the basis of which entrepreneurs choose to bank with 
specific banks. These studies have identified a number of such factors: 
convenience (i.e. the location), friends' recommendations, reputation of bank, 
availability of credit, competitive interest rates, friendliness of bank staff, service 
charges, adequate banking hours, availability of ATM, special services and the 
quality of services on checking accounts. The relative importance of these factors 
varies from one country to another depending upon the age, gender, income, 
marital status, occupation and cultural background of customers as well as the 
type ofbank Islamic or conventional. (Naser and Al-Khatib, 1999). 
Table 7.3 depicts the frequencies and percentage distribution of the banks which 
the respondents work for. 
Table 7.3 Respondents' Employer Banks 
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In our sample the respondents sampled represent all Sudanese banks, both 
governmental and non governmental (private), large and small scale, old and 
new, and specialized and non specialized (commercial) banks. The table shows 
that three of these banks are government banks, notably Omderman National 
Bank, Savings Bank and Bank of Khartoum. These three banks are represented 
by 36% of the sample while the 64% representing the five private banks are 
Shamal Islamic Bank, Sudanese Islamic Bank, Tadamoun Islamic Bank, Faisal 
Islamic Bank and Saudi Sudanese Bank. Additionally, 15% of those respondents 
are working for a specialized bank, the Savings Bank, in contrast to the other 
seven banks which are commercial banks. The table also shows that for each of 
the following, Shamal Islamic Bank (a private relatively new and small scale 
bank), the Savings Bank (a relatively old and large scale bank) and the Sudanese 
Islamic Bank (a private old and large scale bank) the respondents range from 
14% to 15.6% working in each bank. Whereas for Tadamoun Islamic Bank (an 
old, private and large scale bank), Faisal Islamic Bank (an old, private and large 
scale bank) and Khartoum Bank (an old governmental and large scale bank) the 
respondents range from 11.6% to 12.8% working in each bank, the rest of the 
respondents, 20% are working for Omderman National Bank (a relatively new 
and small scale governmental bank) and the Saudi Sudanese Bank (a relatively 
old and small scale bank) as the percentage for each is nearly 10%. This 
sampling is justified, as the majority of these banks are reported to be using an 
average of 47% of their funds to finance customers using musharakah for the 
period between 1993- 1999 (Ahmed, 2005). 
Moreover, the largest two banks in Sudan are included in the sample namely 
Omderman Bank and Bank of Khartoum with a 25% market share. These two 
banks hold about 40% of the total banking deposits (Kireyev, 2001). 
The researcher may conclude that the sample represents the entire population of 
the Sudanese banking industry and its component governmental and non-
governmental (private) banks, specialized and commercial banks, as well as large 
and small scale banks and older and relatively new banks. 
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7.7 Profile for the Sampled Employer Banks which the Respondents Work 
for 
7.7.1 Bank of Khartoum 
Bank of Khartoum is the largest and pioneering bank in Sudan. The bank was 
established in 1913 as 'Anglo- Egyptian Bank' and was the first bank in Sudan. 
In 1925 its name changed to Barclays Bank then was renamed as Barclays Bank 
D.C.O in 1954. In 1970 the name was changed to The State Bank for Foreign 
Trade (Bank ofKhartoum, 1990-2005). Afterwards, in 1983 certain commercial 
and development banks belonging to the State were merged in BOK namely 
Unity Bank and National Export Import Bank and renamed Bank of Khartoum 
Group. In 2006 the bank was privatised with the authorized share capital of SD 5 
billion (Sudanese Dinars). Up to 2001 the bank was owned totally by the Bank of 
Sudan and the Sudanese Ministry of Finance. The bank has recently undergone a 
privatisation process, when in 2006 the Government offered 74% of the shares in 
return for US $100 million to the Dubai Islamic Bank. As a result all of the 
departments had been restructured and jobs streamlined. The market share of the 
BOK branches equal 20% out of all the branches of other banks in the capital, 
where the major economic activities are concentrated. The bank owns four 
subsidiary companies (Bank of Khartoum, 1990-2005): National Company for 
Financial Transactions; trades in the quoted companies' shares as well as 
promoting shares in case of initial offering, National Company for Hire 
Purchase; trades in consumer's commodities on hire purchase terms, National 
Company of Exchange; deals in Foreign Exchange, and National Company for 
Trade and Service: deals in all types of consignor's commodities as well as 
import and export. 
7.7.2 Omderman National Bank 
Omderman national bank is the largest growing bank in Sudan with three digit 
growth of profit in 2003 and 44% in 2004. Net profits in 2004 were SD1982m 
($7.9m) (Omderman National Bank, 1995-2005). Increased capitalisation was 
indicative of the bank's push to develop both itself and the market. In 2004, 
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Omderman placed strong emphasis on technology investments and training. 
Special emphasis was given to corporate services without neglecting the bank's 
strength in the retail segment. The judges noted the increasing diversification of 
Omderman 's deposit base, with strong deposit growth from expatriates and 
foreign corporate. Overall, in 2005 deposits of Omderman National Bank grew 
by 46.6% and the bank now enjoys a 32% share of total deposits in the banking 
sector. The bank owns three subsidiary companies (Omderman National Bank, 
1995-2005): Khartoum Trade and Shipping Company; deals in export and 
import, Nasr Housing and Construction Company; engages in construction, 
rehabilitation of building, roads and bridges, and supply of local building 
materials, and Omsisco International Co; engages in custom cleaners, carriage, 
storage and insurance. 
7.7.3 Shamal Islamic Bank 
Shamal Islamic Bank was established in 1990 with an authorised capital of SDD 
5 billion. Tadamoun Islamic Bank and Faisal Islamic Bank were part of the first 
share holders together with some northern Sudanese private investors. The bank 
owns some few small subsidiary companies working in different sectors 
including agriculture, constructions and trade (Shamal Islamic Bank, 1990-
2005). 
7.7.4 The Sudanese Savings Bank for Social Development 
The Sudanese Savings Bank for Social Development is a governmental bank 
which was established in 1995 to help the poor and provide production tools to 
small scale producers and the disadvantaged. The authorised capital of the bank 
is SDD 7 billion (The Sudanese Savings Bank for Social Development, 1990-
2005). 
7.7.5 Sudanese Islamic Bank 
Sudanese Islamic Bank was established in 1983, with a nominal capital ofUS$20 
million. The concept behind establishment of the Sudanese Islamic Bank has 
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materialized as a natural outcome of the Islamic revival both within and outside 
the Sudan on the basis of the fact that economic, social and political integration, 
added to religious tolerance and collaboration. By the end of 1989-90 the paid-up 
capital was $16 million. The bank has 50 branches spread all over the country. 
The bank owns four subsidiary companies: the Islamic Sudanese Company for 
constructions and real Estate, Alsalama Insurance Company, the Islamic 
Sudanese Company for Trade and Investment, and the Islamic Sudanese 
Company for Agricultural Services (Sudanese Islamic Bank, 1990-2005). 
7.7.6 Tadamoun Islamic Bank 
Tadamoun Islamic Bank was established as a public company with a limited 
liability in 1983 as a second Islamic Bank in Sudan with the equivalent of US$20 
million as authorised capital which has been boosted to SDD 3 billion in 2003. 
The bank's total assets and deposits reached SDD 29.1 and 27.9 billion in 2003 
respectively. The bank owns 99% of the equity of two subsidiaries Tadamoun 
Real estate Co. and Tadamoun Financial Services (Tadamoun Islamic Bank, 
1990-2005). 
7.7.7 Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic bank was established on the 4 April 1977 as the first Islamic Bank 
in Sudan, in accordance with the temporary act No 9 for the year 1977. On 18 
August 1977, Faisal Islamic Bank had been officially registered as a public 
limited company, under the companies registration act for 1925, to start 
operations, in May 1978. The Paid Capital is 3 billion (SD) (Faisal Islamic Bank, 
1979-2005). 
7.7.8 Saudi Sudanese Bank 
The Saudi Sudanese Bank is a symbol of Arabian traditions and a gateway to 
· ·-busini~ss-in · Sudan:~rr "Was· established in-198:4 with ·an·authorised- capital of 
US$20 million, as a gesture to demonstrate and strengthen the strong ties 
between the Saudi and Sudanese nations. It also encourages commerce between 
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the Afro and Arab peoples. The share of the Saudi part is 60% and the remaining 
40% is owned by Sudanese private investment. The bank has become a 
powerhouse of financial capability, professional efficiency and adoption of the 
most recent technology, serving the (Sudanese) economy and community without 
losing focus on stakeholders' interests. The bank owns two subsidiary 
companies: The Saudi Sudanese Trade Company and the Saudi Sudanese 
Company for Agricultural investment (Saudi Sudanese Bank, 1990-2005). 
7.8 Number of Staff and Branches for the Sampled Banks 
Figure 7.1 shows the number of the staff working for the eight selected banks 
and figure 7.2 shows the number of staff in the capital. Generally, the numbers of 
staff in these eight selected banks are in the range of 200 and 600, except the 
Bank of Khartoum, the biggest bank in Sudan, which has a range of 1000 and 
1700 staff. The average staff members for the selected banks, Khartoum bank, 
Omderman National Bank, Islamic Sudanese Bank, Tadamoun Islamic Bank, 
Saudi Sudanese Bank, Shamal Islamic Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank and Savings 
Bank for the period 2000 and 2005 are 1170, 536, 509, 458, 355, 305, 356, and 
430 respectively. In general, the number of staff in the Bank of Khartoum and 
Tadamoun Islamic bank decreased compared with the fluctuation which occurred 
for the numbers of staff members of Shamal Islamic Bank, Islamic Sudanese 
Bank and Savings bank. The rest of the banks have a general trend of increase. 
As for the number of staff, as shown in figure 7.2, in Khartoum, Saudi Sudanese 
Bank and Omderman National Bank experienced a steady increase. In general, 
the bank of Khartoum, Tadamoun Islamic Bank and Islamic Sudanese Bank 
witnessed general increases except in a couple of years compared with Savings 
Bank which witnessed a decrease in their number of staff. Fluctuation occurred 
in the Faisal Islamic bank's number ofstafftoo. 
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Figure 7.2 No of Staff Members 
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The number of branches in the capital Khartoum for these eight banks did not 
experience a big change as presented by table 7.4. Noticeably, the number of 
branches for the Faisal Islamic Bank and Khartoum Bank are almost equal. 
Table 7.4 No of Branches in Khartoum 
7.9 Deposits 
Table 7.5 depicts the ranking of the eight banks according to the attraction of 
deposits. Omderman National bank maintains its position being the first bank in 
attracting customers' deposits while Khartoum bank kept its second position 
throughout most of the period 2000-2005. Saudi Sudanese bank came fourth in 
2005. On average, the rest of the banks are placed in the middle of the total list of 
Sudanese banks. 
Table 7.5 Ranking the Banks According to their Deposits 
In concluding, after having seen the profile analysis in this chapter, the following 
empirical chapters are devoted to presenting the survey analysis. These include 
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the sample characteristics presented in chapter eight, performance and preference 
analysis presented in chapter nine and obstacles and constraints presented in 
chapter ten. 
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Chapter 8 Sample Characteristics and Analysis of the Opinions 
of Bank Personnel towards Banking Activities 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter, firstly, atms to present the demographic and work related 
characteristics of the bank personnel who responded to the questionnaire 
conducted by this study. It is crucial to recognise the demographic details of the 
respondents, as well as their managerial experience, job level and satisfaction 
with their financial packages. Hence, this chapter provides information on the 
personal characteristics of investment department employees in the Sudanese 
banking industry including gender, age, marital status, education and managerial 
experience. The questionnaire included a section on respondents' profile as 
various biographic, demographic and experience factors were likely to influence 
the answer of the research questions of this study as well as the practice and 
implications of financing through the musharakah method of finance. In order to 
conduct the data analysis for the primary data, descriptive statistics were 
employed in this chapter. 
Secondly, it also atms to identify musharakah management characteristics 
including the awareness of the product cost and pricing decisions as well as the 
responsibility and objective characteristics of the banks when carrying out 
musharakah finance projects. 
Thirdly, it aims to study the age of musharakah projects in which the following 
two research questions will be answered: what is the average age of musharakah 
projects? and why or why not do Islatnic banks prefer short-term musharakah 
finance? 
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The analysis in this chapter will enhance the understanding of musharakah 
finance practice and will help to recognise its prospects and obstacles, in order to 
answer the research questions. 
8.2 Demographic Information of the Respondents 
Table 8.1 provides the frequencies and percentage distribution of personal 
characteristics of investment departments' employees in the Sudanese banking 
industry. 
Table 8.1 Demographic Profile 
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8.2.1 Gender 
As can be seen from table 8.1 the distribution of males and females is uneven. 
The females represent only 10% of the total sample and 90% of the sample is 
male. This reflects the representation of both genders in the banking industry in 
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reality, as females have not joined the industry fully yet. This may be due to the 
nature of Muslim society where males are expected to carry out the 
responsibilities of their families; and therefore they are expected to undertake 
more formal and remunerable work than the women. It is important to note that 
some Islamic banks like Faisal Islamic bank, Tadamoun Islamic Bank and 
Shamal Islamic Bank adopted a policy of not employing women. The reasons 
given in support of this policy relate to both ideology and control. As far as the 
ideology is concerned, it is understood that Islam is not against the employment 
of women; however, it implicitly encourages them to stay within the confines of 
domestic duties. Only in exceptional cases such as the lack of a male provider or 
in a vocation crucial to the community, may a woman go out to work. It should, 
however, be noted that the Muslim society has been going through important 
changes in their social fabric and due to the pressing economic condition, a 
certain level of liberalisation is taking place regarding women's work. 
In order to illustrate the change that has taken place, it is important to state that 
Islamic banks had a noticeable number of female employees before and after 
Islamization. However, the control and evaluation of women is considered more 
difficult than that of men. A woman, it is stated, has to be evaluated due to her 
physical and emotional differences if management is fair. Culturally, in Muslim 
societies, a man and a woman doing similar jobs are always treated differently by 
their superior, as women have always been treated more leniently. Although 
most managers will at times praise a woman, it is always difficult or impossible 
to blame or punish her due to the perceived emotional reactions from women. 
Some even believe that wherever men and women come together in a work 
setting, productivity is reduced (Ahmed, 1998). As suggested by Ahmed (1998) 
this is particularly true in a society where males and females are socially 
segregated. The area of male gender domination needs further study, but this is 
outside the scope of our research area. 
181 
efuwteJt eigftt Sampk ~tic6 and ~;., of, tlie {!)pinitm6 of, 9Janli 
fleMo.turd towauJ., 9Jan!Wy; UdWitie, 
8.2.2 Age and Marital Status 
Table 8.1 shows that 58.4% of the respondents belong to the age group ranging 
between 31-40 years old while the percentage in the 41-50 group is almost 30%. 
This indicates that the majority of the respondents come from a younger age 
group. 
The majority of respondents (78.0%) were married; which reflects the Sudanese 
culture that has a tendency towards early marriage. These findings may be 
attributed to the importance of marriage in Islam (the religion of the majority of 
the Sudanese), and to Islamic laws, which prohibit sexual relationships outside 
mamage. 
8.2.3 Education and Qualification Level 
In general the respondents were well educated. Almost three quarters, i.e. 73%, 
had a university degree, 51% held a bachelor degree and 22% held a 
postgraduate degree. The high level of education found in this level indicates the 
high degree to which employees are informed about finance and banking. This 
evidence, considered in light of the overall illiteracy rate of about 60% for the 
Sudanese population over 15 years old (The World Bank, 2005), illustrates that 
those involved in taking financial decisions are well educated. By contrast, 
approximately 10% of the employees hold higher secondary school certificates, 
which is the lowest education level needed to be currently appointed to a position 
in any Sudanese bank. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the dominant 
types of employees are well educated. However, this will not allow us to assume 
that the same quality will be found outside Khartoum. 
8.3 Managerial Experience and Trainings 
- Table8~2 provides tlie- distrihution-of riutriagenar experience and-training of 
investment department employees in the Sudanese banking industry. 
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Table 8.2 Managerial Experience and Investment Training 
8.3.1 Managerial Experience 
In view of table 8.2, 44% of the respondents had between 11 and 15 years of 
banking experience combined with 16% and 14% of them who have between 16 
to 20 and over 20 years respectively. One can notice that a substantial majority 
(74%) of the respondents have had over 10 years of banking experience which 
means that they almost witnessed the whole process of the Islamization of the 
banking system in Sudan which started in 1992. It can, therefore, be concluded 
that most of the respondents have relatively long experiences. 
8.3.2 Investment Training Undertaken 
Table 8.2 also shows that 86% of the respondents have had the chance to be 
trained to work for an investment department which is responsible for studying, 
ac-cepting, nnaricing- and -foHowing ~up.,pro]ects " nilailcecC iJy-t11e -baili ~,u,sing --- · 7 
various Islamic finance methods including musharakah (partnership). This, 
183 
e/fapt« eig!it Sample ~tk6 and ~i6 oJ tire l9p~ oJ 9Jan& 
{f~onnd towaJuL, 9Jan!Ung llctioitk6 
together with the results brought out about the respondents expenence and 
education, point out that the respondents are fairly qualified to manage finance 
operations including musharakah projects and to follow up these projects. 
8.4 Respondents' Grade and Number of Supervisees Working under their 
Direct Supervision 
Table 8.3 presents the frequencies and percentages distribution of respondents' 
job level and number of supervisees. 
8.4.1 Number of Employees Working under the Respondents' Direct 
Supervision 
Table 8.3 depicts that most of the respondents are well educated and have 
relatively good working experience with banks and had the opportunity to be 
specially trained to work in an investment department. However, the majority of 
them have less than three employees under their direct supervision, which 
indicates that promotion in the banking system, will not increase the number of 
people working under supervision and that the kind of work, tasks and missions 
they undertake are not changing when they are promoted. 
8.4.2 Job Level 
Table 8.3 also shows that the normal distribution of the respondents is among 
different hierarchy levels, which, further, shows that for all hierarchy levels the 
respondents range between 5% and 19%. Yet, a substantial majority of the 
respondents were based between grade 7 (g) to grade 4 (d). Approximately 18% 
of the respondents are based in both grade 5 and 6, then the percentage decreases 
when it goes up the grading scale and down to the bottom grades. In other words, 
the number of employees based in any management level goes down gradually 
whenever-moving-fromc grade 6, · whichmeans that these'banks:-increased ·their 
employees several years ago at the beginning of the Islamization process (about 
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10 years in total, 2 years for each level); but after that time they started to 
decrease their appointments. 
Table 8.3 Respondents' Job Level and No of Supervisees 
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8.5 Financial Packages Satisfaction 
Table 8.4 demonstrates the frequencies and percentages of respondents' 
satisfaction with salary and incentives. 
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Table 8.4 Satisfaction with Salary and Incentives 
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Despite the fact that the respondents are well educated and have good work 
experience, most of them (51%) are not satisfied with their current salary and 
incentives as demonstrated by table 8.4., which also shows that only about 18% 
of them are positively satisfied and 29% to some extent satisfied. This may be a 
sign of a real need to review the salary and incentive systems to work towards 
improving the work environment. It can be argued that it is normal to have such 
results especially in Sudan, where low incomes are somehow a norm. 
Furthermore, it might be said that any respondents are expected to express their 
dissatisfaction with their salaries. Nevertheless, such a majority of dissatisfaction 
should be taken for further study in order to improve the working environment as 
a first step to improve managerial efficiency in the banking industry as a whole. 
Additionally, improved working conditions are expected to attract more efficient 
employees which will increase the customers' trust in the ability of the banking 
system to manage their deposit's risk. This will also increase the amount of 
deposits. Furthermore, these steps will increase the profitability of the bank 
leading to high returns for shareholders and depositors. 
8.6 Identifying Differences between the Eight Sampled Banks in Some 
Selected Factors 
Table 8.5 depicts the results of cross tabulation between the sampled banks and 
some selected variables. 
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Table 8.5 Cross Tabulation and Chi-square Tests for the Sampled Banks 
against some Selected Factors 
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Table 8.5 shows that there is significant difference between the sampled banks 
against the respondents' age, managerial experience and satisfaction with current 
salary since their significance values (0.000) in all factors is smaller than the 
alpha value of 0.05. This indicates that the level of age, managerial experience 
and satisfaction with financial package is not the same in all sampled banks. 
8.7 Musharakah Management Characteristics 
This section intends to discuss the different characteristics of musharakah 
management including the interference in management decisions, sharing the 
pricing decision, the awareness of the accurate product costs of partnership 
projects, improvement programmes conducted to improve finance management 
especially in the management of musharakah projects, satisfaction with a bank's 
methodology for measuring the credit worthiness of the customers, responsibility 
of the bank in musharakah projects, the objective for the Islamic bank to achieve 
first during-its-operation, and~regulations·encouraging· using PLS methods of-
finance. 
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8.7.1 Awareness of Product Cost and Sharing Pricing Decision with the 
Customers in Partnership Projects 
Table 8.6 Sharing Pricing Decision 
As part of the process, staff must regularly visit the projects and check the 
bookkeeping, marketing of products, account receivable and collection 
procedures. These arrangements tend to ensure the safety as well as the 
profitability of the bank's investment. The bank must constantly watch its 
interests by focusing on the overall performance of the project, through which a 
good knowledge of the product's cost and pricing strategy will be gained-
investigating for example where losses are made. In such a case the business 
being supported will be required to provide a satisfactory explanation (Wilson, 
1984). 
The respondents were asked whether they are aware of the product cost and share 
the pricing decision. The results are presented in table 8.6. Since the chi-square 
level is bigger than 0.05 then the null hypothesis will be accepted. Therefore any 
differences in the respondents' views can not be attributed to chance. In our 
sample, the employees' awareness of the accurate product cost of the partnership 
projects is high with 63% of them aware of it because their customers provide 
them with the necessary information, as well as updating them about market 
price changes:-()nly a few-of-them-(less-tna.rt 5%) ·are not aware oCtliis, wliile 
38% are to some extent aware of it. Conversely and unexpectedly, with 
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insignificant chi-square, 38% of them share pricing decisions with their partner 
while 32% of them do not and 28% to some extent do. This apparent difference 
can be perceived to be insignificant. 
In general, the bank is taking an equity share in the business being supported; it 
has no interest in sitting on the board of the company or exercising its voting 
rights at the company or partnership annual general meetings or at any other 
shareholders' meetings if registered as a separate entity and has no interests in 
any capital gains if registered as a partnership. Islamic banks maintain low 
profiles, and are, thus, best regarded as sleeping partners. Referring to most of 
the musharakah cases, the researcher might say that in a substantial amount of 
these projects the researcher may consider the banks to be indeed sleeping 
partners. The bank shares in a partnership's profits and is liable for any financial 
losses. There is no serious problem with this arrangement if the bank is able, and 
is allowed, to monitor the business operations of the firm. However, proper 
monitoring mechanisms are yet to be devised for musharakah (Ahmed, 2004, 
Dar and Presley, 2000). Reducing the moral hazard will need a proper follow-up 
for PLS projects and co-operations between banks and its entrepreneurs. Where 
there is an ongoing dialogue between the financier and the entrepreneur, business 
decision-making can be improved, as two parties will be working together to 
produce a better outcome than when each is working in isolation. 
8.7.2 Regulations Encouraging using PLS Methods of Finance 
The majority of our sample respondents, as shown in table 8.7, consider their 
bank's regulations as encouraging the using ofPLS methods of finance. 
Table 8.7 Regulations Encouraging PLS Finance 
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8.7.3 Improvement Programme 
As shown before, in a substantial number of projects staff were neither aware of 
the product cost nor share pricing decisions with their entrepreneurs. In 
attempting to see if there are any systematic plans for improvement, respondents 
were asked to judge whether their banks were committed to a quality 
improvement programme and their management actively supports the quality 
programme. The results are presented in table 8.8. 
Since the chi-square test shows a level of significance lower than 0.05 then any 
differences that appear on the percentages of the options given to the respondents 
is likely true. We can observe that nearly half of the respondents believe that 
their bank is committed to a quality improvement programme whereas 29% of 
them believe that to some extent they are committed and 24% do not believe they 
are committed at all. Therefore, it is can be concluded that the majority consider 
their banks to be committed to a quality improvement programme regarding their 
performance. 
Almost 60% of respondents believe that their management support their quality 
programme and in contrast 19% of them believe their management does not, and 
in the middle, 22% to some extent do. Thus it may seem, when put side by side 
with previous results concerning commitment to a quality programme, that the 
respondents believe that there are quality programmes carried out by their banks 
to improve performance and that their management does commit themselves and 
support these programmes with a significance level of 0.0. 
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Table 8.8 Improvement Programmes 
8. 7.4 Performance and Management Decisions Characteristics 
The results of the satisfaction with the bank's performance and the interference 
in management decisions are depicted in table 8.9. It is notable that the p-value 
(significance or asymp. sig.) is equal to 0.0. As a non-parametric test, therefore, 
it confirms that the values are not on the same level on all options according to 
the respondents views. The following can be observed in these differences: 
8.7.4.1 Interference into Management Decisions 
Table 8.9 Satisfaction with Bank's Performance Measurement 
191 
e/iapteJt eig& sanwte. efuvtacwti6~ and llnal!pi6 4 tiie l9p~ 4 9Janii 
fleMcmnel towaJtd6 9Janfdng lldivitk6 
Since the musharakah mode of finance contains a moral hazard that represents 
the two possibilities of profit and loss which may occur, Islamic banks when 
using profit and loss sharing contracts try to carefully study the feasibility of this 
kind of finance. Then, if approved, they manage and follow up these projects as 
they contain high risk which will lead to more interference in management 
decisions than other projects and transactions financed using other methods (such 
as non profit and loss sharing contracts). Consequently, one assumption, which 
enforces itself effectively here, states that the right to interfere into management 
decisions results in musharakah not being attractive to customers or even to their 
banks. 
The majority of respondents, almost 60%, show their support of the assumption 
with different kinds of agreements, that is 20% of them strongly agreed and 38% 
agreed with it. By contrast, 30% of the respondents disagreed with the 
assumption and only less than 3% strongly disagreed while about 8% of them 
were uncertain. It can, therefore, be concluded that on the whole most of the 
respondents suppose the right to interfere into management decisions and this 
results in musharakah not being attractive to customers or their banks. 
8.7.4.2 Satisfaction with Performance Measurement Systems 
46% of the respondents are satisfied with their bank's measurement systems for 
the performance of musharakah projects; whilst 38% of them are to some extent 
satisfied and only about 15% of them are not satisfied. Consequently, it may be 
possible to conclude that a relatively simple majority of the respondents believe 
that the measurements of musharakah performance are quite satisfying and 
therefore there is no need to proceed further for substantial changes or 
improvement. 
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8.8 Responsibility and Objectives Characteristics 
8.8.1 The Objective for the Islamic Bank to Achieve in Musharakah 
Finance 
The respondents were asked to determine which objective for the Islamic bank 
should be achieved first during its operation. The Friedman test results, mean 
rank and mean are presented in table 8.10. The Friedman test was run to identify 
whether these differences are attributed to chance. The result of the Friedman test 
chi-square test shown in table 8.11 indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the differences between the mean ranks in the sample data can be attributed 
to chance. The mean confirm the results derived from weighted significance 
points shown in table 8.10 which can confirm the same ranking mentioned in the 
descriptive. 
The descriptive results indicate that respondents placed highest weight on the 
contribution to the economic and social development of the country as a first 
(1.69 mean rank, 1328 points) since 51% of them voted for it while 40% as a first 
objective and 30% voted for it as a second objective. 
Table 8.10 and 8.11 suggest that maximizing the return of the shareholders and 
depositors is the second important objective with significant points of 1309 and 
mean rank of 1.76. 40% of the respondents ranked it first which can be compared 
with 43% and 16% who ranked it second and third. Following them, the 
customer satisfaction came in third position with a mean rank of 2.66 and 
significant point of 1086. 
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Table 8.10 The Objectives for the Islamic Bank to Achieve in Musharakah 
Finance 
r··~<-'-·"~······,,·. 
! 
Table 8.11 Friedman Tests and Mean Ranks for the Objectives for the 
Islamic Bank 
I 1\IJ.ean II ~~~ 
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Numbers weighteCI significance (points) column in the table are the number of votes that each 
factor received, ranked from 1 to 4. To estimate each factors' significance, the researcher have 
weighted each vote by points from 4 to 1, 1st rank has 4 points, 2nd rank has 3 points 3rd rank 
has 2 points 4th rank has 1 points e.g. 129* 4 + 76 *3 + 39*2 + 6*1 = 1328. 
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There is no doubt that poverty in Sudan is wide spread to the extent that incomes 
cover only a fraction of the cost of living. This is as a result of the relatively low 
incomes or the inequality of its distribution and the continuous rise in the prices 
of goods and services. The degree of poverty in Sudan has been measured to be 
82.7% and 83.1% for rural and urban populations respectively. Since banks in 
Sudan are generally commercial and traditional in nature, their credit facilities 
are only extended to big firms, while their general attitude towards small 
business is neglected. Access to the official credit system therefore represents a 
big problem for the small scale entrepreneur. There are neither flexible credit 
policies for them to acquire funds, nor specialized banks to provide them with 
credit facilities (Adam, 1997). 
Hence, the question arises as to what the Sudanese Islamic banking system of 
finance to small enterprises can offer to mitigate poverty? In order to see the 
effects of bank lending to small enterprises upon poverty alleviation, let us 
concentrate for a moment on the distinction between absolute poverty and 
relative poverty. Absolute poverty (the inability to meet the basic needs, 
subsistence needs, in the prevailing socio-economic circumstances) can be a 
result of sickness, old age, or a continuous increase of prices. Relative poverty, 
on the other hand, is related to income inequality or as a result of a 
malfunctioning supply and demand mechanism (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003). 
8.8.2 Responsibility of the Bank in Musharakah Projects 
The distributions of the percentages of different responsibilities to be carried by 
the banks during its musharakah finance together with chi-square results are 
presented in table 8.12. 
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Table 8.12 Responsibilities of Banks in Musharakah Finance 
Islamic banks are obliged to give priority to the needs of society and the common 
interest over individual profit and private interest. When the primary concern of 
the banks is not the maximization of profitability as such, but rather the social 
imperatives, the tangibility of assets, as a requisite to access to finance loses its 
importance. Moreover, the granting of credit to an educated, yet financially poor 
person could be even more beneficial on both social justice and long run growth. 
With a significant chi-square, the majority of the respondents (52%) believe their 
banks should provide money only in musharakah projects which means not 
taking part in other responsibilities like administration, marketing, providing raw 
material, machinery or equipment. However, 32% of them believe that banks 
should have administrative duties like day to day operations, 16% of the 
respondents selected other responsibilities including marketing, providing raw 
material and machinery or equipment. 
It is crucial to state that the selection of providing money comes from a wrong 
understanding of the nature of musharakah finance. Musharakah finance 
assumes that the two partners (bank and entrepreneur) will share the capital and 
work to achieve the profit. Hence, the understanding of providing money may be 
the easy_ way out,_put_neitl1ecdo(:s_itconfi,fl_ll the Isl,amic_finanG~"'Rti:m;_i_t')le nQr i_::; 
it the best way to manage the bank risks. 
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While marketing did not attract the respondents, research conducted about 
entrepreneurs in agriculture musharakah in Sudan showed that 88%, the majority 
of farmers indicated that they faced marketing problems and the bank did not 
provide them with enough help (Al-Harran, 1997). It is clear that there are 
several difficulties facing the customers in marketing musharakah products, 
hence, a recommendation should be proposed for the banks to improve their 
marketing services provided with its finance. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank has had experience of financing small entrepreneurs 
and providing them with marketing services as part of the finance package. The 
goal was to help farmers to fetch good prices for their crop which are often low 
at harvest time. At that time the bank buys the crop by paying 50% of the 
obtaining price and stores it under its supervision. When prices rise to some 
reasonable level, the crop is sold. Of the profits, 50% goes to the farmer by way 
of management fees while the other 50% is divided equally between bank and 
partners (Al-Harran, 1995a). Although it is not safe to pass judgement about the 
feasibility of this practice on the basis of limited information, the evidence ofthis 
section supports the contention that the practice is viable and equitable. It is 
viable for it generates reasonable rates of return for the banks and the legal 
contract protects their interests (Al-Harran, 1993). 
8.9 Average Longevity of the Musharakah Projects 
This section aims to test the research questions set initially related to the average 
longevity of the musharakah projects. The research questions are as follow: 
Research Question (3) What is the average age of musharakah projects? 
Research Question (4) Why or why not do Islamic banks prefer short-term 
musharakah finance? 
S_I:B,s."usually do~not present~data-relating to the--distribution of finance'"1ls -short, 
medium and long-term. But, nevertheless, because of inflation, most of the 
finance, even for agriculture and industry (via provision of raw materials, fixed 
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assets, working capital, irrigation, inputs, storage, transport and marketing, land 
preparations, etc.) is short term for a period of a maximum of one year, mainly 
through murabahah and sa/am financing methods. These two modes of finance 
are suitable for financing short-term projects. 
To determine the average age of the musharakah finance, the respondents 
verified the average age of musharakah projects they usually finance. Table 8.13 
presents the results of chi-square goodness of fit test for the average age of 
musharakah projects together with the distribution of percentages of different 
periods of projects' ages. 
Table 8.13 Average Age of the Musharakah Projects 
The result of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, as shown in table 8.13, indicates 
that there are differences between the averages of musharakah projects' ages. 
The dominant type of musharakah is that which lasts for 3 to 6 months as 
reflected by 72% of the respondents. Therefore as the researcher mentioned 
earlier, the reason mentioned by Choudhury (2001) that the PLS involves long 
term finance which causes a lack of profit and loss sharing finance is no longer 
valid for the Sudanese case. Choudhury (200 1) believes that the reason that the 
PLS is not feasible for funding short-term projects is due to the ensuing high 
degree of risk (i.e., the time diversification effect of equity). This makes Islamic 
banks and ~!~er __ financL~L ip.~ituHQ~!3 n~ly on_ _som<;: ___ otheLdebhlike-.modes,-
especially mark-up, to ensure a certain degree of liquidity. This is again not the 
case in Sudan as most musharakah finance is a short-term finance. Choudhury 
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(200 1) further added, the restrictive role of shareholders (investors) in 
management and, hence, the dichotomous financial structure of PLS contracts 
make them non-participatory in nature, which allows a sleeping partnership. In 
this way, they are not sharing contracts in a true sense; as the transacting parties 
share financial resources without participatory decision-making. 
Part of the explanation is that long-term financing requires expertise which is not 
always available. Another reason is that there are no back-up institutional 
structures such as secondary capital markets for Islamic financial instruments. It 
is possible also that the tendency to concentrate on short-term financing reflects 
the early years of operation: it is easier to administer and the returns are quicker. 
The banks may learn to pay more attention to long financing as they grow older. 
Al-Harran (1995a) believes that the nature of the short term deposit at Sudanese 
banks is the main reason for preferring short term finance. He further concluded 
that if they do not devise non-usurious tools of raising investment deposits, then 
these banks are likely to face problems in their growth particularly when they are 
working side by side with the modem banks. 
There are three advantages of using short term musharakah strategy: 
(i) A broader portfolio diversification, which can reduce risk for a given 
return or increase return for a given risk; 
(ii) The ability to participate in new risks, including new projects; 
(iii) Rapid capital turnover 
These help money circulation as well as allowing for continual re-appraisal of 
projects. Allowing the banks to engage in risk-return sharing presents them with 
additional opportunities to diversify their assets, and a bank's asset 
diversification affects its overall expected net earnings as well as its variance. A 
_ more, diversifiedcbank represents, a- more stable-source of funds-and-·a morestaole -
place for depositors. Given the desirability of diversification, the banks should be 
the primary source of determination of the appropriate trade-off between risk and 
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return as well as the method of diversification. It is the bank, which has to assess 
how the various modes of asset acquisition are related in their prospects for 
timely payment of returns and principal. If the banks are constrained to 
concentrate their portfolios heavily in favour of one type of asset like mark-up 
only, then that portfolio must be considered very risky. To discourage banks 
from engaging in risk-return sharing activities, either through fiscal monetary 
tools or through institutional constraints such as unfavourable laws, simply 
because of the perceived risk of these activities, may not be an optimal policy 
(Mirakhor, 1987). In addition, the lack of popularity of the long term 
musharakah is a reflection of the fact that in an economic climate with negative 
economic growth and high inflation, no bank (or anybody else for that matter) 
will commit capital to long-term investment but rather focus on short-term 
ventures. 
Table 8.14 presents the results of the cross tabulation between musharakah 
performance in terms of profitability and risks and the average age of 
musharakah. The results indicate the correlation between musharakah risk and 
the average age of musharakah with a significance chi square which states that 
degree of musharakah risk has influence on the average age of musharakah. 
Table 8.14 Cross Tabulation between Musharakah Performance and 
Average Age of Musharakah 
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However, almost all the literature states that the PLS supports long term 
economic and financial development, especially musharakah by financing long 
term productive projects. In reality, nearly all Islamic banks offer trade and 
project finance murabahah, commissioned manufacturing, or on a leasing basis 
and thus PLS features marginally in the practice of Islamic banking and finance. 
Whatever the degree of success of individual Islamic banks, the majority have so 
far failed to adopt PLS-based modes of financing in their businesses. However, 
the Sudanese banking experience is different, having seen that they succeeded in 
offering PLS modes, namely here musharakah. Yet, these offers are mainly for a 
short term period of 3 to 6 months. 
This study argues that one of the major dilemmas facing the present Sudanese 
Islamic banks is the fact that these banks have to involve in long term finance 
according to its theory where these banks mobilize funds on the basis of short 
term deposits. Facing all the economical and political barriers fronting the 
country e.g. high inflation rate as external factors, as well as internal factors e.g. 
small size of capital and lack of managerial efficiency, yet Sudanese Islamic 
banks have to involve in long term finance. The Islamic banks in many Muslim 
countries have occasionally used this partnership financing scheme for financing 
of the working capital of the enterprises for more than one year with considerable 
success ( Al-Harran, 1995b ). 
Y ousef (1996), on the other hand, showed some evidence indicating that ISBs 
financing is rarely extended on a long-term basis and short-term lending 
dominates overall. ISBs distribution of finance during the period 1984-1992 was 
75.4% short term, 5.4% medium term, 2.1% long term and real estate financing 
shared 15.4% If ISBs are not able to generate long-term sizable deposits, they 
will not be able to extend long-term loans that are deemed necessary to achieve 
developmental goals (Yousef, 1996). 
In- fact -most -sudanese- Islamic- funds go -to ·short -term lending and -to financing 
foreign trade (more than 80%). Less than one-third of the short-term credit goes 
to financing the working capital of industries. For example the Agricultural Bank 
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of Sudan (now the biggest development bank in Sudan, in terms of capital and 
number of branches) directs 80% of its loans to relatively short-term credit for 
medium and large-scale farmers (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
The financing of long-term projects has certain prerequisites. For instance, the 
Islamic bank will have to identify projects, carry out feasibility studies, estimate 
expected streams of profits and only then they shall be able to invest in a project. 
Moreover, they will have to develop a long-term investment strategy (Al-Harran, 
1993). 
Although all the banks finance short term musharakah heavily, notably, not all 
the sampled banks have the same average age of musharakah projects. Table 
8.15 shows that the differences of the average longevity of the musharakah 
projects between these banks are significant. 
Significantly, this means that the average age of musharakah is different from 
one bank to another. 
Table 8.15 Cross Tabulation between the Eight Sampled Banks and the 
Average Age of Musharakah 
Figure 8.1 gives illustration to these differences. The figure shows that Sudanese 
Islamic bank, Faisal Islamic Bank and Omderman National Bank finance 
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musharakah with a preferred period of 7-12 months more than other banks. 
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Figure 8.1 Average Age of Musharakah Projects in the Eight Sampled Banks 
-c ::s 
0 20 
0 
Name of the Bank 
Average age of the 
musharakah 
Projects 
Ill Less than 3 
months 
Ill 3-6 months 
Ill 7 - 12 months 
Ill 1 - 2 years 
IE Above 2 years 
In concluding, after presenting the sample characteristics in this chapter, the 
following empirical chapters are devoted to survey analysis. These include 
performance and preference analysis presented in chapter nine and obstacles and 
constraints presented m chapter ten followed by conclusion and 
recommendations in chapter eleven. 
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Chapter 9 Musharakah Finance in the Sudanese Islamic 
Banking System: Preference and Performance 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the preference of the staff of the 
investment departments at the Sudanese banks in regards to different modes of 
finance, especially musharakah finance as well as its performance. 
It is crucial to identify all factors influencing the decision of taking finance 
through musharakah made by the staff of the investment departments at the 
Sudanese banks. Hence, in this chapter, the preference mode of finance will be 
analysed, the preferred sector to finance musharakah will be determined as well 
as factors influencing granting credits and hindering musharakah investment and 
factors affecting the distribution of Bank funds according to the different 
methods of finance. The performance of musharakah finance is also crucial. Risk 
and profitability will by analysed in this chapter. 
9.2 The Preference of the Finance Sectors 
This section atms to identify the most preferred sector financed through 
musharakah. Therefore, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (5) What is the preferred economic sector for financing using 
musharakah instruments? 
In order to determine the preferred sector using the musharakah mode of finance, 
the respondents were given five sectors and were asked to rank them starting 
with~thesector'they'lfelieve sfiould come-f1rsri~-~sing ,;,;;sha~akah i~s-~m:e~;s. 
These sectors are trade, industry, agriculture, export and import and co operative, 
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small producers and the craftsmen sector. The mean rank and Friedman test 
' 
which shows whether the differences between the mean ranks are statistically 
significant or not, are shown in table 9.1. The descriptive results are presented in 
table 9.2. 
Table 9.1 Identifying the Preferred Sectors 
The analysis in table 9.1 indicates that there is a difference in reaction towards 
financing different sectors with significance equal to 0.00. Giving that the first 
important sector was ranked using number 1 and least important ranked using 
number 6, the industrial sector resulted as the first important sector which should 
get musharakah finance with a mean of 2.23 followed by the commercial sector 
with a mean of 2.69. The export and import sector came in third place followed 
by the agriculture sector. 
Table 9.2 shows that 27% of the respondents ranked the industry sector as the 
first important sector compared with 37% ranking it second followed by 22% 
ranking it third. While 33% ofthem ranked the commercial sector first, only 18% 
ranked it second and 14% ranked it third. In addition, the respondents believe 
that export and import sectors and the agricultural sector are the third and fourth 
important sectors with 18% and 14% of the respondents, opting for these as the 
first important sectors, respectively. Lastly cooperative, small producers and 
craftsmen come last in the ranking. The weighted significance points and the 
total scores, which are our chosen scheme to identify the overall importance, 
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prove the same results. 
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Hence, in answer to the question about the most important sectors, it is the 
industrial sector followed by the commercial sector. The export and import sector 
came in third place followed by the agriculture sector. The cooperative and small 
producers sector came in fifth place. 
Table 9.2 The Preferred Sector for Financing Musharakah 
1· Ind;~trial 
! sector 
I 
Export and 
import sectors 
Agricultural 
sector 
I Co operative, 
; small 
: producers and 
craftsmen ~~===~=-~=-=-=-~~--··········:::::::':::::==~=~==:::::==~-= 
In general, the researcher may divide musharakah projects m the Sudanese 
banking industry into the following categories: 
(i) Musharakah sharing of certain financial transactions. In this type 
of musharakah the bank pays up to 40% of the capital of a given 
project, which is most likely to be an internal trade type project. 
1 Numbers weighted significance (points) column in the table are the number of votes that each 
factor received, ranked from 1 to 5. To estimate each factors' significance, the researcher has 
weighted each vote by points from 5 to 1, 1 '1 rank has 5 points, 2"d rank has 4 points 3 rd rank has 
3 points 4th rank has 2 points 5th has 1 point e.g. 69* 5 + 94 *4 + 57*3 + 21 *2 + 9*1 = 1328. 
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This type of musharakah is characterised by short-term projects. 
This type is mainly trade, export and import. 
(ii) Musharakah through sharing the operational capital. This type of 
musharakah takes place when the entrepreneur has in his 
possession an asset, in the form of a company or factory of some 
kind, but does not have sufficient funds for the day-to-day 
expenses. The bank provides the customer with financial support 
for the day to day running of the business, and in return earns a 
share of the company's profit. This type is mainly used in the 
industry sector. 
(iii) Diminishing musharakah. The bank collaborates with a customer 
who invests a lesser amount than that of the bank for a certain 
project. Once this business is up and running the bank takes a 
larger amount of the profits and as a result gradually gives up its 
share in the company to its customer. This process continues until 
the customer becomes the sole proprietor of the business. This 
type is mainly used in the real estate sector. 
(iv) Continuous musharakah: where both parties, the bank and the 
customer (whose share in the company is usually not below 25%), 
collaborate specifically for long term projects. The amounts of 
their capital invested in the projects are reflected by share values, 
whether in a public or private limited company. This type is rarely 
used by the Sudanese banks but it can be utilised for different 
sectors. 
In the case of financing the industrial sector through musharakah, the Islamic 
banks provide capital to the owners of the industries, and the owners, on the 
other hand, contribute with their industry, labour, part of the running expenses 
and management (Abdel Mohsin, 2005). The industrialist also gets a proportion 
of the net profit for his management, and the remaining profit is divided between 
the bank and the industrialist according to their equity share. Through 
-musharakah~contta.tHf,'"the Ishlmic oarucs-succeede(f 1ri~providt~g c~pit;l- t~ th~ 
industrial sector for the purchase of raw materials, machinery and equipment. 
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Moreover, the Islamic banks diversified their industrial investments as they 
entered, as a provider of capital, into different long-term projects. These included 
food factories, plastic factories, printing presses, drugs factories, spare parts for 
petroleum refinery, sugar factories, and railway corporations in Sudan. In 
addition, they enhanced the small-scale industries in Sudan which are believed to 
play an important role at the present and are a more labour intensive stage of 
development. The Islamic banks opened specialised branches in one of the 
biggest industrial areas in Khartoum to develop the handicraft sector (Abdel 
Mohsin, 2005). 
Stated preferences as revealed in this section, however, are not necessarily 
reflected in actions. The sector which needs more concentration given the 
Sudanese economy is the agriculture sector. The least sector financed using 
musharakah is the cooperative and small producers; hence, the following section 
further investigates financing of these three sectors. 
9.2.1 Partnership Financing for Trade Finance 
This section mms to identify the reasons behind the preference of trade 
musharakah. Therefore, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (6) Why or why not do Islamic banks prefer musharakah 
trade finance? 
Although table 9.2. shows that the respondents ranked the industrial sector first 
followed by the commercial sector but in reality these preferences have not been 
reflected through practice. Trade finance is the sector that gets most of the 
musharakah finance (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). The respondents were asked, 
therefore, to identify the reasons for their musharakah trade finance preferences. 
The results are presented in table 9.3. 
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Table 9.3 Reasons for Trade Finance Preference 
r ,_, - ,_ ,_ '"' ,_,_ ,_ "-,~---,-. -- .-,- ,._._ 
I 
As depicted in table 9 .3, with significant chi-square test, 41% of the respondents 
believe that the rapid tum over of the capital in trade is the reason behind the 
preference for trade finance while 35% of them refer it to the high profit margins 
of the trade sector compared with other sectors. Other reasons such as the low 
risk and inadequate capital for other non trading investments got approximately 
10%. 
Hence, the main reason behind the preference of musharakah trade is the high 
profit margins of the commercial and trade finance. 
The availability of trade finance, particularly in developing and less-developed 
countries, plays a crucial role in facilitating international trade. Exporters with 
limited access to working capital often require financing to process or 
manufacture products before receiving payments. Conversely, importers often 
need credit to buy raw materials, goods and equipment from overseas. The need 
for trade finance is underlined by the fact that competition for export contracts is 
often based on the attractiveness of the payment terms offered, with stronger 
importers preferring to buy on an open account basis with extended terms as 
compared to stronger exporters who prefer to sell on a cash basis, or secured 
basis if extended terms are needed. A number of common trade financing 
instruments have been developed to cater to this need. Short-term trade finance 
has-been a:ssociatecnvith the expansionotintematlonartrade in the past century, 
and has in general been considered as a routine operation, providing fluidity and 
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security to the movement of goods and services (Auboin and Meier-Ewert, 
2003). 
9.2.2 Partnership Financing for the Agricultural Sector 
One of the most important features of the deepened Islamized system after 1990 
was its preference of and special attention to production, especially agriculture. 
Therefore, attention to the productive sectors went alongside the various reforms 
in the banking industry. It could be said, therefore, that these continued reforms 
in the banking system took considerable time from the policy makers (Ali, 1990). 
The consistent coordination of credit monetary policy with the fiscal and other 
policies could not have been successfully undertaken had it not been for the 
continued reforms undertaken in the banking system. Therefore, the Islamization 
process will continue and improvements in the methods and means applied are 
subject to revision. The instruments created to control liquidity draw even the 
attention of the IMF as very novel and creative methods and the musharakah 
formula remains a forceful tool in enhancing development without the 
cumbersome nature of traditional finance. 
However, agriculture finance in Sudan, certainly, saw very high default rates in 
the 1990s; some bank managers reported that they only recovered about 50% of 
their agricultural investments. In particular, salam contracts were exposed to high 
risk and a high percentage of non-performing debts. Under normal 
circumstances, rainfall and other factors that determine production decide 
whether or not a farmer is capable of servicing his bank obligation. Fluctuations 
in the weather determined output of the agricultural sector of the Sudan in the 
1990s as anywhere else, and in bad years farmers were not in a position to hand 
over whatever they had sold through a salam forward contract (Stiansen, 2004). 
Musharakah was widely used in Sudan in financing the agricultural sector. In 
this case, the banks provide small farmers with fixed assets such as tractors, 
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plouglis,-harrows, wafer pumps and inputs, e.g. seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and 
fuel. The entrepreneur, on the other hand, contributes with his land, labour, part 
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of the running expenses and management. The farmer gets a proportion of the net 
profit for his management and the remaining profit is divided between the bank 
and the farmer according to their equity share (Abdel Mohsin, 2005). The 
instruments include co-farming, co-irrigation, lease of machinery, and 
agricultural and marketing services. For instance, SIB executed a number of 
projects at different places in Sudan with substantial benefits to itself and 
farmers. The bank provided machinery and other service inputs in these projects, 
while farmers provided land and operating expenses (Akhtar, 1997). 
The Sudanese Islamic bank has excellent experience in financing agriculture 
through the musharakah formula, in which the SIB usually purchases the 
machinery (tractors, water pumps, spraying equipment etc.) and provides its 
contribution in the form of services that are complementary to what the farmers 
provide in a joint effort on the basis of real, not commercial, costs. Usually the 
SIB provides ploughing and irrigation services, inputs such as improved seeds, 
insecticide, fertiliser, jute bags (all at cost) delivered to the gate of the farm, 
working capital, agricultural extension services, storage and marketing, 
marketing partnership. The farmer's contribution in musharakah includes: 
provision of cultivable land, contribution in the working capital (if available), 
provision of agricultural labour (which could be the effort of the farmer, his 
family or those he chooses to hire), and management ofthe operation jointly with 
the SIBs (Ali, 1990). Figure 9.1 presents a model for the SIB experience of 
financing agriculture through the musharakah instrument. 
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Figure 9.1 Model for Muslrarakah Agriculture Finance 
Musharakah agriculture projects 
~ ~ 
Bank's contribution: Farmer's contribution: ! . 
~ Fixed assets: 
Tractors-scrapers 1 
Pumps 
Spraying equipments 
Land's labour 
1 
Running expenses: Management & Part of the Expense 
Fuel 
Improved seeds 
Insecticides 
Fertilisers 
Sacks 
Assistance in farm management 
Agricultural extension 
Marketing and storage 
Agricultural production 
Minus Zakat 
Sales Price 
Minus operating expenses 
Net profits 
Minus Tax 
Profit after deduction of Management fee 
30% to the farmer as management fee 
/ ~ 
1 
Farmer's share in accordance 
with participation in capital 
Bank's share in accordance 
with participation in capital 
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A shown in the figure the farmer nurses the plant until it is ready for harvest. 
When the crop is collected, it is not sold immediately. This is because at the 
beginning of the harvest season the prices are usually on the low side. Under 
normal circumstances, farmers used to sell their crops to merchants who took 
advantage of the farmers' need for cash after harvest. These merchants purchased 
the crop at a low price, and they stored it until the price improved and, therefore, 
became the main beneficiaries ofthe farmers' effort (Ali, 1990). In this formula, 
the SIB store the crop after harvest and help the farmer by giving him part of the 
estimated share of the crop in order to meet his urgent needs. Then, when prices 
increase, the crop is sold with the knowledge of the farmer and the proceeds are 
distributed as shown in the figure 9.1. The operating expenses (at cost) and the 
zakat, an Islamic tax, are deducted from the total proceeds. Out of this balance, 
the farmer is given about 30% of the proceeds for the efforts in nursing the plant 
and managing the agricultural operation with the SIB. The balance is then 
divided in accordance with the contribution of each partner in the operating 
costs. lfthe farmer contributed 50% of the operating cost (in addition to the land, 
agricultural effort and management), then the farmer is eligible for 50% of the 
last balance (Dooren, 1990). 
From the SIB experience, and as elaborated by Ali (1990), the farmer obtained 
123% ofhis capital and SIB 109%. The participation ofthe SIB aimed at starting 
with the farmer at his current level of technology and gradually making him 
absorb a higher level of technology. In some cases, SIB has structured a tripartite 
partnership consisting of a farmer, bank and an expert. The farmer supplies land 
and labour, and the bank provides working capital while the expert provided 
management and supervision (Akhtar, 1997). Usually 30% of the net profit is 
reserved for the expert and the remaining profits are distributed between bank 
and farmer on an equity share basis. 
Local Sudanese Islamic banks are reluctant to use this mode, because of its high 
risk, since Sudanese agriculture is exposed to high risks such as drought or flood, 
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pests and other threats. Another problem with agricultural musharakah is that the 
prices of agricultural crops fall drastically at the time of harvest. All these, in 
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tum, lead to poor production, decrease the return on the capital employed or even 
result in loss. Moreover, this kind of musharakah requires close supervision and 
follow-up, a matter which increases the transaction costs of the bank (Abdel 
Mohsin, 2005). 
However, musharakah agriculture finance has proved to be risky, due to bad 
farming seasons that render most agriculture projects unable to repay the capital, 
particularly in the absence of a modem means of production to help combat 
frequent droughts and annual rainfall fluctuations. This is complicated by 
problems of poor guarantees. Under these difficult conditions it is important to 
consider the main challenges and risks that face the Sills and the measures that 
can be taken to alleviate the problem. Generally, Sudanese banks adopted some 
measures to tackle the challenges of credit risks in agriculture. These include: 
(i) Delivery of farm financing in instalments according to the actual 
needs of the crops' growth stage accompanied with frequent visits to 
the projects receiving financing; 
(ii) Contributing to the establishment of the national insurance company 
to encourage the establishment of insurance services for farming 
activities; 
(iii) Participating in the establishment of crop marketing companies to 
help in marketing crops produced by the project subject of finance 
such as Sudan Cotton; and 
(iv) More financial training for the staff, especially with regard to proper 
delivery and collection procedures. 
9.2.3 Financing the Co-operative and Small Producers Sector 
Wider branch networks and ranges of banking services are a prerequisite for 
b~s in order to reach a large number of entrepreneurs, through partnership 
-------:----~,;:--
formulae. The partnership arrangements can also enhance the ability and 
incentives of banks to reach small entrepreneurs, thus overcoming the 
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commercial banks' reluctance to lend to small producers. Using partnership 
arrangements, however, does not mean providing finance to small and micro-
enterprises on lower rates. 
As shown in Chapter 7, the prominent increase in the number of Sudanese banks 
and branches in the 90s is described and characterized by the regional inequality 
in the distribution of branches. It is clear that there is a higher concentration of 
branches in commercial towns compared with urban areas, and in the middle 
including Khartoum, the capital, compared with other regions. The Central States 
in which 35% of the population live and which are considered to be the most 
advanced States in terms of development projects, infrastructure, per capita 
income, and the standards of living (IMF, 2005), share around 50% of the total 
banks in the country (Hassan and Hussein, 2003). Moreover, the pattern of 
distribution has been more or less the same for the last fifteen years or so. 
Another feature of the Sills sector is the declining number of branches from over 
700 in 1997 to only 533 branches in 2002. This is a distorted geographical 
distribution of banking facilities, which consequently cannot serve socio-
economic development, particularly in rural areas. 
Micro-enterprises and small businesses have received little attention from the 
formal financing system. With the exception of isolated experiences, most of the 
Sudanese financial institutions have been reluctant to extend credit to this sub-
sector. The policies of these institutions, in addition to the macroeconomic 
policies adopted by the Sudanese Government until recently, were biased in 
favour of medium and large-scale enterprises. Some reported evidence shows 
that the partnership financing scheme provides reasonable returns to small 
entrepreneurs, which help raise their standard of living (Akhtar, 1997). 
The lack of a co-ordinating mechanism between the banks themselves and other 
institutions concerned with small enterprise financing has created another 
important constraint, together with the lack of national policies especially 
designed and oriented towards Small and Medium Enterprises SMEs. Recent 
national policies towards small enterprises and productive families have shown 
some positive signs. However, the financing policy of 1994-95 for the first time 
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specified productive families as being the sectors which need more support 
(Ibrahim, 1997). 
The financing regulations of the Bank of Sudan are still under modification, and 
lack proper identification of the share of banking finance in co-operative and 
small producers sector, despite more than seven years having passed since the 
mid-1990s. In addition, the lack of recognition of female managed small 
enterprises relates to the understanding of the Sudanese financial institutions that 
these are only income generating activities rather than commercial, business-like 
activities. It may also be related to the lack of recognition of female business 
acumen. This understanding ignores the recent growing phenomenon of female 
managed small enterprises in Sudan and the role of women as proactive 
entrepreneurs. 
Some Sudanese banks, however, have managed to employ Islamic formulae to 
finance small producers. So far these banks have fulfilled some expectations in 
small enterprise financing, though some difficult questions still need to be 
tackled. These are related to co-ordination, national policies, definition of the 
target group and the relatively high costs of follow-up (Sffi, 1993). There is a 
lack of a unified definition of small and medium enterprises, SMEs with 
specified socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, the costs of continuous 
follow-up and the monitoring of projects are relatively high. To reduce the cost 
of follow-up, the sm, for example, have created the small producers and families 
branches SPFBs to serve limited geographical areas and the bank is thinking of 
employing a third party to follow-up and share a certain percentage in the total 
profits. 
Among all Sudanese banks, banks like the Sudanese Islamic Bank seem to be the 
only one to confine the scope of musharakah to finance poor families and 
handicraft. Others appear to be confining the scope of musharakah mainly to 
trading operations excluding private sector imports. In fact law relating to 
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musharakah is suggestive of a simple mode of trade vis-a-vis purchase and sale. 
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In financing productive families and SMEs, the SIB has the following aims: 
(i) The consolidation of the sense of social justice and solidarity 
(Takaful) among the members of society; 
(ii) Participation in investment in ways that benefit the local community; 
(iii) Promotion ofbanking awareness; 
(iv) The use of the largest portion of the fund, that IS available for 
investments, in income-generating activities. 
Projects financed cover a wide range of small urban enterprises such as tailoring, 
food processing, shoe and soap making, chalk, cheese-making, goat and poultry-
keeping, petty retail trade and some informal sector activities, such as kisra (flat 
local bread) making. Business specialisation varies according to geographical 
location of the productive families' branches, with the concentration of 
foodstuffs at al-Thawra branch; sewing at al-Girsh model branch; poultry, cows, 
and goat keeping at Wad Medani branch. The expelience of the Sudanese Islamic 
Bank has revealed some of the advantages of such non-traditional transactions. 
None of the partners who are financed could have previously gained access to 
such funding, had the Sudanese Islamic Bank, especially Productive Families 
Branches (PFBs) not been available. Ordinary people in urban residential areas, 
especially women, can get access to conveniently located branches. They can 
open family savings accounts with a minimum amount and no formalities in 
withdrawals. The experience helped in such a way to mobilise deposits from a 
specific geographical location, and finance that money to the same dwellers. 
The SIB experiment in financing productive families has also brought with it 
some innovations in banking on both local and international levels, by 
establishing branches in the residential areas. This new banking convention has 
reformulated the bank-client relationship on both the savings and investment 
sides with regard to regulatory control. 
---.. ----
As a result of musharakah financing trust is built between the bank and residents 
of the local community in which the bank operates. This could be further 
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capitalised on by launching community based development programmes. 
One important positive aspect of musharakah is that no finance cost is added to 
the production cost. It can, therefore, contribute to lower prices in comparison to 
other methods of finance (Abdalla, 1999). 
Currently, much of the commercial banks' reluctance for financing small firms 
and entrepreneurs is due to their lack of bookkeeping, the concealment of actual 
profits and reporting of losses. A serious effort is needed on socio-cultural, 
moral, and political fronts to develop a culture of sound and fair business 
practices. Media and mosque institutions, and political parties can play an 
important role in developing this culture (Akhtar, 1997). The Government of 
Sudan should enact a specific law to regulate the conduct of musharakah 
financing. This law should obligate the clients to keep complete accounts of the 
musharakah-financed projects. Banks should have the right to probe the accounts 
and monitor the project at different stages. Moreover, specific regulations should 
be enacted to close all possible loopholes for cheating, fraud and concealment. 
It is worth mentioning that banks have to work, so as to achieve the best results 
for its projects, to improve customers' skills in management by conducting 
training to customers in small business management marketing policies and 
promotion; and quality and production control. 
9.3 Performance Analysis of Musharakah Projects 
Performance evaluation is an important pre-requisite for sustained growth and 
development of any situation. It is customary in commercial banks to evaluate 
the pre-determined goals and objectives, the criteria of revaluation has undergone 
changes overtime (Sarker, 1999). To get a clear picture of the musharakah 
performance, the researcher investigates the respondents' assessment of its 
profitability, risk and performance management system for their banks. This 
section provides information on the financial performance of musharakah 
'• . - - ~·-- - --=-; 
projects. 
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9.3.1 Musharakah Profitability 
This section a1ms to investigate the perception of musharakah profitability. 
Hence, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (7) What is the perceived financial performance of 
musharakah in terms ofprofitability? 
Table 9.4 depicts the perceived musharakah profitability, from which it is 
notable that the P-value (significance or Asymp. Sig.) is equal to 0.0 for 
musharakah profitability. The non-parametric test, therefore, confirms that the 
profitability performance is not on the same level on all options according to the 
respondents views. The profitability of musharakah projects is high. As a result, 
on the whole 45% of the respondents consider the profitability of musharakah 
projects to be high, alongside 22% of them who believe it is very high, while 
only 8% believe it is low and 33% consider it to have acceptable profits 
compared with other projects financed with other methods. Accordingly, it can 
be summed up that the majority of the respondents believe that the projects 
financed using musharakah have a high profitability compared to their banks' 
standards. 
Table 9.4 Musharakah Profitability 
r··· 
~~"· ~ TOo~ 
·11 -lr Frequency]EJ! Valid 
~Musll~;~k~h.Profitab.ility- I vefX'tii~h ·-J[ -·~--·~- l[~-·22i-l 57 
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r . Low or none lr······· ... 2··w·-·· .8] 
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-
219 
e/iapWt- .Ni.ne .Mu.,liaJUJWi !Jituur.a in tfre S~e !16lamk 9Jan!Ung S1J6W1t: 
9'~and9'~ 
Sudanese banks usually use murabahah profit margin as a minimum accepted 
profitability for any musharakah application and feasibility study. Meera and 
Abdul Razak (2005) have suggested market interest rates, such as the LffiOR, 
BLR etc., as the benchmark for musharakah acceptable profitability for any 
feasibility study. Doing so would make the musharakah similar to floating-rate 
conventional financing, since the mathematical formulas with interest were 
replaced with rental for the musharakah turn out to be similar to the 
conventional. 
One way to achieve increased profitability is to generate surplus by reducing the 
cost of finance with fixed revenue, or by increasing the revenue with a fixed cost 
or to reduce the cost and increase the revenue if both can be manipulated. Since 
the research will advise more monitoring and following up to reduce risks then 
minimising cost is not an option. The only choice then is to select high profit 
projects. 
9.3.2 Musharakah Risk 
9.3.2.1 Musharakah and the Risks Foreseen by Banks 
The musharakah involves a degree of risk which depends on the technical and 
managerial authority granted to the client who becomes a participating partner. 
The Islamic bank should not require collateral from the other partner(s) and if the 
bank asks for any guarantees they will be related to the management of the 
project and the ability of the partner(s) to abide by the legal terms of the contract. 
As shown in figure 9.2 risks can be divided into three different categories: 
entrepreneur risks; activity and circumstantial, operational and financial risks. 
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Figure 9.2 Musharakah Risks Foreseen by the Islamic Banks 
fRisk Foreseen to the Islamic Banks] 
Risks Concerning the Entrepreneur 1 
The Customer Behaviour I 
The Customer Credit Worthiness: I 
The Manal!erial Abititv and Efficiencvl 
IThe Guarantee I 
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Economic Risk I 
Le!!al Risk I 
Political Risk I 
Activitv Risks l 
Aaricultural Activitv Risk I 
Industrial Activitv Risk I 
r;;ommercial Activitv I 
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Other Risks l 
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9.3.2.1.1 Risks Concerning the Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur risk may arise due to the entrepreneur's behaviour and financial 
capability, their credit-worthiness, the managerial competence and efficiency of 
the entrepreneurs, the guarantee offered by entrepreneurs. 
(i) The customer's behaviour: The relevant factors in assessing risk are 
lifestyle and manners, previous dealings and reputation, credibility 
and honesty. All of these factors have a significant bearing upon the 
entrepreneur's behaviour post-loan, on whether he will carry out the 
agreements entered into, or has signed the agreement without 
intending to carry it out. Of course the bank would not like to deal 
with someone whose behaviour is classed as 'bad' (Ahmed, 2006) 
(ii) The entrepreneur's credit-worthiness: The capital offered by the 
entrepreneur is an indication for the entrepreneur's credit-worthiness. 
This is found out through publications such as annual reports and 
shareholders' bulletins. Profitability and liquidity ratios can also give 
indications of the amount of capital (Ahmed, 2005). 
(iii) The managerial competence and efficiency of the customer: This 
relates to the customer's dealings with money and operations 
(Ahmed, 2004). 
(iv) The guarantee: A written guarantee from the customer can solve any 
of the problems faced by the investment. Such a guarantee needs to be 
something that is easy to sell and easily convertible to cash. It must be 
noted here that the guarantee provided in musharakah is against 
mismanagement and negligence as the profit is not secured nor 
guaranteed according to the profit and loss sharing rules (Ahmed, 
2005). 
9.3.2.1.2 Activity Risks 
These may differ according to the~ kind of project - agricultural or industrial 
production or commercial services etc. - which differ in the conditions affecting 
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them. For example, agricultural activities are affected by weather conditions, 
natural disasters and the availability of natural rural sources of production. On 
the other hand, industrial activities may be affected by and be dependent upon 
the availability of skilled labour as well as on the availability of (imported) raw 
material. Both of these require hard currency, a lack of which impacts on 
productivity as well as the prices of their products. Commercial activities are 
affected by the competition as a result of the entry of competitors and by storage 
and distribution - problems that the Sudan particularly suffers from (Ahmed, 
2005). 
9.3.2.1.3 General Circumstantial Risks 
General circumstantial risks may be divided into economic and political and 
legal risks. 
(i) Economic situations change regarding things like goods that are sold 
and bought quickly and those that remain hard to sell. Such changes 
have nothing to do with the relationship between the banks and the 
entrepreneurs. Competition, in the broad meaning of the word, is a 
part of these risks. It can arise from the introduction of new 
substitutes in the market and the introduction of new technology by 
the producers, from changes in customers' preference (market trends). 
Other risk areas include money invested being riskier than that which 
is owned and invested by the owner, the rise in prices for international 
money transfers, the weakness of the construction and the lack of 
energy and the transfer to a type of consumerism (Ahmed, 2003). 
(ii) The political and legal risks: In any country these two factors affect 
the situation at differing levels. Without doubt, political stability 
greatly reduces these risks. Also fiscal and monetary pricing policies 
have very obvious effects. The laws that enable control of imports and 
exports affect the performance of government in various realms. The 
national economic strategy and regiliations and policies on investment 
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laid down by the National Bank of Sudan (Sudan Central Bank) 
restrict and will affect banking operations too (Ahmed, 2003). 
9.3.2.1.4 Operational Risks 
Operational risks involve bad management, which lead to problems for the 
projects being financed. Losses are usually incurred as a result of poor 
investment decisions, which may derive from a mix of factors, including a 
volatile operating environment, weak internal governance (notably 
mismanagement), and limited market discipline. Such losses are reflected not 
only in depreciation of the value of the depositors' wealth, but also in a decline in 
banks profitability. If not corrected in good time, such decline can jeopardize the 
bank's soundness. This, in tum, can progressively reduce the banks' role as 
financial intermediaries and inhibit the mobilization of private savings towards 
investment (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
9.3.2.1.5 Financial Risks 
The change in the financial position of the company or the corporation and its 
failure to pay will affect a kind of risk (Ahmed, 2005). 
9.3.2.2 Musharakah Risk Performance 
This section aims to investigate the perception of the musharakah projects risks. 
Hence, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (8) What is the perceived financial performance of 
musharakah in terms of risk? 
It is notable from table 9.5 that the P-value (significance or Asymp. Sig.) is equal 
to 0.0 for musharakah risk. The non-parametric test, therefore, confirms that the 
performance is-not-on -the same-level-on-all options -according-to the- respondents 
views. Almost one third (30%) of the sample respondents believe that the 
musharakah risk is high with an additional 28% believing it is very high. In 
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regards to those who consider musharakah risk to be acceptable or low they were 
simply 24% and 14% respectively. 
Table 9.5 Musharakah Risk 
~-- -- ~~ ¥- - -- lialid rFrequency''lr Percent II I 
~--- ----- - -Musharakah Risk r Very-High ---,r ---- - 72 I[- 28.8 T 
Chi-Square 67.240 1 · T--- - l r - :o1l , H1gh l 75 1 30. , I 
l 
I 
I 
t 
I 
l 
Asymp. Sig .. 000 
rAcceptabie w -- 61'11' ... 24.4--, 
!Low or none ·w·· 36 ,,-14.4 I fNot sure- ., r -----
'611 -~ 
r·-········ - ][ ..... 2soT-- foo.o] I Total I 
···-····· 
.. u cuu,,,cumNNN ·'~"······ .,, '"'"'""~"'"'~='"' ~ 
Concerning the risk there are three points that can be considered: 
(i) The moral commitment by the banks to facilitate and to finance small 
producers and poor families. 
(ii) The regulations for musharakah in Sudan do not allow any of the 
partners to takeout any kind of guarantee against the other partner. 
The only situation that allows a form of guarantee to be taken is that 
in respect of mismanagement and fraud. This leads to the bank not 
asking for sufficient guarantees and ignoring the credit-worthiness of 
the customer. As an alternative they ask for personal guarantors. 
These guarantees have never been used. 
(iii) The partnerships do not have a great deal of control over some 
operations, such as animal export, which may lead to the delegating 
of responsibility by the bank to the other partner and allowing the 
other partner to do whatever he or she wishes to do. 
(iv) Diversification strategy is advised to minimise the risks through 
financing different entrepreneurs instead of concentration of finance 
.. 
to a few of them, diversification in financing different sectors in 
different seasons 
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(v) This specialization is also advised. It probably will have some far 
reaching consequences. In the first instance, the bank may accumulate 
intimate knowledge of some markets in which they have 
concentrated. This may enable the banks to protect themselves more 
efficiently against too optimistic entrepreneurial calculations in these 
areas, although a perfect protection seems to be impossible (Al-
Harran, 1997). 
(vi) In high risk projects, the researcher recommends selecting carefully 
good entrepreneurs and hence minimising possible defaults; older 
entrepreneurs with good track records can take part in nominating 
new entrepreneurs. 
(vii) Improving the contract conditions which can minimize risk and give 
more authority to following up these projects. 
(viii) Part of the profits could be used to build up reserves as a buffer 
against possible future losses (Karsten, 1982). 
9.3.2.3 The High Risk of Musharakah Contracts Causes Great Institutional 
Influence on Management Decisions 
This section intends to examine the influence of musharakah risk on 
management decisions. Therefore, it aims to respond to the following research 
question: 
Research Question (9) What is the perceived impact of musharakah risk on the 
degree of interference on management? 
Consideration of the entrepreneur's wishes of no interference is essential, even 
though it may at times cause weak monitoring. By contrast the high risk of 
musharakah contracts causes great institutional influence on management 
decisions. So a sense of balance is, indeed, needed in these cases. As shown in 
table 9.6, the majority of respondents, with significant chi-square level, agreed 
th~t it ~~y cau-;e;n-inf'fuence on managemenf'"'ciecis1ons:~10% and-36% ofthem 
agreed and strongly agreed with this respectively. By contrast, 22% disagreed 
and only less than 3% of them strongly disagreed with this assertion. In addition, 
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only 8% of the respondents were uncertain. These differences are statistically 
significant, as the chi-square value is below 0.05. 
Table 9.6 The Influence of Musharakah Risk on Management Decisions 
It is most important to recognize the impact of PLS modes of financing on 
Islamic banks, especially the fact that when Islamic banks provide funds through 
their PLS facilities, there is a recognizable default on the part of the agent-
entrepreneur until PLS contracts expire, barring proved negligence or 
mismanagement on the part of the agent-entrepreneur. In fact, a default of PLS 
contracts means that the investment project has failed to deliver what was 
expected, that is a lower or no profit, or loss. In this case, the lower profit or loss 
is shared between or among parties according to the stipulated PLS ratios (Errico 
and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
Islamic banks, therefore, have a lower degree of control over the management of 
the enterprise they finance through the PLS contract. By contrast, credit risk 
related to financing through non-PLS modes are lessened by the possibility of 
collateralization, including mortgaging. The assessment of an appropriate level 
of the capital adequacy ratio for Islamic banks should be primarily based on 
systematic analysis of the underlining asset portfolio between PLS and non-PLS 
transactions (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). Although the PLS contracts perhaps 
present significant risks to Islamic banks, it also presents a profitable 
opportunity. -xccoraingly, th.eassessment and ·management of-investment· risk · 
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becomes more difficult in an Islamic environment than in conventional banking 
because of the following factors: 
(i) PLS modes cannot be systematically made dependant on collateral or 
other guarantees; 
(ii) Administration of the PLS modes 1s more complex compared to 
conventional financing; 
(iii) The relatively weak legal framework supporting bank lending 
operations. 
Another point to be added here is that the dual Islamic and conventional banking 
system taking place in Sudan since 2006 may increase the level of competition 
between Islamic banks from one hand and Islamic and conventional banks from 
the other hand. This greater competition, though driving firms to improve their 
efficiency, may also encourage them to orient their businesses towards activities, 
sectors, and/or entrepreneurs of higher risk. In order to safeguard invested funds 
and realise profits, Islamic banks will need to rely more than conventional banks 
on a set of appropriate policies and adequate infrastructure for portfolio 
diversification, monitoring and control. They would also need to rely on the 
existence of an adequate supply of trained banking staff skilled in investment and 
Islamic banking practices to implement these policies. 
To conclude, there is a need for risk analysis and risk management tools to 
provide agents with hedging instruments, especially with Islamic banks. In 
conventional banks, interest rates play a key role in managing liquidity, pricing 
risk and allocating credit. In the absence of the interest rates, the risk manager in 
an Islamic bank faces a greater challenge than the risk manager of a similar size 
conventional bank. In addition, Islamic banks are unlikely to benefit from a 
critical mass of similar institutions with which the Islamic bank can be 
developed, thus requiring Islamic banks to hold higher levels of liquidity than 
co_nven!i9nal banks, with a consequent negative impact on their ability to 
compete. 
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9.3.3 Risk and Profitability Analysis 
In the case of musharakah, Islamic banks have to carry out feasibility studies 
with more depth and precaution (Usmani, 1999). Since these projects will be 
carried out by feasibility studies, then risk management can be developed to 
minimise the exposed risks and to maximise the expected profitability. 
Therefore, more likely, these banks will be able, in time through accumulated 
experiences, to develop their own approaches to accept only those projects which 
fulfil the need of achieving higher profitability. In addition, risk management 
tools will always contain a diversified portfolio of musharakah projects as no 
bank can restrict itself to a single musharakah, therefore, it is hardly conceivable 
that all of these musharakahs, or the majority of them will result in a loss. 
Provided that, some loss occurred can be attributed to chance or luck, for the rest, 
some of them will only make a loss if proper measures have been taken while 
high returns are expected for exposing more risks compared with semi 
profitability guaranteed projects. Hence, if well managed, the possibility of loss 
for the bank is much less theoretical, or at worst, equal, than the possibility of 
loss in a joint stock company which will be restricted to a limited sector of 
commercial activities. 
In regard to the performance of the risk compared with the profitability, it is 
generally clear, from figure 9.3 that there is a harmony between the risk and 
profitability of musharakah: whenever one increases, the other also increases and 
vice versa. This financial activity is consistent with the economics principle 
which states that there should be proportionality between profit and risk. Hence, 
the researcher might say that the profitability is quite high and the risk is to some 
extent also high. However, musharakah profitability is higher than its risk. 
Ahmed (2005) studied the musharakah profitability and risks compared with 
murabahah, salam and other Islamic finance instruments in Sudan. His results 
show that the musharakah method in two out of nine Sudanese banks had higher 
profitability and lower risk compared to other methods. Likewise, murabahah 
was better in another two banks only because it had a higher profitability 
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significant. His analysis has shown no differences between the methods for the 
remaining five banks. Ahmed (2005) reported that lack of knowledgeable 
bankers in selecting, evaluating and managing profitable projects is a significant 
factor. 
Figure 9.3 Risks and Profitability for Musharakah (Respondents' 
Perception) 
Mushrakah Performance 
50 .-------------------------------
40 +-------
10 
0 
II Musharakah Profitability 
II Musharakah Risk 
Are there any differences in the degree of profitability and risk between the 
different managerial experience groups of the respondents and different groups 
of the respondents who worked for the various sampled banks? The ANOV A test 
was used to answer this, the results of which are presented in table 9.7 
The results show that there is no significant difference in any of the different 
managerial groups in their assessment of both the profitability and risk of 
musharakah, since their significances are bigger than 0.000. On the other hand, 
there are significant differences between the respondent groups in terms of their 
assessment to the degree of risk that musharakah contains with a significance 
value of0.018. 
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Table 9.7 Analysis of Variance ANOVA for Musharakah Performance 
According to Managerial Experience and Sampled Banks Groups 
~--·~·--~ 
1 Banks ····-- r.s~~~G~~p~~--~ 
I r···wiihi;orollj)~-·-····J!,_·_··----___ .. ___ __.~...-___ ....~ 
Between Groups 2.925 jj 
t========.-:-: ... =.-=~=-= . ...::::.=J~_·T_hi~-~~~p-s··-~11 1~18o 1'-L-~ ..-.. ~--.. .... -... _J .• ~...--___ ___~ 
Hence, the respondents, regardless of their managerial experience and the bank 
they work for, have assessed the musharakah profitability without difference, 
while the results show the differences between the respondent groups according 
to their banks in their assessment to musharakah risk. Table 9.8 elaborates these 
differences. 
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Table 9.8 ANOV A Multiple Perception Comparisons between Sampled 
Banks on Dependent Variable: Performance of Musharakah Risk 
r··(I)'N'i;;~ofthe Bank- ]f(J) Name of the Bank ~~ Mean oirr~;~nce (I~J) ''I[ Sig. I 
[Savings Bank IC ·· " .o2564]j.9-i7 I 
I SudaneselslamicBank I[ .18168 II .473 I 
~ Shamai-Islamic Bank 
' 
' r Tadamoun Islamic Ba'ii!Z' IC'' -.24599'llj43 I 
l"'i3iisal Islamic ba~C ··-~][ - ·-- ~-.4I026]l.TT8'1 
1 BankofKhartoum--H~I -.34836 ... 1! .192-l 
lom~derman Nati;nal B3ffik]l .36859 H~T92] 
l'-:-..,..--..,..--====---ll Saudi Sudanese Bank · =w··M · ······.60073(*)][··.042 I 
[ sa.~-ings sli.~k. · ··· ls'hllffia:t rsl;~rc &tik- ........ 1:··--.. ········ -~o2564·lr .917] 
J Sudanese Islamic Bank --~ C ·· .15604] [ill] 
[fildamoun Islamic Bank IC- -.27163 lf~296 I 
['Fai;a! Islamic bank ·••· ···-·-w· ----- -.38462] I .14fT 
[Bank of Khartoum ·----~~ -.37401 II .162 1! 
r·omederman National Bank lr:=••wo :34295''H ~225"1 
[saudi Sudan~se 8Wik · -- I[ .57509 '] !~052 I 
;=su=d=an::::e::::se=--I=-s=lmm=--=·.c=B=a=nk=:! Shamal Islamic Ba~k ··· 11· -.18168'1! . .473 I 
I Savings Bank·---- ~c= -- -.15604 lr .538 I 
r· Tadamou~- Islamic Bank- I r. . - > -- ~.427681 [JQ[] 
ff'aisaCislamic bank -- - -w·----- ·-- .22857 W:I94"L 
['sai-tiZ-orKhartoum -· ---~~------- -.53oo5 Jr·:o53 -II 
I Omederman National Bank I! .18690 11··:517 -~~ 
1 saudi suda;;ese-·Bank -- II .41905 Jl .164 II 
~'r--·T--ad--.a--m--~u---~---~--~~--ain __ i __ c __ B--an::::k:::'[ Sha~aTislamic Bank- '''IC' wow>>• --- .24599 l!-~34[1 
I Savings Bank - --~~ .27163 Jl-:296] 
I Sudanese Islamic Bank --]I ----- :4276!flf'~l09 I 
I Faisal Islamic bank-- IC .65625(*) jj .017 11 
r Bank ~[Khartoum"'"' II -.1023'n[.714--l' 
[oille'de~ Nationa(Bank I[' m .61458(*) I [ill] 
l!.......--===--=..,..--=---ll Saudi Sudanese Bank I[____ .84673(*) I[QQ[J 
lr Faisal Islamic-bank···· [}hamal Islamic Bank IC .. - -.41026 I[II[I I ·savings-Bank --- -lr -.38462 II .142l ! r·s{;d-~nese Isi~ic Bank"- .. II --- -.22857 I [ .394··1 
'>!
! I Tadamoun Islamic Bank I c ' ·:.65625(*) I r .oi 7 I 
: I Bank of Khartoum II -.75862(*) JCQQIJ 
~~d~rman Nationa~-~ankl liL··. •.. -- -.04167 J,[·-:88~11 
1 Saudi Sudanese Bank __ .19048 .536 
Bank of Khartoum I Shamal Islamic Bank II -·- .34836 1r~i92 I 
f Savings Bank --- ---]! --.3i40T)rJ62-I 
~danes~ IslamicB-~~k II · · · ·· .53005] I 
I"Tadamoun Islamic Bank~ r·--- . 0 l023 7 "]I . 714 "I 
! Faisal Islamic bank ~~- -- - .75862(*) -~~ 
[ 0mederman National Bank:][ n_::- --··;71695('HI---]}1'8JI 
[Saudi sudanese Bank ·=w .94910(*) ·w.oo3 1 
l '-:--= .. -= .. =:::: ... :::: ..:::: ...:::: ..... =---1 - --- - ~-~ 
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As indicated by the mean differences in the table 9.8, respondents who work for 
Saudi Sudanese Bank consider their musharakah risks higher when compared 
with respondents working for Shamal Islamic Bank, Tadamoun Islamic Bank and 
Khartoum Bank. Respondents who work for Faisal Islamic Bank consider their 
musharakah risks higher when compared with respondents working for 
Tadamoun Islamic Bank and Khartoum Bank. Staffs of Omderman National 
consider musharakah financed by their bank to have a higher risk compared with 
a degree signed by the respondents working for Tadamoun Islamic Bank and 
Khartoum Bank. Lastly, Tadamoun Islamic Bank respondents consider their 
musharakah risk higher compared to their counterpart in Khartoum Bank. The 
rest of the banks consider their risks on the same level. Hence, the respondents of 
Khartoum Bank consider their musharakah risk as the lowest among all sampled 
banks. 
9.3.4 Profitability and Risk Financial Performance of Islamic Financial 
Methods: Method's Return of Equity and Debt Equity Ratios 
Until here, perception analysis of the participants is presented. Against this 
nen.~eption_analysis, this section-aims to take the~research further to-investigate 
the real financial performance of musharakah compared with murabahah, salam 
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and other methods of Islamic finance in the case of Sudan by utilising secondary 
data as opposed to the primary data utilised so far. It is crucial to mention that 
since the data collection process is terribly difficult in Sudan, consistent data 
were only available for the period of 1993-1999. It was not possible to gain 
access to the data for the period 2000-2005 due to three reasons: 
(i) Current information on the banks' bad debts as reported to central 
banks regarding classified methods is not easily accessible to 
researchers; 
(ii) Some banks' information systems do not provide information per 
method of finance. Data per method of finance should be collected 
per branch first then accumulated. This took substantial time to work 
out for the existing available data for the period 1993-1999; 
(iii) Some banks were reluctant to provide recent data about their 
performance, so they only allowed old data. 
This section, thus, compares the performances or the profitability and risks of 
various Islamic financial instruments by using secondary data for the period of 
1993-1999. Before presenting the results of ANOV A test investigating the 
significance of the performance differences, it is important to state that a number 
of calculations were initially conducted to prepare the ground for performance 
differential analysis. For the purpose of this section of the study the profitability 
and risk will be judged by the following criteria: 
Risks measured by the method debt equity ratio (MDER) =method's debt/ capital 
equity. 
Profitability measured by the method profit ratio (MFR) =method's profit /total 
capital equity. 
If the researcher wishes to consider banks' efficiency controlling by risk, only 
those loan losses arising from internal factors, such as risk management 
inefficiency or bad-management, should oe coriSiderecf,.wiiife nsk generat~d by 
adverse local business conditions (bad luck) should be excluded. Based on this, 
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table 9.9 presents the results of the ANOV A test for the differences between the 
financial performance of musharakah, murabahah, salam and other methods in 
terms of profitability and risk. 
As shown in table 9.9 the profitability analysis shows there is no difference 
between the methods as their significance is 0.385, which is bigger than 0.05. 
Similarly the risk analysis shows that there is no significant difference between 
these methods in terms of risk rates, stating, as the F test shows the significance 
to be 0.547. The researcher can, therefore, conclude that there is no difference 
between the profitability and risk of these methods, namely musharakah, 
murabahah, salam, and other methods2• 
A common principle of economics is that of scales moving in the same direction 
when discussing profitability and risk. When there is high risk one should expect 
high profits and when there is low risk one should expect low profits. The 
analysis in this section was expecting to have some methods with both high 
profitability and high risk but this didn't happen. However, these results describe 
the rational movement for the fund between the methods; whenever a method 
gives more probability for profit in some incidents there will be a preferred 
2 On an individual banking level, the researcher has studied the performance of the sampled bank. 
The statistical analysis has shown that the musharakah method in two individual banks had 
higher profitability and lower risk compared to other methods. Likewise, murabahah was better 
in another two banks only because it had a higher profitability significant. The analysis has 
shown no differences between the methods for the remaining five banks. This indicates that lack 
of knowledgeable bankers in selecting, evaluating and managing profitable projects is a 
significant factor. This paper closely stu~diesjll~ r_esllits fo_r the_fO!:lf_b_~~s-for_whicb"there-werec 
significant differences-;-to measure the efficiency of the Islamic fmance methods and the lack of 
PLS performance. For full discussion of the study see Ahmed, G. A. (2005). "Risk and 
Profitability for the Islamic Finance Methods." Review oflslamic Economics Vol. 9(No. 2): 31 -
75. 
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economic choice and the opposite IS true; whenever a method gives less 
probability for profit in some incidents the preferred economic choice will be 
converted to a new preferred method. Ceteris paribus, such statements can be 
used to describe the risk. 
Figure 9.4 depicts the profitability of the methods. As can be seen, it shows that 
musharakah had the lowest average profitability during the time when the other 
methods had the highest profitability. Figure 9.4 further shows that the averages 
of their profitability are 14%, 18%, 18.5% and 23% for musharakah, murabahah, 
sa/am and other methods respectively. The reason why murabahah is greater 
than musharakah may be because its profits are more guaranteed compared with 
musharakah. As mentioned before, murabahah is the selling of collateral by 
covering the cost price with a fixed and known profit margin. The bank usually 
takes some guarantees from the customers and these guarantees can be cheques. 
The consequences for giving RD/bounced cheques to banks as stated by the 
Sudanese criminal law in 1991 is imprisonment tmtil the cheque is fully paid 
(Article No 179, 1991 Sudanese Criminal Act). 
Figure 9.4 Profitability Performance for Islamic Finance Methods 
The percentages of Return of Equity Ratios of the Finance Methods 
0.60000 
'8 
.t::. 0.50000 a; 
~ 
Qj 0.40000 a. 
0 ~ 
~a::: 
row 
O:::o::: 0.30000 
.~~ 
:::~~ 
CT 
w 0.20000 
0 
E 
2 0.10000 
Q) 
0::: 
0.00000 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
Years 
I c Mlsharakah Return of Equity Ratio • Mlrabahah Return of Equity Ratio 
o Salam Return of Equity Ratio o Other Return of Equity Ratio 
236 
efia:pWi .Nitre ..!Wu61Uvta/ia4 fJUuuu:e in tfre S~e :hlamic 9Jan!Ung Swkm: 
:I~ and :I~ 
It is for that reason that many customers were put in prison. This is seen as a 
pressure on murabahah. Because of the problems associated with it, the BOS 
placed profit ceilings upon murabahah projects that banks are forbidden to go 
over (Bank of Sudan 1990-2006). For the same reason they are also planning to 
set a limit on the amount of funds that can be given over to murabahah use. The 
other methods are also justified by the results, as are all different ways that 
increase profitability and reduce risk. The researcher cannot find a justification 
for the high profitability of sa/am when compared with musharakah. This is not 
because of an agricultural disaster - something that did not occur in Sudan in this 
period - but because the agricultural season does not usually begin on time and 
there is not enough investment, as well as the fact that, as banks often complain, 
the sa/am given to farmers is not being used for crop growing. The sa/am and 
their non-payment were the reasons for the prosecution of some of the farmers. It 
was expected therefore that the profitability of the musharakah will be at least 
slightly higher. Figure 9.6 describes the risk rates for the Islamic financing 
methods in relation to arrears and bad debts, which depicts that the other methods 
had the highest risks. This is in line with the principle that there is a proportional 
relationship between profit and risk. 
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Figure 9.5 Risk Performance for Islamic Finance Methods 
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The average of the debt equity ratios for the other methods is 22%. Nevertheless 
this was because of the extraordinary and odd result in the year 1996. At the 
time, salam was the lowest risk with an average of 7% while musharakah and 
murabahah achieved 11% and 9.5%. 
One way to solve the moral hazard problem with musharakah is to increase 
project monitoring and enforce restrictive covenants. Sudanese banks have paid 
little attention to developing their project appraisal capabilities. The moral hazard 
problem makes it desirable for the banks to monitor the performance of the 
projects they finance. No doubt, this entails additional costs but the benefits in 
terms of final declared profits more than offset those. In spite of this, the banks 
have been reluctant to do that because the entrepreneurs tend to resist it. They 
have instead chosen the easier way out, i.e. fixed return modes. 
Debts rate is usually an indication of the managerial efficiency especially of 
those projects which depend on following up, management and control, notably 
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musharakah projects. Management is defined as initiation of projects (demand 
and feasibility studies, project proposals etc.) and implementation of these 
proposals by active involvement in the production process. Control on the other 
hand is defined as the right to ratify the initial proposals and supervise the 
projects either through internal monitoring or external mechanisms (Dar and 
Presley 2000). Accordingly, strengthening the managerial efficiency of these 
banks is strongly advised. 
The proportional relationships between profit and risk for these methods, as 
shown in figure 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, and 9.9, with the exception of musharakah was 
stable, with constant profit returns being higher than the risk. This indicates the 
managerial efficiency in following up these projects, as musharakah requires two 
main actions: exceptional feasibility studies and constant re-appraisal. It appears 
therefore, from what has been mentioned previously, that the level of re-appraisal 
is low. The same happened to sa/am and the other methods. By contrast 
murabahah did see a proportional relationship between 1isk and profit, especially 
over the last four years ofthe period of study. 
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Figure 9.6 Musharakah Profitability and Risk 
Return of B:!uity and Debt E"l:luity Ratios of fvlusharakah 
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Figure 9. 7 Murabahah Profitability and Risk 
Return of B:!uity and Debt B:!uity Ratios of IV'urabahah 
0 
IJ) 
.Q 
0.25000 
-ro 
0:: 
-~ 
::J 0.20000 r::r 
l.U.c 
- ro -5l~ Cl.o 0.15000 
-c ro c ..... 
ro ::J ~::2 
0.10000 ::J 
r::r 
l.U 
0 
c 
... 
0.05000 
::J Q) 
0::: 
0.00000 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1 999 Average 
Years 
g M.Jrabahah Return of B:!uity Ratio • M.Jrabahah Debt B:!uity Ratio 
240 
efzapWt- .Nine .Mu61iwta/Wi f}i~ran,u in tlie Sudane6e !16famic fiJan!Wuj Swtmt: 
[f~andfJ~ 
Figure 9.8 Salam Profitability and Risk 
Return of Equity and !Rbt Ef1uity Ratios of Salam 
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Figure 9.9 Other Finance Methods' Profitability and Risk 
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After dividing the numbers into the currency index as in Figure 9.1 0, this study 
found that the average profitability of the musharakah were the highest followed 
by murabahah, which is consistent with the results mentioned before, but more 
accurate. Moreover musharakah was the highest performing in 1995-1997. 
Murabahah, on the other hand, had fluctuating profits, while sa/am had a 
constant but low average profitability level. The year 1996 saw the least profit 
for the sa/am method due to that year's agricultural season. With regard to the 
other methods, they saw a gradual increase in their average profitability between 
1993 and 1998. The average profit margin did decrease however in 1999. 
Figure 9.10 Profitability of the Islamic Finance Methods Adjusted by the 
Index Numbers 
Methods' Profit Timescale Adjusted According to the Index Numbers for Eight Sudanese 
Banks 1993-1999 
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The timescale for these methods, when comparing their performance in covering 
their bad debts over time as is depicted in figure 9.11, shows high fluctuations, 
which do not conform to the profitability over time. It should also be stated that 
sa/am was the lowest bad debt method and again it had a constant but low 
average bad debts level. 
Figure 9.11 Risk for the Islamic Finance Methods Adjusted by the Index 
Numbers 
Methods' Debts Timescale Adjusted According to the Index Numbers 
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9.4 Pecking Order for Islamic Finance Instruments 
9.4.1 Preference of Islamic Financial Methods 
This section intends to investigate the preference for Islamic finance instruments. 
Hence, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (1 0) What is the most preferred instrument among Islamic 
finance methods according to the respondents' perception? 
The result ofthe chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicates, as shown in table 9.10, 
that there is reasonable very low likelihood that the differences in the Islamic 
finance methods preference in the sample data can be attributed to chance. In 
spite of the high risk of musharakah mode of finance and the high management 
skills needed, most of the respondents prefer musharakah as their mode of 
finance in dealing with their customers. As shown in table 9.10 almost 60% of 
the respondents preferred musharakah and by contrast only about 35% of them 
selected murabahah, whilst less than 3% chose the sa/am mode of finance and 
less than 3% of the respondents selected other modes of finance including 
mudarabah, istisnaa ', muzarahah and mosagah. This may show the support of 
the banks' employees to musharakah. 
Hence, the most preferred finance instrument IS musharakah followed by 
murabahah. 
Table 9.10 Preference of Islamic Finance Instruments 
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The managers as well as customers are guided by a pecking order when choosing 
among financing opportunities. The most popular reason for this behaviour, as 
mentioned by Read (1998), is due to control, which is the desire to avoid external 
interference and maintain independence. The amount of debt or equity sought is 
determined, to a large extent, by the enterprises owner's and managers' goals of 
protecting the control of enterprise. Nasr (2005) argues that if the pecking order 
hypothesis holds, then, owners should be reluctant to use the musharakah mode 
of finance mainly due to the absence of a control factor from the demand side 
and high risk embedded in the instrument from the supply side. According to 
Nasr (2005) small business owners prefer to be financed using murabahah then 
ijarah wa iqtinaa, followed by mudarabah and lastly musharakah. The results 
shown above, by contrast, do not support his outcomes. The reason the 
researcher can put forward is that, as Nasr (2005) mentioned, there were several 
factors that potentially restrict his conclusions to be drawn from his study. This is 
due to the small number of distributed and collected survey ( 45 respondents from 
which only a few have been financed using musharakah) and the low education 
level of the respondents. In addition the sample contains a high percentage of 
Christians.3 In Sudan, some clients who reject interest-based loans may be 
sceptical about murabahah, with its strict collateral requirements which bear an 
apparent similarity to interest-yielding loans. Such clients may welcome 
musharakah, which minimizes the pressure exerted on clients by the financier 
(Abdalla, 1997). However, in big businesses, especially lucrative ones, some 
clients would prefer murabahah because they would know in advance the exact 
amount they will pay as a profit margin and at the same time keep banks away 
from direct intervention in their businesses. On the other hand, banks would 
prefer musharakah since the end return on investment would be higher. In non-
lucrative businesses this scenario is reversed. Banks would go for murabahah, 
especially when dealing with risky small businesses (Abdalla, 1999). 
This is a distinct feature of the SIBs experience. The entrepreneur in musharakah 
financing is entitled to a share in the business profit pro rata to his contribution in 
3 The study has been conducted on the customer demand side on musharakah in the urban area of 
Cairo. 
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the investment (in addition to earnings gained as management entrepreneurship 
fees). Thus, he would be tempted, in order to increase his profit share, to save or 
reinvest his profits in buying out the bank shares. This is another important 
advantage of musharakah i.e., encouragement or mobilisation of savings. 
It should be noted that these stated preferences, however, are not necessarily 
reflected in real life. To some extent these preferences may be the result of an 
awareness of Islamic Finance. 
Table 9.11 presents the results of cross tabulation between the preferred mode of 
finance and the sampled banks, which shows that there is a relation between the 
bank and the mode of finance preferred since its Chi-Square significance is equal 
to 0.002. 
Table 9.11 Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square Tests for the Different 
Sampled Banks and the Preferred Method of Finance 
of the Islamic finance method 
To illustrate this, figure 9.12 shows the distributions of preference percentages 
among different sampled banks. The figure shows that murabahah is preferred in 
Shamal Islamic bank, while the rest of the seven banks prefer musharakah. 
Salam finance is weak in all banks except in Savings Bank. 
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Figure 9.12 Preferred Mode of Finance in the Sampled Banks 
10 
5 
0 
Shamal Savings Sudanese Tadarnoun Faisiiil Bank of Omderman Saudi 
lslarric Bank Islamic lslarric Islamic Khartoum Natolnal Sudanese 
Bank Bank Bank bank Bank Bank 
Name of the Bank 
Preference of lslami< 
finance method 
• Musharakah 
• Murabahah 
Dsalam 
• Other 
In order to see whether there is a relation between the mode of finance preferred 
and the degree of profitability and risk signed for these modes by the respondents 
the chi square cross tabulation test was run. The results are demonstrated in table 
9 .12. The results show that the degree of profitability and risk correlate with the 
mode of finance preferred with significant difference. 
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Table 9.12 The Relation between the Preferred Mode of Finance and 
Musharakah Performance 
I[ -- IL:JLJ Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Performance of Musharakah I Pearson Chi-Square II 22.967(a) ~ ~81 Profitab ili ty * Preference of 
Islamic finance method I Likelihood Ratio II 12.001 IIJIJI .446 1 I Linear-by-Linear Association II 1.792 1GI .181 1 I N of Valid Cases II 250 101 l 
Performance of Muslzarakah Risk I Pearson Chi-Sguare II 22.516{a} IIJDI .032] 
* Preference of Islamic finance I Likelihood Ratio II 24.18o IIJDI .o1g 1 
method l Linear-b~-Linear Association II 7.418 I[JJI .oo6 1 I N of Valid Cases II 2so !D l 
Figure 9.13 illustrates this relation. While most of those who preferred 
murabahah have ranked musharakah risk as very high and high, those who 
preferred musharakah consider its risk as acceptable. Hence, there is a strong 
relation between musharakah risk performance and the preferred mode of 
finance. 
Figure 9.13 Musharakah Risks Performance and the Preferred Mode of 
Finance 
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9.4.2 .Perception Related Factors Influencing Granting Credits and 
Hindering Musharakah Investment in Fund Allocations 
This section aims to identify factors influencing granting credits and hindering 
musharakah investment in fund allocations. Therefore, it aims to respond to the 
following research question: 
Research Question (II) What are the possible factors influencing granting 
credits musharakah finance according to the perception of the respondents? 
Table 9.13 presents the relevant importance of some selected perceived factors 
influencing granting credit and hindering investment in fund allocations. These 
factors are risk, limited credit ceilings, profitability and personal qualities of the 
entrepreneurs. The descriptive analysis shows that the most influencing factor is 
the profitability with significant points of 1290 followed by risk factor on the 
second place and limited credit ceiling with 1219 and 1053 points respectively. It 
is important to mention that these differences and the mean rank difference 
shown in table 9.14 are not significant which show a significance of .145. 
Table 9.13 Factors Hindering Musharakah Finance and Allocation Fund 
Profitability 
Weighted 
significance points 
i Risk 
I 
1 Personal qualities ofthe · 
! entrepreneurs 
1-
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Table 9.14 Friedman Tests and Mean Ranks for the Factors Hindering 
Musharakah Finance 
7==-:=-==-===========::::::--llf m .Mean - I! l Ri~k ... II 2.4320 II 
;:::f =L~=inu=.t=ed=c=r=ed=it=c=ei=lin=g=s=·=======.=::=.--11 2.6480 11 
j Piofitah.ility··- ---]~---2.5160 ~~ 
1 
"'[ ""r""er""'sa""n""at"""q""'·u""at""iti=es,_o-r-ih=e=.cl=ie""~-=i~-=--·=· =====]-': -- 2.4040 11 
r·chi~sq;;are Friedman Te~t-·5.400 Of 3 - .. AsymP,-Sig.··~-145 --1 
Hence, to answer the research question, all the factors studied significantly have 
the same weight of importance. 
9.4.3 Factors Affecting the Distribution of Bank Funds According to the 
Different Methods of Finance 
This section aims to identify the factors affecting the distribution of bank funds 
according to the different methods of finance. Hence, it aims to respond to the 
following research question: 
Research Question (12) What are the perceived possible factors influencing the 
distribution of bank funds among different Islamic finance instruments? 
The choice of one mode of Islamic finance over another is influenced to a large 
extent by the suitability of the nature and type of business; the size of loan; and 
the base of lending (individual or group). Choosing between one mode of finance 
or another depends on a number of factors, including the character and 
trustworthiness of the entrepreneur; the capital amount needed; the conditions 
under which the business operates and the collateral required to ensure business 
success. In an attempt to decide factors affecting the distribution of bank funds 
according to the different methods of finance, the respondents were given six 
factors· tocrank-according-t<nneir ·importance: Tlies<r!actors· iie credit -poll'cies -s-~t . 
by the BOS, the amount of fund available, risk of finance methods, profitability 
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of finance methods, the activity type, and other factors. The descriptive 
distributions are shown in table 9.15 and the results of Friedman Tests and the 
mean ranks are shown in table 9.16. 
The results indicate that respondents placed greatest importance on credit 
policies set by the Central Bank and greater importance on the amount of funds 
available and risk of finance methods. Factors such as profitability of finance 
methods, the activity type and other factors score relatively less. The majority of 
respondents (75%) believe that the BOS credit policy is the first important factor 
and almost 10% of them believe it is the second important factor. On the other 
hand the table shows that the amount of funds available is the second important 
factor giving that almost 37% of the respondents believe so while the percentages 
of them who chose it as the third, fourth or fifth important factor was less than 
20% for each rank. In addition to that the respondents believe that the risk of 
finance method is the third important factor affecting the decision of distributing 
funds available to different methods of finance to their budgets. Almost one third 
of the respondents consider risk factor as the third important factor, whilst 27% 
of them believe it is the fourth important factor. The respondents also believe that 
the profitability of finance methods is the fourth important factor with 32%. Then 
the activity type comes in as the fifth important factor with 42%. Lastly other 
factors rank as the sixth and the least important factor. 
Table 9.15 presents weighting of the results. The weighted significance points 
column based on six points for the most important factor, five points for the 
second most important, and so on. The total scores column has been calculated 
by adding and submitting all scores given by respondents. The results of the 
weighting significance points go in the same direction; credit policies set by the 
Central Bank came first with 956 points followed by amount of funds available 
then the risk of methods in second and third position with 686 and 638 points 
respectively. 
To take-the reseatch~fuftlier, -tlie Ffiedinan test -was run to identify whether these 
differences are attributed to chance. The result of the Friedman test chi-square 
251 
r 
i 
e&!pt« .Nine .Mu6~ !Jinatta in tlie Suda.ne6e J6fmnic !JJan!Ung SwU~n: 
[f~and[f~ 
test shown in table 9.16 indicates that there is reasonable very low likelihood that 
the differences between the mean ranks in the sample data can be attributed to 
chance. The mean rank confirms the results derived from weighted significance 
points, which also confirm the same ranking mentioned in the descriptive 
analysis above. 
Table 9.15 Factors Influencing Distribution of Funds among Different 
Financing Instruments 
! The amount 
' available 
'---------' .. 68611 
.... T 
Risk of finance methods 1········~--- ·····~--~--~- 63iill 
l 
Profitability 
methods 
4 The question was not applicable for 169 of the respondents. 
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Table 9.16 Friedman Tests Results and Mean Ranks for the Factors 
Influencing Distribution of Funds Decision 
r '"- ~~~~'" ····11~ Mean ..... ,r·····Mean.R.a~k :J! 
[c~~dit·p~iici~~-~~et by the Central B!mk ·· M-·lf~ 1.5057][ ··-···· · ~ · I II 
lfhe"amou~t-~ffu~ds avail;hle . .. ··~ lr- -· 3.0575 K MN •• ~· ··- 2 li 
rR:Isf·;;n~~;;;:;~em~ih~cts ·········~ .......... 1[- ··3.3333][····· ·3-11 
r Protftability.offinance methods II 3.4368 II 4 I! 
! The acti~ity type .. .... ---·--- I! 3.8391 -~~--- - 5 li 
I Other II u 5.8276 ][' u 6 r i'clii~sti~a~~ Fri~dman Test 484~582 or 5 Asymp. Sig .. ooo ·· ·· 1! 
Therefore, we can conclude that the most important factor influencing 
distribution of funds is credit policies set by the central bank followed by the 
amount of funds available. 
Hence, it is necessary to institute a dialogue with the central bank to design 
separate and different rules and regulations for supervising musharakah so as to 
facilitate and encourage banks to use this mode of finance. It is important, 
therefore, to study the credit policy to see how it effects the decision on 
distribution of available funds among various modes of finance. 
Giving the results shown in the 9.15 and 9.16, it is necessary to identify the role 
which has been played by the BOS in controlling financial instruments including 
musharakah in the period 1990-2005 as well as the size ofbanks. 
9.4.4 Credit Policy Set by the BOS 
The Bank of Sudan annually sets the objectives of financing policies, and rules 
governing extension of banking finance, as well as liquidity management through 
setting and monitoring quantitative monetary targets such as murabahah 
margins, setting the minimum ceiling for murabahah finance and setting 
entrepreneurs' share in musharakah, administrative margins under a murabahah 
contract· and setting the- miniri1Iim- ceiling-fof the'partner .. to- i"rive-sf within- any 
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murabahah project (Ibrahim, 2006). These tools are discussed in the following 
sections. 
9.4.4.1 Controlling Musharakah Finance 
The central bank has the authority to change the return on partnership projects by 
altering the ratios in which the bank and the entrepreneurs are expected to share 
the capital and consequently the profits and losses that are associated with the 
transactions. To achieve its policy, the central bank has control over the supply 
of high-powered money, the reserve ratios on the different types of liabilities, 
and the maximum amount of assets, which the banks can allocate to their profit 
sharing activities. 
Overall for the period 1990-2005, as table 9.1 7 depicts, we see a gradual increase 
in the minimum percentages of the capital sharing of the customers in 
musharakah projects. For instance, for internal trade, it comprised 50%, 55%, 
60%, and 70% for the period beginning 1993. For the priority sectors during the 
same period, it was 20% for three years, which then increased to 25%, and then 
up to 40%. It should be noted that the same gradual increase exists in regard to 
financing the production sector. This may indicate an intent to discourage using 
musharakah. It may indicate also that musharakah is preferred by the customers, 
for that reason and in order to control the money supply and demand, the central 
bank issued such policies. However, more formal statements of the Bank of 
Sudan's policies start with a number of guidelines or rules, one of which is the 
bank's duty to encourage. The minimum percentages of the capital sharing of the 
entrepreneurs in musharakah projects for internal trade is considered the highest 
among all other kind of musharakah as the BOS wanted to reduce the internal 
trade though musharakah. For instance the minimum percentages of the capital 
sharing of the entrepreneurs in musharakah projects in internal trade were 50% 
and 55% in 1992/93 and 1993/94 respectively. Then it jumps to 75% and 60% 
then 80% in 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively. By contrast, the percentage for 
financing musharakah in the co.:operative sector- for production were betw~en 
10-45% for the whole period compared with 25-55% for the co-operative sector 
254 
e!'ra;ptu .Nine ~fuvtallaA fJiluura in tire Stufmu.,e .16lmnk 91an!Ung Swtem: 
[j~ and fJeyJMmance 
for non productive purposes. The percentage for financing the priority sectors 
were in general between 20-45% 
While specifying a percentage for the capital share for financing professionals, 
craft makers, and small producers including productive families started after the 
mid nineties, starting from 1999 the percentage in all sectors has been left to 
individual banks to decide. 
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Table 9.17 Minimum Percentages of the Capital Sharing Musharakah 
EJ Sector financed I The percentage of minimum capital provided li by the partner I 
::J ·-· 0 II 25% -- - I Internal tradmg - 91 Co-oEerative sector and federal state fmance li tO% I Other sectors II Should be SEecified b~ the individual bank I 
l:J ] 25% Internal trading -, 2 Co-opera~ve sector and f~deral state finance IF - - -l and pnority sectors except lllport 
~ 1992 1· Internal trade 11 50% I 
\ -93 ' Priority sectors - -II 2o% ------ ) 
- I! 50% ·- -- "" I 0 Intern•! tr•d;ng of the Good's Erice 
I Priori!}: sectors 1 1 20% I I Non Priori!}: sectors II 5o% I 
1994 ; Internal trading II 55% then changed to 75% for the last four months I 
' -95 11 20% --
- I ; Priori!}: sectors 
CooEerative sector for the Eroduction Eurpose ll t5% --- I 
' 
!I 
Cooperative sector for the non production 11 25% I purpose 
-
Internal trading II 55% then increase to 75% in the last 4 months I July 
to ] 1 25% - I Dec Priori!}: sectors exceEt exEort 
95 CooEerative sector for the Eroduction purpose 11 20% I 
Cooperative sector for the non production 11 30% 
--
I purpose 
ExEort sector 11 25% I 
Professionals and Craft makers J 15% 
11 1996 Internal trading II 60% then changed to 70% in the last 6 month I 
r. II 25% changed to then 35% in the last 6 month I ' Priori!}: sectors exceEt exEort 
I Export and Cooperative sectors for the I 20% then changed to 30% in the last 6 month 
production purpose 
Cooperative sector for the non production ., 30% then changed to 40% in the last 6 month 
purpose 
: Professionals II 15% then changed to 25% in the last 6 month I 
Small Eroducers including Eroductive families II 10% then changed to 20% in the last 6 month I 
1997 Internal trading II 75% then changed to 80% starting from Ma~ I 
- -
I 
Priority sectors and Export Cooperative sectors 40% then changed to 45% starting from May 
for the production purpose 
-
Cooperative sector for the non production II 50% then changed to 55% starting from May 
purpose 
Craft makers and Erofessionals I [ 30% then changed to 35% starting from Ma~ I 
Small producers including production families ]I 25% then changed to 30% starting from May 
-
l l 70% I LJ Internal trading 
I Priori!}: sectors 11 36% I l:JI Alhecto" 
I 
Percentages were left to the individual banks 
5 
- -·-Source: (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2006) 
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9.4.4.2 Controlling Murabahah Finance 
Murabahah was regulated by using a policy that set the minimum ceiling for the 
partner to invest. Then another policy, the maximum profit margins policy, was 
added in 1995. Table 9.18 and 9.19 depict both the increase in the first instalment 
percentages as well as the decrease in the maximum profit margins percentages 
for murabahah. In general, the table 9.18 and 9.19 indicate the goals of these 
policies, one of which is to discourage the customers from using murabahah and 
to persuade them to move to other finance methods. That is more obvious when 
we see that the use of murabahah or sa/am in the internal trade was prohibited 
during this period (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2006). This policy did not meet with 
much success. One can notice that 1999 was the first year that these policies 
were left to negotiation between the bank and the customer in these finance 
methods as well as the marketing of banking services (Ahmed, 2003, Ahmed, 
2004). 
The average minimum ceiling for the partner to invest within any murabahah 
project in priority sectors, cooperative sector for production purposes and 
cooperative sector for non-production purposes were 25%, 10% and 25% 
respectively. The minimum ceiling percentage for murabahah in internal trade is 
less compared with the capital share percentage in musharakah in internal trade 
as the average for the minimum ceiling for murabahah was 25% in 1990-1992, 
which was then left to the banks to decide thereafter. This indicates that the BOS 
is pushing banks to use murabahah in internal trade. Starting from 2001 the 
percentage in all sectors has been left to individual banks to decide. 
After 1995, BOS depended on profit margins to control murabahah more than 
the minimum ceiling. The range for murabahah profit margins in priority sectors 
were between 30% - 45% in 1990s and 18% - 15% after 2000. After 2002 the 
percentage in all sectors has been left to individual banks to decide. 
Changes in the murabahah profit margins, however, introduce some risks in the 
earnings of Islamic banks' activities. Islamic banks use this profit margin rate to 
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price different financial instruments. Specifically, in a musharakah contract the 
feasibility of project proposals are decided according to the current mark-up 
margin. Since murabahah is less risky compared with musharakah and the 
contract and profit is known and predetermined and guaranteed before hand, 
therefore the profitability of musharakahs are expected to be bigger (Chapra and 
Khan, 2000). As a result Islamic banks face risks arising from movements in 
market murabahah margin rates. 
Table 9.18 Minimum Ceiling for Murabahah 
I Yea,·· -~i··.·Sectorfinanced ·~~The ··nrirti~~m percentage of the 
i II;eu:rabahah first advance instalment per 
rl996/9i - i ~z~~;Lo:·-~ ·;.~::~-~;.H:·-~ = -- II! 
I l finance I _, I ?:,--~O~th=e=r=se=c=to::-r-:s====-=·~·=···= ....:::.::: ...:::-.. :::. ==-=·l=l
1
jsiiould be spe~ified by th~- indivicfti'~l l 
I ~~ba~ I ~~~---.i-99-i-/9-2-.... -'. [ Internal trading ] [25% .. J
1
l.
1
.::.·• 
' I i Co-operati~e sector an~i federa(' ~tat~ 110% : 
,I finance and priorities sectors except I 
I! import . ~[-=i 9=9=2=·79=3= .. -~JI Prio~itY. s~ctors "' II'--25-.0-Yo-= .. = .. ::-... -: .. =. ======~lj 
I 'i 993/~i4 -~ 1 Priority secto~s -~ ['25% . ...... .. ··1 
'1994!95. · r;:~e~ti::d c~:~%a~~~~ sect~;oduct~[(S% ........... !' 
rc~operativ~ sector for .. non production' 1[~35% 
lpurposes ~============~! I Other prioritY''sectors ··· ... ... ... ..] ~~~th~~n 
7 
~~reas~·- ill th~ last four. 
~-(~-~,-~ .. -~---~.,-·~~ .. ~~--=- · ·-······ ·- ·w= ··· ·11 
1. 2006 -lr;:r;~\:.--... ft =:;]~ . .:;.:, I 25% . - -- . I! 
1 i producers I - '1 
! ··;~~~ :-·]L All sectors .. .. . l [t~:ntages w~re left to the-indi~i~ i 
Source: (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2006) 
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Table 9.19 Profit Margins for Murabahah 
r~ll~~;f;~-===~=l;;;.maxi~~~~~~~~~4.1' 
I ! Craft makers _j l 25% J 
1 r-s~~~- --· --------·~~---- ······1!15%~--·-·---·-···~~-·~- ····~ --.. -·-1 
r··cooperati~~~-p~d~cti~~plllpo~-~s~l25%----~·-- ···-·-~. -~ .. --.. "] 
········-~--·······-.. ·-··~~-~----···- .. -- r ..... _ .. ···-· ~·~· ···~· ~-~·-····--....... 
1 Cooperative sector for non production ! 36% I 
: u oses 1 . 
'--. ___ - .. -l ... r· ··---·--·---·-... ·-~··--·-- ···- . ;=::::==· =-=··=-·=-=--=--=-::::.":::: .... :::: ... ::::: ....::::. = ... :::: .. ::: ... :::.~ .  
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9.4.4.3 Controlling Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Finance 
In general, most of the difficulties in obtaining finance for small and micro 
enterprises (SMEs) are related to transaction costs, namely the cost of 
administering and delivering of credit and the cost arising from the risk of 
default. That is why bankers consider SMEs as risky clients since they do not 
keep proper records or meet conventional security requirements, and hence they 
are not bankable. Literature encourages private banks to extend credit through 
various risk guarantee measures. Others argue that these measures may involve 
'moral hazards' as a result of financial institutions passing on the losses to the 
government, rather than reducing the risk (Ibrahim and Vijaykumar, 2003) 
Numerous examples, from many countries, and usmg a wide variety of 
methodologies, demonstrate that it is possible to lend poor people the very small 
amounts of money they need, without tangible security, at times and in places 
that are convenient to them, and at a price that the borrowers can afford, and 
which also makes the operation sustainable (Harper, 1994). 
It is argued that by pooling resources in terms of capital and expertise with small 
enterprises, such as individual farmers, not only would the farmer benefit from 
an increase in the size of capital available, but would also gain efficiency by 
learning from the financier's expertise. In this way it is possible to alleviate long 
term poverty. 
One important advantage of musharakah is that the entrepreneur does not have to 
contribute in cash to the proposed investment. The entrepreneur is rewarded for 
his entrepreneurship, since in relatively profitable ventures the return on 
investment is much higher than other modes of finance (Abdalla, 1997). Hence, 
musharakah financing looks promising towards small scale, rural development 
projects aimed at poverty alleviation. 
-
Although there were a few rules before, the full recognition of the small 
enterprise sub-sector started with the 1994/95 Financing Policy. 'Craftsmen, 
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Professionals and Small Producers including the Productive Families sector' is 
considered one of the priority sectors for banking finance. The Financing Policy 
of the 1990s, for the first time, included crafts as one of the priority sectors for 
financing. In addition, the 1990 Financing Policy stressed the importance of 
banks' financing to regional and backward areas and small enterprises (Bank of 
Sudan, 1990-2006). The successive financing policies determined the financing 
ceiling for priority between 90% to 95% of the total finance, without any 
breakdown for each sub sector. The financing policies for the period 1994 - 2002 
included concessions and financing regulations to this sub-sector. 
In the financing policies of 1994/95 and July-December 1995, the percentage of 
participation in musharakah finance granted to craftsmen or professionals must 
not be less than 15% of the bank's total funding. In the case of small producers 
the participation is left for mutual agreement between the bank and the partner. In 
the Financing Policy of 1996, the small entrepreneur's percentage of 
participation in musharakah must be 10%. For Craftsmen and Professionals, the 
percentage of participation is still 15%. In the 1996 Financing Policy, the 
percentage of participation for Professionals and Craftsmen was raised to 25%, 
and that for small producers was raised to 20%. In 1997, both participation 
percentages were raised to 30% and 25% for the partner's participation for 
Professionals and Craftsmen and Small Producers (including Productive 
Families) respectively. The partner's participation in 1998 was not less than 
30%. Since 1999 it is left for each bank to decide (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2006). 
To conclude, BOS financing policies were hindering the musharakah finance as 
well as SMEs finance throughout the last fifteen years. The tariff and fiscal 
policies of government were designed without taking into account the interests of 
encouraging musharakah finance and small enterprises. The State Bank of Sudan 
regulations required (especially between 1991 and 2000) higher percentages of 
entrepreneurs' shares for these enterprises to qualify for musharakah financing. 
Therefore, these regulations should be discontinued. It is possible to conclude 
thafthereHf~fneed to erid BOS 3iscrimiriaiory regulations. 
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9.4.5 Size of Banks 
As far as the amount of funds available, the most significant problem is the 
banks' narrow capital, eroded by the high inflation of the past years. According 
to the BOS, 1 0 Sudanese banks are classified as undercapitalized, with capital 
adequacy ratios below 8%. Non-performing loans in the sector are also high, 
representing 18% oftotalloans (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
Most of the Sudanese banks are extremely small and cannot remain senous 
players in the market as it continues to expand and attract large international 
banks. In order to remain competitive in a global sense, Sudanese banks have to 
reach mutual understandings to merge or cooperate. They also have to take 
fundamental strategic decisions about the type of banks they wish to become. 
The best future prospects may well be in specialization. Since smaller banks 
cannot diversify their assets portfolios as much as larger banks can, they need a 
larger amount of capital relative to their assets to inspire confidence in their 
viability as well as their ability to maintain their core operations over the longer 
term. For this reason BOS requires banks to either strengthen their capital or 
merge to ensure greater strength. Capital requirements also depend on the 
riskiness of the banks' portfolio of loans and investments. If the more risky PLS 
modes of mudarabah and musharakah constitute a greater part of banks' assets, 
the need for capital may be relatively larger to guarantee the full repayment of 
demand deposits and also the withdrawal of investment deposits. If, however, the 
less risky sales-based modes of murabahah, sa/am, and ijarah constitute a larger 
proportion, the need for capital may be relatively less. The probability of default 
also determines the quality of assets and therefore the size of capital, and until a 
consensus is reached on the imposition of a penalty on the defaulting party, 
banks may have to hold more capital (Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
Researches indicate Sudanese banks are one of the least concentrated and the 
least cost efficient banks among Arab and Islamic countries' banks when 
'< "-" - - • ------ -
" --
comparing the concentration of asset size and liquidity of the banks with the 
population (Brown, 2003). Hence, it is necessary to remove the disadvantage of 
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the small size of Sudanese banks by encouraging and facilitating the merger of a 
number of such banks so that an optimum size is attained. In the absence of an 
optimum size, their average overhead costs are high and it is not possible for 
them to diversify their risks or be able to compete successfully with large 
conventional banks which now start to open in the south of the Sudan (Chapra 
and Khan, 2000). 
Since the mid-1990s there has been apparent progress in bank supervision and 
regulations. Small bank size and weak bank performance in the 1990s, in 
particular, contributed to heavy government intervention and regulations that 
shattered public confidence in banks in the early 1990s (Elhiraika and Ahmed, 
1998). The BOS has begun to reduce financial restrictions and liberalise the 
banking system and banks have engaged in inter-bank market activities. Uniform 
accounting principles for all financial institutions in Sudan were introduced in 
1998. Key items of the banks' balance sheets are monitored by the BOS and 
banks have to submit specific information to the BOS on a daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. 
Reports show that Banks' paid-up capital has considerably deteriorated as a 
percentage of total assets. Sudanese banks had a narrow capital base over the 
1990s and the capital adequacy ratio was always below the international norm of 
8%. In 1994, the BOS required that all banks should comply with the 8% risk-
weighted capital requirement within three years. In 1996, only 13 banks out of 28 
met the capital requirement. In 2000, 9 out of 26 banks still undercapitalised 
(Hassan and Hussein, 2003). The BOS encouraged undercapitalized banks to 
merge through voluntary bilateral agreements; alternatively banks have to 
increase their paid-up capital to SD 3 billion by the end of 2002. Eight banks are 
requested to increase their paid-up capital to SD 1 billion by the end of 2000, to 
SD 2 billion by end of 2001 and SD 3 billion by end of 2002. Banking finance 
(in real terms) declined by 46% in 1990-2000. The growth rate of banking 
finance to private and public sectors were 82% and 20%, respectively, over the 
1990s (Hussein, 2003). 
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To conclude, the banking sector is continuously under pressure to become more 
efficient. Bank supervision is being strengthened. Unifying bank accounting 
systems as well as regulations on capital adequacy ratios according to Basle 
standards have been introduced. A programme for the central bank to monitor 
non-performing loans on a monthly basis was established in 1999. A banking 
sector restructuring strategy was initiated in 2000 with the aim of strengthening 
the capital base of the banks. This will include restructuring and privatizing 
public banks; merging, liquidizing, or recapitalizing small banks; reducing non-
performing loans; and improving loan evaluation. The share of non-performing 
loans is still high, and most banks did not fulfil the Basle requirements for capital 
adequacy by the end of 2001. One way of handling non-performing loans has 
been establishing the Bank of Sudan committees that negotiate directly with the 
banks' boards and directors about how to decrease the share of non-performing 
loans. 
BOS initiated a reform programme to develop and restructure commercial banks 
(2006-2008). By the end of 2007, banks are expected to increase minimum 
capital requirements for commercial banks from SDD3 billion to SDD6 billion 
(US$25 million) and increase the capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 12%. BOS 
requires banks to implement action plans to meet provisioning and capitalization 
requirements. Lastly, the BOS will encourage mergers of commercial banks 
according to specific guidelines. In order to permit screening of any 
merger/acquisition, we will carry out an evaluation of banks to identify their net 
worth and share value (IMF, 2006). 
The main challenge for the banking sector is how to reform and restructure 
themselves to be able to cope with the very fast changing environment within the 
Sudanese economy and on an international level. The Sudanese economy is 
undergoing a very major transformation with the discovery of oil and resumption 
of foreign direct investment in a substantial way. This in tum will create new 
challenges for the banking sector regarding the demand for bank financing and 
services. 
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After discussing the preference and performance of musharakah in Islamic 
banking system in Sudan, the next chapter, chapter ten, will identify the 
constraints and obstacles facing musharakah finance including the causes of non-
performing musharakah, the lack of proper feasibility studies, factors 
determining the capability of the entrepreneurs to be offered musharakah 
finance, and measuring entrepreneurs' creditworthiness. 
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Chapter 10 Obstacles and Prospects for Equity Participation 
Finance (musharakah) in Sudan 
10.1 Introduction 
An Islamic bank being aware of the magnitude of risk, to which its finance is 
exposed, should not only study the project with utmost care to the finest details, 
but should also closely follow up the execution and render all the necessary 
advice and expert service needed, to its partners. Since efficient management in 
most developing countries is a rare commodity, Islamic bank found this practice 
quite rewarding (Al-Harran, 1993). 
Although theoretically musharakah finance is very promising, the practice has 
revealed many constraints. Some examples of such constraints have been 
discussed in this chapter including the causes of non-performing musharakah, 
the lack of proper feasibility studies, factors determining the capability of the 
entrepreneurs to be offered musharakah finance, and measuring entrepreneurs' 
creditworthiness. In this chapter the researcher intends to discuss these 
constraints and obstacles. 
10.2 Factors Causing Non Performing Musharakah 
This section aims to identify the factors causing non-performing musharakah 
investment. Therefore, it aims to respond to the following research question: 
Research Question (13) What are the perceived factors causing non performing 
musharakah investment? And how can Sudanese banks over come these factors? 
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In macro-level analysis, normally, business as a whole is not expected to suffer 
losses, though individual firms may not always earn profits. Failure can be 
attributed to the lack of one or more of the success factors. Failure on the part of 
the bank to follow-up the operations closely may be because of distance; and the 
lack of marketing outlets and the inexperience of the entrepreneur; all factors that 
contribute to the failure of the financed project (EI-Bhasri and Adam, 1997). 
Some factors may be beyond the control of the bank or the partner, and may 
contribute to the project failure. These include social factors, which may be a 
particular problem for women entrepreneurs: divorce and husbands' intervention 
are known to be a source of risk to the business project in micro-finance (EI-
Bhasri and Adam, 1997). 
To identify the factor(s) which usually cause(s) the non-performing musharakah 
(non performing debts1), respondents were presented with six possible factors, 
and were asked to rank them. The six factors are lack of proper feasibility 
studies, lack of following up projects, lack of customer's experience, lack of 
bank staffs experience, lack of proper risk management and measurement, and 
other factors. The descriptive results are presented in table 10.1 and the results of 
the Friedman Test are presented in table 1 0.2. 
With a significant level of differences as shown by Friedman chi-square test, the 
descriptive results indicate that respondents placed highest weight on lack of 
proper feasibility studies (mean rank 1.96, 1260 points) since 51% ofthem voted 
for it while 23% of them voted for lack of follow up on the projects. Other 
factors like lack of customer's experience got less weight with 8% whilst the rest 
of the factors all together weighed less than 5% including lack of bank staffs 
expenence. 
1 The term bad debts is well known but not quite valid for the musharakah case as no debts 
should have occurred between partners, therefore it should be called non performing musharakah 
investment. 
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Table 10.1 Factors Causing Non-Performing Musharakah 
: proper 
feasibility 
studies 
Lack of 
follow up of 
the projects 
Lack 
customer's 
experience 
of 
\' ~~-· __ , __ , 
I 
Lack of 
proper risk 
management 
and 
Lack of bank 
staffs 
experience 
Table 10.2 Friedman Test and Mean Ranks for the Factors Causing Non-
Performing Musharakah 
,~·----·· ·-· ·-----··-··-·~· 
1 Lack of proper feasibility studies 
j~Lack~i·f~llow up.ofthe-projects 
l 
2 Numbers weighted significance (points) colll_rnn in the tabl~ are the number of votes that each 
factor received~raltkedfiom~l to 6. To estimate each factors' significance, the researcher has 
weighted each vote by points from 6 to 1, 1 '1 rank has 6 points, 2"d rank has 5 points 3rd rank has 
4 points 4th rank has 3 points 5th has 2 points, and 6th rank has 1 point. e.g. 128* 6 + 49*5 + 
42*4 + 18*3 + 12*2 + 1 *1= 1260. 
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To conclude, the most important factors causing non-performing musharakah are 
the lack of proper feasibility studies and lack of follow up of the projects. Hence, 
the researcher studies below the non-performing musharakah and the lack of 
proper feasibility studies. 
10.2.1 Non-Performing Musharakah 
Neither the Sudanese banks nor the Bank of Sudan have an exact definition of 
non-performing loan or investment. The Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision considers a default has occurred with regard to a particular obligor 
when one or more of the following events have taken place (Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2001): 
(i) It is determined that the obligor is unlikely to pay its debt obligations 
(principal, interest, or fees) in full; 
(ii) A credit loss event associated with any obligation of the obligor, such 
as a charge off, specific provision, or distressed restructuring 
involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest or fees; 
(iii) The obligor is past its due more than 90 days on any credit obligation; 
or 
(iv) The obligor has filed for bankruptcy or similar protection from 
creditors 
Notably, one of the main problems of musharakah is the non-performing debts 
affair that has delayed simply the process of pay back both to the investor and to 
the bank. The problems faced by musharakah are mainly risk; the report proves 
that the problem of delay is the biggest problem that musharakah faces because 
if these loans are not paid off in time, they accumulate. 
It is practically impossible to start executing all elements of the project at the 
same time, and therefore a certain degree of coordination is very relevant. For 
example--Hie deValUation of"tlie Suoanese pound made it almosHmpossible for 
some projects, which were financed on a musharakah basis, to pay off the 
instalments due to foreign suppliers of the machinery. This delayed and reduced 
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the level of income due to the bank and prolonged the period of repayment of the 
cost of the machines. The case might have been quite different with a traditional 
bank. It might have delayed payment, but not necessarily given a low rate of 
return. Unlike traditional banks, the anxieties of Islamic banks start after they 
give out funds for investments. The Islamic bank has to follow up the projects to 
which finance is provided to see that it has been spent in the proper way and that the 
project is well managed (Al-Harran, 1993). 
The follow-up does not only ensure efficient utilization of finance and guarantee 
a sizable return on the investment, but also looks after the efficient performance 
of the concerned business. The Faisal Islamic Bank for example has unique 
experience in this area. At the start of its operations, the bank used to provide 
working capital to certain industries in the form of cash without having 
supervision over the performance of the relevant factory. The rate of return 
increased by about 10% when the bank started to send out its staff to supervise 
projects, to consult with the factory management on problems of purchasing raw 
materials at the right time, providing proper storage for both raw material and the 
finished product, as well as discussing problems of marketing the products. In 
addition the expenditure on supervision was only 1.5% of the capital invested 
(Al-Harran, 1993). 
Do all respondents agree, regardless of their managerial experience without 
significant differences about the reason for non-performing debts? In other 
words, will the different type of managerial experience affect their responses to 
the reasons behind the non-performing musharakah. Table 10.3 shows the cross 
tabulation between the managerial experience and causes of non-performing 
debts, which suggests that there is a correlation between the managerial 
experience and the reason behind the non-performing musharakah. 
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Table 10.3 Cross Tabulation for Managerial experience 
I IDD Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Factors causing the weakness I Pearson Chi-Square 11 34.311(a) 1~1 .024 
-
I 
of following up projects 11 Likelihood Ratio II 37.4171~1 .010 ] j Linear-by-Linear Association II 1 . 719 1~1 .190 1 I N of Valid Cases II 2501 0 1 I I N of Valid Cases II 2soj[Jj l 
To illustrate, figure 10.1 demonstrates the distribution of the percentages of the 
different causes of non-performing musharakah amongst different managerial 
expenence groups. 
Figure 10.1 Managerial Experience and Reasons behind Non-performing 
Musharakah 
-
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21 years and 
above 
Cause and reason for 
non-performing 
musharakah 
Lack of proper 
feasibi lity studies 
Lack of follow up of 
the projects 
Lack of customer's 
experience 
Lack of bank staff's 
experience 
Lack of proper risk 
management and 
measurement 
Other reasons 
It is clear from the figure that the lack of feasibility studies plays a big role in all 
managerial groups especially those who have 11-15 years of managerial 
expenence. Similarly, those who have 11-15 years of experience place a big 
emphasis on lack of following up projects as a cause of non-performing 
musharakah. 
1 0.2.2 Lack of Proper Feasibility Studies 
When working capital financing is requested, sufficient information concerning 
insurance expenses, transportation costs, storage costs, etc., are collected. For 
example, in the commercial sector, the product turnover period becomes 
important as it influences the duration of the partnership contract. Another 
important factor is the sale mark-up used by the client-partner to sell the 
commercial product, as it determines the approximate ex-ante profit-sharing 
ratios as between the bank and its partner. 
Usually there would be a greater number and variety of investment projects that 
would be seeking financing. As a result, more cautious, selective, and perhaps 
more efficient project selection by the banks and a greater involvement by the 
public in investment and entrepreneurial activities are needed. 
Hence, there is no shortage of proposals for projects that have been identified but 
there may be a shortage of projects prepared in sufficient detail to permit 
implementation. Selection should be made based on economic and financial 
viability usually done through a feasibility study. The feasibility should clearly 
define the objectives of the project. It should explicitly address the question of 
whether alternative ways and methods of finance to achieve the same objectives 
may be preferable (Al-Harran, 1995b). Usually, when a project is proposed, a 
critical review or an independent appraisal would be carried out by going to the 
field which provides an opportunity to re-examine every aspect of the project 
plan to assess whether the proposal is sound and appropriate before a large sum 
of money-is committed{Al-Harran; 1995b ): 
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Reports show that some Islamic banks have favoured members of the same 
political movement, and the political criteria carried more weight than the quality 
of the business proposal. For example in Faisal Islamic bank it was often enough 
that a senior member of the Islamic movement recommended somebody for 
finance. Members of the board of directors were among those who 
benefited, and the lack of normal procedure could go unchecked because of the 
FIB Act (Stiansen, 2004). Therefore the major challenge has not been the 
shortage of funds but rather the difficulty in identifying sound financing 
opportunities. 
The criterion creditworthiness of the entrepreneurs indicates that the 
conventional banking system has to be changed to place more emphasis on the 
availability and profitability of projects. In addition to a term structure of rates of 
return, there has to be a structure of returns from different economics activities 
that banks have to consider. Project evaluation and appraisal, determination of 
profit sharing ratios, and the establishment of a procedural framework for the 
processing, monitoring, supervision, and auditing of various projects create new 
demands on commercial banks (Khan and Mirakhor, 1987). Hence, projects 
should be selected for funding through partnerships primarily on the basis of 
their expected profitability rather than the creditworthiness or solvency of the 
entrepreneur (Al-Harran, 1993). 
Little effort, if any, is directed to collecting information about creditworthiness 
of the entrepreneurs. However, it may be emphasised that the researcher has only 
looked at one face of the problem. Sudan faces problems of enormous 
complexity and gravity. The need for a credit scores system and data base for the 
customers is urged at this stage. 
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10.3 Reasons for Weakness in Following up Projects From the Bank 
This section aims to identify the reasons behind weakness in following up 
projects in musharakah finance. Hence, it aims to respond to the following 
research question: 
Research Question (14) What are the perceived factor(s) that cause(s) weakness 
in the follow up process of musharakah projects? And how can Sudanese banks 
over come them? 
To identify the factor(s) which usually cause(s) weakness in following up 
projects, respondents were presented with six possible factors, and were asked to 
choose the most important factor. The six factors are high cost of the follow up 
operations, non-cooperation from the customers or their refusal, absence of 
specialized departments for following up, weak or the absence of good incentives 
for those following up projects, the need for specialized and technical experience 
in some musharakah projects and other factors. The results related to distribution 
and significant points are presented in table 1 0.4. The results of chi-square 
Friedman test are presented in table 10.5. 
The result of the Friedman chi-square test indicates that there is reasonable very 
low likelihood that the differences between the mean ranks in the sample data 
can be attributed to chance. The mean rank confirms the results derived from 
weighted significance points which on the other hand confirm the same ranking 
mentioned in the descriptive on table 1 0.4. The two tables suggest that the 
absence of a specialized department for following up is the most important factor 
with significant points of 1099 and a mean rank of 2.60. That is, 31.6% of the 
respondents ranked it first which can be compared with 20%, 20% and 13% who 
ranked it second, third and fourth. Concerning the second important factor the 
respondents believe that the need for specialized and technical experience is the 
second important factor causing the weakness of following up of projects, with 
significant points of l040"and a mean rank of2;81,~since 24% oHhe-respondents 
believe it is so. In addition, the respondents believe that the high cost of the 
follow up operations and the non-cooperation from the customers or their refusal 
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is the third and fourth important factor, with a mean rank of 2.84 and 3.14 
respectively, and with a percentage of 20% and 17% of the respondents 
respectively voting for them. In fifth place comes weak or the absence of 
appropriate incentives for those following up projects and lastly come the other 
factors. 
Hence, to cover this obstacle the researcher studies the follow up, the need for 
specialized departments for following up and technical experience, supervisory 
process, setting a credit policy on every individual bank and training provided to 
staff. 
Table 10.4 Factor(s) Causing the Weakness of the Follow up Process in 
Musharakah Projects 
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Table 10.5 Friedman Test and Mean Ranks for the Factors that Cause the 
Weakness of Following up Projects 
I . -- --. -rMoan T~~::n . r ~:: II 
;::1 -=-=A::;:-bs:::e::-nc-==e=-=o-:::f:::sp=-e::::ci::::al=iz=ed;::d;::e=p=artm=-e=n=t fl::::or=fl=o==Iro=w=in=g=-~=p==-=-====::!112:tr04o'l r· '1.46141 I u! 
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10.3.1 Following up 
By sharing losses as well as profits, banks could function as absorbers of shocks 
stemming from the real sector and could thereby reduce the cost of adjustment. 
Since local entrepreneurs are hardly able to meet even temporary losses owing to 
their lack of resources, they may be overcautious in the implementation of 
projects that have a high expected return but high variability (Karsten, 1982). It 
seems likely that greater administrative resources would be required to operate a 
PLS system effectively than would be required for the effective operation of a 
traditional system, though it is to be hoped that the resulting higher costs could 
be offset, or more than offset, by improved allocation of investment. Greater 
involvement by institutional providers of funds in determining the uses to which 
such funds are put should have a positive effect (as the experience of western 
financial institutions seems to show). Still, the difficulties already alluded in 
finding a suitable means of providing and charging for short-term lending will 
need to be overcome if inflexibilities are not to hamper the smooth working of 
the financial system (Karsten, 1982). The limited evidence available 
demonstrates that Islamic banks have operated quite successfully during the past 
year. 
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Banks do not manage firms on a day-to-day basis because it is too costly for 
outside investors to verify project returns and have to rely on the financial 
intermediaries. Financial intermediaries may arise to alleviate the information 
acquisition and enforcement costs of monitoring firm managers and exerting 
corporate control. Thus, this may deter insiders to misrepresent project returns to 
outsiders. Furthermore, in the case that entrepreneurs need to obtain funds from 
many outsiders, financial intermediaries can economize monitoring costs. 
According to Diamond (1984) financial intermediaries reduce information and 
incentive problems by monitoring the entrepreneurs. Some monitoring takes 
place before a contract is signed and some takes place after the contract is signed. 
The former serves to reduce the proportion of bad loans and serves to improve 
the performance of a given contract. Therefore, monitoring is much more 
effective if delegated to the financial intermediaries. It is possible to conclude 
that the reduction in monitoring cost can foster efficient and long running 
investment (Ismail, 2006). 
Following up projects entails additional cost for the banks arising from the cost 
of monitoring the joint venture. Moreover, the banks incur the training cost. They 
have to train their staff in the fields of planning and execution of the projects. 
Furthermore, following up is unsuitable for the businesses involving petty and 
repetitive transactions. It becomes too difficult to maintain the record of such 
businesses or even to properly monitor them. In spite of the above-mentioned 
weaknesses, following up is based on sound theoretical foundations. It can 
operate efficiently in a large number of enterprises belonging to various sectors 
of the economy (Akhtar, 1997). The experience of entrepreneurs, follow up by 
the bank, and availability of marketing channels mainly determined the success 
of these projects. 
The application of musharakah in Sudan has singled out the high costs of 
following up and monitoring projects as major problems (Ibrahim, 1999; Harper, 
1994). To reduce the administrative burden,- branclies liave been created to -serve 
limited geographical areas and are located around the business (Ibrahim, 1997). 
277 
Musharakah returned a negligible portion of its operating costs, which are 
relatively high due to the level of monitoring the approach requires. 
Entrepreneurs would frequently claim business failures, but would be unable to 
provide substantiation of these claims. For example, a client would claim that an 
animal purchased with the capital had died, and that the cows had made off with 
the carcass. 
The risk of fraud, which is especially worrisome to the regulators, seems to have 
two resources. One is the possibility of underreporting of profits earned by the 
firm. The second resource is the perception that since it is a PLS arrangement, 
the bank will have to carry the burden of potential financial losses. Thus there is 
an element of moral hazard in these transactions (Al-Harran, 1995a). 
One factor that may increase the degree of risk is the lack of statistical data, such 
as profit distribution ratios among the parties involved in various trade, 
industrial, or service investment ventures. 
However, there are at least three possible ways in which this residual risk can be 
minimized. The first is by faithfully implementing and observing the contract 
terms. Second is the possibility of third party insurance schemes with cost 
participation by the central bank and commercial banks. Third is maintenance of 
loss-compensating reserves by the banks. It must be noted that it is hard to 
finance using PLS without sufficient information regarding the managerial 
ability, competence and character of the entrepreneurs. 
It is recommended to manage and monitor a specific number of musharakah 
transactions through a hired part-time manager whose cost is covered from the 
share of profit earmarked for management. After liquidation the same manager 
could monitor another set of musharakah. The bank, especially in Sudan, could 
create employment opportunities for unemployed graduates whose numbers 
increase annually as a result of expansion in higher education (approximately 30 
universities-were established during the last fifteen years) (Abdalla, 1999). 
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Some Sudanese banks believe penalty on default payment may be charged by the 
Islamic Bank but the bank will not consider the penalty money as its income. The 
money may be used for charity. This is allowed only to force the customer to pay 
the instalment on time. Otherwise this penalty would not affect rate/profit of the 
bank profit distribution. 
In this regards, the following steps are recommended: 
(i) Banks might accept to finance high risk musharakah on a selective 
basis to a number of clients, such as those whom the banks know have 
integrity beyond all doubts. 
(ii) In some sectors there is not much space for misconduct, negligence 
and dishonesty to work as an obstacle for financing through 
musharakah such as Export and Import. For instance, almost every 
essential thing will be known e.g. the exporter will have the specific 
order from abroad, the prices are agreed, the costs are not difficult to 
determine, payments are normally secured by a letter of credit, the 
payments are made through the bank itself. Similarly, financing of 
imports may be designed on the basis of musharakah with some 
precautions, as explained earlier. Therefore dishonesty will not be an 
obstacle to using musharakah instruments (Usmani, 2002). 
These steps will serve as strong prevention against hiding the actual profit or 
committing any other act of dishonesty. Otherwise, the clients of the banks also 
cannot afford to show artificial losses constantly, because it will be against their 
own interest in many respects. It is true that even after taking all such 
precautions, there will remain a possibility of some cases where dishonest clients 
may succeed in their evil designs, but the penalizing steps and the general 
atmosphere of the business will gradually reduce the number of such cases. 
To conclude, an Islamic bank should be aware of the magnitude of risk, to which 
its-finance-is exposed, not-only studies the projecfwith utmost care to the finest 
details, but also closely follows up the execution and renders all the necessary 
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advice and expert service to its partners. Since efficient management in most 
developing countries is a rare commodity, Islamic banks found this practice quite 
rewarding (Al-Harran, 1993). Hence, proper monitoring mechanisms are yet to 
be devised for PLS, especially in the case of musharakah, which does not 
provide any control rights to the financier. 
10.3.2 The Need for Specialized Departments for Following up and 
Technical Experience 
How far a bank can contribute effectively in running a project by itself can be 
primarily determined by the level of linkage it can establish through its financing 
mechanism. These are: project selection criteria; pre-financing appraisal of 
projects; post-financing supervision; built-in mechanical linkage of the bank to 
its financed projects (Sarker, 1999). Notably none of the Sudanese banks has 
specialized banks for following up projects. It is recommended to establish a 
section under the investment department or risk management department to be 
devoted to following up alone. 
The roles expected to be played by the suggested specialized and technical 
department are: 
(i) Information systems and analytical techniques to measure the credit 
risk inherent in all activities; 
(ii) Setting the bank annual credit policy; 
(iii) Have in place a system for monitoring the overall composition and 
quality of the credit portfolio; 
(iv) Take into consideration potential future changes in economic 
conditions when assessing individual credits and credit portfolios; 
(v) Establishing a system of independent, ongoing credit review to 
evaluate the condition of the credit portfolio and performance of 
credit officers; and 
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(vi) Ensure credit granting function is properly managed and credit 
exposures are within internal limits; credits exceeding predetermined 
levels to be monitored carefully 
Each of the well-trained bank staff could handle a specified number of 
transactions annually. Hence, specification would contribute to efficiency of the 
bank and would expedite the completion of transactions. 
10.3.3 Supervisory Process 
Supervision is necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking 
system as a whole and to ensure the protection of entrepreneurs. Supervision and 
follow up can be offsite musharakah projects or onsite. 
For the purpose of follow up, Sudanese Islamic Bank uses both field follow up 
and office follow up. Field follow up, or personal contact, involves regular visits 
to the project by the bank representative to make periodic examinations of the 
partnership business records. Office follow up, on the other hand, is based on the 
reports and statements submitted by the entrepreneur. 
Offsite supervision is mainly carried out on the musharakah project through 
meeting entrepreneurs and interviewing them as well as going through papers 
presented by the entrepreneurs including contractual requirements, legal 
covenants, policies, collateral etc. The purposes of the offsite are to 
(i) Assess the entrepreneur's compliance with banks regulations; 
(ii) Understand the entrepreneur's activities and risk profile; 
(iii) Probe the bank's management if "something odd" arises from the 
entrepreneur's regular reporting; 
(iv) Accuracy and timeliness of information provided to management 
information systems. 
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In practice, the Sudanese banks don't carry regular offsite meetings. Interviews 
and off-site reviews should be periodical, since most of the projects are short-
term ones and then it is advisable to have the offsite meeting at least once a 
month. These meeting are 'routine'; and tend to focus on analyzing regulatory 
reports, financial statements and checking if minimum requirements were met. 
For supervision in the field staff should regularly visit the projects and check 
bookkeeping, marketing of products, account receivable and collection 
procedure. These arrangements tend to ensure the safety as well as the 
profitability of the bank's investment. The bank constantly watches its interest by 
focusing on the overall performance of the project. On-site inspections/audits are 
intended to: 
(i) Check in-depth an entrepreneur's financial position and current 
financial condition; 
(ii) Assess the quality of the entrepreneur's management and procedures. 
(iii) Review of functional activities; 
(iv) Use of approved credit (finance) lines; and 
(v) Adequate collateral coverage. 
These occur through rev1ew transactions and processes, evaluate models, 
observation, discussing any obstacles and constraint facing the projects, and 
finalize financial analysis. 
To conclude, more efficient supervision is needed because problems tend to be 
detected at an earlier stage. The supervisor can intervene or exert some pressure 
before the situation deteriorates. More specialised supervision is also needed. 
(Larger banks are supervised by more staff than smaller ones because they are 
systemic and more complex). Tailoring of regulations and requirements is also 
needed with the possibility of imposing tougher ones if needed. 
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1 0.3.4 Setting a Credit Policy for Individual Banks 
Each individual bank should have its own annual credit policy which is not the 
case in Sudan; most of the banks don't have a clear credit policy. The credit 
policies should address target markets, portfolio mix, price and non-price terms, 
structure of limits, approval authorities. Banks should identify and manage credit 
risk in all products and ensure the risks are subject to adequate procedures and 
controls before being introduced and approved by the board of directors. 
Banks should have a well-defined credit granting criteria that sets forth who is 
eligible for credit and how much, the type available and terms. Factors to be 
considered and documented in approving credits include: 
(i) The current risk profile of the entrepreneur and its sensitivity to 
economic and market developments; 
(ii) Credit risk strategy to include a statement of the bank's willingness to 
grant credit based on type (commercial, consumer, real estate, etc.), 
economic sector, geographical location, currency, maturity, and 
anticipated profitability. 
(iii) Credit risk strategy to include a statement of the bank's willingness to 
grant credit based on mode of finance type (musharakah, murabahah, 
sa/am, etc.). 
(iv) The proposed terms and conditions of the credit 
(v) Where applicable, the adequacy and enforceability of collateral or 
guarantees. 
(vi) The credit limits on single entrepreneurs and groups of connected 
entrepreneurs. 
(vii) A system of independent, ongoing credit review and the results of 
such reviews should be communicated directly to the board of 
directors and senior management. 
(viii) Identification of target markets and overall characteristics the bank 
wants to achieve in the credit portfolio. 
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1 0.3.5 Training Provided to Entrepreneurs 
The individual entrepreneur's failure problem can be linked to the lack of 
entrepreneurs' experience. Some people's enterprises are bound to fail; many 
group-based programmes have an insurance fund of some kind, either formal, 
informal or both, to cover losses, but these are usually only available in cases of 
extreme hardship. For most poor people, business failure means the loss of 
livelihood and of the only capital which the owner possessed. This may lead to 
the discouragement of poor people to ask for finance (Harper, 1994). 
By providing training to staff, banks will be able to help any entrepreneur 
including those who have had no previous contacts with a formal financial 
institution. However, the training is recommended for the entrepreneurs as well. 
Since the Islamic Bank is a real partner and is interested in achieving the best 
results for its entrepreneurs, the banks should provide its entrepreneurs with 
training in small business management; marketing policies and promotion; and 
quality and production control. 
Unfortunately, the attitude of those who work in Sudanese Islamic banks or as 
consultants or extension agents has, more often than not, been inclined towards 
one of professional arrogance. Thus, an entrepreneur applicant is usually 
expected only to answer questions, not to participate actively in data analysis and 
budget preparation. Profit calculations and cash flow budgets are more likely to 
be in the filing cabinet of the financial institution than in the hands of the 
entrepreneur. This seems a wasted opportunity when the financial management 
skills of the clients could be enhanced by explaining and involving them in the 
calculations and decisions relating to their own businesses. Similarly in follow up 
visits to entrepreneurs there are opportunities to enhance learning by encouraging 
record-keeping and budgetary control measures as part of the loan review 
process. 
-'!'raining programmes targeted at rural people-must-implement training on issues 
of financial management such as regular recording of daily expenses and 
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revenues, calculation of profit and losses, and keeping track of the dates and 
amounts of finance and repayment date. For the small entrepreneurs, focus 
should be on book-keeping, record-keeping and marketing, group management 
leadership training and community mobilisation and initial business appraisal 
and advice for all finance applications. Entrepreneurs need to properly diagnose 
the causes of non performing investment (formerly non performing debts) so as 
to learn and not repeat the same mistakes. 
A consultancy or an advisory service may be introduced at the branches (perhaps 
through technical assistance) to help clients in identifying business opportunities, 
drawing business plans, preparing financial proposals, etc. Many donors would 
welcome a request for such assistance. 
In addition, individual counselling can be introduced or one-to-one discussion 
which has many advantages as a means of adult training and education. It clearly 
addresses the unique needs and situation of the individual involved and enables 
the advisor or counsellor to take these unique circumstances into account when 
giving advice or information. The exchange of ideas that is possible in one-to-
one discussions is very beneficial in helping people reassess situations and 
change their attitudes to problems and solutions. When dealing with money 
issues, these are intensely personal and few like to discuss their affairs in detail 
unless they are with someone they trust. Developing this kind of trust is possible 
with individual counselling. It is obviously possible to teach practical financial 
management skills like book-keeping in a one-to-one situation but it is costly in 
terms of time. 
Where there is an ongoing dialogue between the financier and the entrepreneur, 
business decision-making is improved, as two parties working together produce a 
better outcome than when each is working in isolation. 
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10.4 Factor(s) Determining the Capability of the Entrepreneurs to be 
Offered Musharakah Finance 
This section atms to identify the factors determining the capability of the 
entrepreneurs to be offered musharakah. Therefore, it aims to respond to the 
following research question: 
Research Question (1 5) What are the perceived factors determining the 
capability of the entrepreneurs to be offered musharakahfinance? 
In an attempt to identify which are the most important, respondents were 
presented with five possible factors, that might determine the capability of 
entrepreneurs to be offered finance using the musharakah method, and were 
asked to rank them according to their importance. The five factors are customer's 
financial capability and current account movement, customer's financial history, 
customer's experience and type of guarantee provided by the customer. The 
descriptive results are presented in table 10.6 and the Freidman Test and the 
mean ranks are presented in table 10.7. 
It is notable from table 10.7 that the difference apparent between the mean ranks 
is significant giving that the chi-square is equal to 0.00. Table 10.6 and 10.7 
suggest that customer's financial capability is the most important factor with 
significant points of 1230 and mean rank of 2.08. That 39% of the respondents 
ranked it first which can be compared with 27% and 22% who rank it second and 
third respectively. Concerning the second important factor the respondents 
believe that the customer's experience is the second important factor with 
significant points of 1132 and a mean rank of 2.47. In addition, the respondents 
believe that the customer's financial history is the third important factor in 
determining the entrepreneur's capability before being offered musharakah 
finance, with significant points of 1112 and a mean rank of 2.55. The type of 
guarantee came fourth, followed by references taken about the customer. Hence, 
in-the-following section the researcnetstudies- the customer's financial capaoifity 
and measuring entrepreneurs' creditworthiness. 
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Table 10.6 Factor(s) Determining the Capability of the Entrepreneurs to be 
Offered Musharakah Finance 
r·---------lor-~-" 
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1 0.4.1 Entrepreneur's Financial Capability and Guarantee Provided 
Financial intermediaries can mm1m1ze the cost of acqumng and processing 
information about investment, which is costly if done by individual savers. 
Eventually, savings channelled through financial intermediaries are managed more 
efficiently. King and Levine (1993) state that the ability to acquire and process 
information leads to higher economic growth because intermediaries are capable of 
allocating funds to the most promising firm. In addition, financial intermediation can 
stimulate the rate of technological innovation by providing funds to entrepreneurs 
with the best chances of successfully initiating new goods and production processes. 
Here, the speciality of the financial intermediaries is to manage the deposit and at the 
same time allocate capital to entrepreneurs. However, if the role of financial 
intermediaries is as monitors and information specialists, then financial intermediaries 
tend to produce debt. 
Theoretically, if the allocation of capital is based on the sharing of risk and profit, 
then, the actual performance of the project, enterprise or the economy as a whole 
determines the return on capital. Therefore, in this profit-sharing technique, the capital 
share profit is according to its actual realized productivity. The actual realized return 
on profit is thus the price of capital, which will determine its allocation (Ismail, 2006). 
Profits produced in musharakah are not guaranteed; as a result, the entrepreneur does 
not assure, secure or guarantee profits. Fundamentally, no collateral is needed. It has 
been observed that the existing banking institutions prefer to grant credit facilities to 
those clients who apart from enjoying a good business reputation are also able to offer 
sufficient collateral security, mainly through valuable assets. This practice seems 
quite reasonable from the risk point of view, however, the non- tangible collateral 
holders are unjustifiably deprived of obtaining the necessary fmancial 
accommodation. The existing practice of demanding collaterals for the purpose of 
granting financial accommodation stems from the fact that Western Banking 
institutions are primarily concerned with profitability rather than the social 
imperatives. The 1mposldon -of tang1bie collaterals as a necessary condition left srruill 
businessmen and farmers trapped in a vicious circle: they cannot get access to finance 
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unless they offer sufficient collaterals, they cannot possess tangible collaterals unless 
they build a strong productive base, they cannot improve their productive base unless 
they get access to finance, they cannot get access to finance unless they offer 
sufficient collaterals, So no solution for the endless, vicious and evil circle. Besides 
this, since you can get the credit as long as the risks are low and the capitals with its 
interests are well guaranteed, there is no real consideration for their management 
skills or the feasibility of their project (Hamid, 1991). 
However, the bank (the financier) who usually does not perform to full management 
capacity, normally asks for a guarantee against any losses caused by the partner as a 
result of his mismanagement or negligence. Therefore, the customer might have to 
provide acceptable collateral, such as: 
(i) A real estate guarantee of the value equal to or more than the volume of 
financing. 
(ii) A bank ownership guarantee which is used when the bank finances a 
means of transport through diminishing musharakah, in which case the 
vehicle is registered as the property of the bank until the time when the 
partner has paid all the instalments. 
(iii) Two reputable guarantors (personal guarantee of a third), and he or she 
should sign promissory bank notes. 
(iv) In the case of financing raw materials, the bank usually supplies only part 
of the raw materials to the partner, depending on his or her payment of 
instalments (Ibrahim 1997). 
On a theoretical level, entrepreneur creditworthiness and the guarantee provided is 
used to determine the foreseen risk brought up from the customer, since no strict 
security is demanded against the risk itself. Therefore, Islamic banks, theoretically, 
put great emphasis on the transaction, rather than the creditworthiness of the 
entrepreneur (Ibrahim, 1997). Hence, great attention will be drawn to the project and 
on studying its feasibility (Ibrahim, 2004). In case of any default, which is not the 
fuuft of any party, and the entrepreneur is unabie to settle liislher &ills, a grace period 
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will be given without any additional fees. Any advancement demanded is made to 
cover the share of the partner in the venture and not as a security against losses. 
These results ra1se a fundamental question of whether intangible assets such as 
education, experience, and skills can be as equal collateral as less tangible assets in 
reality. Would it be possible to consider the intangible assets? Can Islamic Banks 
balance the priority to the needs of society and the common interest with the 
individual profit and private interest? 
Having had more than ten years using musharakah we should have had that balance. 
At least they have had to start concentrating on granting credit to educated talented 
customers with no collateral. The price, which might be paid when adopting the wide 
range of no collateral finance through musharakah, is high in cost and high in risks, as 
financing on the (un-granted) profit and loss sharing base will increase the risks and 
following up many financed projects will increase the costs. This is unless there is a 
developed risk management, efficient managerial staff who are trained and a proper 
follow up has taken place. 
Another obstacle in the use of PLS is related to the way banks are looking at profit 
gain. Since profit is the main criterion to look into, banks will be tempted to finance 
high return projects, ignoring the socially beneficial projects. Hence, Islamic banks 
lack a social orientation, which seems to be necessary in all developing countries. The 
social benefits of ISBs cannot be fully utilized without the substantial use of the PLS 
mode of finance. Most of the limitations and obstacles outlined previously are 
products of weak experience ofiSBs in applying PLS. 
Group responsibility for repayment reduces default while such a grouping raises the 
size of finance and thus reduces administrative cost (Al-Harran, 1993). Fortunately 
this idealistic picture of co-operative societies has proved to be workable only in small 
and micro finance. 
· Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has developed a policy which sfates that in order to join 
the bank, the potential members have to choose the other members of their group, and 
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the group will be penalized if any member fails to repay the current loan on time. In 
addition to weekly loan repayments, members are required to pay a small group tax 
and make small weekly personal savings into a group fund. Members are able to 
borrow from the group fund for consumption and investment purposes, with the 
agreement of the remaining members. If there is to be an expansion, it may be 
necessary to put more emphasis on professional managers and the use of modern 
management techniques. The crucial factor in the success of Grameen Bank is that it 
provides a system of assessing creditworthiness that is very cheap to operate since it 
shifts the risk of default from the bank to the potential borrower. This group lending 
has proved to be a success not only in Grameen Bank, but also in other institutions 
like PRIDE in Kenya and the Co-operative Bank of India in financing the Self 
Employed Women's Association (SEWA). 
The usual situation is that a bank does not need to devote its time and energies to the 
task of assessing the honesty of customers for its loans as long as they can provide 
sufficient collateral to cover the loan. In contrast there are those who do not posses 
collateral to cover the loan, and therefore need to operate within a system in which 
their honesty can be tested. 
Group collateral can serve a dual function of reducing the administrative costs and 
acting as a security against fraud and misuse of funds (Abdalla, 1997), hence, it is 
recommended a group leader, in collaboration with the bank's staff, should undertake 
the monitoring obligations (Ibrahim, 2004). 
Alternatively, the combination of both the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur and the 
viability and usefulness of the project (i.e. towards the physical expansion of 
production and services) may encourage large and small entrepreneurs to venture into 
business with a greater possibility of getting financing from the Islamic banking 
systems. 
The Sudanese Islamic bank had a successful scheme of musharakah for micro finance 
fromcwhich -a lesson can· he learnt. --In- the ·sch-eme -the banlc accepted-personal 
guarantees, but did not ask for one in microfinance applications. The non-insistence of 
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the scheme on physical collateral did not reduce the incentive of the banks. The 
substitute arrangements made by the banks ensured that the interest of the banks was 
not jeopardized. The arrangements included a selection of good partners and projects. 
Additionally, the marketable products of the project usually remained under the 
custody of the bank (storage of raw materials subject to partnership). Also, the banks 
could demand post-dated checks from the client by way of security. In addition, the 
staff regularly carried out field visits, which limited the chances of dishonesty such as 
unrecorded sales of the product under partnership, or tampering with records. In fact, 
the department responsible for the scheme was staffed with bankers and highly 
experienced and qualified technical staff. This department embarked on a number of 
innovations for entering the field of finance of rural agriculture, productive families 
and small enterprises. 
These arrangements can adequately secure the capital of the banks (Akhtar, 1997). 
The scheme enables the small entrepreneurs lacking adequate equity and physical 
collateral to benefit from the finances and other services of the banks. The scheme 
provides an in-built indexation to counteract the effects of inflation and, as such, 
protects the interests of bank and borrowers. On the basis of similar arguments, the 
paper concludes that the scheme is viable and equitable (Akhtar, 1997). Unfortunately 
however, the scheme did not last and the strategy of the bank changed when the new 
management took over. 
10.4.2 Measuring the Creditworthiness of the Entrepreneurs 
This section intends to investigate the respondents' satisfaction with entrepreneurs' 
creditworthiness measurement. Therefore, it aims to respond to the following research 
question: 
Research Question (16) To what extent are the respondents satisfied with their bank's 
methodology for measuring the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs and project related 
risks? 
As shown in table 10.8 with a significant chi-square (Asymp. Sig. .000), 43% of 
respondents are to some extent satisfied with their bank's methodology for measuring 
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the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs and project related risk, which seems likely to 
be the main risk facing musharakah, but 24% on the other hand are not satisfied. This 
may lead to strong advice to review their bank's methodology for measuring the 
creditworthiness of customers and project related risks. 
Table 10.8 Satisfaction with Bank's Methodology in Measuring the 
Entrepreneurs Creditworthiness 
.... ..... ..... II Frequency]! Percent 11 ~~_,.,--.,..,-----------l···1r ·· 
! Satl;ractio~;ith.thei;bank's m;tltodoiogyf~~ ;;ie;u~~lng I lYe~ ~-~···~·@··~ ··lp9··-~····lr 3~.6····1! 
the creditworthiness of customers and project related ! No Jj62 ·· ·]I 24.8 ·· · ~~ 
risks :c:)::::To::::. s=o=m=e=ex=te=n=t ::::. =]~f 109·" v· 43:6 II 
t'=c=h=i-=Sq="::::~~~=e·=·IJ=.s=9=2==A=s===P=-s::::;•=··=-o=o=o=-=-·=-·=·-'=····=·=·=····==··· _["',__~o-ia_·~_-_____ JI"-....... ~~s_o·]i __ :oo.o_d]! 
This degree of satisfaction is not acceptable. Banks should ensure that their 
methodology for measuring the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs and project related 
risks is of a high standard. In this regard it is crucial to make sure of the following: 
(i) The bank's credit-granting activities conform to the established criteria; 
(ii) Written procedures are developed and implemented; 
(iii) Finance approval and review responsibilities are clearly and properly 
assigned; 
(iv) Banks should adopt regular measures of financial statement sheets, 
statistical data analysis forms, and the internal and external audit measures 
for the project financed; 
(v) Banks should also gradually implement the BAZL Committee measures 
for the control of various risk aspects; 
(vi) Banks need to manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio as well 
as the risk in individual credits or transactions; 
(vii) The bank, from previous track records, can classify its clients into 
categories. It is proposed that the selected category of good clients form a 
"Bank's-Frie~ds -club" which meets- on a regular oasis with~'the hank's · 
management and staff to discuss, as an unofficial advisory body, general 
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tssues of mutual interest. This would serve to strengthen the bank's 
relationship with the local community where it operates; 
(viii) Credit scores should be applied to measure entrepreneurs' risks. It is worth 
mentioning here that there is an urgent need for a data system about 
entrepreneurs' history and work, through credit scores to measure the risk 
brought from the entrepreneur. As, if any misconduct, dishonesty or 
negligence is established against a client in any bank, he might be subject 
to punitive steps, and may be deprived of availing any facility from any 
bank in the whole country, at least for a specified period. However such an 
approach is yet to be implemented in Sudan. 
10.5 Other Obstacles Hindering Musharakah Projects 
Table 10.9 presents the relevant importance of some selected obstacles facing 
musharakah finance. These obstacles are lack of funds, lack of managerial efficiency, 
lack of feasibility studies, lack of well experienced customers, and other obstacles. 
The results of the Friedman test and mean ranks are shown in table 10.10. With a 
significant level of differences indicated by the Friedman test. The descriptive 
analysis shows in table 10.9 that the most influencing obstacle is the lack of feasibility 
studies with a 1265 points and mean rank of 1.94. In addition, 38% of the respondents 
ranked it first and 36% ranked it second. The lack of well experienced customers, 
with a 1204 points and mean rank of 2.18, came as a second important obstacle 
followed by limited credit ceilings which has 1096 points and 2.62 as a mean rank. 
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Table 10.9 Obstacles Hindering Musharakah Finance 
Factors 
Lack of 
experienced 
customers 
Table 10.10 Freidman Test and Mean Ranks for Obstacles Hindering 
Musharakah Finance 
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The argument presented here is that it is impossible to judge the risk of musharakah 
transactions in a bank's portfolio without considering how the returns on these 
transactions compare with the rest of the bank's returns, and that the effect on risk of 
adding a musharakah transaction to a bank's portfolio is based on the comparison 
between returns on musharakah transactions and its overall portfolio returns 
(Mirakhor, 1987). This should be in mind when looking at any proposal and 
feasibility study for musharakah finance. 
Since the importance of the feasibility studies is already presented, the following 
section studies the satisfaction with performance measurement systems and training 
provided to staff. 
10.5.1 Satisfaction with Performance Measurement Systems 
With a significant chi-square and as shown in table 10.11, 46% of the respondents are 
satisfied with their bank's measurement systems for the performance of musharakah 
projects; whilst 38% of them are to some extent satisfied and only about 15% ofthem 
are not satisfied. As a result of this, it may be possible to conclude that a relatively 
simple majority of the respondents believe that the measurements of musharakah 
performance are quite satisfying and therefore there is no need to proceed further with 
substantial changes or improvement. 
Table 10.11 Satisfaction with Performance Measurement Systems 
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1 0.5.2 Quality Training Provided and Managerial Efficiency 
With a significant difference as indicated by the chi-square and as shown in table 
1 0.12, 41% of the respondents assume that to some extent quality related training is 
provided for all employees, whilst less than 20% of them do not believe so while the 
majority of them (38%) consider that all employees have been provided with quality 
related training. It is worthwhile to restate that most of the respondents (86%) have 
attended investment training courses (Asymp. Sig. .000). 
Table 10.12 Training Provided 
I[Frequ~~cy lfPercint -~~ 
!:::~::: .... :::::: ....:::::: .. ::::::.:::::: ... :::::: ...= .. :::::: ... :::::: ... :::: ...:::::: .....:::::: .. = ...... :::::: .. :::: ... ::::: .. :::::.:::::: ..=:::: ...:::: ... ::::: ...:::: ... :::-: ....::::::.===:::::::-! .. ,1 :...., -y .. -.e_s-.. -. -----~-~r! 9.7 .......... J!, 38.8 ...... ,! 
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1 To S~me extent Jjto3 ]I. 41.2 .. li 
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Table 10.13 depicts the results of the cross tabulation chi-square tests in which the 
results indicate that the quality related training programme is not provided with the 
same degree in all sampled banks. Some of these banks do provide some training 
programmes of a better quality compared with the rest. 
Table 10.13 Cross Tabulation for the Different Banks and Quality-Related 
Training Provided 
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To illustrate figure 10.2 presents the different distribution of the quality training 
provided among different banks, which shows that Shamal Islamic Bank, Savings 
Bank, Omderman National Bank, and Tadamoun Islamic Bank offer more training 
related programmes compared with the remaining four banks. 
Figure 10.2 Quality Training Programme Provided 
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D To Some extent 
Managerial efficiency is necessary for improving performance, especially for those 
projects which depend on follow up, management and control such as musharakah 
projects. Management is defined as the initiation of projects (demand and feasibility 
studies, project proposals and so on.) and the implementation of these proposals by an 
active involvement in the production process. Control, on the other hand, is defined as 
the right to ratify the initial proposals and supervise the projects either through 
internal monitoring or external mechanisms (Dar and Presley, 2000). Accordingly, the 
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researcher may advise to strengthen the managerial efficiency of these banks. There 
is no doubt that bad debt rates for these methods especially nonperforming 
musharakah, can be an indication of managerial inefficiency, and failing to get 
funding from it can be seen as a sign of this inefficiency. 
Efficient supervision over banking operations could have greatly reduced the 
problems, but efficient supervision requires the availability of trained bank examiners, 
controllers and supervisors, well-versed in the applications and operations of the new 
procedures and techniques, and thoroughly familiar with the theoretical and practical 
details of interest-free banking operations. Such expertise on a sufficient scale has 
been lacking and it may take many years for an efficient system of supervision to be 
satisfactorily installed (Najmabadi, 1999). 
The Sudanese banks need to build stronger internal control mechanisms, as some of 
their problems are caused by internal factors. Hassan and Hussein (2003) argue that 
despite collaterals provided against finance, banks are not able to liquidate the 
collaterals. Other general problems such as a lack of professional, technical and 
managerial expertise have also resulted in the unsatisfactory performance. In fact to 
reduce costs in Sudanese banks there was a reduction in the numbers of staff and 
complementary services while no strengths were planned for the remaining staff. 
Analysis based on the discussion with the Executives of the banks reveals that 
Sudanese banks make the utmost attempts to select efficient projects but they cannot 
supervise post-financing situations in most of the cases. That is why, good 
entrepreneurs diverted elsewhere and projects could be sick and affect recovery of 
finance. It is because of the fact that Sudanese banks mostly finance using the trade 
related modes that have little or no relevance to project financing. Arrangements at 
various levels have been slow in developing and demonstrating their usefulness to 
project management. This situation can be attributed to a number of reasons, such as a 
lack of trained monitoring and evaluation staff, lack of training facilities for new staff, 
and difficulties in retaining trained staff in the absence of good career development 
prospects (Al-Harran, 1995b). 
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Better trained staff with appropriate skills to manage risk is a necessity for the 
survival of Islamic banks in the world market. In fact, PLS modes require greater 
supervision and monitoring operations. In this regard, the staff should be trained to 
ensure that the Islamic operations succeed as planned. The spread of bank branches 
must be well planned. 
To conclude, appropriate training programmes need to be designed and adopted to 
upgrade the skills of staff and short training programmes for the target group need to 
be considered. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusion and Recommendations 
11.1 Introduction 
This research is aimed at introducing musharakah as a modem method of 
financing, without violating its basic principles in any way. I have introduced 
musharakah and have discussed basic problems which face its implementation in 
a modem situation. I hope that this discussion may open new horizons in the area 
of Islamic banking. 
The application of Islamic partnership financing formulae, as discussed has not 
been without its problems. One reason for this is that Islamic banks have been 
created from scratch, with no past relevant experience in profit and loss sharing 
to learn from. As the researcher has shown, many problems remain to be 
resolved. A great deal of research is needed in the application of the PLS 
formulae if it is to become more widespread and successful. Yet, in the recent 
history of Sudan it is difficult to underestimate the overall impact of Islamic 
finance. This is because the political aspect has always been more important than 
the economic aspect of Islamic finance. 
This study has highlighted that there is currently a large interest in understanding 
PLS finance, but little is known about its implications, which reveals many new 
and interesting findings about the implication of using musharakah mode of 
finance. It reinforces previous findings of the financing patterns of musharakah. 
It also adds to the debate over the benefit of using profit and loss sharing finance. 
A number of rather powerful arguments have been presented in the last chapters, 
as a result of practical experiences, which demonstrate that there are many 
constraints in th<;Ladoption Qf pa.rtn~r~bip finance, so that its introduction, if itis 
feasible at all, is certainly not an easy matter. These constraints have been 
identified. 
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The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarise and discuss the findings 
of this study and recommendation derived from these findings on theoretical, 
institutional, and practical levels. Also, questions arising from this study are used 
to propose an agenda for future research. 
These conclusions may not be entirely new, but the way they have been deduced 
and given form here is probably fresh. Some of the assumptions of the 
musharakah model may not seem realistic. But they are of a simplifying nature. 
Their removal would complicate the analysis but would hardly affect its broad 
conclusions. 
11.2 Findings of the Study 
This section aims to summarise the important findings of this research in the 
following sections. 
11.2.1 The Overall Performance of the Sudanese Economy and Banking as 
an Environment for Musharakah Financing 
Over the nineties the economy of Sudan was characterized by severe 
macroeconomic instability as indicated by high and accelerating internal and 
external imbalances, rapid exchange rate depreciation. On average, all 
macroeconomic indicators worsened during 1990-1998. However, the current 
economic situation within Sudan is much better than it was in the late 70s, 80s 
and 90s. Sudan's economic performance in recent years has improved with 
robust growth and single-digit inflation levels. In addition, important economic 
reforms were undertaken. The authorities attained macroeconomic stability, lifted 
price controls, set up liberal foreign investment and foreign exchange regimes, 
pursued an ambitious privatization and enterprise-restructuring programme, and 
began a second phase of reforms to liberalize the trade regime (IMF, 2006). 
The dramatic change in the performance of the Sudanese economy since 1998 
could be attributed to a number of factors that include: (1) economic reforms; (2) 
favourable weather conditions affecting agriculture; and (3) high investment in 
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oil sectors and related services. While the stabilization measures and economic 
reforms have been carried out without external aid or technical assistance and 
achieved success in setting high growth rates for the economy, external debt and 
its accumulated arrears remain to be a problem facing future development of the 
country. 
Some conclusions can be derived from the discussion about the overall 
performance of the banking system in Sudan. First, the reasonably high growth in 
the volume of deposits and increase in the ratio of total deposit-to-GDP over the 
last years signal a stable confidence in the banking system. The low ratio of 
credit to GDP 1990-2000 reflects the difficulties SIBs in Sudan are facing 
providing funds for development. Similarly, the finance sector has witnessed 
dramatic increase in levels as well as a percent of GDP, deposits and assets. 
Second, sectoral concentration of investment is not evenly distributed and is 
biased towards the modem most profitable sectors, including trade, modem 
agriculture, and industry. Third, the banking sector has undergone substantial 
liberalization, privatization and restructuring and increase in bank capital and 
reform in supervision and regulative environment. Moreover, the BOS has been 
active in the last few years in strengthening prudential supervision and reforming 
the banking system, tightening the banks' large share of non-performing loans, 
enhancing profitability, restructuring of banks and increasing the banks' capital, 
restructuring the loans portfolio, and addressing the difficulties facing them. 
Lastly, giving these financial performances demonstrated, Sudanese banking 
finances are not expected to be considered effective for high risk operation nor 
poverty mitigation and financing micro-enterprises, as its performance and 
banking indicators are poor. 
As far as the monetary and credit policies are concerned, in the absence of a well 
developed money market, in the last 15 years the BOS issued policies including 
three main components: the credit ceiling which consists of stipulating the share 
of some economy sectors of the overall finance; the minimum capital for 
entrepreneurs in a musharakah contract; and minimum creditceiling paid_ by the 
customers in a murabahah as a percent of the total price of the goods, the 
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maximum profit margins charged by banks in a murabahah and setting the share 
of the priority sectors over the total banking finance. 
The BOS usually imposed detailed requirements for banking finance, dividing 
the economy into priority sectors and sub-sectors for which the banks were 
required to extend credit. Financing agriculture was a priority, other sectors were 
less of a priority, and some were prohibited from bank financing. 
Selective methods of credit control are used to affect the direction of credit and 
certain guidelines are provided to allocate available credit to different sectors. In 
the present credit policy sectors, exports industry, agriculture, handicraft and 
medium and long term investment projects are identified as priority sectors. A 
minimum of 80% of total credit provided to sectors other than the priority sectors 
may not exceed 20% of the credit ceiling approved for the bank (BOS, 1990-
2006; BOS, 1990-2005). 
The financing regulations of the Bank of Sudan are still under modification, and 
lacks proper identification of the musharakah share of banking finance despite 
more than 15 years having passed since 1990, namely the second Islamization 
period in banking industry (Ahmed, 2004). 
11.2.2 Distribution of Finance by Mode of Finance 
The results presented in this study demonstrate that the Sudanese banks prefer 
murabahah over other types of Islamic modes of finance, as the results show 
murabahah had the biggest share of the fund with an average of 47.3% in the 
overall funds. Musharakah is also a popular form of finance among Sudanese 
banks with an average share of 29.3% of total finance. Due to the increase in 
non-performing loans in agriculture, banking finance through sa/am contracts 
declined from 22% of total banking finance in 1992 to 2% in 2005. Other modes 
of finance constitute a small fraction of total finance. 
In reflecting on the results, it should be mentioned that the mudarabah has never 
been of more than marginal importance. However, there are many reasons why 
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mudarabah does not play as large a part as musharakah. Because, mudarabah in 
Sudan works mainly on trade and mudarabah application is confined only to a 
small number of well-trusted clients with a good track record, usually well 
known to the financiers. Salam, mudarabah and other methods achieved on 
average 6.5%, 4% and 13% respectively. In general, it can be noticed that there is 
a gradual increase in musharakah funds as it started with 15% in 1990 and 
increased to 32% in 2004 compared with a gradual decrease for murabahah 
which started with 70% in 1990 and ended at 38% in 2004. In fact in 2000, 
musharakah reached its peak by holding the largest share: 43% compared to 33% 
for murabahah. 
It can also be noted that government pressure has been the major factor behind 
this shift towards more musharakah finance. Two objectives have guided 
government policy in this regard. First, aiming at reducing what de facto was the 
continuation of interest-based lending through widespread use of synthetic 
murabahah contracts. Another aim has been to increase long-term finance. Some 
bankers have expressed strong reservations about the government's preference 
for the musharakah contract, because they see this contract as much more risky 
than the murabahah that commonly can be secured against liquid assets. Other 
reasons behind the shift are first: risk, difficult nature of investment and long-
gestation period in receiving returns and problems of management. Instead they 
use mostly debt-based sa/am and murabahah instruments, which shift most of 
the risk to the client. Secondly, musharakah modes require adequate experience 
in management, additional supervisory and monitoring roles compared with 
sales-based modes which are relatively easy to manage. Thirdly, the simplicity of 
the murabahah mode and the people's preference, it's suitability for short term 
finance compared with musharakah. Lastly, PLS contracts are inherently 
vulnerable to agency problems, because entrepreneurs have disincentives to put 
in effort and have incentives to report less profit compared to the self-financing 
owner-manager. 
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11.2.3 Short Term Musharakah Finance 
With a significant difference the dominant type of musharakah, lasts for 3 to 6 
months as reflected by 72% of the respondents. Two parties share financial 
resources without participatory decision-making. The results indicate that the 
correlation between musharakah risk and the average age of musharakah, with a 
significance chi-square which states that the degree of musharakah risk has 
influence on the average age of musharakah. The nature of the short term deposit 
at Sudanese banks is the main reason for preferring short term finance. The 
advantages of using a short term musharakah strategy are a broader portfolio 
diversification, which can reduce risk for a given return or increase return for a 
given risk; the ability to participate in new risks, including new projects; and 
rapid capital turnover. 
However, the researcher argues here that one of the major dilemmas facing the 
present Sudanese Islamic banks is the fact that these banks have to involve in 
long term finance according to its theory where these banks mobilize funds on 
the basis of short term deposits. Facing all the economic and political barriers 
confronting the country, such as high inflation rate due to external factors, as 
well as internal factors such as small size of the capital and lack of managerial 
efficiency, Sudanese Islamic banks have to be involved in long-term finance. 
11.2.4 Discussing the Expressed Preferences 
11.2.4.1 Preferred Instruments 
The results show that there is reasonable very low likelihood that the differences 
in the Islamic finance methods preference in the sample data can be attributed to 
chance, implying that in most of the cases the differences are statistically 
significant. Most of the respondents prefer musharakah as their mode of finance 
in dealing with their customers. As almost 60% of the respondents preferred 
musharakah and by contrast only about 35% of them selected murabahah, whilst 
less than 3% chose the sa/am mode of finance and less than 3% of the 
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respondents selected other modes of finance including mudarabah, istisnaa ', 
muzarahah and mosagah. This may show the support of the banks' employees to 
musharakah. Stated preferences, however, are not necessarily reflected in 
actions. To some extent these preferences may be the result of an awareness of 
Islamic finance. In Sudan, some clients who reject interest-based loans may be 
sceptical about murabahah, with its strict collateral requirements which bear an 
apparent similarity to interest-yielding loans. Such clients may welcome 
musharakah, which minimizes the pressure exerted on clients by the financier. 
However, in big businesses, especially lucrative ones, some clients would prefer 
murabahah because they would know in advance the exact amount they will pay 
as a profit margin and at the same time keep banks away from direct intervention 
in their businesses. On the other hand, banks would prefer musharakah since the 
end return on investment would be higher. In non-lucrative businesses this 
scenario is reversed. Banks would choose murabahah, especially when dealing 
with risky small businesses. 
In order to see whether there is a relation between the mode of finance preferred 
and the degree of profitability and risk signed for these modes by the respondents 
the chi-square cross tabulation test was run. The results confirm that the degree 
of profitability and risk correlate with the mode of finance preferred with 
significant difference. 
11.2.4.2 Preferred Economic Sector 
The analysis indicates that there is a difference in reaction towards different 
finance sectors. The industrial sector came as the first important sector which 
should get musharakah finance followed by the commercial sector. The export 
and import sector came in third place followed by the agricultural sector. Stated 
preferences, however, are not necessarily reflected in actions. To some extent 
these preferences may be the result of an awareness of the rise in Islamic 
fundamentalism. In reality the commercial sector takes most of the musharakah 
fund. 
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11.2.4.2.1 Industrial Sector 
In the case of financing the industrial sector through musharakah, the Sudanese 
banks provide capital to the owners of the industries, and the owners, on the 
other hand, contribute with their industry, labour, part of the running expenses 
and management. The industrialist also gets a proportion of the net profit for his 
management, and the remaining profit is divided between the bank and the 
industrialist according to their equity share. Through musharakah contracts, the 
Sudanese banks succeeded in providing capital to the industrial sector for the 
purchase of raw materials, machinery and equipment. Moreover, SIBs diversified 
their industrial investments. These included food factories, plastic factories, 
printing presses, drugs' factories, spare parts for petroleum refinery, sugar 
factories, and railway corporations. In addition, they enhanced the small-scale 
industries in Sudan which are believed to play an important role at the present, as 
they are a more labour intensive stage of development. The SIBs opened 
specialised branches in one of the biggest industrial areas in Khartoum to 
develop the handicraft sector. 
11.2.4.2.2 Agricultural Sector 
In the case of financing the agricultural sector, the SIBs provide the machinery 
(tractors, water pumps, spraying equipment etc.) and provide its contribution in 
the form of services that are complementary to what the farmers provide in a 
joint effort on the basis of real, not commercial, costs. Usually the SIBs provide 
ploughing and irrigation services inputs such as improved seeds, insecticide, 
fertiliser, jute bags delivered at the gate of the farm, working capital, agricultural 
extension services, storage and marketing, marketing partnership. The 
entrepreneur, on the other hand, contributes with his land, labour, part of the 
running expenses and management. The farmer gets a proportion of the net profit 
for his management and the remaining profit is divided between the bank and the 
fa.f!!ler according to their equity share. The instruments include co-farming, co-
irrigation, lease of machinery, and agricultural and marketing services. For 
instance, SIBs executed a number of projects at different places in Sudan with 
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substantial benefits to itself and the farmers. The bank provided machinery and 
other service inputs in these projects, while farmers provided land and operating 
expenses. The farmer nurses the plant until it is ready for harvest. When the crop 
is collected, it is not sold immediately. This is because at the beginning of the 
harvest season the prices are usually on the low side. Under normal 
circumstances, farmers used to sell their crops to merchants who take advantage 
of the farmers' need for cash after harvest. These merchants purchase the crop at 
a low price, and they store it until the price improves and, therefore, are the main 
beneficiaries of the farmers' effort. In this formula, the Sills store the crop after 
harvest and help the farmer by giving him part of the estimated share of the crop 
in order to meet his urgent needs. Then, when prices increase, the crop is sold 
with the knowledge of the farmer. 
11.2.4.2.3 Trade Finance 
The results indicate that 41% of the respondents believe that the rapid tum over 
of the capital in trade is the reason behind the preference of trade finance, while 
35% of them refer it to the high profit margins of the trade sector compared with 
other sectors. Other reasons, like the low risk and inadequate capital for other 
non trading investments, got approximately 10%. 
11.2.4.2.4 Co-operative and Small Producers Sector 
Wider branch networks and ranges of banking services are a prerequisite for 
banks in order to reach a large number of entrepreneurs, through partnership 
formulae. Despite the prominent increase in the number of Sudanese banks and 
branches' in the 90s, it is described and characterized by the regional inequality 
in the distribution of branches, which clearly shows that the concentration of 
branches is in commercial towns compared with urban areas. Moreover, the 
pattern of distribution has been more or less the same for the last fifteen years or 
so:-The lack of-a co-ordinating mecha.Ilism--betWeen the ballks themselves and 
other institutions concerned with small enterprise financing has created another 
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important constraint, together with the lack of national policies specially 
designed and oriented towards Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Recent 
national policies towards small enterprises and productive families have shown 
some positive signs. 
Some Sudanese banks, however, have managed to employ Islamic formulae to 
finance small producers. So far these banks have fulfilled some expectations in 
small enterprise financing, though some difficult questions still need to be 
tackled. Moreover, the costs of continuous follow-up and the monitoring of 
projects are relatively high. To reduce the cost of follow-up, the SIB, for 
example, have created the small producers and families branches, SPFBs, to 
serve limited geographical areas and the bank is thinking of employing a third 
party to follow-up and share a certain percentage in the total profits. 
Projects financed cover a wide range of small urban enterprises such as tailoring, 
food processing, shoe and soap making, chalk, cheese-making, goat and poultry-
keeping, petty retail trade and some informal sector activities, such as Kisra (flat 
local bread) making. Business specialisation varies according to geographical 
location of the productive families' branches, with the concentration of 
foodstuffs at al-Thawra branch; sewing at al-Girsh model branch; poultry, cows, 
and goat keeping at Wad Medani branch. The experience of the Sudanese Islamic 
Bank has revealed some of the advantages of such non-traditional transactions. 
None of the partners who are financed could have previously gained access to 
such funding, had not the Sudanese Islamic Bank, especially Productive Families 
branches (PFBs) been available. Ordinary people in urban residential areas, 
especially women, can get access to conveniently located branches. 
As a result of musharakah financing, trust is built between the bank and residents 
of the local community in which the bank operates. This could be further 
capitalised on by launching community based development programmes. 
One important positive aspect of musharakah is that no finance cost is added to 
the production cost. It can therefore contribute to -lower- prices in comparison to 
other methods of finance. 
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11.2.5 Performance Analysis 
11.2.6 Profitability 
The non-parametric test confirms that the profitability performance is not on the 
same level on all options according to the respondents views. The profitability of 
musharakah projects, as perceived, is high. As a result, on a whole 45% of the 
respondents consider the profitability of musharakah projects to be high, 
alongside 22% of them who believe it is very high, while only 8% believe it is 
low and 33% consider it to have acceptable profits compared with other projects 
financed using other methods. Accordingly, the researcher may sum up that the 
majority of the respondents believe that the projects financed using musharakah 
have a high profitability compared to their bank standards. 
11.2.7 Risk 
Significantly, almost one third (30%) of the sample respondents believe that the 
musharakah risk is high with an additional 28% who believe it is very high. In 
regards to those who consider musharakah risk is acceptable or low they were 
simply 24% and 14% respectively. The results explain that the majority of 
respondents agreed that it may cause an influence on management decisions, 
while 30% and 36% of them agreed and strongly agreed with this respectively. 
By contrast, 22% disagreed and only less than 3% of them strongly disagreed 
with this assertion. Along with that, only 8% of the respondents were uncertain. 
The respondents, regardless of their managerial experience and their bank 
assessed the musharakah profitability without difference, while the results show 
the differences between the respondents' groups according to their banks in their 
assessment to musharakah risk. 
SIBs have a lower degree of control over the management of the enterprise they 
finance through musharakah contract. By contrast, credit risk related to financing 
through non-PLS modes_ are _lessened by the possibility of collateralization, 
including mortgaging. The assessment of an appropriate level of the capital 
adequacy ratio for SIBs should be primarily based on systematic analysis of the 
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underlining asset portfolio between PLS and non-PLS transactions. Although the 
PLS contracts perhaps present significant risks to Sills, it also presents profitable 
opportunity. Hence, there is a need for risk analysis and risk management tools. 
In regard to the performance of the risk compared with the profitability, it is 
generally clear that there is a harmony between the risk and profitability of 
musharakah: whenever one of them increases the other also increases and vice 
versa. This financial activity is consistent with the economics principle which 
states that there should be proportionality between profit and risk. Hence, the 
researcher might say that the profitability is quite high and the risk is to some 
extent also high. However, musharakah profitability is higher than its risk. 
11.2.8 Profitability and Risk Financial Performance 
The profitability analysis shows there is no difference between the methods as 
their significance is 0.385. Similarly the risk analysis shows that there is no 
significant difference between these methods in terms of risk rates, stating, as the 
F test shows the significance to be 0.547. The researcher can, therefore, conclude 
that there is no difference between the profitability and risk of these methods, 
namely musharakah, murabahah, salam, and other methods. 
11.2.9 Factors Influencing Granting Credits 
The analysis proves that all factors studied are of the same level of importance. 
These factors are risk, limited credit ceilings, profitability and personal qualities 
of the clients. 
11.2.10 Factors Influencing the Distribution of Banks Funds 
The results, significantly, indicate that respondents placed greatest importance on 
credit policies set by the Central Bank and greater importance on the amount of 
funds axailable and risk oLfmance methods. Factors such as profitability .of 
finance methods, the activity type and other factors score relatively less. The 
majority of the respondents (75%) believe that the BOS credit policy is the first 
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important factor and almost 10% of them only believe it is the second important 
factor. The amount of fund available is the second important factor giving that 
almost 3 7% of the respondents believe it is the second important factor while the 
percentages of them who chose it as the third, fourth or fifth important factor was 
less than 20% for each rank. In addition, the respondents believe that the risk of 
finance method is the third important factor affecting the decision of distributing 
funds available to different methods of finance at their budgets. As almost one 
third of the respondents consider risks of every finance method is the third 
important factor, whilst 27% of them believe it is the fourth important factor. The 
respondents also believe that the profitability of finance methods is the fourth 
important factor with 32%. Then the activity type comes in as the fifth important 
factor with 42%. Lastly other factors come as the sixth and least important factor. 
11.2.11 Credit Policy 
The Central Bank has the authority to change the return on partnership projects 
by altering the ratios in which the bank and the entrepreneurs are expected to 
share the capital and consequently the profits and losses that are associated with 
the transactions. To achieve its policy, the Central Bank has control over the 
supply of high-powered money, the reserve ratios on the different types of 
liabilities, and the maximum amount of assets, which the banks can allocate to 
their profit sharing activities. Overall for the period 1990-2005, we see a gradual 
increase in the minimum percentages of the capital sharing of the customers in 
musharakah projects. This may indicate an intention to discourage the use of 
musharakah. It may indicate also that musharakah is preferred by the 
entrepreneurs, for that reason and in order to control the money supply and 
demand, the Central Bank issued such policies. While specifying a percentage 
for the capital share for financing professionals, craft makers, and small 
producers including productive families started from 1999, the percentage in all 
sectors has been left to individual banks to decide. 
_ The average minimum ceiling for the. partner to invest within any murabahah 
project in priority sectors, cooperative sector for production purpose and 
cooperative sector for non-production purpose were 25%, 10% and 25% 
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respectively. The minimum ceiling percentage for murabahah in internal trade is 
less compared with the capital share percentage in musharakah in internal trade 
as the average for the minimum ceiling for murabahah was 25% in 1990-1992 
and was then left to the banks to decide thereafter. This indicates that the BOS is 
pushing banks to use murabahah in internal trade. Starting from 2001 the 
percentage in all sectors has been left to individual banks to decide. After 1995, 
BOS depended on profit margins to control murabahah more than the minimum 
ceiling. The range for murabahah profit margins in priority sectors was between 
30%- 45% in the 1990s and 18%- 15% after 2000. After 2002 the percentage in 
all sectors has been left to individual banks to decide. 
BOS financing policies were hindering the musharakah finance as well as SMEs 
finance throughout the last fifteen years. The tariff and fiscal policies of 
government were designed without taking into account the interests of 
encouragmg musharakah finance and small enterprises. The State Bank of 
Sudan's regulations required higher percentages of entrepreneurs' share, 
(especially between 1991 and 2000) for these enterprises to qualify for 
mus harakah financing. Therefore, these regulations should be discontinued. It is 
possible to conclude that there is a need to end BOS discriminatory regulations. 
11.2.12 Size of Banks 
Most of the Sudanese banks are extremely small and cannot remain senous 
players in the market, as it continues to expand and attract large international 
banks. Since smaller banks cannot diversify their assets portfolios as much as 
larger banks can do, they need a larger amount of capital relative to their assets to 
inspire confidence in their viability as well as their ability to maintain their core 
operations over the longer term. For this reason the BOS requires banks to either 
strengthen their capital or merge to ensure greater strength. Capital requirements 
also depend on the riskiness of the banks' portfolio of loans and investments. If 
the more risky PLS modes of mudarabah and musharakah constitute a greater 
part ofbanks'_assets, the need_forcapital may-be relatively larger to guarantee 
the full repayment of demand deposits and also the withdrawal of investment 
deposits. If, however, the less risky sales-based modes of murabahah, sa/am, and 
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ijarah constitute a larger proportion, the need for capital may be relatively less. 
The probability of default also determines the quality of assets and therefore the 
size of capital, and until a consensus is reached on the imposition of a penalty on 
the defaulting party, banks may have to be required to hold more capital. 
Hence, it is necessary to remove the disadvantage of the small size of Sudanese 
banks by encouraging and facilitating the merger of a number of such banks so 
that an optimum size is attained. In the absence of an optimum size, their average 
overhead costs are high and it is not possible for them to diversify their risks or 
be able to compete successfully with large conventional banks which have now 
started to open in the south of the Sudan. 
11.2.13 Factors Causing Non-Performing Musharakah Finance 
With a significant level of differences as shown by Friedman chi-square test, the 
descriptive results indicate that respondents placed highest importance on lack of 
proper feasibility studies (mean rank 1.96, 1260 points), since 51% of them opted 
for it, while 23% of them preferred 'lack of following up the projects'. Other 
factors like 'lack of customer's experience' received less weight with 8%, whilst 
the rest of the factors all together weighed less than 5% including 'lack of bank 
staffs experience'. The results also suggest that there is a correlation between the 
managerial experience and the reason behind the non-performing musharakah. 
Little effort, if any, is directed to collecting information about creditworthiness 
of the entrepreneurs. However, it may be emphasised that the researcher has 
only looked at one face of the problem. Sudan faces problems of enormous 
complexity and gravity. The need for a credit scores system and data base for the 
customers is urged at this stage. 
11.2.14 Factors Causing the Weakness of Following up Projects 
The results regarding this section suggest that 'absence of specialized 
departments for follow up~_is the_most important factor with significant points of 
1099 and mean rank of 2.60. That 31.6% of the respondents ranked it first, which 
can be compared with 20%, 20% and 13% who ranked it second, third and 
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fourth. Concerning the second important factor the respondents believe that the 
need for specialized and technical experience is the second important factor 
causing the weakness of follow up projects, with significant points of 1040 and 
mean rank of 2.82, since 24% of the respondents believe it is. In addition, the 
respondents believe that the high cost of the follow up operations and the non-
cooperation from the customers or their refusal is the third and fourth important 
factor, with mean rank of2.84 and 3.14 respectively, and with a percent of20% 
and 17% of the respondents who voted for. In fifth place comes weak or absence 
of appropriate incentives for those following up projects and lastly come the 
other factors. 
It has been evident that lack of knowledgeable bankers in selecting, evaluating 
and managing profitable projects is a significant factor. It seems likely that 
greater administrative resources would be required to operate a PLS system 
effectively than would be required for the effective operation of a traditional 
system, though it is to be hoped that the resulting higher costs could be offset, or 
more than offset, by improved allocation of investment. Greater involvement by 
institutional providers of funds in determining the uses to which such funds are 
put should have a positive effect. 
Following up entails additional cost for the banks arising from the cost of 
monitoring of the joint venture. Moreover, the banks incur the training cost. They 
have to train their staff in the fields of planning and execution of the projects. 
Furthermore, following up is unsuitable for the businesses involving petty and 
repetitive transactions. It becomes too difficult to maintain the records of such 
businesses or even to properly monitor them. In spite of the above-mentioned 
weaknesses, following up is based on sound theoretical foundations. It can 
operate efficiently in a large number of enterprises belonging to various sectors 
of the economy. 
Notably none of the Sudanese banks has specialized banks for following up 
projects. It is recommended to establish a section under the investment 
department or risk management department to be devoted for following up only. 
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More efficient supervision is needed because problems tend to be detected at an 
earlier stage especially offsite supervision. The supervisor can intervene or exert 
pressure before the situation deteriorates. More specialised supervision is also 
needed. Larger banks are supervised by more staff than smaller ones because 
they are systemic and more complex. Tailoring of regulations and requirements 
is also needed with the possibility of imposing tougher ones if needed. 
11.2.15 Factors Determining the Capability of the Entrepreneurs 
It is notable that customer's financial capability is the most important factor 
determining the capability of the entrepreneurs with significant points of 1230 
and a mean rank of 2.08. 39% of the respondents ranked it first which can be 
compared with 27% and 22% who rank it second and third respectively. 
Concerning the second important factor, the respondents believe that the 
customer's experience is the second important factor with significant points of 
1132 and a mean rank of 2.47. In addition, the respondents believe that the 
customer's financial history is the third important factor determining the 
entrepreneur's capability of being offered musharakah finance with significant 
points of 1112 and a mean rank of 2.55. The type of guarantee came fourth 
followed by references taken about the customer. 
These results raise a fundamental question of whether intangible assets such as 
education, experience, and skills can be regarded as equal collateral as less than 
tangible assets in reality. Would it be possible to consider the intangible assets? 
Can Islamic Banks balance the priority to the needs of society and the common 
interest with individual profit and private interest? 
Another obstacle in the use of musharakah is related to the way banks are 
looking at profit gain. Since profit is the main criterion to look into, banks will be 
tempted to finance high return projects, ignoring the socially beneficial projects. 
Hence, Sills lack a social orientation, which seems to be necessary in all 
developing eountries. 'Jhe social benefits of ISBs cannot be fully utilized without 
the substantial use of the PLS mode of finance. Most of the limitations and 
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obstacles outlined previously are products of weak experience of ISBs m 
applying PLS. 
Group responsibility for repayment, which reduces default while such a grouping 
raises the size of fmance and thus reduces administrative cost, were 
recommended. Fortunately this idealistic picture of co-operative societies has 
proved to be workable only in small and micro finance. 
11.2.16 Satisfaction with Performance Measurement Systems 
The results presented in the previous chapters demonstrate that 43% of 
respondents are to some extent satisfied with their bank's methodology for 
measuring the credit worthiness of entrepreneurs and project related risk, which 
seems likely to be the main risk facing musharakah, and 24% on the other hand 
are not satisfied. This may lead to strong advice to review their bank's 
methodology for measuring the credit worthiness of customers and project 
related risks. 
With a significant chi-square, 46% of the respondents are satisfied with their 
banks' measurement systems for the performance of musharakah projects; whilst 
38% of them are to some extent satisfied and only about 15% of them are not 
satisfied. As a result of this, it may be possible to conclude that a relatively 
simple majority of the respondents believe that the measurements of musharakah 
performance are quite satisfying and therefore there is no need to proceed further 
for substantial changes or improvement. 
11.2.17 Managerial Efficiency and Quality Training Provided 
With a significant difference as indicated by the chi-square, 41% of the 
respondents assume that quality related training is provided for all employees, 
whilst less than 25% of them do not believe so while the majority of them (43%) 
considet:that all-employees hav:e been-provided with quali~ related training.)tis 
worthwhile to restate that most of the respondents (86%) have attended 
investment training courses. The results of the cross tabulation chi-square tests 
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indicate that the quality related training programme is not provided with the same 
degree in all sampled banks. Some of these banks do provide some training 
programmes of better quality compared to the rest. 
Efficient supervision over banking operations could have greatly reduced the 
problems, but efficient supervision requires the availability of trained bank 
examiners, controllers and supervisors, well-versed in the applications and 
operations of the new procedures and techniques, and thoroughly familiar with 
the theoretical and practical details of interest-free banking operations. Such 
expertise on a sufficient scale has been lacking and it may take many years for an 
efficient system of supervision to be satisfactorily installed. 
To conclude, appropriate training programmes need to be designed and adopted 
to upgrade the skills of staff. Short training programmes for the target group need 
to be considered. 
11.2.18 Other Obstacles Hindering Musharakah Projects 
With a significant level of differences indicated by the Friedman test, the results 
confirm that the most influencing obstacle is lack of feasibility studies with 1265 
points and mean rank of 1.94. In addition, 38% of the respondents ranked it first 
and 36% ranked it second. The lack of well experienced customers, with 1204 
points and mean rank of 2.18, came as the second important obstacle followed by 
limited credit ceilings which has 1096 points and 2.62 as mean rank. The thesis 
presented here is that it is impossible to judge the riskiness of musharakah 
transactions in a bank's portfolio without considering how the returns on these 
transactions compare with the rest of the bank's returns, and that the effect on 
risk of adding a musharakah transaction to a bank's portfolio is based on the 
comparison between returns on musharakah transactions and its overall portfolio 
returns. This should be in mind when looking at any proposal and feasibility 
study for musharakah finance. 
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11.3 Recommendations of the Study 
The analysis presented in this study, provides an ample opportunity to reflect on 
the results to develop some recommendations to overcome the highlighted 
shortcomings, obstacles and difficulties. 
11.3.1 Recommendations Concerning Legal Regulations and Musharakah 
Contract 
(i) The legal framework should be in line with the Islamic Shari 'ah and 
lawyers, magistrates, judges in the court should be fully familiar with 
the Islamic banking and economic system; 
(ii) It is argued that, by making the bank a partner in the business of the 
entrepreneur, it may disclose the secrets of the business to other 
traders through the bank. This obstacle in many cases is almost 
theoretical as the banks usually do not interfere deeply with the 
management affairs which cause another problem to musharakah 
projects. However, a suggestion can be made to include a condition in 
the contract which prohibits the bank either from interference with the 
management affairs or disclosure of any information about the 
business to any person without prior permission of the entrepreneur 
(Usmani, 1999); 
(iii) The Government of Sudan should enact a specific law to regulate the 
conduct of musharakah financing. This law should obligate the clients 
to keep complete accounts of the musharakah financed projects. 
Banks should have the right to probe the accounts and monitor the 
project at different stages. Moreover, specific regulations should be 
enacted to close all possible loopholes for cheating, fraud and 
concealment; and 
(iv) To improve the contract conditions. This can minimize risk and give 
more authority to following up these projects. 
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11.3.2 Recommendations Concerning Entrepreneurs 
(i) Entrepreneurs and business enterprises obtaining capital from banks 
and other financial institutions should maintain proper accounts and 
this should be done honestly so as to reveal the true working results of 
the enterprises; 
(ii) Entrepreneurs must provide documents certifying each stage of their 
projects' progress, before the capital is provided for that particular 
stage; and 
(iii) Entrepreneurs should be educated about the concept of Islamic 
finance in general, and musharakah financing in particular 
11.3.3 Recommendations Concerning SMEs and Microfinance 
(i) There is a need for a co-ordinating mechanism between the banks 
themselves and other institutions concerned with small enterprise 
financing; 
(ii) There is a need for national policies specially designed and oriented 
towards Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs ); 
(iii) Banks should establish branches in the residential areas. This new 
banking convention can reformulate the bank-client relationship on 
both the savings and investment sides with regard to regulatory 
control; 
(iv) A serious effort is needed on socio-cultural, moral, and political fronts 
to develop a culture of sound and fair SMEs business finance and 
practices. Media and mosque institutions and political parties can play 
an important role in developing this culture; and 
(v) Training programmes targeted at rural people must implement 
training on issues of financial management such as regular recording 
of daily expenses and revenues, calculation of profit and losses, and 
keeping track of the dates and amounts of loans and repayment date. 
For the~small entrepreneurs,-emphasis should-be-on book.:.keeping, 
record-keeping and marketing, group management leadership training 
321 
and community mobilisation and initial business appraisal and advice 
for all finance applications. Entrepreneurs need to properly diagnose 
the causes of non performing investment (formerly non performing 
debts) so as to learn and not repeat the same mistakes. 
11.3.4 Recommendations Concerning the Central Bank 
(i) It is necessary to institute a dialogue between the Central Bank and 
Islamic banks to design separate and different rules and regulations 
for supervising musharakah so as to facilitate and encourage banks to 
use this mode of finance. It is important, therefore, to study the credit 
policy to see how it effects the decision of distribution of the available 
funds among various modes of finance. 
(ii) Ending the BOS financing policies hindering musharakah and BOS 
discriminatory regulations so as to encourage PLS finance. 
(iii) Setting polices which require banks to either strengthen their capital 
or merge to ensure greater strength. It is necessary to remove the 
disadvantage of the small size of Sudanese banks by encouraging and 
facilitating the merger of a number of such banks so that an optimum 
size is attained. In the absence of an optimum size, their average 
overhead costs are high and it is not possible for them to diversify 
their risks or be able to compete successfully with large conventional 
banks which have now started to open in the south of the Sudan. In 
this sense it is important to continue the BOS current reforms of the 
banking system which aim to unify bank accounting systems as well 
as regulations on capital adequacy ratios according to Basle standards, 
monitor non-performing loans monthly, restructure and privatize 
public banks; merge, liquidize; or recapitalize small banks; reduce 
non-performing loans; and improve loan evaluation. 
(iv) Setting policies to instruct banks to provide finance to the poor and 
small enp:epreneurs who c~rrently have little access to finance with 
the objective of expanding the social capital and economic capacity of 
the society 
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11.3.5 Recommendations Concerning Banks 
11.3.5.1 General Recommendations 
It is worth mentioning that banks have to work efficiently, so as to achieve the 
best results for the investment projects, to improve customers' skills in 
management by conducting training to customers in small business management 
marketing policies and promotion; and quality and production control. 
Facing all the economic and political barriers fronting the country e.g. high 
inflation rate as external factors, as well as internal factors e.g. small size of the 
capital and lack of managerial efficiency, the Sudanese Islamic bank have to 
involve in long term fmance. It should be stated that one of the major dilemmas 
facing the present Sudanese Islamic banks is the fact that these banks have to be 
involved in long-term finance. The financing of long-term projects has certain 
prerequisites. The Islamic bank will have to identify projects, carry out feasibility 
studies, estimate expected streams of profits and only then shall they be able to 
invest in a project. Moreover, they will have to develop a long-term investment 
strategy (Al-Harran, 1993). SIBs have a moral obligation, which makes their role 
unique and superior to traditional banks, to fulfil in order to alleviate some of the 
problems that face the nation today. There is a need for a shift in the Sudanese 
banks operations into long-term entrepreneurship finance. Hence, fiscal policy, 
credit policy as well as individual banks policy should encourage and support 
this shift. 
A consultancy or an advisory service may be introduced at the branches (perhaps 
through technical assistance) to help clients in identifying business opportunities, 
drawing business plans, preparing financial proposals, etc. Many donors would 
welcome a request for such assistance. In addition, individual counselling can be 
introduced or one-to-one discussion which has many advantages as a means of 
adult training and education. It clearly addresses the unique needs and situation 
of the -individual-involved and enables the advisor_ or co.unsellQL to . tal<:~ Jh~se 
unique circumstances into account when giving advice or information. The 
exchange of ideas that is possible in one-to-one discussions is very beneficial in 
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helping people reassess situations and change their attitudes to problems and 
solutions. When dealing with money issues, these are intensely personal and few 
like to discuss their affairs in detail unless they are with someone they trust. 
Developing this kind of trust is possible with individual counselling. It is 
obviously possible to teach practical financial management skills like book-
keeping in a one-to-one situation but it is costly in terms oftime. 
11.3.5.2 Risk Management Related Recommendations 
The following can be advised to improve the banks risk management 
Sudanese Islamic banks should encourage the use of musharakah in agriculture 
finance. The following should be adopted to minimise musharakah finance for 
agriculture: 
(i) Delivery of farm financing in instalments according to the actual 
needs of the crops' growth stage accompanied with frequent visits to 
the projects receiving financing; 
(ii) Contributing to the establishment of the national insurance company 
to encourage the establishment of insurance services for farming 
activities; 
(iii) Participating in the establishment of crop marketing companies to 
help in marketing crops produced by the project subject of finance 
such as Sudan Cotton; 
(iv) More financial training for the staff, especially with regard to proper 
delivery and collection procedures. 
(v) Diversification strategy is advised to minimise the risks through 
financing different entrepreneurs instead of concentration of finance 
to a few of them, as well as diversification in financing different 
sectors in different seasons 
(vi) Specialization is also advised. The bank may accumulate intimate 
knowledge _of some_miilfkets in which they_ have concentrated. This 
may enable the banks to protect themselves more efficiently against 
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too optimistic entrepreneurial calculations in these areas, although a 
perfect protection seems to be impossible. 
(vii) Improving the contract conditions which can minimize risk and give 
more authority to following up these projects. 
(viii) Part of the profits could be used to build up reserves as a buffer 
against possible future losses. 
More efficient and specialized supervision for investments is needed because 
problems tend to be detected at an earlier stage. The supervisor can intervene or 
exert pressure before the situation deteriorates. Larger banks supervised are by 
more staff than smaller ones because they are systemic and more complex. 
Tailoring of regulations and requirements is also needed with the possibility of 
imposing tougher ones if needed. The internal supervision needs more attention. 
The bank staff should watch its interest by focusing on the overall performance 
of the project. More on-site inspections/audits should be carried out to check in-
depth an entrepreneur's financial position and current financial condition; the 
entrepreneur's risk management and procedures and adequate collateral 
coverage. The following can be recommended to improve following up projects: 
(i) The Sudanese banks need to build stronger internal control 
mechanisms, as some of their problems are caused by internal factors; 
(ii) A third party to follow up and share certain percentage in the total 
profit is also recommended. It is recommended to manage and 
monitor a specific number of musharakah transactions through a 
hired part-time manager whose cost is covered from the share of 
profit earmarked for management. After liquidation the same manager 
could monitor another set of musharakah. The bank could create 
employment opportunities for unemployed graduates whose numbers 
increase annually as a result of expansion in higher education; 
(iii) Appropriate training programmes need to be designed and adopted to 
upgrade the skills of staff. Short training programmes for the target 
group need to be_considered; 
(iv) The spread of bank branches must be well planned. 
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(ix) Banks might accept to finance high risk musharakah on a selective 
basis to a number of entrepreneurs, for whom, these banks come to 
know have integrity beyond all doubts. In addition some selected 
sectors might be visible for musharakah finance where there is not 
much space for misconduct, negligence and dishonesty to work as an 
obstacle for financing through musharakah such as export and import. 
For instance, almost every essential thing will be known e.g. the 
exporter will have the specific order from abroad, the prices are 
agreed, the costs are not difficult to determine, payments are normally 
secured by a letter of credit, the payments are made through the bank 
itself. Similarly, financing of imports may be designed on the basis of 
musharakah with some precautions, as explained earlier. (Usmani, 
2002). 
(x) Each of the well-trained bank staff could handle a specified number 
of transactions annually. Hence, specification would contribute to 
efficiency of the bank and would expedite the completion of 
transactions. 
(xi) Banks need to manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio as 
well as the risk in individual credits or transactions; 
(xii) Banks should also consider the relationship between credit risk and 
other risks, sound credit risk management practices should be applied 
in conjunction with sound practices related to the assessment of asset 
quality, the adequacy of provisions and reserves, and the disclosure of 
credit risk. 
(xiii) Credit scores should be applied to measure entrepreneurs' risks. It is 
worth mentioning the urgent need for the data system about 
entrepreneurs' history and works. Since if any misconduct, dishonesty 
or negligence is established against a client in any bank, he might be 
subject to punitive steps, and may be deprived of availing any facility 
from any bank in the whole country, at least for a specified period. 
However such an approach is yet to be implemented in Sudan; 
(xiv) A fair -and- proper measurement should be taken to estimate the 
management role on the profit and this should be reflected on the 
management share of profit denoted to the entrepreneur. 
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A specialized department for risk management and follow up should be 
established. The roles expected to be played by the suggested specialized and 
technical department are: 
(i) Information systems and analytical techniques to measure the credit 
risk inherent in all activities; 
(ii) Setting the bank annual credit policy; 
(iii) Have in place a system for monitoring the overall composition and 
quality of the credit portfolio; 
(iv) Take into consideration potential future changes in economic 
conditions when assessing individual credits and credit portfolios; 
(v) Established system of independent, ongoing credit review to evaluate 
the condition of the credit portfolio and performance of credit 
officers; 
(vi) Ensure credit granting function is properly managed and credit 
exposures are within internal limits; and 
(vii) Credit risk strategy to include a statement of the bank's willingness to 
grant credit based on type (commercial, consumer, real estate, etc.), 
economic sector, geographical location, currency, maturity, and 
anticipated profitability; 
(viii) Credit risk strategy to include a statement of the bank's willingness to 
grant credit based on mode of finance type (musharakah, murabahah, 
sa/am, etc.); 
(ix) The credit limits on single entrepreneurs and groups of connected 
entrepreneurs; 
(x) Identification of target markets and overall characteristics the bank 
wants to achieve in the credit portfolio. 
11.3.5.3 Data Improvement 
The quality of the Sudanese banking industry data has improved in recent years. 
However, t~?.~e are many are(ls whe_re further improvements are needed, 
particularly in compiling accounts and modes of finance accounts of the 
branches. Also there is a need for initiating financial reporting according to the 
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mode of finance and publish details of the non performing debts and investment 
for these methods together with its profit. Standardization of the data for all 
banks is also important in order to analyse the realities of Islamic banking. 
11.3.5.4 Measuring Creditworthiness 
The results raise a fundamental question of whether intangible assets such as 
education, experience, and skills can be as equal collateral as less than tangible 
assets in reality. Would it be possible to consider the intangible assets? Can 
Sudanese banks balance the priority to the needs of society and the common 
interest with the individual profit and private interest? 
Another obstacle in the use of PLS is related to the way banks are looking at 
profit gain. Since profit is the main criterion to look into, banks will be tempted 
to finance high return projects, ignoring the socially beneficial projects. Hence 
Islamic banks lack a social orientation, which seems to be necessary in all 
developing countries. The social benefits of ISBs cannot be fully utilized without 
the substantial use of the PLS mode of finance. Most of the limitations and 
obstacles outlined previously are products of weak experience of ISBs in 
applying PLS. Alternatively, the combination of both the trustworthiness of the 
entrepreneur and the viability and usefulness of the project (i.e. towards the 
physical expansion of production and services) may encourage large and small 
entrepreneurs to venture into business with greater possibility of getting 
financing from Islamic banking. In addition the following should be considered: 
(i) Group responsibility for repayment should be introduced in small and 
micro finance; 
(ii) Banks should ensure that their methodology for measuring the credit 
worthiness of entrepreneurs and project related risks is of a high 
standard; 
(iii) The bank's credit-granting activities should conform to the 
established criteria; 
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Alternatively, the combination of both the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur 
and the viability and usefulness of the project (i.e. towards the physical 
expansion of production and services) may encourage large and small 
entrepreneurs to venture into business with a greater possibility of getting 
financing from the Islamic banking systems. 
11.3.6 General Recommendations 
(i) To internationalise musharakah financing as the main front of Islamic 
finance in order to bring about real changes in the economies of the 
developing countries where Islamic banks operate; 
(ii) To establish an international body to set standards for musharakah 
financing to Islamic banks; establishment of a training institution 
where "implementers" of Islamic financial products could be trained; 
(iii) Exchange of visits among Islamic bank staff; 
(iv) Standardisation of musharakah procedures; 
(v) To establish and strengthen the capability of the market research and 
consultancy centre to make business advice more widely available in 
Sudanese and to integrate general business consulting activities with 
more technical services; 
(vi) To establish a restructured musharakah PLS Promotion Agency to 
strengthen its capacity and the performance of musharakah PLS in 
investment promotion. 
11.4 Areas for Further Research 
There are many issues not covered by this study which might be suggested for 
further research. 
(i) The further growth and development of the Islamic financial system 
will depend largely on the nature of innovations introduced in the 
market. The immediate need is to deploy human and financial 
resources to develop instruments to enhance microfinance, perform 
asset/liability and risk management; and introduce long term 
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entrepreneurship finance instruments. Hence, managerial efficiency is 
an important topic for further research; 
(ii) Further research is required to provide more insight into the topic of 
intemationalising musharakah financing as the main front of Islamic 
finance in order to bring about real changes in the economies of the 
developing countries where Islamic banks operate; 
(iii) Another area that would be of research interest is a comparison study 
of murabahah and musharakah efficiency and performance in Sudan; 
(iv) There is a further need for more empirical studies, particularly to 
evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy and the tools of 
monetary management against the objectives and goals which have 
been set for them; 
(v) The area of male gender domination in both employment and 
entrepreneurship in Sudan needs further study; 
(vi) Further research is also required in the area of Islamic microfinance 
especially of using profit and loss modes; 
(vii) The relationship between entrepreneurs and Islamic banks is of some 
importance and recommended for further research; 
(viii) The perception of musharakah users should also be examined to 
identify the performance of their enterprises, and determine the 
obstacles and prospects they face in order to complete the picture 
about both parties of the participatory finance. 
(ix) Similar studies can be undertaken to identify the performance of 
musharakah financing in other countries with the objective of having 
a comparison, and determining the performance differences and the 
reasons of such differences. 
(x) Can this system be exported to other countries, or does it depend too 
much on the charisma of the Sudanese bank and the special 
characteristics of the Sudanese entrepreneur to be transplanted 
successfully? These issues need more indepth study. Hence it is also 
recommended; and 
(xi) Lastly,- risk management systems for ~Islamic banks in general are 
crucial. Given the nascent nature of the Islamic financial industry 
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there is a need to develop shari 'ah compatible risk management 
techniques and organize training programmes to disseminate these 
among the Islamic banks. Therefore, risk management needs to be 
assigned as a priority area of research and training programmes. 
331 
Appendixes 
A. The Questionnaire in English 
Confidential questionnaire for the Investment Department Employees' in The 
Banking Industry in Sudan 
The following questions relate to your bank using musharakah. I recognize that 
some of the information in this survey may be sensitive, but I assure you that the 
data will only be used in the aggregate to statistically compare various types of 
banks that have participated in the study. Your responses will be kept 
confidential. 
Please answer the questions below by circling, ticking the correct replies or by 
filling in information. 
Section one: Personal Profile 
(Please tick the appropriate answer for each of the following questions) 
Ql. Sex: 
D Male. D Female. 
Q2. What is your age (years)? 
D 20-30. D 31-40. 
Q3. Marital Status: 
D Single. D Married. 
D 41-50. 
D Other. 
Q4. What is the highest educational qualification you hold? 
D Sudan Senior School Certificate D Diploma 
D Above 50. 
D Bachelor D Postgraduate D Other, please specify---------
Q5. How many total years of managerial experience do you have? 
D 1- 5 D 6- 10 D 11 - 15 D 16 - 20 D Over 20 years 
Q6. How many total years ofinvestment management experience do you have? 
D Less than 3 D 3 - 5 D 6 - 8 D 9 and above 
Section two: Bank Information (Please tick the relevant boxes) 
Q7. The name of the bank and the branch you are working for 
Q8. How many people work under your direct supervision? 
Q9. What is your Job level in the bank's hierarchy? 
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Q 10 Did you take any Investment course or training? 
DYes. DNo. 
Q 11. Are you satisfied with your current salary? 
D Yes. D No. D To some Extent 
Section three: Musharakah Method Preference 
(Please tick the relevant boxes) 
Q 12. Do you choose the method of finance for the customer? 
DYes D No (go to Q14) 
Q13. If yes, what is the factor/s which effects your decision when you choose to 
fund a customer using musharakah method? Please rank in order starting with 
the most important: 
D Customer credit worthiness D Expected risk. 
D The customer's choice of financing method. D Expected profitability. 
D The activity type whether it is agricultural or industrial etc .... 
D Credit policies set by the Central Bank. 
Q14. Do you stipulate at the beginning of the year how much you are going to 
fund by each method in your budget? 
DYes. D No (go to Q17) 
Q 15. If yes, which of these factors affects distribution of funds for each Islamic 
finance method in your budgets? Please rank in order starting with the most 
important: 
D Credit policies set by the Central Bank. D Profitability. 
D The amount of fund available. D Risk. 
D The activity type. D Other, please specify ... 
Q16. The lack of risk management knowledge ofthe Sudanese Bank managers is 
behind the weakness of the budgets set for Islamic finance methods. Do you 
agree? (Please tick one box only). 
D Strongly agree. D Agree. D Uncertain D Disagree. D Strongly disagree. 
Q 17. If no, what is the reason behind that? Please rank in order starting with the 
most important: 
D Not Useful or no need for it D Usually external factors are stopping it 
D The senior managers don't think it is important 
D Other, please specify ........ . 
Q18. The following factor/s determines the capability of the customer to be 
offered finance using the Musharakah method. Please rank in order starting with 
the most important: 
D Customer's financial capability and current account movement 
0 Customer'sfinancialhistory-EJ Reference teceiVedaoout the customer 
D Customer's experience D Type of Guarantee provided by the customer 
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Section four: Musharakah performance and management. 
Q19. According to your experience, rank the performance of musharakah 
according to the profitability and risk majors? 
A. Profitability 
D Very High D High D Acceptable D Low or none D Not sure 
B. Risk 
D Very High D High D Acceptable D Low or none D Not sure 
Q20. In your personal opinion which one of the objectives below is more 
important for the Islamic bank to achieve first during its operations 
(musharakah)? Please rank in order starting with the most important: 
D Maximizing the return of the shareholders and depositors. 
D Customer satisfaction. 
D Contributing to the economic and social development of the country. 
D Other, please specify ......... . 
Q21. What is the average age ofthe musharakah projects? 
D Less than 3 months. D 3- 6 months. D 7- 12 months. 
D 1-2 years. D Above 2 years. 
Q22. Rank the following sectors starting with the one which should have the 
biggest amount of musharakah fund? 
D Commercial (Trade). D Industrial. D Agricultural. 
D Export and import. D Co operative, small producers and craftsmen. 
Q23. The bank usually prefers trade finance. If you agree with this statement, 
which of the following is the reason for you to prefer trade finance? Please rank 
in order starting with the most important. 
D High profit margins. D The low risk. 
D The rapid turn over of the capital in trade. 
D Inadequate capital for other non trading investments. 
Q24. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
A. The right to interfere in the management decisions as a partner (the bank) 
results in musharakah not being attractive for the customer 
D Strongly agree. D Agree. D Uncertain D Disagree. D Strongly disagree. 
B. The bank practice great institutional influence on the management decisions in 
partnership projects because musharakah contracts are exposed to high risk 
D Strongly agree. D Agree. D Uncertain D Disagree. D Strongly disagree. 
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Q25. Indicate the relative importance of the following factors in influencing, 
granting credits, hindering investment in any project and fund allocations. Please 
rank in order starting with the most important. 
D Risk D Limited credit ceilings D Profitability 
D Personal qualities of the clients 
Q26. Please indicate whether these statements are correct or not according to 
your opm10n: 
Yes No 
a- You are aware of the accurate product cost of the partnership 
projects 
b- You share the pricing decision with your partner 
c- Your Bank is committed to a quality improvement programme 
for the partnership finance 
d- Management actively supports your quality programme 
e-Quality-related training is provided for all employees 
f- You are satisfied with your bank performance measurement 
systems for Musharakah projects 
g- You are satisfied with your bank methodology for measuring 
the credit worthiness of the customer and the project related risk 
Q27. Are there is any regulations from your bank encouragmg usmg PLS 
methods of finance? 
DYes. D No. 
Q28. What type of transaction do you prefer to have with your customer? 
D Musharakah D Murabahah D Salam D Other, please specify ..... . 
Section five: Obstacles and Constraints 
Q29. Are there any obstacles from your point of view which particularly hinder 
Musharakah projects? Please rank in order starting with the most important. 
D Lack of funds. D Lack of managerial efficiency. 
D Lack of feasibility studies. D Lack of well experienced customers. 
D Other, please specify ...... . 
Q30. What is the factor/s which causes the weakness of following up projects by 
the bank? Please rank in order starting with the most important. 
D High cost of the following up operations 
D Non-Cooperation from the customers or their refusal 
D Absence of specialized departments for following up 
D Weak or absence of good incentives for those following up projects 
D_ The _need_ for specialized and technical experience in some Musharakah 
projects 
D Other, please specify ....... . 
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To 
some 
extent 
Q31. What is the factor/s which causes the non-performing musharakah (non 
performing debts) Please rank in order starting with the most important. 
D Lack of proper feasibility studies D Lack of following up the projects 
D Lack of customer's experience D Lack of bank staffs experience 
D Lack of proper risk management D Other, please specify ... 
Q32. What kind of work should the bank as a partner be responsible for? Please 
rank in order starting with the most important. 
D Administrative (solving day to day operations). D Marketing. 
D Providing money only. D Providing raw material, machinery or equipment. 
D Other, please specify .................... .. 
Q33. If you have any further comments, please add them here: 
Other comments: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for your co-operation. 
The identity of respondents will be treated in strict confidence and not revealed 
in the thesis or any other publications. If you want your copy of my findings, 
please provide me with your details and address: 
Name........................ Address .................. . 
Telephone.................. Fax ....................... . 
E-mail. .................... . 
B. Musharakah Contract for Working Capital 
Core Clauses: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The Parties: 
A. An Islamic Bank, as a first partner, and 
B. A legal or natural person, as a second partner 
Statement of objective of Musharakah, such as "The Second 
Partner approached the bank to enter into a partnership agreement 
to operate the factory of ...... .... .. .. .. located at ........................ . 
which is owned by the second partner, for a period 
of .................... .. 
A Musharakah is hereby established between the two partners as 
follows: 
A. The first partner provides a capital of SD .................... for the 
purpose of using it as an operational capital for the factory 
B. The second partner provides the net worth of his factory as 
represented in the balance sheet, as amended and accepted by 
-the-two partners,- in-the amount of .... : ..... : ......... -.: ..... 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Other Clauses: 
1. 
2. 
The second partner shall manage this Musharakah in the usual 
and customary manner and to the best interest of the partnership 
within the scope of a mutually agreed upon policy and strategy. 
However, the first partner shall appoint one of its employees, as a 
representative in the partnership. The representative has the full 
right to inspect accounts, books and records of the partnership at 
any time, and to place a reservation or an objection on any 
managerial acts he sees unfit with the best interest of the 
partnership. 
All banking transactions of the partnership shall be exclusively 
effected in .... , with and through the first partner. 
The second partner pledges to supply the bank with quarterly 
reports and to consult with its representative before taking any 
decision in important matters and to take a written approval before 
disbursement, or pledge of disbursement of any amount exceeding 
SD .................. . 
The distribution of profits shall be as follows: 
A. .......... % to the second partner as compensation for his 
managerial efforts 
B. The remainder shall be distributed according to the shares in 
capital, as mentioned in Article 3 of this agreement and any 
losses shall solely be distributed in proportion to share in 
capital as in Article 3 too. 
The duration of this Musharakah is .... (months or year), i.e., until 
the day ................. of the month of ............ of the year ................. . 
only; and a balance sheet shall be prepared at the end of this 
period and sufficient assets of the partnership shall, by then, be 
liquidated to pay the share of the first partner plus/minus profit or 
loss. 
The second partner puts under the full authority of the first partner 
his ............... (Securities, real estates, etc.) as a guarantee to be 
used only in case of any damage caused by neglect or 
transgression by the second partner. 
Number of original copies of the contract. 
Determining the Court of competent jurisdiction over the contract. 
C. Declining Musharakah Contract that Applies to Fixed Assets 
Core Clauses: 
1. The-Parties: 
A. An Islamic Bank, as a first partner, and 
B. A legal or natural person, as a second partner 
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2. The objective of partnership 1s to construct (purchase) 
a.................. (Airplane, ship or building in the specification 
mentioned in Annex I and operate it for profit. 
3. A Musharakah is hereby established between the two partners as 
follows: 
1) The first partner provides 90% of the capital or SD .............. . 
2) The second partner provides 10% of the capital or SD ............. . 
3) In case the cost of the assets to be constructed (or purchased) 
exceed the amount of SD............... the increment shall be 
contributed by the parties in the same proportion. 
4. The second partner shall manage this Musharakah in the usual 
and customary manner and to the best interest of the partnership 
within the scope of a mutually agreed upon policy and strategy. 
However, the first partner shall appoint one of its employees, as a 
representative in the partnership. The representative has the full 
right to inspect accounts, books and records of the partnership at 
any time, and to place a reservation or an objection on any 
managerial acts he sees unfit with the best interest of the 
partnership. 
5. All banking transactions of the partnership shall be exclusively 
effected in, with and through the first partner. 
6. The second partner pledges to supply the bank with quarterly 
reports and to consult with its representative before taking any 
decision in important matters and to take a written approval before 
disbursement, or pledge of disbursement of any amount exceeding 
SD ................ . 
7. The distribution of profits shall be as follows: 
A. ...... % to the second partner as compensation for his 
managerial efforts 
B. The remainder shall be distributed according to the share in 
capital mentioned in Article 3 of this agreement and any losses 
shall be distributed in proportion to share in capital as in 
Article 3 too. 
8. The duration of this Musharakah is nine years. 
9. The first partner promises to sell out his share, .. % of the total 
capital of the partnership to the second partner at the end of each 
accounting year for the amount of SD ... , payable at the time of 
signing the sale contract. 
Other Clauses: 
1. Number of original copies of fhe contnict. 
2. Determining the Court of competent jurisdiction over the contract. 
338 
Bibliography 
ABDALLA, G.E. (1997) Partnership Financing for Small Enterprise: Problems 
and Suggested Improvement. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) Partnership 
Financing for Small Enterprise: Some Lessons from Islamic Credit 
Systems. Rugby, Intermediate Technology Development Group 
Publishing. pp. 56-61. 
(1999) Partnership (musharakah): A New Option for Financing Small 
Enterprises, Arab Law Quarterly. Vol. 14(3). pp. 257- 267. 
ABDEL GADIR, E. T. I. M. (1976) Money and Banking m the Sudan. 
Khartoum, Economic and Social Research Council. 
ABDEL MOHSIN, M. I. (2005) The Practice of Islamic Banking System in 
Sudan, Journal ofEconomic Cooperation. Vol. 26(4), pp. 27- 50. 
ABDOULI, A. H. (1991) Access to Finance and Collaterals: Islamic Versus 
Western Banking, Journal oflslamic Economics. Vol. 3(1), pp. 55- 62. 
ABDULLAH, M. Z. YOUSIF, M. A. & ALI, S. A. (2000) Non-performing 
Loans in the Banking System Because of Evasion, Banking and Financial 
Studies, (4), pp. 43 - 69. 
ADAM, S. E. (1997) The Experience of Traditional Saving Groups and El 
Kifaya Bank in Financing Poor Women. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) 
Partnership Financing for Small Enterprise: Some Lessons from Islamic 
Credit Systems. Rugby, Intermediate Technology Development Group 
Publishing._pp. 24-29. 
AGGRA W AL, R. & YOUSEF, T. (2000) Islamic Banks and Investment 
Financing. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Vol. 32(1), pp. 93 -
120. 
339 
AHMED, A. (2000) Instruments of Regulation and Control of Islamic Banks by 
the Central Bank, Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute IRTI, 
Islamic Development Bank IDB. 
AHMED, G. A. (1998) Commercial and Banking Law in Sudan. Khartoum, 
Sudan University Press. (in Arabic). 
(2003) The Performance of the Islamic Financing Methods in Sudanese 
Banks. IN WILSON, R. (Ed.) International Seminar on Islamic Wealth 
Creation. Durham, UK, Durham University. 
(2004) The Efficiency of the Islamic Finance Methods: Sudanese Banks 
Experiment 1993-1999. Banking and Financial Studies, (13), pp.l - 39 
(2005) Measuring Risk and Profitability for the Islamic Financial Modes: 
The Experience of Sudanese Islamic Banks. Review of Islamic 
Economics. Vol. 9(2), pp. 31-75. 
(2006) The Implication ofUsing Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) Modes of 
Finance, with a Particular Reference to Musharakah (partnership) 
Financing Method in Sudanese Islamic Banks. 2nd Banking and Finance 
International Conference in Islamic Banking and Finance. Beirut, 
Lebanon, Lebanese American University. 
(2007) Islamic Micro-Finance Practice with a Particular Reference to 
Financing Entrepreneurs through Equity Participation Contracts in 
Sudanese banks. First International Conference on inclusive Islamic 
Financial sector Development, Enhancing Islamic financial services for 
micro and medium sized enterprises (MMES). Negara Brunei 
Darussalam, University of Brunei. 
(2008) (Forthcoming) The Implication of using Profit and Loss Sharing 
(PLS) Modes of Finance in the Banking System, with a Particular 
Reference to Equity Participation (partnership) Method in Sudan. 
Hurhartomics-: 
340 
AHMED, 0. (1997) Sudan: The Role of the Faisal Islamic Banl(. IN WILSON, 
R. (Ed.) Islamic Financial Market. London, Routledge. 
AHMED, 0. B. (1990) The Contribution of Islamic Banking to Economic 
Development: The Case of the Sudan. PhD Thesis. Economics and 
Finance Department, Durham, Durham University, Durham. 
AHMED, T. E. (1998) The Impact of Religion on Management Control System 
of Islamic and Islamized Banks in Sudan. Savings and Development. Vol. 
22(2), pp. 215- 232. 
AKHTAR, M. R. N. (1997) Musharakah Financing for Small Enterprise in 
Pakistan. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) Partnership Financing for Small 
Enterprise: Some Lessons from Islamic Credit Systems. Rugby, 
Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing. pp. 35- 41 
AL-HARRAN, S. A. S. (1990) Islamic Finance: The Experience of the Sudanese 
Islamic Bank in Partnership (musharakah) Financing as a Tool for Rural 
Development among Small Farmers in Sudan. PhD Thesis. Economics 
and Finance Department, Durham, Durham University, Durham. 
(1993) Islamic Finance: Partnership Financing. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publications. 
(1995a) Musharakah Financing: Concept and Applications. IN AL-
HARRAN, S.A.S. (Ed.) Leading Issues in Islamic Banking and Finance. 
Petaling Jaya. Pelanduk Publications. pp. 1-24 
(1995b) Musharakah Financing: Time for Long -Term Islamic Financing. 
IN AL-HARRAN, S.A.S. (Ed.) Leading Issues in Islamic Banking and 
Finance. Petaling Jaya. Pelanduk Publications. pp. 25- 32. 
(1997) A Proposal for Musharakah Finance for Fishing People in 
Malaysia. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) Partnership Financing for Small 
Enterprise: Some- -bessons from -Islamic - Credit -Systems. Rugby, 
Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing. pp. 45 - 50 
341 
Ali, A. A. (1977) Sudanese Financial Institutions and their Functioning. IN EL-
HASSAN, A. M. (Ed.) Growth, Employment and Equity: a 
Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan 1974 -1975. Geneva, International 
Labour Office. pp.48- 65. 
(1982) The Political Economy of Banking in the Sudan 1970 - 1977. 
Khartoum, University of Khartoum Press. 
(1990) How to Reach the Small Farmer: An Islamic Formula IFDA 
Dossier. No. (75/76): pp.35-44. 
(2001). Sudanese Banking Industry 1956 - 1999: A Survey. Khartoum. 
Sudan University of Science and Technology Press. 
AL-JARHI, M.A. (2001) Islamic Banking: Answers to some Frequently Asked 
Questions. Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic 
Development Bank. 
(2003) Islamic Finance: An Efficient & Equitable Option. Jeddah, Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank 
AL-KASHANI, A. B. I. M. (1968) Badia Al-Sanai Fi Tarteeb Al-Sharai, Cairo, 
Sharikat Al-Matboat Al-Aalamiyah. 
ALLISON, P.D. (2002) Missing Data. London: Sage. 
AL-RAMLI, S. A.D. M. I. A. (1967) Nihayat Al-Muhtaj Ila Sharh Al-Minhaj. 
Cairo, Matbaat Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi. 
ALRA Y ALA'M (2006) 3rd October El Nilein Bank. Alray Ala'm Newspaper. 
Khartoum. pp. 1-3. 
AL-SARKHASI, A. B. (1906) Al-Mabsut. Cairo, Matabaat Al-Saadah. 
AL-SHA YBANI, M. I. (1884) Aljami Al-Saghir, Cairo, Al-Matbaa Al-A'llowi. 
AL-SWAILIM; -S. I. (2000) Financial Intennediation in an Islamic Econmny, 
Journal oflslamic Economics. Vol. 10, pp. 1- 10. 
342 
ANTONIDS, R. (2003) Interpreting Quantitative Data with SPSS. London, Sage. 
AOKI, M. (1994) Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Banking System: An 
Analytical and Developmental View. IN AOKI, M. & PATRICK, H. 
(Eds.) The Japanese Main Bank System New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
ARCHER, S. & ABDEL KARIM, R. A. (Eds.) (2002) Islamic Finance: 
Innovation and Growth. London, Euromoney Books. 
ARIFF, M. (1988) Islamic Banking. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature. Vol. 2 
(2), pp. 46 - 62. 
AUBOIN, M. & MEIER-EWERT, M. (2003) Improving the Availability of 
Trade Finance during Financial Crises. Geneva, World Trade 
Organization. 
BANK OF KHARTOUM (1990-2005) Annual Reports Khartoum, Bank of 
Khartoum. 
BANK OF SUDAN (1990-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, Bank of Sudan. 
BANK OF SUDAN (1990-2006) Finance and Credit Policy, Khartoum, Bank of 
Sudan. 
BANK OF SUDAN (2006) http://www.bankofsudan.org/englishlide.htm, 
Khartoum, Bank of Sudan. (Viewed on 09/06/2006) 
BARNETT, V. (1991) Sample Survey Principles and Methods. London, Arnold. 
BASHIR, A.H. M. (1999) Risk and Profitability Measures in Islamic Banks: The 
Case of Two Sudanese Banks. Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 6 (2), pp. 
1 - 21. 
BASHIR, A.H. M. & DARRAT, A. F. (1992) Equity Participation Contracts and 
Investment: Some Theoretical and E:rpgiri_cal Results. The American 
Journal oflslamic Social Sciences. Vol. 9(2), pp. 219- 232. 
343 
BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (2001) Consultative 
Documents. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. 
BLACK, T. R. (1999) Doing Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences: An 
Integrated Approach to Research Design, Measurement and Statistics. 
London, Sage. 
BASHIR, A.H. M. & DARRAT, A. F. (1992) Equity Participation Contracts and 
Investment: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results. The American 
Journal oflslamic Social Sciences, Vol. 9(2), pp. 219- 232. 
BOUALEM, B. & KHAN, T. (1995) Economics of Diminishing Musharakah. 
Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute IRTI, Islamic 
Development Bank IDB. 
BRANNEN, J. (Ed.) (1992) Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research. Aldershot, A vebury. 
BROWN, B. K. (2003) Islamic Banking Comparative Analysis. The Arab Bank 
Review. Vol. 5 (2), pp 1-8. 
BURNS, R. B. (2000) Introduction to Research Methods. London, Sage. 
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2001) Sudan in Figures 1988-2000 
Khartoum, Central Bureau of Statistics. 
CIA The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2004) The World Factbook 
2004 Dulles, Potomac Books. 
CHAPRA, M. U. (1985) Towards a Just Monetary System: A Discussion of 
Money, Banking and Monetary Policy in the Light of Islamic Teachings. 
Leicester, Islamic Foundation. 
CHAPRA, M. U. & KHAN, T. (2000) Regulation and Supervision of Islamic 
Banks. Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute IRTI, Islamic 
Development Bank IDB. 
344 
CHOUDHURY, M.A. (2001) Islamic Venture Capital- A Critical Examination. 
Journal of Economic Studies Vol. 28 (1), pp 14- 33 
CONOVER, W. J. (1999) Practical Nonparametric Statistics. New York, Wiley. 
COUNTRY STUDIES (2006) Sudan. New York, The Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress. 
CRANO, W. D. (2002) Principles and Methods of Social Research. Mahwah, 
N.J, Lawrence Erlbaum. 
CRESWELL, J. W. (2003) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and 
Mixed Method Approaches. Calif., Sage. 
D'AGOSTINO, R. B. & STEPHENS, M. A. (Eds.) (1986) Goodness-of-Fit 
Technique. New York, M. Dekker. 
DAR, H. A. & PRESLEY, J. R. (2000) Lack of Profit Loss Sharing in Islamic 
Banking: Management and Control Imbalances. International Journal of 
Islamic Financial Services. Vol. 2(2), pp.l- 9. 
DEWENTER, K. L. & HESS, A. C. (1998) An International Comparison of 
Bank's Equity Returns. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Vol. 30 
(3), pp. 472- 492. 
DIAMOND, D. (1984) Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. The 
Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 51, pp. 393- 414. 
DIAMOND, D. & DYBVIG, P. H. (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and 
Liquidity. Journal ofPolitical Economy. Vol. 91, pp. 401 - 419. 
DIV ANNA, J. A. (2006) Understanding Islamic Banking: The Value Proposition 
that Transcends Cultures. Cambridge, Leonardo and Francis Press. 
DOOREN, P. J. (1990) Partnership Contracts as an Alternative to Falling 
Agricultural Credit? Sudan's Rural Credit Experience. Africa Insight. 
-
Vol. 20 (2), pp. 87- 92. 
345 
DUBOIS, J.L. (1992) Think Before Measuring: Methodological Innovation for 
the Collection and Analysis of Statistical Data Washington, D.C., World 
Bank. 
EI-BHASRI, M. E. T. & ADAM, N. A. (1997) Examples of Partnership 
Financing For Microenterprise - The Case of Sudanese Islamic Bank. IN 
HARPER, M. (Ed.) Partnership Financing for Small Enterprise: Some 
Lessons from Islamic Credit Systems. Rugby, Intermediate Technology 
Development Group Publishing. pp. 13- 18. 
EL TAHIR, A. M. Islamic Investment Operations and Banking Services: The 
Case of Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan. Khartoum, Faisal Islamic Bank: 
Sudan. 
EL-GAMAL, M. A. (2006) Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. 
Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
ELHIRAIKA, A. B. (1998) Macroeconomic h1stability, Financial Repression and 
Islamic Banking in Sudan. IIUM Journal of Economics and Management. 
Vol. 6(2), pp. 61 - 85. 
(2003) On the Experience of Islamic Agricultural Finance in Sudan: 
Challenges and Stability. Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute 
IRTI and Islamic Development Bank IDB. 
(2004) Islamic Financial System and Saving: An Empirical Assessment. 
International Conference on Prospects of Arab Economic Cooperation to 
Boost Savings & Investments. Alexandria, Arab Academy for Science & 
Technology, Alexandria University and the Islamic Research and 
Training Institute IRTI, Islamic Development Bank. 
ELHIRAIKA, A. B. & AHMED, S. A. (1998) Agricultural Credit under 
Economic Liberalization and Islamization in Sudan. African Economic 
Research Consortium AERC. Nairobi, African Economic Research 
Consortium AERc:-(79)~ pp. 1 - 32. 
346 
ELSHAFIE, A. E. A. (2002) Farm Liquidity and Finance of Vegetable 
Production in Rural Khartoum, Sudan. Berlin, Koster. 
ERRICO, L. & F ARAHBAKSH, M. (1998) Islamic Banking: Issues in 
Prudential Regulations and Supervision. IMF Working Papers. 
Washington, International Monetary Fund IMF, pp. 1-28. 
FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK (1979-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, Faisal 
Islamic Bank: Sudan. 
FIELD, A. P. (2005) Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London, Sage. 
FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS, C. (1996) Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences. London, Edward Arnold. 
GffiBONS, J.D. (1976) Nonparametric Methods for Quantitative Analysis. New 
York, Holt Rinehart and Winston. 
GILLHAM, B. (2000) Developing a Questionnaire. London, Continuum. 
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN (1984) Civil Transactions Act 1984. Khartoum, 
Government of Sudan. 
HABERMAN, S. J. (1974) The Analysis of Frequency Data. Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press. 
HAMDAN, M. (1997) Musharaka Financing for Small Enterprise under the 
Jordan Islamic Bank's Lending Programme. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) 
Partnership Financial for Small Enterprise: Some Lessons from Islamic 
Credit Systems. Rugby, ITDG. 
HAQUE, N. U. & MIRAKHOR, A. (1986) Optimal Profit-sharing Contracts and 
Investment in an Interest-free Islamic Economy. IMF Staff Working 
Paper. Washington, International Monetary Fund IMF. 
HARPER, M. (1994) Musharaka Partnership Financing - An Approach to 
Venture Capital for Microenterprise. Small Enterprise Development. Vol. 
5(4), pp. 27- 36. 
347 
HASAN, Z. (1985) Determination of Profit and Loss Sharing Ration in Interest 
Free Business Finance. Journal of Research in Islamic Economics. Vol. 
3(1), pp. 13- 27. 
HASSAN, M. K. (2003) Cost, Profit and X-Efficiency of Islamic Banks in 
Pakistan, Sudan and Iran. International Conference on Islamic Banking: 
Risk Management Regulation and Supervision. Jakarta, Islamic Research 
and Training Institute IR TI and Islamic Development Bank IDB. 
HASSAN, M. K. & HUSSEIN, K. A. (2003) Static and Dynamic.Efficiency in 
the Sudanese Banking System. Review oflslamic Economics, (14), pp.5-
48. 
HOLLANDER, M. (1999) Nonparametric Statistical Methods. New York, 
Wiley. 
HUSSEIN, K. A. (2003) Operational Efficiency in Islamic Banking: The 
Sudanese Experience. Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute 
IRTI and Islamic Development Bank IDB. 
IBN ABIDIN, M. A. I. U. (1966) Radd Al-Muhtar Ala Al-Durr Al-Mukhtar 
Sharh Tanwir Al-Absar. Cairo, Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi. 
IBN AL-HUMAM, K. A.D. M. (1970) Fath Al-Qadir ala Al-Hidayah Sharh 
Bidayat Al- Mubtadi. Cairo, Mustafa Al-babi Al-Halabi. 
IBN MANZUR, M. I. M. (1956) Lisan Al-Arab. Beirut, Dar Sadir. 
IBN QUDAMA, M. A.D. A. M. (1962) Al-Mughni Fi Figh Imam Al-Sunnah 
Ahmed Ibn Hanbal Al-Shaybani. Cairo, Al-Matbaha Al-Salafeyah. 
IBRAHIM, B.E.D. A. (1997) Financing Challenges for Small Enterprises -The 
Experience of Sudanese Islamic Banks. IN HARPER, M. (Ed.) 
Partnership Financing for Small Enterprise: Some Lessons from Islamic 
Credit Systems. Rugby, Intermediate Technology Development Group 
Publishing. pp. 3 - 12 
348 
-~ 
(1999) Can Musharakah Financing of SMEs be Applied to the Interest 
Based Banking System? Small Enterprise Development. Vol. 10(3}, pp. 
38- 43. 
(2004) Banking and Finance to Small and Micro-Enterprises in Sudan: 
Some Lessons from the Islamic Financing System. London, Institute of 
Islamic Banking and Insurance Iffil. 
(2006) The "Missing Links" between Islamic Development Objectives 
and the Current Practice of Islamic Banking - the Experience of the 
Sudanese Islamic Banks (Sills). Humanomics. Vol. 22(2), pp. 55- 66. 
IBRAHIM, B.E.D. A. & Vijaykumar, K.C. (2003) Poverty Alleviation via 
Islamic Banking Finance to Micro-Enterprises (MEs) in Sudan: Some 
Lessons for Poor Countries. Bremen, University of Bremen Sudan 
Economy Research Group. 
ffiRAHIM, M. (1987) Bonok Al-Istethmar (Investment Banks). Cairo, Maktabat 
Al-Injlo Al-Misryya. 
IMF (2005) IMF Country Report:Sudan. Washington, International Monetary 
Fund IMF. 
IMF (2006) Consultation and Staff-Monitored Program-Staff Report. 
Washington, International Monetary Fund IMF: the Middle East and 
Central Asia and Policy Development and Review Departments. 
IQBAL, M. (2003) Islamic Banking in Theory and Practice. IN International 
Banking Conference. Prato, Monash University. 
IQBAL, M., AHMAD, A. & KHAN, T. (1998) Challenges Facing Islamic 
Banking. Jeddah, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic 
Development Bank, J eddah. 
IQBAL, M. & LLEWELLYN, D. T. (Eds.) (2000) Islamic Banking and Finance: 
-
New Perspectives on Profit Sharing and Risk Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
349 
IQBAL, M. & Molyneux, P. (2005) Thirty Years of Islamic Banking: History, 
Performance, and Prospects. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
ISMAIL, A. G. B. (2006) Does the Islamic Financial System Design Matter? 
Humanomics. Vol. 22(1), pp. 5-16. 
JAZIRI, A. A. R. (1963) Figh Ala Al-Madzahib Al-Arba'a. Beirut, Dar Ehyaa 
Al-Turath Al-Arabi. 
JESSEN, R. J. (1978) Statistical Survey Techniques. New York, Wiley. 
JOHNSON, J. M. (1975) Doing Field Research. New York, Free Press. 
KAHANE, Y. (1977) Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial 
Intermediaries. Journal ofBanking and Finance. Vol. 1, pp. 207- 218. 
KALTON, G. (1983) Introduction to Survey Sampling. London, Sage. 
KARSTEN, I. (1982) Islam and Financial Intermediation. Washington, 
International Monetary Fund IMF. pp. 108- 142 
KHALEEFA, M. U. (1993) Islamic Banking in Sudan's Rural Sector. Islamic 
Economic Studies Vol. 1(1), pp. 37-55. 
KHAN, M. (1986) Islamic Interest-free Banking: A Theoretical Analysis. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. IMF: Washington. pp. 1 - 27. 
KHAN, M. (2002) Monetary Policy and Central Banking in an Islamic Context. 
In Islamic Banking Conference. London: The Bank of England. 
KHAN, M.S. & MIRAKHOR, A. (Eds) (1987) Theoretical Studies in Islamic 
Banking and Finance. The Institute of Research and Islamic Studies IRIS 
Books, Houston. 
KHAN, T. (1984) Islamic Economics: A Bibliography. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank. 
350 
KHAN, T. AND H. AHMED (2001) Risk Management: Analysis of Issues in 
Islamic Financial Industry. J eddah: Research and Training Institute IR TI, 
Islamic Development Bank Islamic IDB. 26- 59. 
KING, R. G. & LEVINE, R. (1993) Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth. 
Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 32, pp. 513- 542. 
KIREYEV, A. (2001) Financial Reforms in Sudan: Streamlining Bank 
Intermediation. Geneva, International Monetary Fund Office. 
LADO, C. (2002) Political Economy of the Oil Industry in the Sudan: Problem 
or Resource in Development. Kleve, Boss Verlag. 
LEACH, C. (1979) Introduction to Statistics: A Nonparametric Approach for the 
Social Sciences. Chichester, Wiley. 
LEWIS, M. K. (2001) Islamic Banking. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
LAFFONT, J.andMATTOUSSI, M. S. (1995) Moral Hazard, Financial 
Constraints and Sharcropping in El Oulja. Review of Economic Studies, 
62, 381 - 399. 
MAJALLAT, A.A. (1923) Commission of Ottaman Jurists 1867-77. 
Constantinople, Mutbaat Al-Saadah. 
MAPS OF THE WORLD (2006) http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-
tenlworld-top-ten-fastest-growing-economies-map.html Viewed on 28th 
May). 
MAXIM, P. S. (1999) Quantitative Research Methods in the Social Sciences. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
MEERA, A. K. M. & ABDUL RAZAK, D. (2005) Islamic Home Financing 
Through Musharakah Mutanaqisah and Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil Contracts: 
A Comparative Analysis. Review oflslamic Economics. Vol. 9(2), pp. 5-
30~ 
351 
MILLER, W. L. (1983) The Survey Method in the Social and Political Sciences: 
Achievements, Failures and Prospects. London, Pinter. 
MILLS, P. S. (1999) Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. 
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT & PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT (2003) 
Sudan's First National Communications under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Khartoum, Republic of 
Sudan Ministry of Environment and Physical Development MEPD, 
Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources. pp. 1-29 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE & NATIONAL ECONOMY (2006) Annual Report. 
Khartoum, Ministry of Finance & National Economy MFNE. 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND NATIONAL ECONOMY (2002) The 
Sudanese Economy in Figures. Khartoum, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy MFNE. 
MIRAKHOR, A. (1987) Short-term Asset Concentration and Islamic Banking. 
IN KHAN, M. & MIRAKHUR, A. (Eds.) Theoretical Studies in Islamic 
Banking and Finance. Houston, The Institute of Research and Islamic 
Studies IRIS Books. pp. 185- 199. 
NAJMABADI, H. M. (1999) Proposal for Modified Model of Musharakah 
Financing, with Emphasis on Iran. Arab Law Quarterly. Vol. 14(3), pp. 
282- 301. 
NASER, K. & AL-KHATffi, A. J. K. (1999) Islamic Banking: A Study of 
Customer Satisfaction and Preferences in Jordan. International Journal of 
Bank Marketing Vol. 17(3), pp. 135-150. 
NASR, M. (2005) The Demand for Musharakah in Urban Egypt by Small 
Business as a Test of the Pecking Order Hypothesis. In WILSON, R. & 
IQBAL, M,_ (Eds.) Islamic Perspectives on Wealth Creation. Ec:!inburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press. pp. 217-227. 
352 
NAYZEE, I. A. K. (1998) Islamic Law ofBusiness Organisation: Corporations. 
Islamabad, International Institute of Islamic Thoughts. 
(1999) Islamic Law of Business Organization: Partnership. New Delhi, 
Kitab Bhavan. 
NORUSIS, M. J. (2004) SPSS 12.0: Guide to Data Analysis. Upper Saddle 
River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 
OLEYNICK, I. S. & ALEXANDER, N. (2001) Sudan: Business Law Handbook. 
Washington, D.C., International Business Publications. 
OMDERMAN NATIONAL BANK (1995-2005) Annual Reports Khartoum, 
Omderman National Bank. 
O'NEILL, N. & O'BRIEN, J. (Eds.) (1988) Economy and Class in Sudan. 
OSMAN, B.B. (1999) The Experience of the Sudanese Islamic Bank m 
Partnership (musharakah) Financing as a Tool for Rural Development 
among Small Farmers in Sudan. Arab Law Quarterly. Vol. 14(3): pp. 221 
-230. 
OSMAN, B. (1997) Financing the Industrial Sector through Islamic Finance 
Modes: the Sudanese Banks Experience, Jeddah, Islamic Research and 
Training Institute IRTI, Islamic Development Bank IDB. 
OPPENHEIM, A. N. (2000) Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. London, Continuum. 
PASTOR, J. M. (1999) Efficiency and Risk Management in Spanish Banking: A 
Method to Decompose Risk. Applied Financial Economics. Vol. 9(4), pp. 
371 - 375. 
POPULATION CENTRE, C. P. 0. (1982) Sampling Design, Sample Size 
Estimation Procedures and Non-Sampling Errors - Demographic Survey 
-·-·- -
1982. San'a, Republic ofYemen. C. P. 0. 
353 
RAGIN, C. C. (1994) Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of 
Method. London, Pine Forge Press. 
RAO, P. S. R. S. (2000) Sampling Methodologies: With Applications. Boca 
Raton, Chapman & HalVCRC. 
READ, L. (1998) The Financing of Small Business: A Comparative Study of 
Male and Female Business Owners. London, Routledge. 
REMENYI, D. (1998) Doing Research in Business and Management: An 
Introduction to Process and Method. London, Sage. 
ROSLY, S. A. (2005) Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets: 
Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Investments, Takaful and 
Financial Planning. Bloomington, AuthorHouse. 
ROSL Y, S. A. & ABU BAKER, M.A. (2003) Performance of Islamic and 
Mainstream Banks in Malaysia. International Journal of Social 
Economics, Vol. 30(12), pp. 1249- 1265. 
RYAN, B. (2002) Research Method and Methodology m Finance and 
Accounting. London, Thomson. 
SADR, K. (1999) The Role of Musharakah Financing in the Agricultural Bank 
of Iran. Arab Law Quarterly Vol. 14(3), pp. 245- 256. 
SAEED, A. (1999) Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of Prohibition of Riba 
and its Contemporary Interpretation. New York, Brill Academic 
Publishers. 
SAHNUN, A. A.S. I. S. I. H. (1905) Al-Mudawwanah Al-Kubra. Cairo, Mutbaat 
Al-Saadah. 
SALAMA, A. A. (1984) Islamic Banks Economic Significance and Methods of 
Control. Khartoum, Faisal Islamic Bank: Sudan. 
SALEH, N. A. (1986) Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
354 
SAMAD, A. (1999) Comparative Efficiency of the Islamic Bank vis-a-vis 
Traditional Banks in Malaysia. Journal of Economics and Management. 
Vol. 7(1),pp.1-25. 
SARKER, M.A. A. (1998) Why Islamic Banks have so far Failed in Adopting 
the Two Major Islamic Modes of Financing, Mudaraba and Musharaka 
in their Operations? New Horizon, (79), pp. 4-8. 
(1999) Islamic Banking in Bangladesh: Performance, Problems & 
Prospects. International Journal of Islamic Financial Services. Vol 1(3), 
pp. 2 -22. 
SAUDI SUDANESE BANK (1990-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, Saudi 
Sudanese Bank. 
SCHAMELL, E. H. L. (1962) Law of Partnership. London, Sweet and Maxwell. 
SEKARA..l\l", U. (1984) Research Methods for Managers: A Skill-Building 
Approach. New York, Wiley. 
(2003) Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach, New 
York, Wiley. 
SHAAELDIN, E. (1985) Towards an Understanding of Islamic Banking in 
Sudan: The Case of Faisal Islamic Bank. Khartoum, University of 
Khartoum, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, Development Studies 
and Research Centre. 
SHAMAL ISLAMIC BANK (1990-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, Shamal 
Islamic Bank. 
SHESKIN, D. J. (1997) Parametric and Non-parametric Statistical Procedures. 
New York, CRC Press. 
SIDDIQI, M. N. (1983) Banking and Monetary Policies in Islamic Economics. 
khartoum, Faisal islamic Bank: Sudan. 
(1985) Banking Without Interest. Leicester, The Islamic Foundation. 
355 
(1985) Partnership and Pofit Sharing in Islamic Law. Leicester: The 
Islamic Foundation. 
(1992) Impact of Islamic Modes of Finance on Monetary Expansion. 
Islamic Economic Studies. Vol. 4, pp. 37- 46. 
(1994) Issues in Islamic Banking: Selected Papers. Leicester, Islamic 
Foundation. 
SIDDIQUI, A. H. (1985) A Bibliography on Islamic Banking. Karachi, Pakistan, 
Islamic Documentation and Information Centre Karachi University 
Campus. 
SPRENT, P. (2001) Applied Nonparametric Statistical Methods. Boca Raton, 
Chapman & Hall/CRC. 
STACEY, M. (1969) Methods of Social Research. Oxford, Pergamon P. 
STIANSEN, E. (1999) Islamic Banking in the Sudan: Aspects of the Laws and 
the Debate. IN STINSEN, E. & GUYER, J. I. (Eds.) Credit, Currencies 
and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. 
Stockholm Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. pp. 100 - 11 7 
(2004) Interests Politics: Islamic Finance in the Sudan 1977-2001. IN 
HENRY, C. M. A. & WILSON, R. (Eds.) The Politics of Islamic 
Finance. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press Ltd. pp. 155- 167 
THE SUDANESE BANKS ASSOCIATION (2004) Annual Report 2004. 
Khartoum, SBA. 
SUDANESE ISLAMIC BANK (1990-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, 
Sudanese Islamic Bank. 
TADAMOUN ISLAMIC BANK (1990-2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, 
Tadamoun Islamic Bank. 
TAG EL-DIN, S. I. (1991) Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard and Financial 
Islamization Policy. Review oflslamic Economics. Vol. 1(1), pp. 49- 66. 
356 
THE SUDANESE BANKS ASSOCIATION (1995-2005) Annual Report. 
Khartoum, the Sudanese Banks AssociationS. B. A. 
THE SUDANESE SAVINGS BANK FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (1990-
2005) Annual Reports. Khartoum, The Sudanese Savings Bank for Social 
Development. 
THOMAS, J. J. (1995) Replicating the Grameen Bank - The Latin American 
Experience. Small Enterprise Development. Vol. 6(2), 16- 23. 
UDOVITCH, A. (1970a) Partnership and Profit in Early Islam. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
(1970b) Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
USMANI, M. T. (1999) The Concept of Musharakah and its Application as an 
Islamic Method of Financing. Arab Law Quarterly. Vol. 14(3), pp. 203 -
220. 
(2002) An Introduction to Islamic Finance. The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International. 
VOGEL, F. E. (1998) Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return. The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International. 
WARDE, I. (2000) Islamic Finance m the Global Economy. Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press. 
WAX, R. H. (1971) Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice. London, University 
of Chicago Press. 
WEILTZMAN, M. L. (1985) Profit Sharing as Macroeconomic Policy. 
American Economic Review. Vol. 75(2), pp. 41 - 45. 
WILSON, R.~(J-9.84)..co-Islamic -Business:-Theoi¥--and -Practice. London,- the 
Economist Publications. 
357 
( 1997) Islamic Finance. London, FT Financial Publishing Pearson 
Professional Limited. 
(2002) The Interface between Islamic and Conventional Banking. IN 
IQBAL, M. & LIEWELL YN, D. T. (Eds.) Islamic Banking and Finance: 
New Perspectives on Profit - Sharing and Risk. Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar. pp. 196- 218 
THE WORLD BANK (2005) Country Data: Sudan. The World Banlc 
THE WORLD BANK (2006) Country Data: Sudan. The World Bank. 
YESSERI, A. (1999) The Experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran m 
Musharakah Financing. Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 14,231-244. 
YOUSEF, T. (1996) Islamic Banking and Financial Development and Growth. 
Economic Research Forum ERF. Economic Research Forum ERF. Vol. 
3(3), pp. 28- 39. 
ZAHER, T. S. & HASSAN, M. K. (2001) A Comparative Literature Survey of 
Islamic Finance and Banking. Financial Market, Institution And 
Instruments. Vol. 10(4), pp. 155- 199. 
ZINELDIN, M. (1990) The Economics of Money and Banking: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Study of Islamic Interest-Free Banking. Stockholm, 
Almovist & Wiksell Intematinal. 
358 
